IN RE: J.P. and W.P. (2026)

Case Summary

[1] J.P. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order finding that Father's children are children in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] Father presents three issues for our review, which we reorder and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court violated Father's due process rights by failing to give him notice of the basis for the CHINS adjudication.

II. Whether the trial court's failure to hold the factfinding hearings within the time limits set forth in Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1 requires reversal.

III. Whether the trial court clearly erred in determining that Father's children were CHINS.

Facts

[3] Father and N.P.¹ (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents of J.P., born in September 2019, and W.P., born in August 2022 (collectively, “Children”). On December 3, 2024, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) responded to a report of the death of Children's five-month-old sibling, T.P.² DCS began its investigation into the circumstances of T.P.’s death by meeting with members of the local police department, interviewing Parents, and inspecting Parents’ home. DCS found the home to be cluttered, disorganized, infested with cockroaches, and lacking sufficient food for the family. Children were unbathed, smelled bad, and had visible rashes on their bodies.

[4] DCS requested that Children be removed from the home due to the “hazardous home conditions,” Parents’ “possible untreated mental health” issues, and Parents’ delay in providing medical care to T.P. Tr. Vol. II p. 57. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Natalie Shepler substantiated the neglect allegations “[b]ased on the deplorable home conditions and no evidence that there w[ere] any steps taken to improve that, coupled with the concerns for possible untreated mental health, and no plausible explanation for why the home conditions were like that.” Id. at 61. Children were removed from Parents and placed in foster care.

[5] On December 4, 2024, DCS filed petitions alleging that Children were CHINS. As the basis for the CHINS allegations, the petitions listed the conditions of Parents’ home, T.P.’s death, and Father's delayed arrival at home after T.P. died. The petitions did not allege facts concerning Children's skin conditions, malnourishment, or Parents’ mental health.

[6] During a January 10, 2025 pretrial conference, the trial court scheduled the factfinding hearing to take place within sixty days of the petition, setting hearings on January 24 and 31, 2025. At the end of the hearing on January 24, the trial court planned to resume the factfinding hearing the following week. In the interim, however, DCS moved to continue the January 31 hearing based upon its attorney's sudden illness, which was documented by a physician's note stating that counsel could not return to work until February 2, 2025.

[7] Father's attorney filed a motion “object[ing] to a waiver of the 60 day statutory requirement, to a continuance, and to a good-cause finding to go beyond the 60 day statutory requirement.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 114. Neither Mother's counsel nor Children's Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) objected to a continuance. The trial court granted DCS's motion to continue on January 29, 2025, “mak[ing] a finding of good cause to go beyond the sixty (60) day deadline in this matter due [to] the unavailability of counsel for [ ] DCS.” Id. at 120. The trial court then rescheduled the factfinding hearing for February 7, 2025, four days beyond the sixty-day statutory deadline.

[8] On February 5, 2025, Father filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice, arguing that, because the factfinding hearing had not been completed within sixty days of the filing of the petition, the trial court was required to dismiss the petition under the applicable version of Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1(d).³ The trial court held a status conference on February 7 instead of the factfinding hearing as scheduled. On February 14, the trial court issued an order memorializing the events that occurred during the status conference, which provides in relevant part: “DCS requested a continuance of the trial set for 1/31/2025, because [DCS's attorney] could not be present due to illness. The Court responded to that written request and granted the continuance, finding good cause to go outside of 60 [days].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 133. The trial court then set additional factfinding hearings for March 20 and 28, 2025.

[9] At the close of the March 20 hearing, the court set the matter for further factfinding hearings on March 28 and April 3, 2025. At the close of the March 28 hearing, DCS's counsel informed the trial court that she anticipated seeking a finding of good cause to exceed the 120-day deadline found in Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1(b) because Father's cross-examination of FCM Shepler remained outstanding due to that witness being on vacation. At the April 3 hearing, DCS's counsel renewed this request and stated that she would follow up with a written motion. The GAL agreed that a continuance was reasonable, explaining that accommodating the remaining hearing days might not fit within 120 days and that witness-availability issues had made it difficult to complete the factfinding within that timeframe.

[10] On April 8, 2025, DCS filed a written motion under Trial Rule 7(D) asking the court to find good cause to exceed the 120-day deadline, stating that DCS had one remaining witness to recall. Both Parents objected to the motion, but the GAL did not. The trial court granted the motion that same day, finding that “the parties have worked diligently to conclude the Fact Finding within 120 days, but factors, including medical leave and unavailability of essential witnesses, prevented that from occurring.” Id. at 153. The trial court continued the factfinding hearing to April 10, 2025.

[11] At the April 10 factfinding hearing, nurse practitioner Hannah Renfrow testified at length regarding Children's physical condition, including their skin conditions and malnourishment. Mother's counsel cross-examined Renfrow about whether these conditions were alleged in the CHINS petition; DCS objected that the questioning was irrelevant, the GAL joined that objection, and the trial court sustained it and cut off that line of questioning. Father made no objection to NP Renfrow's testimony. Social worker Dajour Crawford testified without objection that Parents left with Children during a supervised visitation and only returned after law enforcement indicated that they could avoid arrest by bringing Children back. FCM Shepler testified that Children were removed, at least in part, due to concerns regarding Parents’ mental health. Father objected to this testimony on the ground that FCM Shepler was not qualified to testify about Parents’ mental health, and the trial court overruled that objection. Mother's counsel also argued that Parents’ mental health was not alleged in the petition, but Father's counsel did not make any such argument or join in Mother's argument.

[12] It was at this April 10 hearing that the trial court noted some of the reasons for the delay in completing the factfinding hearings, which included the trial court's use of an interpreter for Parents, who primarily speak Haitian Creole and have limited English proficiency. Specifically, the trial court explained that the proceedings had been delayed due to: the parties’ tardiness, an extended break necessitated by Mother's emotional testimony, counsel's scheduling conflicts, and the “slower pace” caused by using an interpreter. Tr. Vol. III p. 28.

