Michael D. Jones, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Michael Jones was in his seventies when, over a period of years, he repeatedly molested a neighbor's child (Victim). The State eventually charged Jones with one count of Level 4 felony child molesting. While his prosecution was pending, Jones kept driving past Victim's home in violation of a no-contact order issued by the trial court. At eighty-one, Jones pleaded guilty to the child molesting charge and received the maximum twelve-year sentence.

[2] Jones now asks us to reduce that sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). He points to his age, his sparse criminal record, his guilty plea, and a lifetime of mental illness. But he fails to take into proper account the significant harm his actions caused Victim, his breach of her trust, his violation of the no-contact order, and the substantial benefits he received through pleading guilty. We affirm.

Facts

[3] Victim lived near Jones in Knox County. Victim's mother had long known Jones, and they eventually became neighbors. In April 2021, when Victim was fourteen, she told a school social worker that when she was nine or ten, Jones had made her kiss him before he would allow her to leave his home. Victim also reported another incident at Jones's home when she was ten to twelve years old. She said Jones would not let her leave until she lay down on his bed, where he fondled her breasts and made her touch his penis until he ejaculated.

[4] At a subsequent forensic interview, Victim estimated that Jones had sexually touched her three or four times in total—including the incidents revealed to the school social worker—over a period of several years. During one of the incidents, Jones told Victim to come back when she was older so she could “make love” to him. Exhs., p. 3. Victim reported during the forensic interview that Jones also asked her whether she was a virgin and whether she masturbated, and he made repeated sexual remarks about his own body.

[5] When interviewed by law enforcement, Jones admitted he had kissed Victim on the lips and asked her to rub his penis to ejaculation. When the interviewing officer told him that Victim was only fourteen, Jones said he knew that and vowed never to see or touch her again.

[6] The State charged Jones in June 2021 with one count of Level 4 felony child molesting. The trial court entered an order barring Jones's contact with Victim. About a year later, Jones stopped his truck in front of Victim's home, honked, and waved at Victim and her family. When Victim's mother told him he was violating the no-contact order, Jones reportedly said something like “I had to.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 30-31. For this, the State charged Jones with misdemeanor invasion of privacy in a separate prosecution.

[7] In June 2025, a law enforcement officer drove to Victim's home after receiving a report that Jones had been “incessantly driving by” and “frequently stopping in the [adjacent] road.” Exhs., p. 7. Victim told the officer that Jones drove by at least three times daily, that she had learned to recognize the sound of his vehicle, and that the sound made her panicked and afraid. Id. at 8. A security camera had captured images of Jones's vehicle driving by Victim's home twenty-eight times during the prior four days. Ten of those images appeared to depict a stopped vehicle.

[8] Jones drove by yet again as the investigating officer was leaving Victim's home. When the officer stopped Jones's vehicle, Jones stated that he knew about the no-contact order but drove past Victim's home on his way to a fast-food restaurant several times a day. For this, the State separately charged Jones with Level 6 felony stalking, and the trial court revoked his bond in the molestation prosecution.

[9] In other developments, Jones's counsel in the molestation prosecution moved for a competency evaluation, asserting that Jones was “elderly and losing his mental faculties.” App. Vol. II, p. 27. The trial court appointed two doctors to evaluate Jones.

[10] Dr. Heather Henderson, a psychologist, reported that Jones had been diagnosed with schizophrenia beginning in the 1970s, had suffered a stroke around 2017 or 2018, and reported symptoms of depression during the evaluation. Jones scored 29 out of 30—within the normal range—on the “Mini Mental Status Exam,” a test for identifying cognitive impairments. Jones voiced delusions about trucks “gunning past him real fast on the highway,” conspiracies, and unseen people shooting guns. Exhs., p. 11. He explained his conduct toward Victim with what Dr. Henderson called “magical thinking.” Id. at 12.

[11] Dr. George Parker, a psychiatrist, diagnosed Jones with a mild neurocognitive disorder. Dr. Parker observed no active symptoms of schizophrenia or depression and thought both might be in remission. Both evaluators concluded that Jones was competent to stand trial, and the trial court agreed with those conclusions in September 2024.

[12] In June 2025, the State amended the information to allege that the molestation occurred between January 1, 2017, and April 16, 2021. Five days before Jones's trial was to begin, he pleaded guilty to the Level 4 felony child molesting charge. There was no written plea agreement, but the State agreed to dismiss the invasion of privacy and stalking cases that day if the trial court accepted Jones's guilty plea. The parties set no limits on sentencing.

[13] At Jones's sentencing hearing, the trial court took judicial notice, without objection, of both competency reports and the probable cause affidavits in all three prosecutions pending against Jones. Victim's statement was read by her father at the hearing. The statement described Jones's grooming and abuse, as well as Victim's resulting nightmares, self-harm, and years of therapy. It also described the dread of seeing Jones drive past her home for years after the molestations.

