IN RE: L.F. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur.

[1] J.F. (“Father”) and A.P. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the Marion Superior Court's judgment adjudicating L.F. (“Child”) to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Parents present the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS is clearly erroneous.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to complete certain services.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother have one child together, Child, who was born May 22, 2015. Mother has an older son from a previous relationship, L.M., who was born October 30, 2007. In March 2025, Child told one of his teachers that he had been “struggling” with a “porn addiction” for two years. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 74. Child stated that L.M. was “the one that got him involved in that ․” Id. at 75. The teacher told Mother what Child had said, and Mother was “shocked” and indicated that “she didn't know how that was happening because she ha[d] control or supervision over [her children's] electronic devices.” Id. at 74. Despite this new information, Parents continued to allow Child to access electronic devices without supervision. Child was home alone with L.M. “a lot ․” Id. at 193.

[4] On May 8, Robert Wendling, a Detective with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”), received a tip regarding someone using an app called “Discord” who had distributed “child sex abuse material” through the app. Id. at 15. Detective Wendling's investigation revealed that the Discord account belonged to L.M., who, in addition to distributing child sex abuse material, also had “engaged in online chats with other Discord users where they alleged to have molested their brother.” Id. at 16.

[5] Later that evening, Detective Wendling obtained and executed a search warrant at Parents’ house. When he and other law enforcement officers arrived, Parents were not home, but L.M. was home, and Child was playing outside at a neighbor's house. Law enforcement officers transported L.M. and Child to the police station. Detective Wendling called Mother, and she arrived at her home after the children had been removed. Mother did not believe the allegations against L.M., and she grew “increasingly upset and irate” as the evening wore on. Id. at 25.

[6] Once Mother was at the police station, Father arrived. Father had just driven himself from a local bar, and he appeared to be intoxicated. Detective Wendling spoke to Parents outside of the police station. Mother continued to deny the possibility that L.M. had done anything wrong. And when Father tried to speak, she repeatedly interrupted him and, at one point, told Father to “shut the f*** up ․” Id. at 23. Mother refused Detective Wendling's request for her to allow Child to speak to a forensic interviewer.

[7] Summer Diao, an assessment family case manager with the Department of Child Services (“DCS”), arrived at the police station and spoke with Detective Wendling, and then she spoke with L.M. and Child. At some point, Diao learned that both L.M. and Child had Discord accounts. Diao spoke with Mother and asked her

if she was aware that to be on the Discord site it [sic] an app for games and stuff to play games and whatnot. She said yes. She said that she was also aware that legally you're supposed to be 13 to be able to have an account on the app but she stated she felt sorry for him because [Child] didn't have any friends outside of, say, the gaming world or whatnot. Most of his friends play the same games online and that was a way for him to talk to his friends and talked to other people and so she allowed him to have it. She stated that[, even after she learned of the pornography addiction,] she did not restrict his access to electronics and that he likes YouTube, so she lets him get on YouTube and stuff.

Id. at 191. Mother also told Diao that Father had recently lost his job and “drinks a lot.” Id. at 190.

[8] L.M., who was not yet eighteen years old, was placed at Safe Response, a residential facility for teenaged boys who have sexual maladaptive behaviors. DCS placed Child in an emergency shelter care facility. On May 12, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS.

[9] DCS referred Child and Mother to a child psychologist, Jim Dalton. In June, Dalton conducted psychosexual evaluations on both Child and L.M. Dalton's evaluation of Child included the following findings:

• L.M. had “repeatedly sexually abused” Child “over the past year”

• Child had a history of ADHD and addiction to pornography

• Child had once texted L.M. to say that “he wanted to be ****ed”

• “sexual abuse has occurred in the context of him already being a vulnerable child. He has social, emotional and behavioral challenges that are likely to be synergized and complicated by his sexual abuse and the separation of his family.”

• Child “is a boy with specific needs. Even before experiencing sexual abuse, [Child] was challenged with significant ADHD symptoms, experiences of social rejection, and indications of impoverished home conditions. Sexual abuse and the likely ongoing separation of the family in some form are added challenges for [Child] and his family.

Ex. pp. 5-21. Dalton concluded as follows:

• It has been recommended that [Child's] older brother be removed from his home and placed in a specialized treatment setting – like a treatment oriented group home. If this occurs and DCS finds the family home to be adequately safe and healthy and that [Child] can be adequately supervised by his parents, the results of this assessment would support [Child] returning to live with his parents – with a Safety and Supervision Plan in place.

