Dravyn B. Maxie, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Dravyn B. Maxie appeals his convictions for Level 3 felony aggravated battery and Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. He contends that the State failed to sufficiently rebut his claim of self-defense and, in the alternative, that his dual convictions violate substantive double jeopardy.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On the night of February 21, 2024, Jacob Minder drove to an Arby's restaurant in Mishawaka with his girlfriend, Ja'Nai Davis. Davis had been arguing with a woman she knew only as Nesha, who worked at the Arby's and was dating Mason Miller, Davis's ex-boyfriend. The plan was for Nesha and Davis to settle things with a fight, but when Davis arrived, Nesha came out to the parking lot with “two girls behind her” who were video recording with their phones. Transcript Vol. 2 at 156. Davis feared that she would “get jumped” during the fight, so she left to get her siblings as backup. Id. at 157.

[4] On the way home, Davis called her older sister, Jonnae, and explained the situation. Jonnae agreed to be picked up by Minder and Davis to join what was “just supposed to be a girl fist fight.” Id. at 126. Their younger brother, J.T., also came along because he wanted to get food. All four returned to Arby's a little before 10:50 p.m. Minder drove and Davis sat in the front passenger seat, Jonnae sat behind Minder, and J.T. sat behind Davis.

[5] Minder backed his Ford Focus (the Focus) into a spot in the Arby's parking lot about three spaces down from a Chevy Equinox (the Equinox) with tinted windows. Both vehicles were facing the restaurant. Davis had called Miller on the drive back and then alerted either him or Nesha upon their arrival. Davis planned on there being a “one-on-one fight” with Nesha, and she had Jonnae there as backup if any of the other girls got involved. Id. at 161.

[6] Meanwhile, Miller had already arrived in the Equinox, driven by Donald McClane, and gone into the Arby's. McClane and Maxie waited in the Equinox for about ten minutes believing they were there to get free food and pick up Nesha. Maxie, a longtime friend of Miller, did not know Minder or Davis and was unaware of the dispute between Nesha and Davis until Miller received an angry call from Davis on the drive to the Arby's. During the call, Miller just kept saying, “Whatever.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 62. Miller explained the situation to Maxie after the call and before heading into the Arby's.

[7] While “chilling in the car,” Maxie observed the Focus arrive and suspected that Minder and Davis were inside it. Id. He exited the back passenger door of the Equinox wearing a hoodie and, with his back to the Focus, removed his handgun from his shoulder holster and put the gun in the pocket of his hoodie. He then hurriedly walked toward the Focus, eventually pulling out his gun and aiming it at the Focus. Maxie then repeatedly banged on the driver's window and the rear passenger window with his gun while yelling at the occupants to “get the f**k out of the car.” Id. at 69.

[8] Minder, who did not know who Maxie was, felt threatened, so he grabbed his own gun from the side pocket of the door and kept it at his left hip to be “prepared and ready.” Exhibits Vol. 4 at 88. The occupants of the Focus were shocked and scared, with Jonnae later describing at trial: “I was afraid for my life. I never really had a gun pointed at me before. Like I thought I was gonna die.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 137. And based on the look in Maxie's eyes, Minder believed Maxie was “ready to shoot.” Exhibits Vol. 4 at 83.

[9] When Maxie proceeded to try to open Jonnae's back passenger door, Minder opened his own door and shot Maxie once in the abdomen as Maxie backed up while aiming his gun at Minder. Maxie quickly returned fire, shooting at Minder five times in rapid succession. Minder was struck three times – in his left eye, the back of his right shoulder, and the center of his back. Minder collapsed face first to the ground after being shot, and then Maxie got into the Equinox and was taken by McClane to the hospital.

[10] Responding officers found Minder on the ground just outside of the Focus, covered in blood and unsuccessfully trying to lift himself off the ground. He suffered extensive injuries from the gunshots, including the loss of his left eye and a permanent spinal cord injury resulting in paralysis from the chest down. Minder underwent lengthy medical care before being transferred to hospice, where he remained until he died just after the trial in this matter.

[11] Mishawaka Police Officer John Comeu obtained a brief voluntary statement from Maxie at the hospital the day after the shooting. Maxie acknowledged approaching the Focus with his gun and using it to bang on the car windows while demanding that one of the occupants get out to fight him. Maxie told Officer Comeu that he wanted to fight for Miller, who was on crutches and less physically able to fight. When nobody got out of the Focus, Maxie claimed that he turned to walk away but was then shot in the stomach. Maxie reported to Officer Comeu that he immediately returned fire and, in Maxie's words, “ ‘dumped’ on [Minder].” Transcript Vol. 3 at 18.

[12] On March 2, 2024, the State charged Maxie with three counts: Count I, Level 3 felony aggravated battery; Count II, Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon; and Count III, Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The three-day jury trial commenced on January 12, 2026.

[13] Maxie testified in his own defense, claiming that he acted in self-defense. That is, Maxie claimed that he was “100 percent sure” that the occupants of the Focus were going to harm Miller and Nesha. Id. at 69. Therefore, as Maxie explained, he approached with a gun wanting the two males inside the Focus to come out and fight him rather than Miller. When they did not react, Maxie testified that he moved to the back window and started yelling at Jonnae, whom he believed to be Miller's ex. Maxie testified that he was “screaming” and “really upset” while eventually gesturing with the gun and repeatedly telling them to “get the f**k out of here.” Id. at 72. He claimed that he then got into a screaming match with Jonnae and that when she opened her door, he grabbed the door and slammed it shut on her. According to Maxie, they were “mean mugging” him and not saying a word, so he turned and walked away. Id. at 74. Maxie testified that he ran toward the Equinox after being shot and only returned fire to protect himself from being shot again.

[14] On cross-examination, Maxie acknowledged that he did not alert Miller when the Focus pulled up; he just got out of the Equinox and approached the Focus with a gun. Maxie testified that the occupants of the Focus appeared “shocked” by his actions, and he agreed that if the roles were reversed, he would feel threatened. Id. at 90. Maxie claimed that although he pulled a gun out, he only wanted to “have a fist fight” with the males inside the car. Id. at 92.

[15] The jury found Maxie guilty as charged. Thereafter, the trial court entered judgments of conviction on Counts I and II but not on Count III based on double jeopardy concerns. On February 13, 2026, the trial court sentenced Maxie to consecutive terms of twelve years on Count I and five years on Count II. All five years on Count II were suspended to probation, and three of the twelve years on Count I were ordered to be served on home detention.

[16] Maxie now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[17] Maxie claims that the State failed to sufficiently rebut his claim of self-defense. We review such claims like any other sufficiency of the evidence challenge. Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 533 (Ind. 2025). That is, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, instead leaving those matters to the province of the jury. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024); see also Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022) (“When there are conflicts in the evidence, the jury must resolve them.”). With this deferential review in mind, we will consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Sorgdrager v. State, 208 N.E.3d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. “We will affirm the defendant's conviction if there is evidence, including reasonable inferences, that supports the judgment. And we will reverse the defendant's conviction only if no reasonable person could say that the defendant's self-defense claim was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 533 (quotations and citations omitted).

[18] Self-defense is a legal justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, and it operates as a complete bar to conviction. Id. at 534. Our self-defense statute provides that “a person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). A person is justified in using deadly force, however, to protect themselves or others if “the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony.” Id. Notwithstanding subsection (c) of the self-defense statute, “a person is not justified in using force” if he “entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g)(3).

[19] To prevail on a claim of self-defense involving deadly force, a defendant must (1) have been in a place where he had a right to be; (2) not have provoked, instigated, or participated willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. See Hall v. State, 166 N.E.3d 406, 412-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). “The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999).

[20] On appeal, Maxie argues that he had a right to be in the Arby's parking lot and that he had a reasonable fear that he or his friends might suffer death or great bodily harm at the hands of Minder, whom Maxie thought might be armed with a gun. Maxie acknowledges, however, that “[t]he question of whether [Maxie] provoked or participated in the violence is more complicated.” Appellant's Brief at 17. That is, while he does not deny that he was the initial aggressor by going to the Focus and banging on its doors with his gun, Maxie notes that Minder was indeed armed and argues that he was not required to “wait and be shot” by Minder before defending himself. Id. at 19.

[21] Maxie likens this case to Turner, in which our Supreme Court reversed a conviction for battery by means of a deadly weapon where hindsight showed that the shooting was necessary for self-defense. In that case, shortly after Dequan Briscoe threatened over the phone to pull up on and attack Antonio Turner, Turner walked outside to his own car and “sensed that the unfamiliar car screeching towards him down the sleepy street was an ambush.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 530. “Since he didn't have time to reach the house and had nowhere to hide, he turned while running and fired four shots into the car, wounding Briscoe.” Id. It turned out that Turner's intuition was correct. “Briscoe was aiming a handgun to shoot Turner just before Turner began firing.” Id. At the bench trial, the judge rejected Turner's self-defense claim because Turner did not recognize the car, did not know who was driving, and could not see inside the car or see the gun before he fired. Id. at 532. While acknowledging that Turner's fear that he was about to be shot was accurate, the judge felt “constrained to convict” because Turner's fear “was unreasonable as a matter of self-defense law.” Id. In other words, “Turner's choices, in the judge's view, were either shoot or be shot,” but the first option was unreasonable. Id. at 539.

[22] The Supreme Court reversed and addressed “how the self-defense statute applies to a sliver of circumstances where the necessity of self-defense is only fully apparent in hindsight.” Id. at 534. The Court explained:

Under Indiana's self-defense statute, justification for using force based on a mistaken belief about necessity depends on the reasonableness of the belief given the circumstances. But using defensive force based on an accurate belief is justified regardless of the belief's reasonableness. In other words, using force for protection based on a belief that is both unreasonable and turns out to be wrong isn't justified, but acting on a belief that is unreasonable, yet right, is justified.

Id. Thus, because the trial judge had made the factual conclusion that Turner's conduct was necessary to protect himself, the shooting was justified under Indiana law regardless of the reasonableness of Turner's belief (without the benefit of hindsight) that he was about to be shot. Id. at 539. Based on the trial judge's factual determinations, the Court held that the shooting was justified because: (1) Turner was protecting himself from a threat of serious bodily injury; (2) the threat was imminent; (3) the threat required force for protection; and (4) “the force Turner used was proportional to the threat—he shot at Briscoe to avoid being shot and then stopped shooting when Briscoe drove off.” Id.

[23] The facts in this case are nothing like those in Turner. Maxie was the initial aggressor, actively confronting the occupants of the Focus rather than fleeing. And he did so while armed with a gun and while angrily yelling at them. As Maxie conceded at trial, the occupants of the Focus appeared shocked by his threatening actions. Indeed, they were shocked and frightened. Unlike Turner, this is not “a case about a good guy with a gun shooting a bad guy with a gun when the only choices were to shoot or be shot.” Id. at 530. Maxie had many options, and there was no need for him to aggressively approach the Focus while displaying a gun and yelling for the occupants to get out of the car. For example, he could have called Miller to warn him of the arrival of the Focus, asked McClane to simply drive away, and/or called 911. Moreover, the jury could have reasonably determined based on the facts presented at trial that Minder, despite being armed, did not present an imminent harm to Maxie or anyone else when he parked at the Arby's, that Maxie's alleged fear of death or great bodily harm was not reasonable, and that Minder was the one who, like Turner, shot in self-defense.

[24] The State sufficiently rebutted Maxie's claim of self-defense because, among other things, the evidence showed that he did not act without fault. He took matters into his own hands and provoked violence by inciting a confrontation between himself and Minder, both of whom were armed with guns. As there is ample evidence from which the jury could reject Maxie's claim of self-defense, we will not reverse his convictions on sufficiency grounds.

2. Double Jeopardy

[25] Alternatively, Maxie contends that his convictions for aggravated battery and battery by means of a deadly weapon violate the prohibition against substantive double jeopardy. The State agrees that there is a double jeopardy violation that should be resolved by vacating the conviction on Count II, but it asks that we remand for resentencing on Count I.

