IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationships of B.S. and M.S. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] M.W., M.S., and B.S. (collectively, “Children”) are the biological children of K.J. (“Mother”). R.W. (“Father R.W.”) is the biological father of M.W. D.S. (“Father D.S.”) is the biological father of M.S. and B.S. (collectively, “Younger Children”). Children were each adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”) after M.W. alleged that Father D.S. sexually abused her and Mother did not believe her. Younger Children later alleged that Father D.S. also sexually abused them. The trial court ultimately terminated the parental rights of Mother, Father D.S., and Father R.W. (collectively, “Parents”) to Children. Parents now challenge that termination and present several issues for our review, which we restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court violated Father R.W.’s due process rights; and

2. Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Parents’ parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2022, Children lived with Mother and Father D.S. in Clay County, Indiana.¹ In September 2022, M.W. reported that Father D.S. “sexual abuse[d]” her and that Mother did not believe her. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 104. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) removed Children and filed a petition alleging each was a CHINS because of the alleged abuse and because Mother “fail[ed] to take appropriate measures to protect” them. Id. Father D.S. was charged with child molesting. Parents admitted Children were CHINS, although Father D.S. did not admit to the sexual abuse allegation. In November 2022, each child was adjudicated a CHINS. As the case progressed, Younger Children reported that Father D.S. had also sexually abused them.

Mother and Children

[4] Early on, Mother “mostly” participated in services. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 106. Over time, Mother would “technically complete” services, but she “wouldn't resolve the issues the services sought to resolve.” Id. at 110. Mother “used her therapy sessions to complain about DCS rather than work on herself.” Id.

[5] During Younger Children's trial home visits with Mother, “on-going sexual abuse [occurred] between” Younger Children. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 107. Mother did not consistently follow Younger Children's safety plan by shutting their bedroom doors at night and using door and bed alarms to keep Younger Children separate while unattended. B.S. reported that M.S. came into his room at night “a lot” and inappropriately touched him while Mother played video games with her boyfriend (“Boyfriend”). Id. Mother explained that she did not enforce the shut-door requirement for B.S. because he was afraid of the dark.

[6] Mother allowed Boyfriend around Younger Children without DCS first completing a background check on him. After DCS learned about Boyfriend,² Mother “reluctantly” provided his name, but she did not complete the background check form for 12 days. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 107. The background check revealed that Boyfriend was a registered sex offender. When confronted about Boyfriend's sex offender status, Mother admitted she knew about it but made “excuses” for Boyfriend and claimed it was the “result of a big misunderstanding.” