Richard D. Nash, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judges Brown and Kenworthy concur.

Statement of the Case

[1] Richard Nash appeals his sentence for his conviction of several drug offenses, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by punishing him for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2025, the State charged Nash with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a syringe, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine.

[3] Nash exercised his right to trial by jury, and the jury found him guilty of all charges except possession of a syringe. In addition, the trial court withheld judgment of conviction on the charge of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced Nash on the remaining charges and ordered him to serve concurrent terms of 180 days on the B misdemeanor, 60 days on the C misdemeanor, and four years, with two years suspended, on the Level 5 felony. Nash now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Nash argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Specifically, he contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by imposing a more severe sentence on him merely because he insisted on his right to a jury trial.

[5] We review the trial court's sentence for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. “[I]t is constitutionally impermissible for a trial court to impose a more severe sentence because the defendant has chosen to stand trial rather than plead guilty[.]” Hill v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ind. 1986) (quoting Walker v. State, 454 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)). “Whether the severity of a particular sentence was improperly influenced by a defendant's jury trial election requires an individualized consideration.” Hill, 499 N.E.2d at 1107.

[6] At sentencing, defense counsel recognized that Nash has “a very long criminal history” and acknowledged that it would be “a sensible decision to send [Nash] to DOC for four (4) years.” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 154. Counsel proposed a sentence of two years in community corrections followed by two years of probation. Id. at 155. For its part, the State recommended a sentence of five years, with three years executed and two years in community corrections. Id. at 158-59.

[7] In support of his argument that his constitutional rights were violated, Nash points to a portion of the court's comments prior to sentencing him:

The sentence that your attorney had asked for would be a kind of a reasonable sentence if you were the guy that had walked in and thrown yourself on the mercy of the Court and pled guilty, you know, where that becomes a mitigating circumstance at that point. You're not that kid, that guy. You rolled your dice. You took your chances. You went to trial. We had those people come in for the day and went through the whole thing and your attorney did his work and the State did their work and the witnesses came in and the jury found what they found.

Id. at 164. The trial court then sentenced Nash to an aggregate four-year sentence, with two years executed and two years suspended to probation. The court divided the executed time into one year of jail time and one year in community corrections on home detention.

[8] Prior to issuing Nash's sentence, the court identified aggravating and mitigating circumstances, which Nash does not challenge. It was in this context that the court made the comments that Nash alleges are indicative of its intent to penalize him for exercising his right to a jury trial. The whole of the court's comments are as follows:

You have a pretty substantial criminal record, but by in [sic] large, except for some theft cases back in the day and things like that, you really haven't made it the business of your life to hurt people. So, I do take that into consideration. The accumulative [sic] weight is as the State said of your criminal history. It's pretty substantial. The number of revocations, again, pretty substantial. So, you have those as aggravating circumstances.

As far as mitigating circumstances, you don't have, I mean, you've got the fact that you're really, kind of, minding your own business. You're not randomly hurting people, which is kind of an odd mitigating circumstance, because it's not that you're behaving, it's just that your misbehavior doesn't disproportionately impact innocent people. And I think you were getting at that too, that you know, you know it's not right, but at least it's in your own little place. Right.

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

THE COURT: So, I get that. The sentence that your attorney had asked for would be a kind of a reasonable sentence if you were the guy that had walked in and thrown yourself on the mercy of the Court and pled guilty, you know, where that becomes a mitigating circumstance at that point. You're not that kid, that guy. You rolled your dice. You took your chances. You went to trial. We had those people come in for the day and went through the whole thing and your attorney did his work and the State did their work and the witnesses came in and the jury found what they found.

So, on balance the aggravators do outweigh the mitigators in this case and the sentence that I think is appropriate and acknowledging that the probation department is not completely out of line for asking what they asked for based on your history and performance there, but also, the nature of the offenses isn't the worst it could have been.

Id. at 163-64.

[9] In our view, when read in context as a whole, the court's comments do not demonstrate an intent to punish Nash for exercising his right but rather constitute an explanation. That is to say, after the court had set forth the aggravating circumstances, it discussed possible mitigating circumstances and defense counsel's proposed sentence. The court explained that the sentence recommended by defense counsel may have been feasible if Nash had pleaded guilty because a guilty plea may be considered a mitigating circumstance.

[10] Nevertheless, the sentence imposed by the court varied only slightly from that proposed by Nash's counsel and was more lenient than the three years executed in the Department of Correction followed by two years of probation requested by the State. Defense counsel suggested four years—two years in community corrections followed by two years of probation; the court imposed four years—one year in jail, followed by one year in community corrections on home detention, followed by two years of probation. The court's findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances are supported by the record, and defense counsel acknowledged Nash's lengthy criminal history. Relying on this substantial criminal history and numerous probation revocations, the court entered a four-year sentence. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court sentenced Nash more harshly as a punishment for proceeding to trial.

[11] That said, we pause to caution trial courts that comments such as those present here may be ill-advised. Had the court's remarks been made outside the context of a discussion of possible mitigating circumstances or had a more severe sentence been imposed, we think that a convincing argument could have been made that the comments indicated the court was penalizing Nash for going to trial. Again, while we do not believe that the trial court's intention was at all blameworthy, we suggest that courts refrain from this type of discussion when a guilty plea is not involved in the case.

Conclusion

[12] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not punish Nash for exercising his constitutional rights to a jury trial when it sentenced him to a four-year sentence for a Level 5 felony. Accordingly, we affirm.

[13] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.