[26] We review double jeopardy claims de novo. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1066 (Ind. 2024). The convictions at issue here are for different statutory offenses with common elements, so we apply the three-part test set out by our Supreme Court in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), as clarified and modified by A.W, to determine whether both convictions can stand.

[27] At the first step, we look to the statutory language of the offenses at issue; if there is language that “clearly permits” multiple punishments, then “there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy” and we end our analysis. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1066 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). As relevant here, the battery statute provides that a person who “knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner” commits battery, and the offense is elevated from a Class B misdemeanor to a Level 5 felony if “committed with a deadly weapon.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) and (h)(2). And the aggravated battery statute provides in relevant part that a person “who knowingly or intentionally inflicts injury on a person that creates a substantial risk of death or causes ․ protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ” commits aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5(2). Neither statute clearly permits multiple punishments, and thus we proceed to step two of the Wadle test.

[28] Applying the included offense statute, Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168,¹ and looking only to the facts on the face of the charging instrument, in step two, we assess whether the charges are inherently included or factually included as charged. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067. If ambiguities exist in the charging instrument regarding whether one offense is factually included in another, we must find a presumptive double jeopardy violation and proceed to the third step. See id. at 1069. While battery with a deadly weapon may not be an inherently included offense of aggravated battery,² it may certainly be factually included. That is, as the State concedes, the means used to commit the aggravated battery – shooting Minder – could establish all the elements of battery with a deadly weapon. But the charging instrument simply tracks the statutory language of each offense and is ambiguous, requiring us to move to the third step.

[29] At this final step, “a court may ․ probe the underlying facts – as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at trial – to determine whether [the] defendant's actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’ ” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). If the facts do not show two distinct offenses, the convictions place the defendant in substantive double jeopardy. Easter v. State, 281 N.E.3d 896, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). Further, to rebut a presumptive double jeopardy violation, it is the State's burden on appeal to “demonstrate that it made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses.” Eversole v. State, 251 N.E.3d 604, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[30] The State makes no argument on appeal that it can satisfy the requirements of step three. Instead, it concedes that upon a review of the facts adduced at trial, “Maxie's convictions constitute a substantive double jeopardy violation” because there was “only one continuous crime.” Appellee's Brief at 21. The State continues:

Maxie armed himself with a gun—a deadly weapon—and used it to batter Minder by shooting him with it. That battery was the means Maxie used to inflict the injury alleged in the aggravated battery charge which resulted in the protracted loss or impairment of the function of one of Minder's bodily members or organs because the bullet that struck his spinal cord left him permanently paralyzed from the chest down.

Id. (record cites omitted). As the State has failed to rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation, we reverse Maxie's lesser conviction of battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony.

[31] On remand, the trial court is directed to vacate the conviction and sentence imposed on Count II. Because the trial court imposed consecutive sentences and did not fully enhance the sentence on Count I,³ we recognize that vacating Count II could defeat the court's overall sentencing plan. See Sanjari v. State, 981 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“[A] trial court is likely to view individual sentences in a multi-count proceeding as part of an overall plan, a plan that can be overthrown if one or more of the convictions is reversed or reduced in degree.”), trans. denied. Accordingly, the trial court has the “flexibility” on remand to increase the sentence on Count I, so long as the sentence is no longer than the aggregate sentence originally imposed. Id.; see also Shultz v. State, 115 N.E.3d 1280, 1285 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (remanding for resentencing on remaining count where another count, with a consecutive sentence, was vacated on double jeopardy grounds).

[32] Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168 defines “included offense” as an offense that:(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

2.   Maxie does not argue that the offenses are inherently included offenses.

3.   Count I is a Level 3 felony, which has a sentencing range of three to sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. See Ind. Code 35-50-2-5(b). The trial court imposed a sentence of twelve years on this count, with the five years on Count II to be served consecutively, for an aggregate of seventeen years.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidk, J. and Foley, J., concur.