[13] At the conclusion of the April 10 hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and requested that the parties file proposed findings of fact and conclusions thereon. On July 8, 2025, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, adjudicating Children to be CHINS. The trial court's findings included that: Children's odor indicated they had not recently bathed; Parents initially disbelieved that T.P. had died; and Children had skin conditions and were malnourished but improved after being removed from Parents’ care. On August 1, 2025, a dispositional hearing was held, and the trial court ordered Parents to participate in a “psychological evaluation, home-based therapy, and follow the recommendations [of providers].” Id. at 73. Father now appeals.⁴

Discussion and Decision

I. Father's due process rights were not violated.

[14] Indiana Code Section 31-34-10-2(c) requires that a copy of the CHINS petition accompany the summons served on the child's parent. And at the initial hearing on the petition, the trial court must inform the parties, including the parents, of “[t]he nature of the allegations in the petition” and “[t]he dispositional alternatives available to the court if the child is adjudicated a [CHINS].” Ind. Code § 31-34-10-4.

[15] Father contends that the CHINS petition alleged certain facts—the conditions of Parents’ home, T.P.’s death, and Father's delayed arrival after T.P.’s death—but the trial court's CHINS order was based on facts not listed in the petition, such as Children's rashes and malnutrition, and Parents’ mental health. Thus, Father claims that he had no notice of the basis of the CHINS adjudication and no opportunity to prepare a defense.

A. Father waived his due process claim by failing to present it to the trial court.

[16] DCS argues that Father waived this claim by failing to present it to the trial court in the first instance. We agree. “ ‘[A]ppellate review presupposes that a litigant's arguments have been raised and considered in the trial court.’ ” In re A.R., 271 N.E.3d 1161, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013)). “A party waives a claim of error, ‘including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016)).

[17] Here, at the factfinding hearing, Mother's counsel noted that the CHINS petition did not contain any allegations concerning Children's development or their skin conditions. But neither Parent made any claim of a deprivation of due process based on a lack of notice of such allegations in the CHINS petition.⁵ Indeed, as noted by DCS, the words “due process” do not appear in the transcript of the factfinding hearings; nor does the word “constitution.” By not presenting this argument to the trial court, Father cannot present it now for the first time on appeal. See S.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the father waived his due-process argument because he never raised it to the trial court); Hite v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 845 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that father waived his due process argument because he never objected to the termination on grounds that he lacked notice of the CHINS proceeding).

[18] Waiver notwithstanding, Father's due process claim fails on its merits. Father did not object to testimony regarding Children's malnourishment and skin conditions, Parents’ mental health, or the supervised-visit incident on the ground that these matters were outside the petition. Thus, those issues were tried by implied consent, and any due process claim based on a lack of notice fails. See In re K.W., 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that father's failure to object to evidence on an unpleaded issue established implied consent under Trial Rule 15(B) and defeated his due process claim).

II. The trial court's grant of continuances that exceeded the time limits set forth in Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1 does not mandate reversal.

[19] Father next claims that the trial court violated his right to procedural due process to be heard in a meaningful time and manner by holding the fact-finding hearings outside the sixty-day and 120-day timeframes set forth in the applicable version of Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1 (“Section 1”).

A. Father was not denied due process.

[20] We first note that Father's argument conflates the requirements of procedural due process with those of a statutory deadline. It is well settled that a violation of a state statute, by itself, does not establish a due process violation. Garwood v. State, 77 N.E.3d 204, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. granted, aff'd in relevant part, 84 N.E.3d 624 (Ind. 2017) (citing Charleston v. Bd. of Trs., 741 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will be clear once more: a plaintiff does not have a federal constitutional right to state-mandated process.”); Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n error of state law is not a violation of due process.”).

[21] Procedural due process requires only notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to confront witnesses, In re Adoption of K.M., 31 N.E.3d 533, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), all of which Father received here. Father was represented by counsel throughout the factfinding hearings, and, as discussed above, he was on notice of the issues to be adjudicated. Accordingly, we reject Father's claim to the extent that it is couched in terms of procedural due process.

B. The trial court had inherent authority to continue the factfinding hearing based on good cause.

[22] Father also claims that the trial court violated Section 1 by holding a hearing outside the sixty-day and 120-day deadlines set forth in that statute, which, at the time of the hearing in this case, provided:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), unless the allegations of a petition have been admitted, the juvenile court shall complete a factfinding hearing not more than sixty (60) days after a petition alleging that a child is a child in need of services is filed in accordance with IC 31-34-9.

(b) The juvenile court may extend the time to complete a factfinding hearing, as described in subsection (a), for an additional sixty (60) days if all parties in the action consent to the additional time.

* * * * *

(d) If the factfinding hearing is not held within the time set forth in subsection (a) or (b), upon a motion with the court, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice.

I.C. § 31-34-11-1 (2012) (emphases added).

[23] Father argues that the trial court violated Section 1(b) when, without his consent, it granted continuances of the factfinding hearing beyond sixty days from the date of the filing of the petition. The CHINS petition was filed on December 4, 2024, meaning that the factfinding hearing had to be completed by February 3, 2025,⁶ unless the time for completion of the factfinding hearing was extended by agreement under Section 1(b). The factfinding hearing commenced on January 24 and was scheduled for completion on January 31, 2025. On January 29, 2025, DCS filed a motion to continue the factfinding hearing based upon DCS counsel's illness. The trial court found good cause to grant the continuance over Father's objection, and rescheduled the factfinding hearing for February 7, 2025, which was more than sixty days after the date of the filing of the petition.

[24] Father argues that Section 1 does not contain a good-cause justification for exceeding the sixty-day statutory deadline. This is true. Our Supreme Court, however, recognized a good-cause exception to the statutory deadline in In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 284 (Ind. 2020). Specifically, the Court held:

Because our trial rules trump statutes on matters of procedure, [then current Trial] Rule 53.5 allows extension of the 120-day deadline in [Section 1(b)] provided a party can show “good cause.” Where, as here, the circumstances dictate good cause for a continuance, Trial Rule 53.5 controls and a trial court has discretion to grant a continuance without the risk of mandatory dismissal for failure to complete the factfinding hearing within 120 days.

Id. Former Trial Rule 53.5 provided: “Upon motion, trial may be postponed or continued in the discretion of the court, and shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or other evidence.”

[25] Father notes that Trial Rule 53.5 was repealed effective January 1, 2025. Motions to continue are now governed by Trial Rule 7(D), which provides:

(D) Written Motions for Continuance.

(1) A party must file a motion for continuance as soon after the cause for continuance or delay is discovered by the party seeking the same.

(2) Any written motion to continue a matter must be filed pursuant to subdivision (B) and must include:

(a) A statement that the opposing party has no objection;

(b) A statement that the opposing party objects; or

(c) A statement that the opposing party's position is unknown, and the date, time, and method by which the moving party filing the motion attempted to obtain agreement and the result, or why such outreach was not possible.

(3) If a party did not comply with subdivision (D)(2), a court may grant a motion for continuance only if the moving party certifies to the court, in writing, the efforts made to give notice and the reasons supporting the moving party's claim that actual notice should not be required.

(4) A party's motion must include:

(a) the approximate amount of time needed to elapse before the matter can be heard, and,

(b) a good faith estimate of the time needed for the rescheduled hearing or trial.

Notably, the “good cause” language of former Trial Rule 53.5 is not included in Trial Rule 7(D). Still, we have held that Trial Rule 7(D) “appears to leave continuances to the discretion of the trial court, so long as the procedural requirements of the rule are met.” In re C.J.B., 281 N.E.3d 615, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[26] Trial Rule 7(D) merely contains procedural requirements with respect to the filing of motions to continue; it retains no explicit language governing under what circumstances a trial court should grant a motion to continue. Nor does it make any mention of oral motions to continue. Because Trial Rule 53.5 and Section 1(b) are no longer in conflict, Father claims that M.S. is no longer controlling and that trial courts lack authority to continue a CHINS factfinding hearing beyond the statutory deadlines set forth in Section 1(b). We disagree.

[27] The source of a trial court's authority to grant continuances is not located in Trial Rule 7(D), or the former Trial Rule 53.5, for that matter. The power to grant continuances is instead part of the inherent authority of a court to manage its own docket. Our Supreme Court has long held that “courts have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within their jurisdiction.” Knox Cnty. Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405, 413 (1940); see also Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Good, 919 N.E.2d 144, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that courts have recognized “the inherent power of a court to control the movement of cases on its docket[.]”) (quoting Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 238 Mich.App. 626, 607 N.W.2d 100, 109 (1999)), trans. denied. Former Trial Rule 53.5 did two things: (1) it recognized that continuances rest “in the discretion of the court,” and (2) it separately required that a continuance “shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause.” This second clause guaranteed relief when good cause existed, but it was not the source of the court's underlying discretionary authority.⁷

[28] Our Supreme Court's October 30, 2024 order repealing Trial Rule 53.5 describes the change as deleting an “obsolete rule on continuances of trial” as part of a broader project to reconcile the trial rules with common local-rule practice for “uniform statewide application.” Order Amending Rules of Tr. Proc. & Admin. Rules, No. 24S-MS-1 (Ind. Oct. 30, 2024). Nothing in this Order suggests an intent to abolish the standard that had governed Indiana continuances for decades.

[29] We also conclude that to interpret Section 1 and Trial Rule 7(D) as Father would have us do would produce an absurd result. Indiana courts construe rules and statutes to avoid absurd results. Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 2003). Instead, when interpreting statutes, we consider the objects and purposes of the statute as well as the effects and repercussions of our interpretation. In re J.S., 130 N.E.3d 109, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[30] In July 2025, the General Assembly amended Section 1(d) to excuse dismissal where the delay is “necessitated by unanticipated, emergent circumstances,” “the circumstances of the case,” or “the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.” I.C. § 31-34-11-1(d) (2025). Under Father's interpretation, for the six months between the repeal of Trial Rule 53.5 and the July 1, 2025 statutory amendment, no continuance of any kind—regardless of fault, prejudice, or the parties’ consent—could save a CHINS factfinding from mandatory dismissal if the deadline has passed. We find this reading hard to reconcile. The amendment reads as continuous with, not a departure from, the good-cause practice our Supreme Court approved in M.S.

[31] Father would have us treat the six months after the effective date of Trial Rule 7(D) and before the amendment to Section 1(d) as a “gap” in which even a brief delay caused by unavoidable and unforeseeable circumstances requires dismissal of a CHINS proceeding, regardless of the best interests of the child. This is untenable. We will not mechanistically interpret the Trial Rules and Section 1 to require such an absurd result.

[32] Nor does recognizing a good-cause exception render the statutory deadlines in Section 1 a dead letter. To the contrary, the sixty and 120-day deadlines remain the general rule in CHINS cases. All we hold today is that these deadlines may be extended if a trial court makes an affirmative, case-specific finding that a party has shown a good and sufficient reason for delay. This is a common-sense limitation on the statutory deadlines. Our reading acknowledges that rigid application of the deadlines should yield in the narrow circumstances that justify a continuance.⁸

C. The trial court's decision to grant continuances here was not an abuse of discretion.

[33] Applying our interpretation of Trial Rule 7(D) and Section 1 to the facts of the present case, we have no hesitation in saying that the trial court's decision to grant brief continuances in this matter was not an abuse of the court's discretion. “We review for an abuse of discretion a juvenile court's determination of whether good cause existed for a continuance,” and a trial court abuses its discretion only if the court's decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” In re M.H., 244 N.E.3d 966, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citations omitted). Good cause for a continuance may be shown “where a party is ill, a party's mental capacity needs to be assessed, a party's attorney has a medical emergency such that the party is without counsel, a witness is unavailable to testify, or the parties represent to the court that a settlement is likely.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

[34] Here, the trial court granted two brief continuances. The first continuance rested on DCS counsel's medical inability to proceed due to an illness that was documented by a physician's note. Father's counsel objected, claiming that there was no good cause for a continuance and that another DCS attorney could cover the hearing. But Father's objection made no claim of prejudice from the delay itself. Moreover, substituting counsel on such short notice is often a difficult task. Neither Mother's counsel nor the GAL objected. The resulting delay was brief, consisting of merely one week, from January 31 to February 7, 2025. Under these circumstances, the trial court's decision to grant a continuance based upon the good cause of counsel's unforeseen illness was not an abuse of discretion.

