T.M., Appellant-Respondent v. M.M., Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] This is at least the third time T.M. has asked this Court to undo or clarify the same protective order entered against him in 2025. A panel of this Court affirmed the protective order when T.M. initially challenged it on appeal. When T.M. appealed the trial court's denial of his later request to clarify or modify the protective order, another panel of this Court affirmed that decision as well. Now, T.M., pro se, appeals the denial of his latest motion to terminate or modify the protective order, offering several reasons why he believes he is entitled to relief. As none of those reasons is meritorious, the trial court did not err in denying his motion. We therefore affirm.

Facts

[2] The trial court entered the original two-year protective order against T.M. and in favor of his ex-wife, M.M., after finding that T.M. had committed repeated acts of harassment and posed a credible threat to the safety of M.M. or a member of her household. The order prohibited T.M. from harassing M.M. or contacting her directly or indirectly and required him to stay away from her home and workplace. It also required him to surrender any firearms that he owned, controlled, or possessed. The protective order will expire in March 2027 unless it is extended.

[3] T.M. appealed the issuance of the protective order. A panel of this Court affirmed in a memorandum decision. T.M. v. M.M., No. 25A-PO-677, 2025 WL 2718488 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2025), trans. denied (hereinafter, T.M. 1). In that opinion, the Court explained that the evidence supported the harassment finding and that T.M. had not challenged the credible-threat finding at all. Id. at *5 n.4. It also determined that nothing in the protective order “prohibit[s] T.M. from engaging in legitimate civil litigation via communication with M.M.’s attorney.” Id. at *6. Whether any of T.M.’s litigation conduct amounts to harassment is “left for determination in the trial court with jurisdiction over such matters,” according to the T.M. 1 panel. Id.

[4] T.M. returned to the trial court and filed motions to clarify the order and to set up a “litigation-only contact protocol.” T.M. v. M.M., No. 26A-PO-75, 2026 WL 1243619, *1 (Ind. Ct. App. May 6, 2026) (hereinafter, T.M. 2). The trial court denied these motions, and T.M. appealed. This Court again affirmed, finding that T.M.’s failure to provide cogent argument in his brief left the panel “unable to address his appeal.” Id. To give T.M. the clarity he purportedly lacked, the Court repeated the language from the earlier appellate decision and told T.M. that, if he needs to serve process on M.M. in a legitimate civil matter, he must do so through her lawyer. Id. at *2.

[5] Separately, in T.M.’s appeal in the parties’ dissolution of marriage action (hereinafter, T.M. 3),¹ another panel of this Court ruled that the trial court should have sanctioned M.M.’s former attorney under Indiana Trial Rule 37(D) for failing to appear at T.M.’s scheduled deposition of M.M. The Court reasoned that T.M.’s request to depose M.M. was appropriate under the discovery rules and directed that the expenses be charged to the absent attorney, not to M.M. But the Court declined T.M.’s request to strike the portion of the trial court's order finding that T.M.’s scheduling of the deposition was an attempt to harass M.M. That decision was certified as final in April 2026.

[6] T.M. thereafter filed the motion at issue here, asking the trial court to terminate the protective order or to modify it so that lawful “litigation conduct” would not count as prohibited contact under the protective order. App. Vol. III, p. 43. He offered several reasons for terminating the protective order: (1) the certified decision in T.M. 3; (2) his compliance with the protective order since its entry; and (3) the order's collateral consequences, including restrictions on his ability to possess or control firearms and entry of the protective order on a governmental database. Alternatively, T.M. argued that modification of the protective order was necessary to clarify its application to his conduct in litigation involving M.M.

[7] The trial court denied the motion because it “states no basis upon which the Court would reconsider the Protective Order, even when taking Respondent's allegations as true.” Id. at 37. T.M. appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] T.M. claims the trial court wrongly denied his motion to terminate or modify the protective order. He asks that we review the trial court's order de novo because, in his view, the court decided a question of law when it found that his allegations, even if accepted as true, were legally insufficient. He notes that questions of law are reviewed de novo.

[9] M.M. did not file an appellee's brief. “When the appellee has failed to submit an answer brief[,] we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). “Rather, we will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error”—that is, error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id.

[10] The Indiana Civil Protection Order Act specifies that the term of a protective order is two years “unless another date is ordered by the court.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(f). The trial court here did not specify a different date. Thus, the question before us, as presented by T.M., is whether the trial court properly denied his motion to terminate or modify the protective order before the order expired. T.M. offers no statutory authority that would entitle him to early termination or modification of a protective order that has been in effect for 11/212 years. But even assuming such relief were available, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant it. None of the reasons that T.M. offered to the trial court as a basis for this relief supports it.

I. Dissolution Decision

[11] T.M. offered T.M. 3 as a basis for terminating the protective order, but he misconstrues that decision. T.M. views T.M. 3—the appeal in the dissolution case—as finding that his conduct toward M.M. was not harassment. He further claims this holding is now binding between the parties. T.M. misinterprets T.M. 3.

[12] The T.M. 3 panel ruled that the deposition request in the dissolution action was proper under the discovery rules and that sanctions were warranted for M.M.’s former attorney but not M.M. The panel did not decide that T.M.’s overall conduct toward M.M. was appropriate or harmless, as T.M. seems to suggest.

[13] T.M.’s litigation tactics were only part of the conduct that prompted the protective order. The evidence before the trial court at the protective order hearing suggested that T.M. had angrily grabbed M.M., threatened to kill her and her family, followed M.M., attempted to track her car electronically, and launched litigation against her. The trial court that issued the protective order found that T.M.’s conduct, when taken “in total,” constituted harassment. T.M. 1, 2025 WL 2718488, at *2.

[14] T.M. 3 did not undo this factfinding. In fact, the T.M. 3 panel specifically denied T.M.’s request to strike the trial court's determination that his scheduling of the deposition was an attempt to harass M.M.

II. No Protective Order Violation

[15] T.M.’s claim that the protective order should be terminated or modified because he has not violated it does not justify altering or ending the order. T.M. has done only what the law requires: comply with the protective order issued by the court. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (invasion of privacy statute that criminalizes protective order violations). T.M.’s compliance with the protective order does not establish that he would not harass M.M. absent such an order. Cf. S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 499 (Ind. 2023) (noting that the mere lapse in time does not necessarily render a threat less credible).

III. Collateral Consequences

[16] The collateral consequences that T.M. lists, such as the firearm restrictions and entry of the protective order on a governmental database, do not show that the protective order is no longer warranted. Instead, these consequences are the ordinary and foreseeable effects of a protective order. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h) (imposing firearm restrictions on protective order respondents); Ind. Code § 34-26-5-18(7) (requiring entry of protective orders on a particular governmental database).

[17] The firearm restrictions were imposed because the trial court found T.M. to be a credible threat to the safety of M.M. or a member of her household. See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h). T.M. did not challenge that finding when appealing the issuance of the protective order. T.M. 1, 2025 WL 2718488, at *5 n.4. On a record where the credible-threat finding stands and the order will expire in March 2027 absent an extension, the trial court did not err in concluding that T.M.’s reference to collateral consequences did not state any basis for relief.

IV. No Further Clarification Is Needed

[18] T.M. alternatively sought modification of the order if the trial court declined to terminate it. He asked the court again to clarify that lawful litigation conduct is not contact that the protective order prohibits. But this Court has offered T.M. that interpretation of the protective order at least twice. T.M. 1, 2025 WL 2718488, at *6; T.M. 2, 2026 WL 1243619, at *2. The trial court did not err in refusing to clarify the protective order yet again.

Conclusion

[19] T.M. has not met his burden of showing prima facie error in the trial court's denial of his motion to terminate or modify the protective order. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because the parties’ names appear in the caption to T.M. 3 (this Court's decision in the dissolution appeal), we do not provide a citation to that decision to avoid identifying the parties in this confidential appeal.

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.