Dominick G. Williams, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Dominick Williams, Jr., appeals his conviction for murder, a felony, and his sixty-five-year sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] Williams presents five issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following three:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence regarding cell-tower timing data in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b).

II. Whether statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments regarding accomplice liability constituted prosecutorial misconduct warranting an admonishment to the jury and a mistrial.

III. Whether Williams’ sixty-five-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of Williams’ offense and his character.

Facts

[3] On the afternoon of April 20, 2023, thirteen-year-old Child Witness was on an enclosed front porch of a house in South Bend with his siblings and his friend, Child Victim, who was only eleven years old. At about 4:42 p.m. that day, a white Dodge Charger with tinted windows left the area of Williams’ father's house. Surveillance cameras and Flock license-plate readers tracked the Charger toward the house where Child Witness and Child Victim were located. Child Witness saw a white car drive down the street and turn into an alley across the street from the house where he was located. A man dressed entirely in black and wearing a ski mask, through which his short dreadlocks were visible, got out of the car, moved into the bushes beside a house across the street, and fired a “long gun” toward the porch. Tr. Vol. II p. 44. Child Victim was hit by two of these shots, one of which went through his thigh; the other pierced his liver, diaphragm, heart, and pericardial sac. Child Witness briefly fled inside the home but came out to see his sibling with a wounded Child Victim. Child Victim stated that he had been shot and said to “tell his mom that he love[d] her.” Id. at 46. Child Victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds.

[4] Neighbors described a man with dreadlocks and dressed in black running from the scene of the shooting and carrying a large gun “almost bigger than him.” Id. at 125. The neighbors saw this man get into the white Dodge Charger and speed away. Minutes later, and several blocks north, the Charger broke down. An eyewitness observed a young man step out of the driver's door of the Charger carrying a duffle bag and an assault rifle and run roughly a hundred yards. No one else was in the car at that time, and the car was abandoned at the location where it broke down.

[5] South Bend Police Department Officer John Bies responded to the scene of the shooting based on a report from ShotSpotter, a system that detects the sounds of gunfire. The ShotSpotter system detected gunshot-level sounds at 4:52 p.m. within a twenty-five-meter radius of a house across the street from the house where Child Victim was shot. Two other ShotSpotter alerts registered multiple gunshot-level sounds near the same house.

[6] During the police investigation of the shooting, officers recovered nine spent 7.62 x 39mm rifle casings in the alley on the shooter's side of the street. All nine casings had been fired from the same weapon. Police also found thirteen 9mm casings. A projectile recovered from the porch where Child Victim was killed was identified as belonging to the “thirty family” of ammunition, which is consistent with 7.62 x 39mm ammunition. Tr. Vol. III p. 104.

[7] DNA swabs were collected from the abandoned Charger's steering wheel and gear shift, and from AirPod earbuds found inside the car. Testing of these swabs indicated that they were each at least “one trillion” times more likely to have originated from Williams than from an unknown, unrelated person. Id. at 57-59. A black ski mask found inside the car also contained Williams’ DNA, and Williams’ fingerprints were found on a cigar box inside the Charger. FBI cell-site analysis placed Williams’ cellphone at or near the house where Child Victim was shot at the time of the shooting.

[8] After the shooting, Williams was picked up in a car driven by Arthur Taylor. The pair went to Taylor's home in South Bend. Williams’ mother, Ashley Peck, who owned the Charger, claimed that she received an anonymous call from a female telling Peck to report the Charger as stolen; Peck did so around 5:30 p.m. on the day of the shooting. Williams’ and Peck's phones communicated with each other between 5:21 and 5:29 p.m. on that day, and Peck repeatedly searched for “South Bend breaking news” and local news coverage that evening. Id. at 132.