[35] The second continuance was similarly the result of unavoidable circumstances. As early as March 28, 2025, DCS informed the trial court that it anticipated needing additional time because Father's own cross-examination of FCM Shepler remained outstanding. At the April 3 hearing, the GAL agreed that a continuance was reasonable. The trial court then entered a specific finding that the parties had worked diligently but that witness unavailability still prevented timely completion of the factfinding hearing. And again, the resulting delay was brief—merely two days from April 8 to April 10.

[36] In short, both continuances were brief in duration, based on specific and unavoidable causes, and supported by explicit findings. We, therefore, cannot say that the trial court's decision to grant brief continuances based on these good causes was an abuse of discretion.

D. The scheduling of the factfinding hearings did not deprive Father of due process.

[37] Father also argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by conducting the factfinding hearing over five hearing dates that spanned seventy-seven days. Father asks this Court to establish, as a matter of first impression, “an upper bound to the number of hearings over which the State can conduct factfinding in a CHINS action.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. We decline to do so.

[38] We first conclude that Father's challenge to the trial court's scheduling is waived. Although Father objected to the continuance that produced the February 7 setting and he later moved to dismiss based on the sixty-day deadline, he did not object to the settings on April 3 or April 10. Having failed to object to the scheduling he now challenges, Father cannot raise a due process claim based on that scheduling for the first time on appeal. See N.G., 51 N.E.3d at 1173.

[39] Regardless, there is no due process right to have a CHINS factfinding hearing completed within a set number of days or at a certain number of settings. As discussed above, a violation of a statutory timeframe, standing alone, does not establish a due process violation. Garwood, 77 N.E.3d at 220; Charleston, 741 F.3d at 773. Because the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents, trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in scheduling and in ruling on continuances. M.S., 140 N.E.3d at 284-85. Adopting a fixed cap on the number of hearings at which a trial court may conduct factfinding would remove the very discretion that allows trial courts to accommodate scheduling conflicts and witness availability. See In re L.S., 82 N.E.3d 333, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (rejecting due process challenge based on the length of the factfinding proceeding and the delay between the factfinding hearing and the trial court's CHINS order), trans. denied.

III. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Children were CHINS.

[40] Lastly, Father claims that the trial court's order contains findings not supported by the evidence and not relevant to a CHINS determination, and, that the court's findings do not support a CHINS adjudication. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

[41] CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “ ‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see also Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017)). Instead, we consider only the evidence that favors the juvenile court's decision and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012).

[42] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.; D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578. “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without the coercive intervention of the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child ․ [T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014).

[43] Here, the trial court entered findings and conclusions thereon sua sponte.⁹ As to the issues covered by such findings, we apply our familiar two-tiered standard of “whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 1287 (citations omitted). We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, under which a judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.¹⁰ Id.

[44] The trial court here found Children to be CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, referred to as the “neglect statute.” This statute provides that a child is a CHINS if, before the child turns eighteen:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1 (2019).¹¹

B. The trial court's factual findings are sufficient.

[45] When a trial court enters findings of fact under Trial Rule 52(A), it “shall find the facts specially and state its conclusions thereon.” Findings that merely “ ‘indicate that the testimony or evidence was this or the other are not findings of fact.’ ” In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Parks v. Del. Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 862 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Instead, “findings ‘must indicate, not what someone said is true, but what is determined to be true, for this is the trier of fact's duty.’ ” Id. (quoting Parks, 862 N.E.2d at 1279). “ ‘The trier of fact must adopt the testimony of the witness before the finding may be considered a finding of fact.’ ” Id. (quoting Parks, 862 N.E.2d at 1279).

[46] Father claims that several of the trial court's factual findings are merely recitations of the witness testimony. We list these challenged findings below:

13. The home was in a deplorable condition that was unsafe for the children. There was garbage, dirty diapers, and other choking hazards on the floor. Dirty dishes were piled in the sink and there was rotting food on the counter tops in the kitchen. There was a high level of cockroaches crawling around and there was black mold in a bedroom. Detective Hoch stated the home was not suitable for anyone to be living in. The home had a strong, pungent odor. There was a lack of food in the home and law enforcement officers had to go purchase food for the children. The children devoured the food and ate more at the DCS office.

14. The Detective and Family Case Manager spoke to Mother. She told them that in October 2024, a witch tried to take [T.P.] from her as she was putting him into her car. She stated that the witch cursed the baby. Since then, magical things began to happen and he would vomit during feeds, he would not eat or sleep, and he was not himself. Mother stated she did not take him to the doctor between the time that his symptoms began and the time of his death.

15. On the morning of [T.P.’s] death, Mother stated that [Father] had changed the baby's diaper and laid him on their adult bed before leaving for work. When she returned to check on him, something was wrong so she yelled for help and 911 was called.

16. The Detective and Family Case Manager were able to speak to Father when he arrived at the apartment, though he was called many hours earlier with the news of the child's death. [Father] stated he stopped at a bar before returning home, despite having been informed his baby died. He stated that he woke up around 4 am that morning. He fed [T.P.] and changed his diaper. When he left for work at 5:30 am, he laid the baby on his side in their bed.

* * * * *

18. At the conclusion of the assessment, DCS substantiated the assessment against both parents and placed the children in a foster home. DCS recommended the removal of the children. DCS had many safety concerns, including the hazardous conditions of the home, signs of untreated mental health, concerns of delayed medical care and unsafe sleeping practices for [T.P.], and poor hygiene of [J.P.] and [W.P.]. These factors created an environment of abuse or neglect.

