Brandi Devine, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Brandi Devine appeals her convictions for two counts of resisting law enforcement, arguing they were not supported by sufficient evidence. Finding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] On February 2, 2024, Devine called 911 and said someone was walking around her house and knocking on the doors. Indianapolis police officer Samuel Cohrs drove to Devine's home to investigate. Cohrs was familiar with Devine, as she habitually called 911, and he had been dispatched to her home over a dozen times on prior occasions. When Cohrs arrived at Devine's home on February 2, he saw no one outside. He decided to surveil the home, and while he did so, Devine again called 911 to report “a suspicious person ․ pounding on the doors of the house.” Transcript at 43. Still seeing no one outside, Cohrs asked another officer to come to the scene and then approached Devine's front door to speak with her.

[3] Devine let Cohrs inside, sat down in a reclining chair, and told him she saw someone walking outside her window. After a few minutes, Officer Garrett Trout arrived and joined Devine and Cohrs inside. As Trout walked into the house, Cohrs told Devine she was under arrest for making a false report. Devine, who was still sitting in the chair, began to repeatedly scream, “No!” State's Exhibit 2 at 00:09-00:31. Cohrs explained that he needed to place Devine in handcuffs, and after he placed one of the cuffs on her left wrist, she exclaimed, “Please don't make me hit you.” Id. at 00:31-00:33.

[4] At that point, Cohrs asked Devine to stand, but she refused to do so. Trout then instructed her to put her hands behind her back, and she screamed “No! No! Leave me alone!” Id. at 00:40-00:44. Cohrs forced Devine's left arm behind her back and Trout tried to do the same with her right. As Trout began to manipulate Devine's arm, she said, “Get the hell off me or I'll do self-defense.” Id. at 01:07-01:11. Devine held her arm tight against her body and rolled her shoulders away from Trout as he pulled against her forearm. Eventually, Trout successfully placed Devine's arm behind her back, after which she declared, “I have all rights [sic] to fight at all costs!” Id. at 01:21-01:25. Once her hands were cuffed behind her back, Devine remained seated and said she would not move.

[5] Ultimately, the officers successfully arrested Devine, and she was charged with Class A misdemeanor unlawful use of the 911 service,² Class B misdemeanor false informing,³ and two counts of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.⁴ At a bench trial on February 20, 2026, the State called Cohrs and Trout to testify, and the footage of Devine's arrest recorded by the officers’ body-worn cameras was admitted into evidence. After finding Devine guilty of both resisting law enforcement counts and not guilty on the remaining charges, the trial court sentenced her to time served. Devine now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Devine contends the State presented insufficient evidence that she forcibly resisted Cohrs’ and Trout's efforts to arrest her. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that it is the fact-finder's role, not ours, “to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). As such, “[w]e consider only the evidence most favorable to” the conviction, together with any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could have found “the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[7] To convict Devine of resisting law enforcement as alleged, the State had to prove that she “(1) knowingly or intentionally (2) forcibly (3) resisted, obstructed, or interfered with (4) a law enforcement officer, (5) while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties.” Runnells v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022); see also Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2021). Devine focuses on the element of force. A person “ ‘forcibly resists’ ․ when strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement official's rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993). While “the [resisting law enforcement] statute does not demand complete passivity,” K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013), the “force involved need not rise to the level of mayhem” and even a “modest level of resistance” might support the offense, Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965, 966 (Ind. 2009).

[8] Cases considering whether a person forcibly resisted are “necessarily fact-sensitive” and often “vary[ ] only by slight degrees.” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 727 (Ind. 2013). Indeed, while “simply refusing to present arms for handcuffing is not forcible resistance,” refusing to submit to handcuffing in a way that exerts strength, power, or violence against the arresting officer can be. McNary v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Graham, 903 N.E.2d at 966), trans. denied. Moreover, the statute contemplates punishment not just for actual physical contact with an officer, but also “the active threat of such strength, power, or violence ․” Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727.

[9] Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Devine's convictions. Devine repeatedly threatened to use force against the officers, telling Cohrs she would “hit” him and warning Trout she would use “self-defense” as he grabbed her right arm. State's Ex. 2 at 00:31-00:33, 01:07-01:11. She followed those threats with actual force by rolling her shoulders away from Trout and holding her right arm tight against her body as he tried to handcuff her. These facts are sufficient to sustain Devine's convictions. See Johnson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming when defendant turned away from an officer trying to search him “and pushed away [from the officer] with his shoulders while cursing and yelling”); Jordan v. State, 37 N.E.3d 525, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming when defendant “yanked her shoulder away, twisted and turned, and started ‘firing her arms and pulling her body away from [the officer] to that [he] could not get control of her’ ”) (second alteration in original) (record citation omitted).

[10] Despite Devine's argument to the contrary, this case is distinguishable from Brooks v. State, where the defendant merely “tensed up and wouldn't give [the officer] her arms.” 113 N.E.3d 782, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding insufficient evidence of forcible resistance). The Brooks panel found no evidence the arresting officer “had to use force to execute the arrest” or that the defendant used force to pull away from the officer. Id. at 785. Here, in contrast, the officers’ body-camera footage showed Devine tensing her arm and rolling her body away from Trout as he struggled to handcuff her, which was consistent with the officers’ testimonies that they had to force Devine's right arm behind her back. From that evidence—together with Devine's threatening statements—the trial court reasonably concluded that Devine forcibly resisted Cohrs’ and Trout's attempts to arrest her.

Conclusion

[11] For these reasons, we affirm Devine's convictions.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Ind. Code § 36-8-16.7-46 (2012).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1) (2021).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2021).

DeBoer, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.