[9] On May 12, 2023, the State charged Williams with murder and alleged that he used a firearm during the commission of the offense. Williams was released on a $50,000 cash bond with GPS monitoring in July 2023, but his bond was revoked in September 2024, after he was charged in Marion County with burglary, felony theft, and unlawful carrying of a handgun in one case and dealing in marijuana in another. Prior to trial, Williams moved to exclude the State's cellphone and cell-tower location evidence under Indiana Evidence Rules 701, 702, and 703, but the trial court never ruled on this pre-trial motion.

[10] A five-day jury trial commenced on December 8, 2025. At trial, FBI Special Agent Nick Marshall testified that cellphones constantly communicate with nearby towers and generate “timing advance” data, which is derived from the time a tower's signal takes to reach a phone and return. Tr. Vol. III p. 147. Cellphone carriers log this data, which can be used to determine a cellphone's physical location. Agent Marshall testified that this technique is widely used in law enforcement and that he had previously used it dozens of times. Agent Marshall testified that timing-advance data is “extremely reliable,” and that he used data from the day of the incident. Additionally, another member of the FBI's Cellular Analysis Survey Team independently reviewed his analysis. Id. at 165. Using this data, Agent Marshall placed Williams’ cellphone at or near the crime scene on the day of the shooting from roughly 4:48 to 4:53 p.m., at distances of 0.1, 0.15, and 0.19 miles (equivalent to 528 to 1,003 feet). Agent Marshall also determined that Williams’ cellphone had been near the location of the abandoned Charger. The underlying cellphone carrier phone records were admitted into evidence without objection.

[11] Williams’ only objection to the cell-tower evidence came at a bench conference, where he objected to the admission of Agent Marshall's demonstrative slides and the 120-degree “wedge” diagrams of tower coverage. Id. at 141; Ex. Vol. VI pp. 117-129. Williams argued that “those wedge shapes don't exist in reality,” and did not reflect the towers’ true coverage areas. Id. Williams claimed that the slides and diagrams would confuse the jury if sent to the jury room, but he admitted that it was “fair” for Agent Marshall to use them to explain how he came to his conclusions. Id. at 140.

[12] The State responded that Williams’ arguments went to the weight to be given to the exhibits, not their admissibility. The trial court agreed and overruled Williams’ objections. Notably, Williams never objected based on Evidence Rule 702; that is, he did not challenge the scientific reliability of timing-advance methodology or Marshall's qualifications, nor did he move to exclude Marshall's location testimony itself. Williams also made no Evidence Rule 702 objection after cross-examining Marshall about carrier cautions regarding the use of such timing-advance data, the wedge shapes, and his selection of data points.

[13] During closing arguments, the deputy prosecutor discussed the concept of accomplice liability and offered an example of bank robbery, stating:

If you were working in a group to execute a plan, like a bank robbery, the driver, the person that goes in to rob the bank, the mastermind, all three of you are working together collectively. You are all guilty as the sum of your parts. All for one, one for all. Kind of like the Three Musketeers. You're all working together.

Tr. Vol. IV p. 22. The prosecutor further stated that accomplice liability “also applies if you create an event that stirs a reaction and there is a natural response or a consequence of those reactions, then you are guilty of that event. So if you fire a gun, a rifle multiple times at two individuals --.” Id. at 23. At that point, Williams’ counsel asked to approach and objected at a sidebar conference that the State was misstating the law by suggesting that return gunfire amounts to aiding, inducing, or causing. Id. The trial court overruled the objection and stated that the jury would “be instructed on the law,” and told Williams’ counsel he was “free to comment on what she [the prosecutor] just said.” Id. The prosecutor then stated that, if Williams “shoots into a group of individuals and they fire back and for some reason [Child Victim] gets hit by one of those bullets, he is the one putting it into motion.” Id. at 24. She then argued that Williams knowingly killed Child Victim when he fired nine rifle rounds into a house where children were present.

[14] Outside the presence of the jury, Williams moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. Williams’ counsel then began his closing by addressing the State's comments. Williams’ counsel told the jury that: (1) the State's suggestion was “a theory that's coming out of left field;” (2) instead, accomplice liability “is two people acting in concert together with the same common plan or motive;” and (3) the jury should “just forget you heard that because that's not right and it's not true.” Id. at 26. The trial court then instructed the jury regarding accomplice liability.

[15] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Williams guilty of murder, but at the enhancement phase of the trial, the jury did not find that Williams had used a firearm during the commission of the offense. At sentencing on January 16, 2026, the trial court found no mitigating factors but found several aggravating factors: (1) Williams’ juvenile record; (2) Williams was charged with additional crimes while on bond; (3) Child Victim was under the age of twelve; and (4) the crime was committed in the presence of another child. The trial court sentenced Williams to the maximum sentence of sixty-five years in the DOC. Williams now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Williams waived his argument regarding the admissibility of the cell-tower evidence.

[16] Williams first claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Agent Marshall's testimony regarding cell-tower location and his wedge-chart exhibits. Williams claims that the underlying timing-advance methodology does not meet the reliability threshold of Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b).¹ He claims that the cell carriers even warn against using timing-advance data for determining location; that Agent Marshall selectively omitted certain data; that the wedge charts did not reflect actual tower coverage; and that the data showed only an approximate location rather than the specific crime-scene address. Williams claims that this error was prejudicial because Agent Marshall's testimony was the “centerpiece” of the State's case. Appellant's Br. p. 19. The State responds by arguing that Williams failed to properly preserve his claim because he did not object on these grounds at trial. We agree with the State.

To preserve a suppression claim for appeal, at trial, a defendant must make a contemporaneous objection that is sufficiently specific to alert the trial judge fully of the legal issue. Additionally, [w]hen a party raises an argument on appeal predicated on grounds substantially different from those raised at trial, any allegation of error is waived.

Zuniga v. State, 237 N.E.3d 1168, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citations and internal quotations omitted), trans. denied.²

[17] Here, when the trial court asked the parties if there needed to be a “discussion about [Agent Marshall] testifying,” Williams’ counsel objected on grounds that the wedge diagrams did not depict real coverage. Tr. Vol. III p. 140. Specifically, counsel stated that he “would be objecting to the admission” of the slides, but admitted that “it's fair for [Agent Marshall] to use [the diagrams] to at least explain how he reached his opinions.” Id. But counsel argued that the slides “don't actually reflect the true coverage areas of cell towers the way he got [sic] mapped out.” Id. Counsel argued that “those wedge shapes don't exist in reality. Those are general things to explain which way a tower points, but that doesn't have anything to do with the actual coverage areas of the towers.” Id. at 141. When asked whether his objection went to weight or admissibility, defense counsel tied admissibility to the inaccuracy of the slides, stating: “It's just not an exact area of what's covered by the cell towers.” Id. at 142. Defense counsel also stated: “I don't think [the exhibits] should go back to the jury because they would ․ quite likely be confused or mistaken by them because it's not accurate. If it was an actual propagation map provided by the carrier ․ it would be different.” Id.

[18] Put simply, Williams’ counsel never used the words “reliability,” “unreliable,” “scientific,” “methodology,” “peer review,” or “Rule 702.” Nor did he ask the trial court to evaluate the timing-advance methodology or request a Rule 702(b) foundation. And he conceded Agent Marshall could use the exhibits to explain how he reached his opinions. We, therefore, conclude that Williams failed to preserve his Evidence Rule 702 claim for purposes of appeal.³

[19] Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that any error in the admission of this evidence would be, at most, harmless.

“The effect of an error on a party's substantial rights turns on the probable impact of the impermissible evidence upon the jury in light of all the other evidence at trial.” Gonzalez v. State, 929 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2010). “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.” Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

Setlak v. State, 234 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Here, there was substantial independent evidence of Williams’ guilt such that we are satisfied that the cell-tower evidence did not contribute to the jury's verdict.