* * * * *

20. NP Renfrow did a head-to-toe examination of both children and observed that both children had itchy rashes all over their bodies. [W.P.]’s rash was present from his head all the way to his toes, while [J.P.]’s was present from her neck all the way to her toes. The rash covered their chest, belly, back, arms, hands, legs, and feet. The rash would have been extremely itchy and uncomfortable for the children and would have been noticeable to the parents. She testified she had never seen children with such severe rashes because they are typically treated as soon as they begin on the fingers and toes due to how uncomfortable it is. The rash could have been present for weeks or months based on the severity. She diagnosed both children with scabies, caused by mites that burrow under the skin.

21. NP Renfrow also diagnosed the children as underweight. On a growth chart, [W.P.]’s weight was in the 6th percentile and his BMI was in the first percentile, while [J.P.]’s weight was below the 10th percentile and her BMI [w]as in the 6th percentile. NP Renfrow was concerned that the children were being underfed and their bloodwork showed that they both had nutritional deficiencies.

* * * * *

23. DCS offered many services to [Father and Mother]․ DCS still believes these services are necessary to ensure the safety of the children in parents’ care.

24. In order to keep the children safe, parents need to address their mental health needs, learn about safe sleep practices, and demonstrate that they can seek medical care when it is necessary. DCS also needs to see that parents can ensure a clean and sanitary living environment for the children and provide sufficient and appropriate nutrition. Mother and Father have demonstrated that they cannot do this without the coercive intervention of the Court. They further demonstrated that the coercive intervention of the Court [was necessary] when they became aggressive with the supervised visitation provider and absconded with the children, only returning when law enforcement threatened to arrest them if they did not bring the children back.

25. The [GAL] testified that she also has safety concerns, believes the family should participate in services, and that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary to protect the children. She believes that untreated mental health issues are impacting their ability to parent the children appropriately and parents need services to ensure that they can maintain a sanitary home, seek medical treatment for their children when necessary and appropriate, and feed their children appropriately.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 178-80 (emphases added).

[47] We acknowledge that some portions of the trial court's findings—which we have emphasized above—merely recite a witness’ testimony, which is not a true factual finding. See Pitcavage v. Pitcavage, 11 N.E.3d 547, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The remaining challenged findings, however, are not similarly deficient; they instead indicate that the trial court determined that a particular event occurred or a particular statement was made, rather than merely reciting to what a witness testified. Findings 14, 15, and 16 all find as a factual matter that Mother or Father made certain statements. Findings 18, 21, 23, and 24 indicate the trial court's own factual determinations regarding the matters contained therein, not mere recitations of witness testimony.

[48] Our analysis of Finding 13 is slightly different. This finding provides that “Detective Hoch stated the home was not suitable for anyone to be living in.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 178. Assuming that this is merely a recitation of the detective's testimony, the remaining portions of Finding 13 find as a matter of fact—not a mere recitation of testimony—that the home was in a “deplorable” condition with garbage, dirty diapers, and other hazards on the floor, dirty dishes in the sink, rotten food on the countertops, numerous cockroaches, and black mold in the bedroom. The home had a foul odor and a lack of food for Children, who were hungry and “devoured” the food offered by DCS. Id. These findings are supported by Detective Hoch and FCM Shepler's testimony.

[49] Even if we agreed with Father's claims regarding the remaining findings—which we do not—any error would be harmless “surplusage,” because the unchallenged findings alone are sufficient to support the trial court's CHINS determination. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that erroneous factual finding was “harmless surplusage” where there was evidence sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate findings on the elements necessary to sustain the judgment).

[50] Apart from his recitation-of-testimony argument, Father also claims that the following findings are either contradicted by the record or immaterial because they describe conditions that were no longer current by the time of the CHINS determination:

10. The reasons for the filing of the case have not been alleviated or addressed by [Parents].

11. On December 3, 202[4], [T.P.], a four-month-old [sic] baby, was found unresponsive and taken to Riley Children's Hospital. IMPD Detective Jaime Hoch was assigned to the case. DCS Family Case Manager Natalie Shepler was assigned the assessment. Detective [Hoch] and FCM Shelper [sic] went to the hospital at approximately 9:30 a.m. When they arrived, parents were not present and the child was deceased.

12. After leaving the hospital, Detective Hoch and FCM Shepler went to the family apartment. [Mother] was present along with [J.P.], [W.P.], and two other children that Mother was babysitting. The children were unkempt. Their odor would indicate that they had not had a recent bath.

* * * * *

17. Though it was explained to both Mother and Father that the baby had died, parents did not believe it was their baby. Mother stated she would know if her baby was dead and hers was not.

19. After [J.P.] and [W.P.] were removed from parents’ care, they were taken to receive medical attention. Nurse Practitioner Hannah Renfrow treated the children on December 5, 2025 [sic], two days after their removal. Their chief complaints were coughs and itchiness.

* * * * *

22. Nurse Practitioner Renfrow saw the children again about two weeks later. Their scabies had cleared up considerably with medication. Both children gained weight during that time period. [J.P.] had gained four pounds in two weeks, which is about the amount of weight a child her age would gain in a year, further demonstrating that she had been underfed and had not been given enough food to eat prior to removal.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 178-79. As explained below, these findings are supported by the evidence.¹²

[51] As to Finding 10, although Parents eventually addressed the deplorable conditions of their home by moving to a new residence in December 2024, they never explained how the home reached such deplorable conditions in the first place. FCM Shepler and the GAL testified that this unresolved question, combined with Parents’ unaddressed mental health issues, remained a concern at the time of the factfinding hearings. The fact that Parents moved to a nicer residence does not contradict Finding 10.

[52] Finding 12, which noted that Children's odor indicated they had not recently bathed, is supported by FCM Shepler's testimony at the factfinding hearings. Father's claim that Children's hygiene improved in DCS's care merely shows the extent to which Children's hygiene was being neglected by Parents.

[53] Finding 17 details Parents’ initial disbelief regarding T.P.’s death. This too is supported by FCM Shepler's testimony and even Mother's own testimony. The fact that FCM Shepler could not recall Father making similar statements is, at most, a conflict in the evidence or an issue of credibility that was for the trial court, not this Court on appeal, to resolve. Father also claims that Finding 17 is unrelated to Children because it concerns Parents’ reaction to T.P.’s death rather than J.P.’s or W.P.’s own circumstances. We disagree. A parent's response to the death of one child bears on the parent's judgment and emotional stability.

[54] Lastly, Findings 20-22 discuss Children's skin conditions, malnourishment, and their improvement after being removed from Parents’ care. Father does not claim that these findings are unsupported by the evidence; instead, he claims that these findings describe conditions that were no longer current by the time of the CHINS adjudications. As noted above, a trial court should consider both the conditions at the time of the CHINS hearing and when the case was filed. S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290. The fact that Children's condition improved after being removed from Parents emphasizes that Children were neglected while in Parents’ care.

C. The findings support the trial court's judgment.

[55] We also reject Father's claim that the trial court's findings do not support a CHINS adjudication. As noted above, a child is CHINS under the neglect statute if the child's condition is seriously impaired or endangered due to parental neglect, the child needs care or treatment the child is not receiving, and such care is unlikely to be provided without court intervention. I.C. § 31-34-1-1. Here, the trial court's findings support each of these requirements.

[56] First, the trial court's findings establish that Children's physical condition was seriously impaired when in Parents’ care. Indeed, both had severe, untreated scabies, and both were significantly underweight. After being removed from Parents, both Children quickly gained weight and their skin condition improved with treatment. This establishes the extent to which Children's nutritional and medical needs were neglected while in Parents’ care. The trial court's findings also note the horrifically unsanitary conditions of Parents’ home and the concerns regarding their mental health.

[57] The evidence also established that Children and Parents needed ongoing services. The trial court's dispositional order directed Parents to participate in psychological evaluations and home-based therapy for Children and themselves. These services were to address the concerns regarding Parents’ mental health and the conditions of the home noted in the trial court's findings. The trial court's findings also establish that Parents were unlikely to accept these services without court intervention. Indeed, Parents initially refused all services other than supervised visitation. And, when offered services, Parents did not comply voluntarily. The GAL testified that Parents would not seek mental health treatment unless the court ordered it. Parents also demonstrated a lack of awareness of the situation by telling a service provider they could care for Children on their own, despite the evidence to the contrary. We, therefore, conclude that the unchallenged findings support the trial court's CHINS adjudications.

D. The findings support the trial court's conclusions.

[58] Lastly, Father challenges several of the trial court's conclusions of law. Conclusion 1.5 provides:

[J.P.] and [W.P.] are [CHINS] because the children's physical and psychological condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered by [Parents’] inability to ensure a safe, sanitary, and appropriate living environment.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 181. Father claims that the evidence shows the opposite and that Parents were living in a safe and appropriate place for months before the CHINS adjudication. But, as noted above, Parents’ relocation did not answer the question of how Parents’ home reached the deplorable state in the first place, nor did it remedy their unaddressed mental health issues.

[59] Conclusion 1.6 states:

[Children] need care, treatment, and rehabilitation that [they are] not receiving, and that [they are] unlikely to be provided, without the coercive intervention of the Court because Mother and Father are not compliant in the services that have been referred during the life of the case, as demonstrated through testimony of numerous providers, and have refused to address potential mental health needs.

Id. Father's challenge to this conclusion largely restates his argument that DCS failed to provide notice that Parents’ mental health was at issue in this case. We have already rejected that argument above. To the extent Father separately argues that the conclusion is merely “regurgitative of the statute,” we disagree. Appellant's Br. p. 36. The conclusion is based on specific findings and evidence that were presented in this case.

[60] Lastly, Father challenges Conclusion 1.7, which simply states that DCS met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Children are CHINS under the neglect statute. As discussed above, the trial court's findings and the evidence support this conclusion.

Conclusion

[61] Father waived his due process claim, but waiver notwithstanding, the claim fails on its merits because the unpleaded issues were tried by implied consent. The trial court had inherent authority to grant brief continuances for good cause notwithstanding the repeal of Trial Rule 53.5, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the continuances. Finally, the trial court's findings are sufficient to sustain its determination that Children are CHINS. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's CHINS adjudications.

[62] Affirmed.

[63] I concur in the majority's decision to affirm the trial court's CHINS adjudications. I also agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting DCS a brief continuance of the January 31, 2025, factfinding hearing. I write separately because I would rest that conclusion on narrower grounds than the majority does.

[64] The continuance that Father challenges arose from a single, easily identified circumstance. DCS's attorney was suddenly and unexpectedly incapacitated by illness, a fact confirmed by a physician's note. No substitute counsel could reasonably have been expected to step into a contested factfinding hearing on a day's notice. That is an emergency in the ordinary sense of the word, and a trial court's power to grant a brief continuance to accommodate an emergency of that kind is not conferred by any statute or procedural rule. It belongs to the court by virtue of the judicial power itself, and it is on that basis alone that I would affirm the continuance here.

[65] Our courts have long recognized that they possess “inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within their jurisdiction.” Knox Cnty. C. v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405, 413 (1940). That authority is not a creature of legislative grace; it “ ‘result[s] from the very nature of [a court's] organization’ ” and stands independent of any statute. State ex rel. Cnty. Welfare Bd. of Starke Cnty. v. Starke Cir. Ct., 238 Ind. 35, 147 N.E.2d 585, 590 (1958) (quoting Patterson v. Pollock, 84 Ohio App. 489, 84 N.E.2d 606, 611 (1948)). Among the powers a court carries simply by virtue of its office is the authority “to order, in emergency situations, the removal of obstacles to the due administration of justice in the court,” a power that flows directly from the constitutional vesting of the judicial power in our courts and exists precisely so that a court may act when “further delay in achieving a necessary result is intolerable.” State ex rel. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Bldg. Auth. v. Superior Ct. of Marion Cnty., Room No. 1, 264 Ind. 313, 344 N.E.2d 61, 64 (1976).

[66] We have already recognized that this same emergency authority reaches continuances specifically. When our Supreme Court issued emergency relief for Indiana's trial courts at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it did not purport to create new authority; it simply confirmed what trial courts already possessed—“inherent authority” to reschedule proceedings and to continue even a criminal trial “upon the finding of an emergency, without the necessity of a motion.” Matter of Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Ind. Trial Cts. Relating to 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 155 N.E.3d 1191 (Ind. 2020).

[67] And this emergency-based authority operates even against the most rigid of deadlines: a defendant's demand for a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4 does not strip a court of its power to “take note of ․ an emergency” and continue the trial regardless. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1037-38 (Ind. 2013). If a trial court's inherent emergency authority can override the constitutionally rooted, dismissal-enforced deadlines of Criminal Rule 4, then that same authority necessarily permits a brief continuance of a CHINS factfinding hearing when opposing counsel is suddenly felled by illness—regardless of what the current text of Trial Rule 7(D) or Section 1(b) does or does not say about good cause.

[68] That principle resolves this continuance case. DCS counsel's illness was sudden, was medically documented, and left DCS no realistic opportunity to field substitute counsel for a contested hearing on such short notice. Neither Mother's counsel nor the GAL objected, and the resulting delay pushed the hearing back only one week. This is precisely the sort of unforeseeable and unpreventable circumstance that trial courts have always been trusted to accommodate without waiting on legislative or rule-based permission. Because I would affirm the continuance on this ground alone, I do not join the majority's discussion of Trial Rule 7(D)’s relationship to Section 1(b), the fate of In re M.S. following the repeal of former Trial Rule 53.5, or the General Assembly's 2025 amendment to Section 1(d). In all other respects, I concur in the judgment the Court reaches.

[69] I respectfully dissent with respect to Section II of the majority opinion, concluding that the trial court committed error when it denied Father's motion to dismiss the CHINS matter. The trial court's failure to complete the fact-finding hearing not more than sixty days after the filing of the CHINS petition violated the unambiguous terms of Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(a) (“the Statute”). Father did not consent to additional time to complete the fact-finding hearing and timely filed a motion to dismiss, which in this instance, required the trial court to dismiss the petition, without prejudice. Ind. Code § 31-34-11-1(d).

[70] I agree with the majority that a trial court retains “inherent authority” to continue a matter due to the emergency circumstances and that the sudden illness of trial counsel is such an emergency circumstance. However, the authority to grant a continuance is simply one part of the equation. At issue here is whether the authority to grant a continuance also permits a trial court to exceed the statutory deadline to complete the fact-finding hearing established by the Legislature. I do not believe, standing alone, that it does.

[71] I base my position on the legal framework established in the In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 284 (Ind. 2020). There, the Supreme Court characterized the deadlines imposed by the Statute and the provisions of Trial Rule 53.5 concerning continuances for “good cause” to both be procedural in nature. Id. Because both the trial rule and the Statute were procedural in nature, the Court concluded that the trial rule controlled and that the deadlines set forth in the Statute may be exceeded for “good cause.” Id. The Court based its holding exclusively upon the language of Trial Rule 53.5 that compelled a trial court to grant a continuance upon a showing of good cause and made no mention of a trial court's “inherent authority” to extend statutory deadlines nor the need to avoid an absurd result.

[72] Trial Rule 53.5 was repealed effective January 1, 2025, and motions to continue are now governed by Trial Rule 7(D). The “good cause” language of former Trial Rule 53.5 was not included in Trial Rule 7(D). Rather, Trial Rule 7(D) largely contains procedural requirements with respect to the filing of motions to continue and retains no explicit language requiring a trial court to grant a continuance. As a result, the Statute and the trial rule are no longer in conflict, and the deadlines in the Statute must prevail.¹³ See Jackson v. City of Jeffersonville, 771 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining “a procedural statute that does not conflict with any of the court rules may be held operative.”), trans. denied.

[73] Notably, the legislature recognized the void left by the repeal of Trial Rule 53.5 and subsequently amended the Statute. This amendment, which became, effective July 1, 2025, provided trial courts with the ability to extend the 60-day and 120-day deadlines in the Statute under limited circumstances.¹⁴ These amendments appear to largely address, and supply, the “good cause” exception set forth in M.S. and the “good and sufficient reason for delay” exception proposed by the majority.

[74] It is certainly discomforting for a trial court to be required to dismiss a CHINS petition where the delay in the proceedings was based upon an emergency and not due to a lack of diligence or other causes, however the procedural timelines imposed by the Statute reflect the balancing of competing policy priorities by our legislature. In addition, the remedy mandated by the Statute is dismissal without prejudice, meaning a petition may be refiled by DCS, and other emergency detention remedies can be sought by DCS to avoid returning a child to a dangerous situation. Nonetheless, the lifespan of this anomaly is limited to the six-month time period between the repeal of Trial Rule 53.5 (January 1, 2025) and the effective date of the amendments to the Statute (July 1, 2025).

[75] I also do not view the absurdity doctrine to be applicable under these circumstances. The absurdity doctrine requires a two-part showing, first the text of the statute must impose an outcome that no reasonable person could intend, and second, a court must be able to remove the absurdity by “changing or supplying a word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or ministerial error.” R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1042 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 237-38 (2012)). I do not believe that the strict application of the deadlines set forth in the Statute leads to either an “obviously unintended result” or a judicial fix by the inclusion or exclusion of a word or phrase. Id. I view the inclusion or exclusion of exceptions to the statutory deadlines to be a policy choice best left to the legislature. The statutory remedy for exceeding the Statute's deadlines, dismissal of a pending CHINS petition without prejudice, is not an outcome that no reasonable person could intend. Next, the “fix” of creating an exception to the deadlines based upon a “good and sufficient reason for delay” is not a ministerial fix to a drafting or scrivener's error but a substantive alteration of the statute that requires the weighing of competing policy concerns. Finally, I fear that the majority's “good and sufficient reason for delay” exception provides a separate and distinct exception from the exceptions set forth in the recent amendments to the Statute. Because I do not view the strict application of the Statute to compel an “absurd” result, I would leave the means and methods of implementing any deadlines and extensions of those deadlines to the Legislature.

