Jonathan DeShawn Currin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jonathan Currin appeals his sentence, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider his intellectual disability as a mitigating factor. Currin also asks us to revise his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 27, 2024, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Detective Thomas Borgmann observed Currin, who Borgmann knew to be a convicted felon, selling marijuana to three individuals outside of a gas station. During one of the transactions, Currin removed a handgun from his waistband and showed it to one of the buyers. Officers apprehended Currin and recovered a 9-millimeter handgun, marijuana, fentanyl, a digital scale, clear plastic baggies, and $3,625 in cash.

[3] As a result, and as later amended, the State charged Currin with: Count 1: Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a Level 4 felony;¹ Count 3: Dealing in Marijuana, as a Level 6 felony;² Count 4: Possession of Marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor;³ and Count 5: Possession of a Narcotic Drug, as a Level 4 felony.⁴

[4] Shortly after the State filed these charges, Currin was also charged and found guilty under cause 49D30-2407-F1-18513 of the following: attempted child molesting as a Level 1 felony, two counts of child molesting as Level 1 and Level 4 felonies, and two counts of invasion of privacy as Class A misdemeanors. In November 2025, those convictions resulted in an aggregate sentence of fifty-six years in the Department of Correction (DOC).

[5] On March 2, 2026, without a plea agreement, Currin pled guilty as charged in the present case. At the same hearing, Currin admitted that the commission of these offenses violated the terms of his probation in an earlier, unrelated cause, 49D30-2105-F4-13988.⁵ The court accepted his guilty pleas and admission of the probation violation, entered judgment of conviction on each count, and set the matters for sentencing.

[6] At the April 23 sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that the sentence imposed in the present cause was statutorily required to be served consecutively to the sentence in F4-13988. Then the State proffered two aggravating factors: (1) Currin's extensive juvenile and adult criminal history and (2) Currin's admission in the presentence investigation report that he has a drug problem. The State asked the court to order that he serve his sentence consecutively to his sentence in F1-18513.

[7] In response, Currin presented two mitigating factors: (1) he took responsibility and pled guilty to the present offenses, and (2) he had been incarcerated on and off beginning in the tenth grade, which impacted his brain development and led to an “intellectual disability and oppositional disorders.” Transcript at 22. Currin asked the court to order the sentence be served concurrently to his sentence in F1-18513. The court weighed the factors as follows:

In aggravation, I'll find that he has a history of criminal or delinquent behavior and it dates back a long time. I understand your argument about the brain development ․ and that is unfortunate that he was put there at such an early date. I will find in aggravation that he[ ] recently violated the conditions of [his] probation ․ In mitigation, I will find that he has accepted responsibility for his offense by his plea[s] of guilt[y].

Id.

[8] The trial court first revoked Currin's probation in F4-13988 and ordered him to serve the balance of that two-year sentence in the DOC.⁶ Then the court sentenced him to a ten-year aggregate term in the DOC in the present cause, to be served consecutive to F4-13988 and F1-18513. Currin now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Currin has not shown the trial court failed to consider his intellectual disability as a mitigating factor.

[9] Currin first argues the trial court failed to consider his intellectual disability as a mitigating factor. The trial court has broad sentencing discretion, which we review “only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We will find an abuse of discretion only in limited circumstances, including when the trial court omitted a factor from its sentencing statement that the record clearly supports. Id. at 491. When a defendant alleges the trial court failed to recognize a mitigating factor, he must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 493. “However, ‘if the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.’ ” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).

[10] During the sentencing hearing, Currin argued that his juvenile incarceration negatively impacted his brain development, leading to his current intellectual disability and oppositional disorders. The trial court explicitly stated it understood the argument but declined to find on the record that it was a mitigating factor.⁷ In any event, the court was not required to find the existence of the mitigating factor or explain why it found the factor does not exist. Furthermore, with the inconsistent and outdated evidence of Currin's mental health, we cannot find, based on his own self-serving testimony, that there was significant and clearly support evidence of his intellectual disability. We therefore cannot say the court abused its discretion.

2. Currin has not shown his consecutive sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

[11] Next, Currin argues his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to revise it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Under the rule, “[we] may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). We grant considerable deference to the trial court and balance “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). The defendant bears the burden of proving that his sentence is inappropriate. Herzog v. State, 285 N.E.3d 203, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied.

[12] As the State points out, Currin does not allege the length of the sentence he received in this case is inappropriate. Rather, he contends his sentence is inappropriate because it runs consecutive to two other sentences, neither of which are before us in this appeal. First, however, Currin is statutorily required to serve this sentence consecutive to F4-13988 because he committed the present offenses while he was on probation in that cause. See Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(e)(1) (2025) (under such circumstances, “the terms of imprisonment for the crimes shall be served consecutively”). Second, the court had broad discretion to order this sentence to be served consecutively to F1-18513. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(c) (“The court may order terms of imprisonment to be served consecutively even if the sentences are not imposed at the same time.”). And Currin has failed to show that decision was inappropriate given the nature of his offense or his character. The two prongs of the analysis “are ‘separate inquires to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.’ ” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 126 (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). We “ ‘must consider’ both factors, but the defendant need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts.” Id. (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 219).

[13] Starting with the nature of the offenses, Currin argues he “did not discharge, point, brandish in a threatening manner, or use the handgun to facilitate violence” and complied with officers during his arrest. Appellant's Brief at 11. But that doesn't change the fact that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm given his status as a serious violent felon. Moreover, the two marijuana charges in this case were elevated because he had prior drug convictions. Currin had conducted three drug deals and possessed thousands of dollars, forty-seven fentanyl pills, and drug paraphernalia when he was arrested. Based on these circumstances, we cannot say the nature of these offenses deems his consecutive sentence inappropriate.

[14] As for Currin's character, we consider his qualities and whether he has consistent good character or prominent virtuous traits. Herzog, 285 N.E.3d at 213. Currin claims he has good character because he took responsibility by pleading guilty, and he asks this Court to consider the fact that his intellectual disability has negatively impacted his life. But these traits are far outweighed by Currin's twenty-one-year criminal history, which includes convictions for child molesting, unlawful possession of a firearm, and dealing marijuana. Altogether, Currin has accumulated approximately seven juvenile adjudications, six misdemeanor convictions, and eight felony convictions, as well as forty incidents of misconduct while incarcerated in the Marion County Jail and the DOC. Moreover, Currin was on probation when he committed the present offenses. We therefore cannot say Currin's consecutive sentence in this present cause is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[15] For these reasons, we affirm Currin's sentence.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c) (2023).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10(a)(2), (c)(1)(A)(2018).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a)(1), (b)(1) (2018).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a), (c)(2) (2014). The State initially believed the narcotic was oxycodone and charged the offense as a Level 5 felony in Count 2. But when the State discovered the drug was actually fentanyl, the trial court granted its motion to dismiss Count 2 and allowed the court to amend the information by adding Count 5.

5.   In F4-13988, Currin was convicted of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and spent two years in the DOC followed by two years of probation.

6.   Currin does not appeal this disposition.

7.   We also note the supplemental sentencing statement lists the factors the court considered. There, the court handwrote “brain development” (or so it appears) at the bottom under “additional factors.”

DeBoer, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.