[20] The Charger was registered to Williams’ mother, and Williams’ fingerprints and DNA were found inside the car, including on a black ski mask located on the front seat that matched the mask the gunman wore. Minutes after the shooting, a witness saw a lone man exit the driver's door of the abandoned Charger carrying a duffle bag and an assault rifle and run down the street; no one else left or returned to the car. Surveillance and Flock license-plate readers tracked the Charger from the area of Williams’ father's home to the scene shortly before the shooting and away from the scene at a high rate of speed, and video captured the car's sole occupant leaving it with a bag and rifle.

[21] Taylor received a call telling him to pick up Williams because his car had broken down. Taylor found Williams and the Charger and drove past the murder scene to Taylor's residence. A neighbor saw one of the men carry a large gun wrapped in a blanket or sweater into Taylor's house. Later that day, Williams’ mother reported the Charger stolen, and her phone and Williams’ phone communicated repeatedly that afternoon and evening. Her phone was used to search for South Bend news, the police department, and the nickname of the person who lived at the house where the shooting occurred. Given this strong evidence of Williams’ guilt, we conclude that the admission of the cell-tower evidence was harmless.

II. The prosecutor's statements during closing argument do not require reversal.

[22] Williams next claims that the prosecutor's statements during closing argument regarding the proof required for accomplice liability were improper. Williams contends that the statements required, at the very least, an admonishment and, because there was no admonishment given, constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct

[23] In Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1077 (Ind. 2025), our Supreme Court explained:

[w]hen reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in the trial court, we determine (1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise. Whether a prosecutor's argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury's decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.

(citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).⁴

[24] Williams correctly notes that a misstatement of the law during closing arguments may constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1082. But “it is also well established that ‘any misstatement of law during closing argument is presumably cured by the trial court's final jury instructions.’ ” Id. (quoting Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 664-65).

[25] Here, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the question of accomplice liability:

A person is responsible for the acts of his accomplice or confederates which were a probable and natural consequence of their common plan even though the acts may not have been originally intended as part of the plan. The acts of one person are attributable to all who are acting together in furtherance of their common objective. A common plan or objective may be inferred from concerted action or participation in the illegal acts.

The presence of a defendant at the scene of the commission of a crime, companionship with another person engaged in the commission of a crime and a course of a defendant's conduct at the time of an offense are circumstances which may be considered in determining whether that defendant aided, induced, or caused the commission of the crime. However, evidence that merely tends to establish a suspicion of guilt, or the mere presence of a defendant, or the mere opportunity of a defendant to commit a charged act, without other evidence, is insufficient to sustain a conviction.

The State need not prove that the defendant personally committed all the essential elements of the crimes charged. In order to convict the defendant of either or both charges, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant and another person or persons acting together committed all the essential elements of that crime or those crimes.

However, the essential element of knowledge cannot be attributed or transferred to a person on an aiding or abetting theory. In addition to prove the other elements, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant personally and knowingly participated in the crime or crimes charged.

A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense, even if the other person:

1. has not been prosecuted for the offense;

2. has not been convicted of the offense; or

3. has been acquitted of the offense

Appellant's App. Vol. III pp. 96-97; Tr. Vol. IV pp. 45-46. This is a correct statement of the law. See Gamble v. State, 256 N.E.3d 546, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (summarizing law of accomplice liability), trans. denied. Williams does not argue otherwise. Thus, even assuming that the prosecutor's statements were improper, we presume that this correct instruction cured any error in the prosecutor's remarks.

[26] In addition, the jury was instructed that final arguments “are not evidence,” that attorneys “argue the law” in order to “try to persuade you to a particular verdict,” and that jurors “may accept or reject those arguments as you see fit.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 49. The prosecutor's remarks were also relatively brief, and accomplice liability was not the State's main theory of the case; instead, the State argued that it was Williams who put on the mask and fired the shots from the rifle into the house, which constituted a knowing killing of Child Victim. We, therefore, conclude that the probable persuasive effect of the State's remarks on the jury's verdict was slight, and that Williams was, accordingly, not placed in a position of grave peril.

B. Failure to Admonish the Jury

[27] Williams also argues that the trial court should have admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks regarding accomplice liability. The State responds that Williams never requested an admonishment and has waived this claim. We agree with the State.

[28] When Williams objected to the prosecutor's statements, the trial court overruled the objection and told Williams’ counsel that he was “free to comment on what she just said.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 23. Williams, however, did not ask the court to admonish the jury. After the State's initial closing, Williams moved for a mistrial at a second sidebar but, again, did not request an admonishment.

[29] In Konkle, our Supreme Court held that, when a defendant timely objects to alleged prosecutorial misconduct and the trial court overrules the objection, nothing further is required to preserve the claim of misconduct. 253 N.E.3d at 1082. Williams’ claim of prosecutorial misconduct and his challenge to the denial of his mistrial motion are, therefore, preserved for appeal. But Konkle addressed preservation; it did not create a duty for trial courts to give an admonishment when none was requested.

[30] The cases Williams cites describe an admonishment as the preferred first remedy and discuss its curative effect. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 669 N.E.2d 733, 741 (Ind. 1996); Jackson v. State, 698 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Williams, however, cites no authority supporting the proposition that a trial court commits error by failing to give an admonishment sua sponte. We cannot say that the trial court was required to do an act it was not asked to do. See Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004) (observing that “a trial court cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to consider,” and that, “as a general rule, a party may not present an argument or issue on appeal unless the party raised that argument or issue before the trial court”). Williams, accordingly, waived any claim of error with regard to the trial court's failure to admonish the jury.⁵ See id.; Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (reviewing defendant's claim that trial court failed to admonish the jury only for fundamental error because the issue was raised for the first time on appeal), trans. denied.

C. Motion for Mistrial

[31] Williams also claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's statements regarding accomplice liability. The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Eichelburger v. State, 251 N.E.3d 1106, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 480 (Ind. 2015)). “ ‘We afford great deference to the trial court's decision and review the decision solely for abuse of that discretion.’ ” Id. A mistrial is an “extreme remedy” that is only justified when other remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation. Id. “To prevail on appeal from the denial of a motion for mistrial, the appellant must establish that the questioned conduct was so prejudicial and inflammatory that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected.” Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2001) (internal quotation omitted).

[32] Here, even if we again assume that the prosecutor's remarks were improper, Williams has not shown that he was placed in a position of grave peril. We presume that the jury followed the trial court's instructions, which presumptively cure any misstatement of law in closing. Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1082. Further, the evidence that Williams was the shooter was substantial, as set forth above. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Williams’ motion for a mistrial.⁶

III. Williams’ sixty-five-year sentence is not inappropriate.

[33] Williams lastly claims that his maximum sixty-five-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, which is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables a court on appeal to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127. Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[34] The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. Here, Williams received the maximum sentence. Our Supreme Court has noted that “the maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders.” Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002). This statement, however, is not an invitation to “determine whether a worse offender could be imagined.” Id. “Despite the nature of any particular offense and offender, it will always be possible to identify or hypothesize a significantly more despicable scenario.” Id. Thus, when referring to the worst offenders, “we refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant the maximum punishment. But such class encompasses a considerable variety of offenses and offenders.” Id.

[35] Our review is not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Nature of the Offense

[36] Our analysis of the nature of the offense requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). “ ‘Deference to the trial court's sentence ‘should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality).’ ” Id. (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[37] The nature of Williams’ offense is particularly heinous. He shot a rifle multiple times at a home where children were present. His actions resulted in the tragic death of an eleven-year-old child and were witnessed by other children. Williams’ actions were also planned and deliberate; he armed himself, drove to the scene of the shooting, and took an ambush position in the bushes while firing repeated shots at the house; he then fled the scene. Williams’ claims regarding the nature of the offense are merely a veiled attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, but the jury found Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There is nothing about the nature of Williams’ offense that portrays his crime in a positive light.

B. Character of the Offender

[38] Regarding the character of the offender, we have explained:

Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the gravity, nature, proximity, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character. Again, deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light ․ the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).

Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 668 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

[39] Here, although Williams has no adult convictions other than the present offense, his juvenile record reflects poorly on his character. In 2018, when Williams was only thirteen, he was charged with what would be, if committed by an adult, three counts of rape, two counts of sexual battery, and one count of battery. Williams was ultimately adjudicated on one count of sexual battery and the battery count, for which he was placed on probation. Then, in 2021, when he was sixteen, Williams was charged with what would be, if committed by an adult, criminal recklessness for shooting a firearm into a building, dangerous possession of a firearm, and carrying a handgun without a license. Williams was adjudicated on the dangerous possession of a firearm charge and again placed on probation. At the time of sentencing, Williams was facing 2024 charges in Marion County.⁷

[40] We are cognizant of Williams’ young age—he was only eighteen at the time of these crimes and twenty-one at the time of sentencing. But this is offset by Williams’ juvenile history, which includes an adjudication for a firearms offense. According to the pre-sentence investigation report, Williams was also at a high risk to reoffend. See Kayser v. State, 131 N.E.3d 717, 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that defendant's assessment scores showed that he was at a high risk to reoffend when considering the character of the offender). In short, there is no compelling evidence portraying Williams’ character in a positive light. Thus, considering both the horrific and senseless nature of Williams’ offense and his poor character, we cannot say that his maximum, sixty-five-year sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[41] Williams waived his challenge to the admission of the evidence regarding cell-tower timing data. Notwithstanding this waiver, the admission of that evidence was, at most, harmless given the strong, independent evidence of Williams’ guilt. Assuming the prosecutor's statements regarding accomplice liability were improper, any resulting error was cured when the trial court properly instructed the jury on accomplice liability. Williams waived his claim that the trial court should have admonished the jury, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’ request for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's statements. Lastly, Williams’ sixty-five-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the horrific nature of his offense and his poor character. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment.

[42] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This rule provides: “Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the expert testimony rests upon reliable scientific principles.” Evid. R. 702(b).

2.   Effective July 1, 2026, Evidence Rule 103(b) was amended to provide: “Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before trial or at trial—a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. This includes a ruling on a motion in limine.” The version of Evidence Rule 103 in effect at the time of Williams’ trial provided: “Once the court rules definitively on the record at trial a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” Here, the trial court never ruled on Williams’ pre-trial motion to exclude.

3.   We recently addressed a similar issue in Tandy v. State, 273 N.E.3d 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. There, defense counsel questioned a detective about “the reliability of the software” used to create exhibits showing cell site location information, and, when the State moved to admit a PowerPoint exhibit based on such information, defense counsel objected “on the basis of the unreliability of the science[.]” Id. at 1156. The majority in Tandy held that this objection was insufficient to preserve an Evidence Rule 702 claim because it was focused on the “potentially misleading nature of the demonstrative exhibit.” Id. The author of the present opinion dissented on grounds that defense counsel's objections regarding the reliability of the science were sufficient to preserve an Evidence Rule 702(b) issue for appeal. Id. at 1165. Here, in contrast, Williams’ counsel's objections made no mention of the scientific reliability of the methodology used by Agent Marshall.

4.   Prior to Konkle, our courts had held that, even if a defendant's timely objection to a statement was overruled, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct was waived unless the defendant also requested that the jury be admonished and moved for a mistrial. See Foster v. State, 283 N.E.3d 202, 211 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied. Konkle overruled those cases and held that only an objection is required to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See id. (citing Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1080-82). Because Williams did object to the prosecutor's statements, and his objection was overruled, Williams preserved his claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

5.   Williams makes no argument that the trial court's failure constituted fundamental error.

6.   Because we conclude that neither of Williams’ first two claims of error has merit, we also reject his claim that their cumulative effect requires reversal.

7.   We take judicial notice of the fact that Williams pleaded guilty to burglary, a Level 4 felony, in Marion County in March 2026. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) (providing that the court may take judicial notice of “records of a court of this state”).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.