[76] The concurring opinion relies upon Criminal Rule 4 in support of its position that a trial court retains “inherent authority” to briefly extend the deadlines set forth in the Statute. I disagree; for it is not a trial court's “inherent authority” that permits extension of the “rigid” deadlines of Criminal Rule 4 but rather the explicit text of the Rule. All of the deadlines imposed by Criminal Rule 4 ¹⁵ contain an exception based upon delays caused by an emergency.¹⁶ See Grimes v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1224, 1228 (Ind. 2024) (stating “[t]he rule requires the State to try defendants in a prompt manner but also permits trial courts to reschedule trials in case of calendar ‘congestion’ or an ‘emergency’.”); Paul v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (stating “Crim[inal] Rule 4(B)(1)’s direction to discharge is mandatory, and ‘nothing will prevent the rule's operation save its own exceptions.’ ”).

[77] For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. Finding this issue dispositive, the trial court's denial of Father's motion to dismiss was clearly erroneous; the adjudication of the Children as CHINS should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded to the trial court to dismiss this cause, without prejudice.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   The record does not reveal a cause of death for T.P.

3.   The trial court never issued a direct ruling on Father's February 5 motion to dismiss, but the trial court implicitly overruled it by proceeding with the case.

4.   During the pendency of this appeal, the wardship was terminated, resulting in reunification of Parents and Children. See Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 2. Despite this, Father's appeal is not moot, which DCS concedes. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014).

5.   In his reply brief, Father claims that this issue was preserved because Mother's counsel objected when testimony concerning Parents’ mental health and Children's skin condition was elicited. But Mother never presented a due process argument.

6.   The sixty-day deadline fell on February 2, 2025, which was a Sunday. See Ind. Trial Rule 6(A).

7.   Our conclusion is not inconsistent with In re W.H., No. 26A-JC-109, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2026 WL 2250472 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2026), also written by the author of the instant opinion. In W.H., no party moved for a continuance before the statutory deadline for holding dispositional hearings elapsed. We, therefore, held that the trial court could not retroactively use good cause to grant a continuance that was never requested. Id. at *4. W.H. did not consider the question of whether a trial court has authority to grant a continuance that has been properly requested. Here, DCS moved in writing for both continuances well before the applicable deadlines expired.

8.   Father also argues that DCS violated Trial Rule 7(D) because it discovered the need for a continuance on April 3 but did not file its motion until April 8. However, Father identifies no prejudice from this five-day delay. Indeed, the motion was granted the same day it was filed, and the continuance itself was brief and unavoidable. Moreover, any delay in DCS making its written request for a continuance did not deprive Father of notice or an opportunity to be heard on the timing of the continuance. At the April 3 hearing, DCS informed the trial court it intended to seek a continuance, and Father's counsel confirmed she wanted the request in writing. The trial court and parties agreed on the record to reconvene on April 10. DCS's April 8 motion simply formalized the timing of the continuance the parties had already worked out.

9.   “Unlike CHINS dispositional decrees, no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS factfinding order.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10).

10.   Neither party requested that the trial court enter specific findings and conclusions pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A); instead, the trial court ordered the parties to submit proposed findings and conclusions. We, therefore, treat the trial court's findings as sua sponte. Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Father also claims that the trial court adopted DCS's proposed findings and conclusions wholesale, as indicated by the introductory paragraph stating that the findings were prepared by DCS's attorney. Although this practice is not forbidden, “ ‘our confidence that findings of fact and conclusions of law are the result of a considered judgment by the trial court is diminished when the trial court adopts verbatim the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by one of the parties[.]’ ” Beckman v. Beckman, 271 N.E.3d 1135, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Pfadt v. Wheels Assured Delivery Sys., Inc., 200 N.E.3d 961, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)). Father further notes that the chronological case summaries (“CCS”) here do not reflect that the proposed findings and conclusions were submitted by the parties. He then cautions us not to rely on materials outside the record on appeal. Contrary to Father's suggestion, we do not resort to the Odyssey docket or any other material outside the record. Instead, our review is confined to the Clerk's Record and Transcript before us pursuant to Appellate Rule 27. To the extent that Father presents this as an independent ground for reversal, it is waived for failure to make a cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We remind trial courts that all documents filed with the Clerk of the Court are required to be noted on the CCS per Trial Rule 77(B).

11.   We cite to the version of the statute that was in effect at the time the CHINS petitions were filed.

12.   Father makes no cognizable argument regarding Finding 11, and we, therefore, consider it unchallenged.

13.   Other panels of this court have recognized the potential consequences of the repeal of Trial Rule 53.5 with respect to elimination of the “good cause” language. See In re A.B., 277 N.E.3d 98, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (stating “several amendments to our Trial Court Rules and the applicable CHINS statute during the course of these proceedings have led to the dispute in this case: whether good cause is still sufficient to warrant a continuance of a CHINS factfinding hearing beyond the 120-day statutory deadline for that hearing.”); In re O.M., 266 N.E.3d 326, 330 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (stating that the parents contended that “because Trial Rule 53.5 was repealed, the trial court was automatically required to dismiss the case.”).

14.   See P.L.179-2025, § 14, eff. July 1, 2025.

15.   Subsection A applies to defendants detained in jail and imposes a 180-day deadline; Subsection B applies to defendants who are in jail and have requested an early trial and imposes a 70-day deadline; and Subsection C applies to defendants not in jail and imposes a one-year deadline. See Ind. Crim. Rule 4.

16.   Subsection A provides that “[d]elays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period.” Crim. R. 4(A). Subsection B provides the following exception: “(1) delays due to congestion of the court calendar or emergency are excluded from the seventy-day calculation ․” Crim. R. 4(B). Lastly, Subsection C provides that “[d]elays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period.” Crim. R. 4(C).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., concurs in result with separate opinion. Foley, J., dissents with separate opinion.