Timothy Marcus Mayberry, Appellant/Plaintiff v. Nathanael Angle, et al., Appellees/Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2022, Timothy Marcus Mayberry, an inmate at the Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”) in Miami County, filed a complaint against MCF employees Nathanael Angle, Mea Porter, and Jenna Schlarf (collectively, “Appellees”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”),¹ alleging that they had violated his rights to free speech and access to the courts by refusing to process various mailings and by retaliating against him for having filed previous grievances against them. The Appellees moved for summary judgment, which motion the trial court granted. Mayberry contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] MCF operational procedures in effect in 2022 regarding inmate correspondence provided that an inmate's “COMMITMENT NAME” was

the offender's name as recorded on the Abstract of Judgment and documents assigning the offender to the Department of Correction [and t]he only name acceptable for use on correspondence, facility and state forms, legal correspondence, etc. The use of street names, prison names, religious names, aliases, nicknames, etc is not authorized unless accompanied with a legal name change from the appropriate court.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 140.

[3] In June of 2022, Mayberry was an inmate at the MCF when a caseworker noticed that a different inmate had been signing the remittance slips for Mayberry's mail. Mayberry was instructed that he needed to sign his legal name when submitting his legal mail, which is mandated by the MCF's policies and procedures.

[4] On August 15, 2022, Mayberry filed a formal grievance, in which he alleged that mailroom supervisor Porter and/or caseworker Schlarf had wrongfully returned mail to him on the ground that it had not included a compliant request for remittance, which is required for outgoing mail that is not in a state envelope or is too heavy. The remittance forms Mayberry had submitted with his mail had not been signed with his legal name, but with “by Mayson El” instead. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 99, 108–09.

[5] Also on August 15, 2022, Mayberry filed a Section 1983 complaint in Miami Circuit Court against MCF unit team leader Angle (who had allegedly issued a standing order that all of Mayberry's mailings had to be personally approved by him), Porter, and Schlarf, alleging that they had violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and access to the courts by refusing to process his various mailings in retaliation for having filed previous grievances against them. Mayberry requested declaratory judgment and compensatory and punitive damages.

[6] On February 14, 2025, Appellees moved for summary judgment, inter alia, on the basis that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether they had acted in retaliation and were shielded from liability by qualified immunity. On November 10, 2025, the trial court granted Appellees’ summary-judgment motion,² concluding that Mayberry had not exhausted his administrative remedies and that Appellees were shielded from liability by qualified immunity in any event.

Discussion and Decision

[7] As an initial matter, we note that, although Mayberry is proceeding pro se, he is held to the same standards as trained attorneys and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “[P]ro se litigants are [․] required to follow procedural rules.” Martin v. Brown, 129 N.E.3d 283, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Pro se litigants who do not follow established rules of procedure “must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[8] That said, Mayberry appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, and, in deciding whether to affirm or reverse the entry of summary judgment, we apply the same standards as the trial court. First Farmers Bank & Tr. Co. v. Whorley, 891 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kluger v. J.J.P. Enters., Inc., 159 N.E.3d 82, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Once these two requirements are met by the moving party, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue by setting forth specifically designated facts. Id. at 87. We consider all of the designated evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. First Farmers, 891 N.E.2d at 607–08.

[9] A fact is “material” if it helps to prove or disprove an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action, and a factual issue is “genuine” if the trier of fact is required to resolve the opposing party's different version of the facts. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Grp. v. Blaskie, 727 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind. 2000). The party appealing the grant of summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that the trial court's ruling was improper. Trueblood v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1242, 1260 (Ind. 1999). Cases “hinging on disputed material facts” are “ ‘a matter for trial, not summary judgment.’ ” Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1188 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1005–06 (Ind. 2014)). Indeed, it is well-settled that “Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1004. Mayberry's claims are (1) a Section 1983 claim that Appellees’ requiring him to sign his legal name to have his mail sent out was done in retaliation for having filed previous grievances against them and (2) that Appellees had wrongfully denied him access to the courts by refusing to send his legal mail out without adequate justification.

I. The Trial Court did not Err in Entering Summary Judgement in Favor of Appellees on Mayberry's Section 1983 Claim

[10] To prevail on a claim that one has been retaliated against for exercising free-speech rights, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that “the harsh realities of a prison environment affect our consideration of what actions are sufficiently adverse.” Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 880 (7th Cir. 2020).

[11] Mayberry's filing of grievances against Appellees constitutes protected speech. See, e.g., Medley v. Lemmon, 994 N.E.2d 1177, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“It is generally accepted that a prisoner has a First Amendment right to pursue grievances and that prison officials may not retaliate against a prisoner for exercising that right.”) (citing Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80 (2nd Cir. 1996); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005)), trans. denied. Moving to the second element, it is an objective standard requiring a plaintiff to show that he had suffered a deprivation likely to deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from continuing to engage in protected activity, which, in this case, means filing grievances. Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878 (7th Cir. 2011).

[12] Mayberry does not identify any designated evidence from which a factfinder could infer that Appellees’ alleged campaign of harassment and intimidation would have deterred a person of ordinary firmness from filing additional grievances, nor does he cite to any legal authority applying the ordinary-firmness standard in any context, much less in a context similar to this case's. We will not endeavor to determine if any such evidence exists in the record or if relevant authority supports Mayberry's position. See Lowrance v. State, 64 N.E.3d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that we may not become an advocate for pro se litigants or develop arguments on their behalf), trans. denied; see also Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990) (noting that “a court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has presented them in perfunctory form runs the risk of being an advocate rather than an adjudicator”).

[13] Mayberry's actual arguments on this point are to claim that the DOC's policy on written submissions did not actually require him to sign any prison document in any particular manner and to repeat his allegation that he was subjected to a “campaign of harassment and intimidation” by Appellees. Appellant's Br. p. 34. The DOC's policy on the signing of various prison documents was not devised by Appellees, and, even if we assume that Appellees did subject Mayberry to such a campaign, Mayberry has failed to designate evidence to allow a jury to find that this would have deterred a person of ordinary firmness from the further exercise of First Amendment rights.³ The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Mayberry's Section 1983 claim.⁴

II. The Trial Court did not Err in Entering Summary Judgment in Favor of Appellees on Mayberry's Denial-of-Access Claim

[14] To prevail on a denial-of-access claim, Mayberry must show that Appellees’ unjustified acts or conditions hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim, Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998), and that actual injury resulted. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996). “[P]art of meaningful access is furnishing basic scribe materials for the preparation of legal papers[,] includ[ing] paper, some means of writing, staplers, access to notary services where required by procedural rules, and mailing materials.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). When a plaintiff alleges a denial of the right to access the courts, he must plead specific prejudice to state a claim, examples of which may be the missing of court deadlines, failure to make timely filings, or the dismissal of legitimate claims because of the denial of reasonable access to legal resources. See Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that prisoner had failed to sufficiently plead prejudice in denial-of-access case when he had alleged “no court dates missed; no inability to make timely filings; no denial of legal assistance to which he was entitled; and no loss of a case which could have been won”).

[15] Mayberry contends that Appellees acts of refusing to mail materials that were accompanied by remittances he signed “by Mayson El” denied him access to the courts without justification. Appellees argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from this claim, and we agree. As a general rule, government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from civil liability insofar as their conduct conforms to what a reasonable person would have believed to be lawful in light of those rights that are clearly enumerated by statute or the Constitution. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Where a defendant's behavior was not clearly forbidden at the time of its commission, they are assumed to lack knowledge about the conduct's possible illegality and cannot be held liable. Id. “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

[16] Designed to protect government officials “from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability[,]” the doctrine of qualified immunity serves as “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis removed). Moreover, “[t]he protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law[,]” courts must determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as early as possible during the proceedings. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Purtell, 527 F.3d at 621.

[17] Mayberry has not established that there is a clearly-established constitutional right for an incarcerated individual to sign a name other than their legal commitment name when submitting mail. Mayberry does not cite any case holding that such a right exists or is clearly-established, and, in fact, a prison requirement to sign a legal name is not unconstitutional and has been upheld. “Under the First Amendment, a prison is not obligated to accept [a prisoner's] new name, until he has legally changed it, even if he adopted it for sincere religious reasons.” Shidler v. Moore, 446 F.Supp.2d 942, 948 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (citing Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986)) (concluding that a policy preventing incarcerated individual from using his religious name on his mail did not violate his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion). Because Mayberry has failed to establish that the right to use a name other than one's commitment name on prison documents is not a clearly-established constitutional right, Appellees have established qualified immunity to Mayberry's denial-of-access claims. The trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Mayberry's denial-of-access claim.

[18] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 1983 provides, in part, as follows:Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

2.   Appellees’ summary-judgment motion was originally denied by Judge Matthew Elkin on April 28, 2025. Appellees’ motion to reconsider was granted by Senior Judge Douglas Tate, who had been appointed on November 4, 2025.

3.   While we again acknowledge that the “ordinary fitness” standard is an objective one, we think it worth noting that Mayberry himself has not actually been deterred from filing further grievances by anything Appellees may or may not have done in this case, filing a grievance about the very actions he now claims would have deterred a person of ordinary firmness from filing a grievance. Moreover, according to Mayberry's DOC grievance record up to March 29, 2023, Mayberry filed four additional formal grievances regarding other matters in September and October of 2022. Because Mayberry points to no designated evidence that his firmness is anything other than ordinary, the record, if anything, supports a conclusion that Appellees’ actions would not have deterred a person of ordinary firmness.

4.   Because Mayberry has not established that he has a triable claim, we need not determine whether Mayberry exhausted his administrative remedies or whether Appellees have qualified immunity from his Section 1983 claim. While these were the bases of the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, we are not bound by this and will affirm the entry of summary judgment on any theory supported by the record. Markey v. Est. of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1006–07 (Ind. 2015).

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.