Amy L. Nunn, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] To fund her personal spending, Amy Nunn abused her position as her church's treasurer to steal more than $180,000 from the church. Nunn was convicted of two counts of theft and sentenced to six years of incarceration and four years of probation. Nunn appeals and raises one issue for our review: Whether Nunn's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Nunn's grandfather was a retired pastor, and he and Nunn's family joined the church when Nunn was approximately ten years old. In 2020, after being a member of the church for decades and assisting the church's previous treasurer, the church “chose” Nunn to serve as its new treasurer. Tr. Vol. II at 26. Nunn's responsibilities included collecting and depositing tithes and donations, paying the church's insurance and bills, making purchases on behalf of the church, and managing the church's accounts. Nunn was the only person with “direct access to the [church's] money.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 31.

[4] Within the “first few months” of becoming treasurer, Nunn began spending the church's funds—including money earmarked for donations and insurance payments—for her own personal use. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 32. Nunn spent the money on family vacations, utilities, groceries, personal shopping, personal loans, property taxes, vehicle registrations, legal fees, and online gambling. Nunn “kept cash from the offering plate” and wrote checks to herself for taking Sunday school children “on field trips and to a church camp that never existed.” Tr. Vol. II at 15. To exceed the daily limit on cash withdrawals from the church's bank accounts, Nunn visited “several different banks on a daily basis.” Id. at 18.

[5] Every month, Nunn presented false treasurer reports to conceal the church's deteriorating finances. Nunn only admitted to her thefts after other church members noticed several bounced checks. By the time of this discovery in January 2025, Nunn had emptied nearly all the church's accounts and allowed the church's insurance to lapse.

[6] The State charged Nunn with five counts of theft, two as Level 5 felonies and three as Level 6 felonies. The charges were based on allegations that between 2020 and 2024, Nunn stole at least $185,359.96 from the church.¹ Nunn pled guilty to the two Level 5 counts. In exchange for Nunn's plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. Nunn agreed to pay restitution and to serve for each count a sentence of five years with a maximum of three years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Additionally, Nunn agreed to leave to the trial court's discretion whether the sentences were to run consecutively.

[7] After a hearing, the trial court sentenced Nunn on each count to three years executed at the DOC and two years suspended to probation. The trial court ordered Nunn to serve her sentences consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of six years executed at the DOC and four years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Nunn's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[8] Nunn argues her sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Tillett v. State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 366 (Ind. 2026) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6), reh'g denied (July 9, 2026). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B). The defendant must produce compelling evidence that the sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the offense, the defendant's character, or both. Id. (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)); Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[9] Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). “[W]e are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we focus on the aggregate sentence rather than its components, Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Considering the trial court's wide discretion on sentencing matters, only “exceptional cases” warrant sentence revisions, Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 856 (Ind. 2024), cert. denied).

[10] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, Nunn was convicted of and sentenced on two Level 5 felonies. “A person who commits a Level 5 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (emphasis added). On her two Level 5 felony convictions, the trial court sentenced Nunn to a total of ten years, with six years executed at the DOC and four years suspended to probation.

[11] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[12] Nunn essentially used the church as her own bank account. Instead of processing donations to local charities and paying the church's bills, Nunn funneled the church's money into all manner of personal expenses. Nunn methodically covered her tracks by writing checks for fictional field trips and camps and by fabricating treasurer reports to deceive the church regarding its deteriorating finances. Nunn's actions went beyond ordinary theft because she stole money intended for charitable purposes and repeatedly deceived the church to cover up her actions.

[13] Moreover, Nunn's two felony theft convictions required only that she twice steal at least $50,000.00 from the church. See I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(2)(A). Nunn's serial thefts totaled far more than this amount, and she also allowed the church's insurance to lapse. During the sentencing hearing, the assistant pastor of the church testified that if an accident involving the church or the children in its care took place, without insurance, “it would have been devastating [to the church].” Tr. Vol. II at 23. The “harm, injury, loss, or damage” suffered by the church was “significant” and “greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission” of Nunn's offenses. See I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1).

[14] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122). Entrusted with protecting the garden of the church, Nunn repeatedly succumbed to the apple of greed. Although Nunn does not have a history of criminal convictions prior to this case, that does not redeem her actions. For at least four years, Nunn lied to the church and betrayed the trust placed in her as treasurer by stealing thousands of dollars in charitable donations to fuel her personal spending. Nunn's lack of criminal history is a testament to her criminal conduct being kept secret rather than to her being a law-abiding citizen.

[15] Nunn argues that she demonstrated good character by pleading guilty, showing remorse, and promising to pay back the church ² . Nunn also points out that the presentence investigation report placed her at a low risk of reoffending. While Nunn did admit to taking tithes, keeping contributions, and draining donations, her admissions occurred only after other members of the church noticed bounced checks. And given Nunn's years of deception to conceal and continue her thefts, the fact that she pled guilty after her wrongdoing came to light does not demonstrate positive character. Moreover, Nunn received a “significant benefit in return” for her plea—the State dropped the three Level 6 felony charges, and the executed portion of Nunn's sentence was capped at three years for each count. See Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Nunn's remaining arguments do not demonstrate the sort of positive character necessary to revise her sentence.

[16] Based on the serious nature of Nunn's offenses and the depths she went to cover them up, we cannot say that Nunn has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of her offenses or her character renders her sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 119. We therefore affirm Nunn's sentence.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Evidence presented at the sentencing hearing showed the thefts continued into 2025 and the amount stolen exceeded $214,000.00.

2.   Nunn contends that she “already paid some of the money she owed by the time of her sentencing.” Appellant's Am. Br. at 11. The record does not support this claim. At the sentencing hearing, a member of Nunn's church testified that Nunn “has made no attempt to repay the church in small amounts as promised.” Tr. Vol. II at 16. In her allocution statement, Nunn did not claim that she had repaid the church to any extent. See id. at 37. The only amount Nunn appears to have “repaid” is her cash bond, which the trial court ordered to be paid to the church as partial restitution.

Felix, Judge.

Foley, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.