• The Safety and Supervision Plan would include [Child] not having access to any forms of social media, texting or the internet – that is not 100% directly supervised (by line of sight) by one of his parents. The Plan would be proactive and not allow [Child] to have any unsupervised contact with children under the age of 10. The Plan would prescribe that [Child] have no access to pornography – in any form (magazines, internet, TV).

• If [Child] returns home, it is recommended that he receive sexual abuse treatment and support from a trained pediatric provider. In Indiana, to ensure adequate training for the clinician has occurred, look for the CSAYC credential. The clinician should work closely with [Child] and with his parents to endorse psychosexual education, abuse prevention skills, and pornography education and resistance skills. [Child's] ADHD condition should be aggressively treated with medications, and he should receive strong doses of social skills training – including in-vivo practice of newly learned skills. More integration and experiences with health similar aged to slightly older children is encouraged.

• Having the same therapist (CSAYC) assigned to [Child] and to his older brother is now considered a best/better practice option. This should be considered if possible (for example the therapist(s) at the brother's group home also be the separate therapist for [Child] and for his family).

• [Child] should have no contact at all with his older brother (not even by phone) until the brother has been treated and the brother, [Child], and the parents are prepared for clarification and the eventual consideration of reunification. Eventually, clarification and family reunification should be considered – but only if [Child] and his family are prepared and willing. Reunification should never occur unless it is in the best interest of [Child].

Id. at 21-22 (emphases added).

[10] The trial court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”), Abigail Larr, who visited Child in the emergency shelter at the end of May and again at home on July 29.¹ During the July 29 visit, Child and Parents were all home. Child was sitting in the living room, by himself, and he was using Mother's phone. Father was in another room, and Mother was in the kitchen. Larr told Mother that she was concerned about Child using the phone unsupervised, and Mother responded that Parents were supervising him by making sure he was within earshot of one of them while he was on the internet. Larr then saw Child take Mother's phone with him when he went to his bedroom, alone.

[11] Mother received a copy of Dalton's report at the end of July. Despite Dalton's clear recommendation that Child not be allowed to use an electronic device without Mother or Father keeping a direct line of sight to the device, Jaziman Martin, a family intervention specialist with Youth Villages, observed during an August visit that Child was using Mother's phone alone in his bedroom. Martin asked Mother if she could check the search history on the phone, and Mother agreed. Martin discovered that Child had been watching “erotica cartoons” on the phone. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 165. Mother asked Martin for help in preventing that from occurring again, and Martin told Mother about the Bark app, which allows parents to monitor a child's internet use.

[12] During a hearing on the CHINS petition over two days in late August and early September, the trial court heard evidence, including Martin's testimony, that Parents continued to let Child access the internet without consistently maintaining line of sight supervision over him. Parents had just started using the Bark app one or two weeks before the hearing. Martin testified that, despite the Bark app being in place, she still had concerns about Parents’ ability to properly supervise Child's internet use. Martin stated that if the Bark app were “not used correctly, it could be [a] slippery slope.” Id. at 183. Mother testified that, despite an order prohibiting Child from having contact with L.M., she had allowed Child to talk to L.M. over the telephone.

[13] Father appeared virtually for the first day of the fact-finding hearing, and he later testified that Child was home for an “e-learning day” that day and was alone in his bedroom. Id. at 107. Father testified that Child “was doing the schoolwork and watching a movie and every hour [Father] would go [in] there and check o[n] him.” Id. Father testified that he thought his supervision of Child that day was sufficient between the Bark app and his hourly check-ins.

[14] The trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. The court found that: “Parents are putting too much faith in being able to supervise [Child's] internet usage through Bark”; Mother had recently allowed Child to talk to L.M. on the phone; Child has had unsupervised access to Parents’ cell phones since May, “as recently as August 2025,” when Martin discovered he had accessed a pornography site on Mother's phone; the GAL recommended “ongoing services” for the family and “further DCS involvement”; and the GAL believed that court intervention was necessary “because the family seems unable or unwilling to obtain necessary services on their own.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 140-42. In the dispositional order, the trial court, in relevant part, ordered Father to complete a parent/family functional assessment and complete all recommendations and to participate in home-based therapy. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: CHINS Adjudication

[15] Parents contend that the trial court's CHINS adjudication is clearly erroneous. Our standard of review is well settled:

A CHINS proceeding is a civil action; thus, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Egly v. Blackford County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992). We consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We reverse only upon a showing that the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous. Id.

In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012).

[16] DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 (2025), which provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[17] Our Supreme Court has interpreted that statute to require “three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). And, when determining whether a child is a CHINS under Section 31-34-1-1, the juvenile court “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

[18] Initially, Parents challenge the trial court's findings numbered 15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 38, 41, and 42. Parents maintain that, excluding those allegedly improper findings, the evidence is insufficient to prove that Child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered due to their inability, refusal, or neglect to provide Child with appropriate supervision. We disagree. “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). And even assuming the challenged findings are erroneous, the unchallenged, true findings are sufficient to support the CHINS adjudication. In any event, we address Parents’ arguments challenging the findings in turn.

Finding No. 15

[19] The trial court found that, “[a]lthough Mother states that she was closely monitoring [Child], he continued was molested [sic] and continued watching pornography between March and May 2025.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 140.² Mother argues that there is no evidence to show that Child was molested between March and May 2025. First, it appears that the word “continued” before “was molested” is a typographical error. It is likely that the trial court meant to observe that Child was molested despite Mother's supervision of him and that he continued to watch pornography between March and May 2025. The stated timeframe does not necessarily refer to both the molestation and the exposure to pornography. In any event, Dalton evaluated Child in June 2025, and he noted in relevant part that, according to DCS, Child had been molested “repeatedly” over the past year, which included the period of March to May 2025. Ex. p. 25. Further, Mother argues that she cannot be blamed for L.M.’s molestation of Child without evidence that her “action or inaction” was the cause. Mother's Br. at 16. But the trial court did not blame Mother for the molestation. The court's finding merely shows that Mother's supervision of Child had been insufficient to protect Child. Mother has not shown clear error.

Finding No. 17

[20] The trial court found that, “[d]espite the acknowledgement of [Child's] pornography addiction and that he was not old enough to create a Discord account, Mother ‘felt badly for him,’ so she deceitfully created an account for him.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 140. Father argues that there is no evidence that Mother used deceit in creating the account. But Mother acknowledged that a child must be thirteen years old to use Discord, so she did misrepresent Child's age when she helped him create the account. Father has not shown clear error.

Finding No. 19

[21] The trial court found that “Parents have not adequately restricted [Child's] internet access, and he is currently allowed to have two hours of electronic time after school.” Id. Mother argues that there is no evidence that Parents were supposed to prohibit Child's internet use. She maintains that two hours after school “is acceptable.” Mother's Br. at 17. But in the context of the trial court's findings that Parents were not adequately supervising Child's internet use, we cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous.

Finding No. 22

[22] The trial court found that “Parents are putting too much faith in being able to supervise [Child's] internet usage through Bark.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 140. Mother argues that the evidence shows that, with proper use, Bark is an effective tool for monitoring Child's internet use and for preventing access to pornography. But Mother ignores Martin's testimony that, if the Bark app were “not used correctly, it could be [a] slippery slope.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 183. And Dalton recommended that Parents maintain “complete supervision” of Child's internet use, with line of sight supervision. Id. at 54. Mother has not shown that this finding is clearly erroneous.

Finding No. 23

[23] The trial court found that, “[d]espite a no contact order being issued preventing [L.M.] from having contact with [Child], Mother allowed [Child] [to] talk on the telephone with [L.M.], as recently as two weeks prior to the trial.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 141. Father argues that the evidence does not show that it had only been two weeks since Mother had permitted Child to talk to L.M. The State acknowledges that the evidence of when Mother had last allowed Child to talk to L.M. was unclear. But the evidence is undisputed that Mother permitted Child to talk to L.M. despite her knowledge of the no contact order. Mother testified that her sons last spoke to one another sometime in August, and the fact-finding hearing commenced on August 29, 2025. To the extent the trial court erred by a few weeks, any error was harmless.

Finding No. 38

[24] The trial court found that “Parents lack the ability to identify risks and appropriately parent [Child] to address his pornography addiction and the trauma he experienced as the victim of a sexual offense.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 142. Mother argues that the evidence shows that she has taken several steps to supervise Child's internet use. But Mother's argument ignores the evidence that she did not take meaningful steps to restrict Child's internet use between March 2025, when she learned that he had a pornography addiction, and May 2025, when she learned that L.M. had molested Child. And even after May 2025, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Parents were too lax about Child's internet use. Finally, Mother's argument ignores the trial court's finding that Parents lack the ability to address the trauma Child experienced as the victim of sexual offenses. Mother has not shown clear error.

Finding No. 41

[25] The trial court found that “[L.M.] is expected to return home after he is done with his treatment.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 142. Parents argue that the undisputed evidence shows that L.M. will not return home when he is discharged from treatment. But FCM Tisa Baker testified that she was worried that L.M. “could return home” if L.M.’s CHINS case was closed. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 244. While Mother testified that L.M. would not be allowed to move home, the trial court had discretion to find Mother's testimony not credible. In any event, there is no evidence that L.M. is “expected” to return home, so the trial court erred when it made this finding. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 142. But, given that numerous other findings are supported by the evidence and support the CHINS adjudication, this error was harmless.

Finding No. 42

[26] Finally, the trial court found that “[t]he GAL believes Court intervention is necessary because the family seems unable or unwilling to obtain necessary services on their own.” Id. Mother argues that the evidence shows that Parents are willing to obtain the CSAYC counseling that Child requires and that they cannot be blamed for a state-wide shortage of properly licensed counselors. And Father argues that this finding is improper because it merely recites the GAL's testimony. See In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). We agree with Father that this is not a proper finding, and we disregard it. See id.

[27] In sum, disregarding Findings 41 and 42, the remaining findings are supported by the evidence, and the findings support the CHINS adjudication. The trial court found that Parents’ efforts to supervise Child's internet use have been woefully insufficient. Parents argue that the Bark app should be sufficient to keep Child safe. But Parents had only installed the Bark app recently, and Dalton testified that direct supervision was required because children can often find ways around security measures. Indeed, Father's phone is not protected by Bark, and DCS presented evidence that Child had previously stolen Mother's phone while she slept and had overridden the password to unlock it. In any event, Dalton testified that Child needs direct, line of sight supervision while he is online, and as recently as the first day of the fact-finding hearing, Parents were permitting Child to use electronic devices while alone in his room. The evidence shows that Parents are not able to keep Child safe.

[28] With respect to Dalton's recommendation that Child undergo therapy with a CSAYC therapist, the evidence shows that, while Parents agree that Child needs a specialized therapist, they have been unable to find one for him. Parents argue that, because the undisputed evidence shows that they are supportive of CSAYC therapy for Child, state intervention is not needed. Parents maintain that they should not be blamed for being unable to find a therapist when DCS has likewise been unable to find one. Thus, Parents argue that state intervention will not make a difference on this issue.

[29] However, FCM Baker testified that she had never seen “a family successfully get a CSAYC therapist on their own[.]” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 235-36. Baker testified that she would continue her search for a therapist for Child. And the GAL testified that, “to [her] knowledge,” Parents had not done anything on their own to address Child's pornography addiction. Id. 212-13. The GAL testified that she believed that court intervention was required to ensure that Child was receiving appropriate services

[d]ue to the need for the CSAYC therapist still needing to be in place and due to previous testimony heard from Dr. D[alton], that it's easier to get that service in place through DCS as well as the family still needing additional guidance on how to ensure safety through supervision of [Child] and whatnot moving forward.

Id. at 213.

[30] The evidence supports the trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS.

Issue Two: Dispositional Order

[31] Father also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to complete a parent/family functional assessment (“PFFA”) and complete all recommendations and to participate in home-based therapy. As this Court recently explained,

[a] trial court has “broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate” following a CHINS determination, but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was [sic] revealed by the evidence.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (citing A.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). Thus, we review a trial court's order of services and conditions in a CHINS case for abuse of discretion. See In re R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's action is “against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom.” A.C. v. State, 144 N.E.3d 810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[32] Here, Father argues that the evidence shows that Mother does most of the parenting of Child. Thus, he maintains that there is no evidence that his parenting is lacking. And he argues that there is no evidence to show that he needs therapy. Thus, he contends that the dispositional order is an abuse of the trial court's discretion. We disagree.

[33] As the State aptly points out, the fact that Father expects Mother to do most of the parenting is problematic given the crisis the family is facing. Indeed, DCS presented evidence that, in 2024, Mother dealt with some mental health issues and relied on Father to parent the children, but Father, in turn, relied on L.M. to take care of Child during that time. Further, the undisputed evidence shows that Father likely has a problem with alcohol, which is a valid issue that could be addressed in therapy.

[34] Father has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to participate in PFFA and individual therapy.

Conclusion

[35] DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the CHINS adjudication. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the dispositional order.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record is unclear when Child returned home, but it appears to have been sometime in June or July.

2.   For ease of discussion, we cite to Father's appendix.

Mathias, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.