Daron Washington, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Daron Washington neglected his prematurely born child by failing to provide adequate nutrition or to seek medical treatment for her. The child subsequently died. The State charged Washington with two counts of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death—a nutrition-based count and a medical-care-based count. The trial court found Washington guilty as charged and initially entered judgment of conviction only on the nutrition-based count to avoid double jeopardy concerns. In a previous appeal, we found insufficient evidence that lack of nutrition caused the child's death and reduced Washington's nutrition-based conviction to a Level 6 felony. On remand, the trial court vacated that conviction and entered judgment on the medical-care-based count as a Level 1 felony instead. Finding the evidence sufficient to support this conviction, we affirm.

Facts

[2] Our decision on Washington's previous appeal summarized the facts of this case:

[Child 1] and her twin sister, [Child 2],1 were born prematurely at Eskenazi Hospital in November 2022. The children spent 21 days in the neonatal intensive care unit but were ultimately discharged from the hospital in stable condition. Upon the children's discharge, their mother and father—[Mother] and Washington, respectively—were instructed to attend follow-up medical appointments and to maintain routine pediatric care. Neither parent did.

One day in March 2023, [Mother] called Washington's sister just before 9:00 a.m. and reported that she had found [Child 1] unresponsive in the family's home. Washington's sister in turn called 911, and police and paramedics were dispatched to the scene. When they arrived, [Child 1] was in cardiac arrest. She also appeared emaciated with sagging skin and protruding ribs. All attempts to revive [Child 1] were unsuccessful, and she was eventually pronounced dead at Riley Children's Hospital.

When asked about the events leading up to [Child 1]’s death, Washington and [Mother] provided inconsistent narratives. Washington stated that he fed [Child 1] a bottle at 3:00 a.m. before laying her on a couch in the family's home to sleep. Then, at 7:00 a.m., he found [Child 1] unresponsive on the couch with no apparent obstruction to her nose or mouth. [Mother], however, stated that she fed [Child 1] a bottle at 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. before [Child 1] fell asleep in [Mother's] arms. [Mother] then sat awake on the couch for roughly 30 minutes before noticing that [Child 1] was unresponsive in her arms.

Medical experts later determined that [Child 1] was severely malnourished when she died. But her cause of death could not be determined with medical certainty. Still, the State charged both Washington and [Mother] with two counts of neglect of a dependent resulting in death. Count I specifically alleged that they “failed to provide [Child 1] with adequate nutrition,” and Count II specifically alleged that they “failed to seek medical treatment [for Child 1].” [Mother] pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, but Washington proceeded to a bench trial on both charges.

At trial, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Amanda Paul, the forensic pathologist who performed [Child 1's] autopsy and further investigated her death. Dr. Paul testified that [Child 1's] cause of death “could not be determined.” According to Dr. Paul, an “undetermined” cause of death is different from a “sudden unexplained death of an infant” (SUID), which often occurs from an unknown cause during sleep. But because Washington and [Mother] gave conflicting accounts of the events leading up to [Child 1's] death, Dr. Paul did not have the information necessary to place [Child 1's] cause of death in the SUID category. In Dr. Paul's words: “I really just don't know, so I went with undetermined. That was the best I could come up with.”

Despite [Child 1's] severe malnourishment, Dr. Paul could not place [Child 1]’s cause of death in the malnutrition category either. She explained:

I went with an undetermined cause of death because I -- because she was underweight, I couldn't really say if it was enough of a malnourishment because if -- if she was malnourished enough to the point where I said this was definitely the cause of death, I would have listed the cause of death as malnutrition. But she's just small enough that I don't really know, but I think it does play a factor, I really do. But I just can't know with certainty, which is what I'm supposed to do when I, you know, with medical certainty -- I don't have that.

I've had cases that I have called malnutrition because they were significantly smaller than even [Child 1] was. But in this case, I -- you know, it just wasn't enough that I could say with medical certainty that [malnutrition] was the cause of death, and that's why I went with undetermined ․ in addition to the conflicting statements.

The State also presented the testimony of Dr. Shannon Thompson, a child abuse pediatrician who consulted with the Indiana Department of Child Services after [Child 1's] death. Dr. Thompson opined that [Child 1's] malnutrition likely “contributed to” her death, but she could not say it was the cause. As Dr. Thompson explained: “That would be [Dr. Paul's] role, and I essentially agreed with her findings.” But Dr. Thompson was confident that [Child 1] would still be alive if Washington had sought medical care for her.

Additionally, the State presented the testimony of Dr. James Lemons, a neonatologist who treated [Child 1] while she was in the NICU following her birth. Even “without knowing” the specific diagnosis for [Child 1's] death, Dr. Lemons testified that Washington's delay in seeking medical care for [Child 1] “almost certainly” resulted in her death. And when asked whether he was “absolutely certain,” Dr. Lemons stated: “We never say ․ always or never in medicine.”

The trial court found Washington guilty of both counts of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. When explaining its verdict from the bench, the court stated:

[Defense counsel] wants to argue that we don't know why [Child 1] died. We -- we -- I agree with that, we can't know that now. There may have been an underlying condition. But because you didn't seek medical treatment, we couldn't figure that out and attempt to fix it. That's the problem.

The court, however, only entered judgment of conviction on the nutrition-based count (Count I) due to double-jeopardy concerns. The court did not enter judgment of conviction on the medical-care-based count (Count II). Washington was ultimately sentenced to 24 years in prison.

Washington v. State, 274 N.E.3d 196, 197–98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (record citations omitted).

[3] Washington then pursued his previous appeal in this case, “challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he committed neglect of a dependent resulting in death by failing to provide [Child 1] with adequate nutrition.” Id. at 198. We concluded the evidence “established merely the possibility that [Child 1] would not have died but for her malnutrition,” which was insufficient to prove the element of causation. Id. at 199. We therefore reduced Washington's conviction to “the lesser included offense of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent.” Id. at 200. We also noted “that the trial court found Washington guilty of the medical-care-based count but did not enter judgment of conviction due to double jeopardy concerns.” Id. And we remanded for the trial court “to determine whether judgments of conviction on both Count I's lesser-included Level 6 felony and Count II's Level 1 felony would implicate double jeopardy” and “whether resentencing [was] necessary.” Id.

[4] On remand, the trial court vacated Count I, entered judgment on Count II alone, and again imposed a twenty-four-year executed sentence. Washington thus stands convicted of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death based on his failure to seek medical treatment.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Washington challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show that “the lack of medical care caused [Child 1's] death.” Appellant's Br., p. 5. The State contends Washington waived this argument by failing to raise it in his previous appeal and maintains the evidence for causation was sufficient. As we prefer to consider claims on the merits where possible, instead of on procedural grounds like waiver, Hoback v. State, 225 N.E.3d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), we address Washington's sufficiency argument notwithstanding any potential waiver.

[6] “When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Washington, 274 N.E.3d at 198. “We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id. And “[w]e will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[7] In pertinent part, Indiana's neglect statute states: “A person having the care of a dependent ․ who knowingly or intentionally ․ places the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent's life or health ․ commits neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1). “However, the offense is ․ a Level 1 felony if it is committed ․ by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age and results in the death or catastrophic injury of a dependent who is less than fourteen (14) years of age.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(b)(3).

[8] As we explained in Washington's previous appeal, “[a]n enhancing event that results from a criminal act implicates proximate causation, which requires that the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct.” Washington, 274 N.E.3d at 199 (quoting Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1142 (Ind. 2022)). In a medical neglect case, evidence of a mere possibility that the dependent would have survived but for the failure to seek medical care is insufficient to establish but-for causation. Id.; Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[9] Here, Washington contends the State failed to “prove that [Child 1's] malnutrition” was “not caused by an incurable, organic condition, or that [Child 1's] death would have been prevented if she had received medical care.” Appellant's Br., p. 14. In essence, Washington suggests Child 1's death might have been “inevitable even with medical intervention” and that the State failed to disprove this possibility. Id. at 9.

[10] But two medical witnesses expressly testified that earlier medical treatment would have saved Child 1's life. Dr. Thompson stated:

[Child 1] wouldn't have been allowed to waste away that way. She would have been hospitalized[,] or a feeding regimen so that she could get adequate caloric intake could have been addressed. And if she was getting adequate caloric intake but still not thriving, that could have been addressed. It would not have led to her passing.

Prior Case Tr. Vol. II, p. 240. And Dr. Lemons stated with a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” that the delay in seeking medical care “almost certainly” resulted in Child 1's death. Id. at 98. He added that the chances of Child 1 having disease-related malnutrition that was “fatal irrespective of treatment” were “as close to zero as we can predict.” Id. at 95. Then, he explained that one never “say[s] ․ always or never in medicine.” Id. at 98.

[11] The State thus presented evidence that Child 1 did not die from an “incurable, organic condition” and would have survived with earlier medical care. Appellant's Br., p. 14. The medical witnesses stated their opinions with confidence, not in terms of mere possibilities. And to the extent Dr. Lemons declined to state his opinions with utter certainty, we note that the State was only required to prove Washington's guilt beyond “any reasonable doubt”—not “beyond all possible doubt.” Ind. Pattern Crim. Jury Inst. 13.1000.

Conclusion

[12] Sufficient evidence shows that Washington's failure to seek medical care caused Child 1's death. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For the reasons stated in Sayger v. State, No. 25A-CR-3221, at 1 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. Sep. 25, 2026), we anonymize the names of the children and mother here by inserting the familial designators “Child 1,” “Child 2,” and “Mother.” But we do not anonymize the defendant.

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur