IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.H. and J.H. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] H.H. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to his two sons, J.H. and K.H. (collectively, “Children”), on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Father presents several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Ho.H. had two children together: a daughter, Ka.H. (born in June 2009) (“Sister”), and a son, J.H. (born in January 2016).¹ According to a 2019 clinical assessment, Father has a seizure disorder, an IQ of 55, and limited literacy. Sister and J.H. have epilepsy and developmental and cognitive delays. In September 2018, DCS removed Sister and J.H. from their parents’ care after a substantiated assessment for poor home environment. DCS returned them to their parents’ care sometime thereafter. Then, in 2022, Ho.H. passed away.

[3] After Ho.H.’s death, Father and S.W. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) had a son together: K.H. (born in June 2024).² K.H. was born prematurely and spent approximately one month in the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit. He was diagnosed with reflux disease, anemia, and three heart conditions requiring a pediatric cardiologist to regularly monitor him. After his hospital discharge, Parents did not bring K.H. to follow-up appointments.

[4] On July 31, 2024, DCS opened an assessment due to suspected medical neglect. At the time, Parents, fifteen-year-old Sister, eight-year-old J.H., and infant K.H. were living in an unkempt hotel room, and the family was struggling with personal hygiene. Due to the room's uncleanliness, the hotel asked the family to leave. Two days later, a DCS caseworker took Parents and K.H. to the pediatrician, where Mother acknowledged she had not been feeding K.H. as the hospital staff directed. Because of reflux, K.H. struggled to keep food down and had only gained a few ounces since birth. Back at Parents’ new hotel room, Sister slipped away to the front desk while DCS caseworkers spoke with Parents. Due to Sister's inappropriate behavior in the lobby, the new hotel directed Parents to leave. DCS discovered J.H. was not taking medication to treat his epilepsy.

[5] DCS and Parents entered into an informal adjustment (“IA”) to address medical neglect, child safety, inadequate supervision of the children, housing instability, and a lack of parenting skills. Over the next month, DCS provided intensive family preservation services, but the problems persisted. On September 19, K.H. was admitted to the hospital and underwent unplanned surgery to correct a feeding condition. Parents did not seem to understand the severity of K.H.’s medically fragile condition or the importance of keeping medical appointments. DCS removed K.H. on an emergency basis and filed a petition alleging K.H. was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).

[6] After K.H.’s removal, DCS received additional reports of neglect concerning Sister and J.H. Father seemed disinterested in supervising them, believing it was Mother's role. He failed to follow through on the safety plans made with DCS. There was insufficient food in the household for the children. On October 4, Father was evaluated for mental health concerns and hospitalized. DCS removed Sister and J.H. and filed a petition alleging J.H. was a CHINS.

[7] On Parents’ admissions, the trial court adjudicated K.H. a CHINS on October 15. The same day, Father admitted J.H. was a CHINS. The trial court held a dispositional hearing and ordered Father to, among other things: enroll within a reasonable time (not to exceed 30 days) in all programs the Family Case Manager (“FCM”) recommended; engage in home-based counseling; complete a parenting assessment and a psychological evaluation and follow all resulting recommendations; maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; ensure proper food, clothing, and supervision of Children; and meet all Children's medical and mental health needs, including attending appointments and providing Children with prescribed medications.

[8] As of the periodic case review in March 2025, Father had not complied with Children's case plans. He took a long time to begin services, appeared unwilling to learn, and frequently cancelled therapy and home-based case manager appointments. He could not properly care for Children during visits. By the September 2025 permanency hearing, Father was only partially compliant with the case plan. Father had made minimal progress, frequently cancelled sessions with service providers, and expressed reluctance to participate. The trial court adopted a concurrent plan of adoption.

[9] On January 8, 2026, DCS moved to terminate Father's parental rights to Children. The trial court held a hearing on January 15 and March 11, 2026. By the time of the hearing, Father had obtained stable housing through the housing authority, although he had been struggling with a bed bug issue. He had resolved an issue with his social security disability check that had been reducing his income. So, he had both a steady source of income and stable housing.

[10] Numerous service providers testified regarding Father's ability to care for Children. Kendra Fiorucci—Father's and J.H.’s therapist—testified Father had not completed a psychological evaluation, so he had no formal mental health diagnoses. But he reported to her having panic attacks after a Child and Family Team Meeting and a visit with Children. During visits that Fiorucci supervised between Father, Children, and Sister, Father relied on Sister to care for Children or J.H. to care for K.H. About 45 minutes into a two-hour visit, Father would need to take a break. Fiorucci stated Father was struggling to take care of his own physical and medical needs, she had not seen him be able to care for Children's medical needs, and she was concerned he could not handle the stress of caring for Children. She estimated that at the current pace, it would take “[y]ears” before Father would be able to care for Children at home. Tr. Vol. 2 at 15.

[11] Jadyn Wallace, Father's home-based case manager since September 2025, testified Father made little progress on his goals of maintaining financial stability, obtaining and utilizing resources to access food, getting a driver's license, and getting to medical appointments. Father lacked self-motivation and, outside of the sessions, had not shown independence or growth toward his goals. Wallace did not believe Father could care for Children.

[12] Brittany Rice, the family's visit supervisor since May 2025, testified Father had not been able to supervise and care for Children and Sister together, so visits were changed to only one child at a time. In her opinion, Father's parenting skills had not improved in the approximately nine months she had worked with the family. She testified Father knew and understood what Children required, but he did not follow through on those tasks. For example, Father did not carry out the occupational and physical therapy exercises K.H. required. He lacked initiative to feed K.H., instead relying on Rice to mix baby cereal or formula.

[13] FCM Elizabeth Gunter worked with the family through the entire case. Like the other providers, she testified Father lacked initiative, urgency, and follow-through. For example, she ordered a clinical evaluation in December 2024, but Father did not respond to phone calls to schedule an appointment, so it was not done until February 2025. FCM Gunter also testified about Children's medical needs. Managing K.H.’s significant medical needs requires “a lot of communication with the doctor[.]” Id. at 75. J.H. is autistic and takes multiple medications to control persistent seizures; these medications cause serious side effects that require him to have a shortened school day. According to FCM Gunter, Father “believes in more of the traditional ․ parenting roles” where mothers “handle the doctor's appointments and the medication and that kind of stuff,” and so in the past he relied on the women in his life to take care of Children's needs. Id. at 78. She and Father discussed that he would need to take on this role. Yet at the time of the hearing, she believed Father had not shown he could take care of Children and would not be able to do so anytime soon. She testified Children need permanency.

[14] Children's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) Christine Benitos testified as to Children's best interests:

I believe it is in the children's best interest to have permanency. I was appointed on this case in September of 2024. And as others have testified here today, we've had very little progress in moving forward, that [Father] has been able to demonstrate his ability to keep the children safe, and given the complexity of their medical conditions, ․ it would be difficult for me to believe that he would be able to manage that as well as his own health.

Id. at 93.

[15] On March 11, 2026, the trial court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to Children. The court entered numerous findings of fact and determined DCS had proven the allegations in the petition by clear and convincing evidence, specifically concluding: (1) DCS had a satisfactory plan for Children's care (adoption); (2) there was a reasonable probability Father would not remedy the conditions resulting in Children's removal or reasons for placement outside the home; (3) there was a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children's wellbeing; and (4) termination was in Children's best interests.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[16] Father argues the trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous.

[17] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[18] A decision to terminate parental rights is among the most difficult a trial court is called upon to make. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). These decisions are “among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.” Id. We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We do not reweigh the evidence but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). And we do not judge witness credibility for ourselves, instead giving due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses firsthand. Id. We will set aside the trial court's findings and judgment only if they are clearly erroneous. In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts supporting them either directly or by inference. Id. Trial court findings not challenged on appeal are accepted as true. See In re A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

Statutory Requirements

[19] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2025) (“termination statute”). Relevant to this appeal are the following subsection (d) circumstances:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)–(3).

[20] The State bears the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship and shall enter findings of fact supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c) (2012).

Reasonable Efforts and Modifications

[21] Father first argues the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights under subsections (d)(2) and (d)(7) because DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Father acknowledges DCS provided him with “a panoply of services” and devoted “hundreds of billable hours” to interventions. Appellant's Br. at 15 n.1. He nevertheless alleges the efforts DCS made were unreasonable because they were not tailored to accommodate his cognitive disability.

[22] When petitioning to terminate Father's rights, DCS alleged the circumstances in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(7), both of which reference DCS's obligation under the CHINS statutes to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2) and (d)(7) (referring to I.C. § 31-34-21-5.5). But neither of these subsections were the basis of the trial court's termination order. The trial court found DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence only the circumstances alleged in (d)(3) and (d)(4). Neither of these subsections incorporates the “reasonable efforts” language. Therefore, we need not address Father's arguments about reasonable efforts under subsections (d)(2) and (d)(7).

[23] Father also briefly argues DCS's alleged failure to provide services tailored to his cognitive needs amounts to a due process violation. See Appellant's Br. at 19. When the State seeks to terminate parental rights, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process. In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014). But Father's argument is again based on the requirements of subsections (d)(2) and (d)(7), neither of which is at issue here. Further, Father did not raise a due process argument in the trial court during the termination proceedings, and there is no indication in the record he raised it during the CHINS cases. “It is well established that we may consider a party's constitutional claim waived when it is raised for the first time on appeal.” Hite v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 845 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194–95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding mother waived due process challenge for failure to object during CHINS proceedings and at termination stage).

[24] In a related argument, Father contends DCS's provision of services during the CHINS case violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. ch. 126. “Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities and create causes of action for qualified people who have faced such discrimination.” In re R.H., 55 N.E.3d 304, 309–10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)). The ADA provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A public entity, such as DCS, “shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability[.]” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i).

[25] Once DCS opts to provide services during the underlying CHINS proceedings to assist parents in improving parental skills, the provision of those services must comply with the ADA. Stone v. Daviess Cnty. Div. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. But this Court has long held the CHINS provision to make reasonable family preservation and reunification efforts is not a requisite element of our termination statute, and a failure to provide services, or the provision of services in an allegedly discriminatory manner, cannot serve as a basis to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law. See id.; see also In re N.C., 56 N.E.3d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied; In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Although Father invites us to revisit Stone’s holding considering recent case law developments, we decline his invitation in a case in which the trial court did not rely on the statutory subsections containing the “reasonable efforts” language and in which Father did not raise the issue of ADA modifications in the CHINS or termination proceedings below.

Challenged Findings

[26] We next turn to Father's argument that the record does not support several of the trial court's findings. Father has grouped the challenged findings together thematically, and so we address them as he has presented them.

[27] Findings 27–33, 69, 113 and 115 – Father contends the evidence does not support these findings, which “all involve [his] alleged inability to parent as a result of his own physical, emotional, and psychological impairments.” Appellant's Br. at 24.

[28] Findings 27 through 33 summarize therapist Fiorucci's testimony about Father's physical and mental health, the behavior she observed, and her opinion that Father was not ready to parent Children and would not be so for years. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 18–19 (each finding stating, “Fiorucci testified that ․”). Similarly, Finding 69 recounts FCM Gunter's testimony that Father lacked follow-through and accountability and showed no urgency to address issues. Based on our review of the transcript, these summaries accurately represent the substance of the witnesses’ testimonies. Although a summary of a witness's testimony is not properly a finding, the trial court also found “the testimony of [the State's witnesses] to be reliable and credible and adopts their testimony as findings of this Court.” Id. at 35.

[29] After adopting the witnesses’ testimony, the trial court entered Findings 113 and 115:

113. The testimony uniformly establishes that Father cannot independently care for the Children. Ms. Fiorucci, his therapist, testified he is not in a position to parent and that it would take years at his current pace. Ms. Wallace, his case manager, testified that none of his goals have been achieved and that he has shown no growth or independence. Ms. Rice, the visit supervisor, testified that he could not care for the Children even in an unsupervised visit. FCM Gunter testified there would be no follow-through if the case were closed. CASA Benitos testified she does not believe he can manage the Children's needs, let alone his own health.

* * *

115. Father has had panic attacks triggered by the stress of team meetings and visits with the Children. His therapist testified that when Father is under stress, he cannot focus outside of that stress. Given the intensive and continuous nature of the Children's medical needs, the Court finds, that the stress of full-time caregiving would significantly exceed what Father has demonstrated an ability to manage.

Id. at 31–32. In both instances, witness testimony supports the trial court's findings that Father cannot independently care for and manage Children.

[30] In arguing the trial court's findings in this regard are erroneous, Father points to his own testimony that he believed he could provide for Children's needs. At the hearing, he testified he knew how to give Children medication, he could take them to the doctor, and his stress was related to several factors such as his wife's death, his financial and housing instability, and the CHINS cases. But the trial court did not credit his testimony, finding:

132. [T]he testimony of Father was credible in part and not credible in part. Father's testimony regarding his love for the Children and his desire to be their parent was both credible and sincere. However, Father's testimony regarding his ability to care for the Children and address their needs was not supported by the weight of the evidence.

See id. at 35. Father's argument is a request to reweigh the evidence and reassess his credibility, which we cannot do.

[31] Findings 42, 44, 45, 49, 60, 61, 70, 118, 120, and 123 – Father challenges these findings about financial instability, food insecurity, and a recurring bedbug issue at his new home. Based on witness testimony, the trial court found the issues persisted. Father points to his contrary testimony that he had sufficient food to feed himself, he sorted out problems with his social security disability check, and the bedbug issue was resolved. But again, we cannot reweigh the evidence in Father's favor. Having reviewed the testimony, we conclude these findings are not clearly erroneous.

[32] Findings 55, 60, 70, 84, 85, 88, 124 – Finally, Father challenges the findings that—in the opinions of visit supervisor Rice, FCM Gunter, and CASA Benitos—Father had not improved his ability to care for Children. The providers’ testimony supports these findings, even if Father testified otherwise. We must again deny Father's request to reweigh this evidence.

[33] The evidence supports the trial court's findings.

Subsection (d) Circumstances

[34] Father appeals the trial court's determination that DCS proved the subsection (d)(2) and (d)(3) circumstances. See Appellant's Br. at 26–27 (challenging the evidence to support findings 123 and 124). But because subsection (d) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489; see also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 2010) (applying prior version of the statute). Accordingly, we focus on the trial court's determination under subsection (d)(3): that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied.

[35] To make this determination, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis: first, the trial court ascertains what conditions led to Children's removal and placement outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1134. When making these decisions, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. But the trial court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[36] DCS became involved with the family due to medical neglect, but through the IA became concerned about Children's safety, inadequate supervision of Children, housing instability, and Father's lack of parenting skills. Father's housing situation improved during the case. He had both stable income and housing at the time of the hearing. But Father was never able to demonstrate an ability to adequately care for or supervise Children. During visits, he quickly became overwhelmed by Children's needs. He required breaks during visits and once had a panic attack after. Because Father could not supervise Children at the same time, providers changed to separate visits with each child. Although Father was aware of Children's needs, he lacked initiative or relied on others to meet them. All service providers reported Father demonstrated little to no progress in achieving his goals related to parenting and supervision of Children. Based on this evidence, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to determine there was a reasonable probability the conditions leading to Children's removal and continued placement outside Father's home would not be remedied.

Best Interests

[37] Finally, Father challenges the trial court's finding that termination was in Children's best interests. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. A child's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[38] As the evidence shows, Father made little progress in developing the skills required to care for Children, who have complex medical needs that require daily, hands-on management. Despite substantial interventions, Father's therapist believed that at the current pace, it would be years before Father would be able to independently care for Children. Both FCM Gunter and CASA Benitos testified Children need permanency, especially considering their ongoing health needs. The findings support the trial court's determination that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[39] Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[40] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Neither Ho.H. nor Sister is involved in this appeal.

2.   S.W. is Ho.H.’s older daughter from a prior relationship. S.W. voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to K.H. and is not a party to this appeal.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.