[14] The trial court found five aggravating circumstances: (1) the harm to Victim was significant and greater than the required elements of the offense; (2) Jones violated the no-contact order; (3) Jones violated the conditions of his pretrial release; (4) Jones held a position of care, custody, or control over Victim; and (5) Jones told Victim not to say anything, which the court viewed as a threat when made by a grown adult to a child. The court acknowledged Jones's minimal criminal history and noted his age and health problems. But it found no mitigating circumstances. The court sentenced Jones to the maximum term of twelve years imprisonment, with eighty-four days credit. Jones appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Jones raises a single issue: whether his maximum twelve-year sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). This rule authorizes us to revise a statutorily authorized sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision,” we find it “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B). Our role is “to attempt to leaven the outliers,” not “to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We consider “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

[16] In applying this standard, we afford “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222). But such deference may be “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Id. Jones bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 946 (Ind. 2014).

I. Initial Observation

[17] Jones contends neither he nor his offense is among “the worst of the worst.” Appellant's Br., pp. 5-6. But that is not the test. As we recently noted in Crossley v. State, No. 26A-CR-644, 2026 WL 2508133, *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2026), such an analysis belongs to “a regime long since dismantled.” The primary decision that Jones cites—Means v. State, 807 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)—was decided under Indiana's former presumptive sentencing scheme. Under that scheme, a trial court “could deviate from the fixed presumptive term only by identifying the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and articulating its evaluation and balancing of them.” Crossley, 2026 WL 2508133, at *4.

[18] This presumptive scheme was replaced with the current advisory system more than twenty years ago. Id. The legislature “did so by amending Indiana's sentencing statutes to eliminate fixed presumptive terms in favor of ‘advisory sentences’ that are between the minimum and maximum terms left intact by the legislature.” Id.

[19] Under this revised sentencing framework, we do not ask whether a worse crime or a worse offender can be imagined. Instead, we weigh the defendant's culpability, the crime's severity, the damage done, and other factors while remaining mindful that “crimes against children are particularly contemptible.” Tillett v. State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 366 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011)); Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. And when reviewing the sentence under Rule 7(B), the two inquiries—the nature of the offense and the character of the offender—are ultimately balanced as well. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126-27 (Ind. 2024). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127. We now turn to our Rule 7(B) analysis.

II. Nature of the Offense

[20] In determining the appropriateness of a sentence in light of the nature of the offense, we first look to the statutory sentencing range established for that class of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). The sentencing range for Level 4 felony child molesting is two to twelve years imprisonment, with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. Jones received the maximum sentence.

[21] As to the nature of the offense, Victim was only nine or ten when the molestations began. Jones admitted to the investigating officer that he molested Victim more than once. Victim recalled more incidents than Jones—three or four in total—and reported a steady stream of inappropriate sexual remarks and questions.

[22] Although Jones argues his crime involved no force or threat and no physical injury, none was required for his conviction. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (“A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Level 4 felony”). The record shows that Jones conditioned Victim's departure on a kiss and told her that he would not let her leave his home until she lay on his bed. Jones also insisted she not tell anyone—a directive that the trial court viewed as a threat.

[23] Moreover, the record shows Victim suffered significant harm from the offense. Long after the molestations, she had nightmares, engaged in self-harm, had a persistent fear of Jones, and underwent years of therapy to deal with the psychological impact of his wrongdoing. The record also shows, and the trial court essentially found, that Jones betrayed and exploited Victim's trust. Victim lived nearby, and her family had known Jones for many years. Given all of this evidence, Jones has not met his burden of showing that the nature of his offense renders the maximum sentence inappropriate.¹

III. Character of the Offender

[24] Jones offers three reasons why his character does not support imposition of the maximum sentence: (1) his minimal criminal history; (2) his guilty plea; and (3) his mental illness, age, and health.

A. Criminal History

[25] Jones has one prior conviction: misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content of .08 or more in 2010. The significance of a criminal record is “measured by the number of prior convictions and their gravity, by their proximity or distance from the present offense, and by any similarity or dissimilarity to the present offense.” Bryant v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2006). The trial court did not treat Jones's criminal history as aggravating and acknowledged his lack of felony convictions.

[26] Jones overstates the point when he suggests he lived a law-abiding life “until after age seventy-five (75).” Appellant's Br., p. 9. The amended information alleges the present offense began as early as 2017 when Jones was seventy-three, and the incidents described by Victim began around that time. In any case, absence of criminal conduct is not the same as “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character.” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

B. Guilty Plea

[27] A guilty plea is not particularly mitigating when it does not show acceptance of responsibility or when the defendant receives a substantial benefit. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221. Jones says he accepted responsibility “from the moment investigators questioned him” and pleaded “open.” Appellant's Br., p. 9.

[28] Although Jones displayed some candor with the investigating officer in May 2021, Jones has not accepted responsibility consistently. In 2024, he told Dr. Henderson that he “didn't do nothing,” and he informed Dr. Parker that he had been charged with “molestation of a girl, which I didn't even do.” Exhs., pp. 9, 19. He pleaded guilty only five days before trial after the charges had been pending for four years and his bond had been revoked due to the stalking charge. In exchange for Jones's guilty plea to the molestation charge, the State agreed to dismiss those two charges. This was a substantial benefit.

[29] Moreover, Jones's behavior after he was charged reflects negatively on his character. As Jones notes, the dismissal of the invasion of privacy and stalking charges means he was never convicted of either. But Rule 7(B) directs us to consider what the record shows about the offender, and a court may consider all evidence properly before it unless a plea agreement forbids such consideration. See Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2013). No written plea agreement limited the trial court here. At the State's request and without objection from Jones, the trial court took judicial notice of the probable cause affidavits in the invasion of privacy and stalking cases. On appeal, Jones does not challenge the court's consideration of those documents.

[30] The affidavits show that Jones knew he was ordered to stay away from Victim. In June 2022, he stopped his truck in front of her home, honked, and waved. In June 2025, Jones told the investigating officer he knew about the no-contact order. Yet the home security camera captured his vehicle near Victim's home twenty-eight times in the preceding four days. The security video suggested his vehicle was stopped in the road in ten of those instances. Victim, meanwhile, described being “panicked and afraid” at the sound of his vehicle. Exhs., p. 8.

[31] Contacts with the justice system reflect poorly on a defendant's character when they show he “has not been deterred even after having been subject to the police authority of the State.” Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind. 2005). Jones was charged and barred from contact with Victim, but the record shows he continued to intrude on Victim's life.

C. Mental Illness, Age, and Health

[32] Jones contends this case is exceptional due to his mental illness. Our Supreme Court has determined that Rule 7(B) review may include consideration of “the role of a defendant's mental illness in the commission of a crime.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1271 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 229 (Ind. 2015)). The operative words are “the role” of the illness “in the commission of a crime.” Id.

[33] Jones has lived with mental illness for most of his adult life. In Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 367, our Supreme Court was persuaded that the defendant suffered from mental illness but declined to revise her sentence because it was “not clear that it motivated her offenses.” The same is true here.

[34] Jones has been treated for schizophrenia since the 1970s. His son, who had also been diagnosed with schizophrenia, died by suicide. In addition, Jones had suffered a stroke, and Dr. Parker diagnosed him with a mild neurocognitive disorder. Dr. Henderson found Jones to be “a vulnerable person” who “may be easily preyed upon” and for whom traditional incarceration “may not be an appropriate resource.” Exhs., p. 16.

[35] But Jones has not tied his illness to his offense. First, the delusions that the evaluators documented concern fast trucks, conspiracies, and people shooting. Id. at 11. Nothing in the record suggests these delusional thoughts led Jones to abuse Victim. Dr. Parker even thought Jones's schizophrenia or depression might be in remission, given Jones's lack of observable, active symptoms.

[36] Second, Dr. Henderson's statement that Jones explained his conduct through “magical thinking,” including by calling Victim “a gift from heaven,” reflects Jones's later description of what he did. Id. at 12. Her statement does not show that Jones's mental illness caused him to molest Victim. In fact, the cognitive screening that Dr. Henderson administered showed Jones within normal limits, despite his “magical thinking.” Id. at 12-13.

[37] Third, although Dr. Parker suggested that Jones's stroke “appear[ed]” to have affected his social judgment, “particularly in the area of sexual behavior,” this observation was not part of any independent finding by Dr. Parker. Id. at 19. Instead, it was an inference that Dr. Parker drew from “the nature of the alleged offense” and from counsel's report of recent conduct. Id. And Jones's sexual misconduct appears to have predated his stroke, which occurred around 2017 or 2018. The amended information alleges the molestation occurred as early as January 2017, and Victim reported the first touching occurred around that time. Jones's own brother told Dr. Henderson that Jones had always made sexual remarks. And while waiting at the courthouse for his evaluation, Jones asked a younger female court employee to sit on his lap. This incident reflects that the conduct at issue was not an isolated lapse.

[38] We turn finally to age and health. Jones, now eighty-two, walks with difficulty, and has hearing loss. Dr. Henderson thought traditional incarceration might be unsuitable, and Dr. Parker viewed assisted living as potentially appropriate. The trial court did not ignore these considerations. It acknowledged Jones's age and health, considered the possibility of a “some sort of nursing facility,” and concluded that such a placement was not appropriate. Tr. Vol. II, p. 35. Jones has failed to show that his character supports sentencing revision.

Conclusion

[39] Jones sexually abused a child who trusted him, and the harm to her has been deep and lasting. His advanced age, limited criminal record, early candor with police, guilty plea, health, and mental illness are the strongest points in his favor, and the trial court acknowledged several of them. But none of them is the kind of “compelling evidence” that is required to overcome the deference we owe the trial court. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[40] The nature of Jones's offense weighs heavily against relief, so a claim based on his character “must be all the stronger.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127. Jones's claim is not. The evidence does not tie his illness to his offense. In addition, his post-charge conduct undercuts the weight of the evidence that Jones offers in support of his plea for leniency.

[41] As Jones has not carried his burden of showing that his twelve-year sentence is inappropriate under Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of the offense and his character, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We find unpersuasive Jones's reliance on opinions in which our Supreme Court revised lengthy sentences for child molestation. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. 2011); Walker v. State, 747 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 2001). Those opinions involved Class A felonies resulting in sentences totaling at least forty years. Here, Jones received a twelve-year sentence for one Level 4 felony molestation, and he admitted committing more than one molestation.

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.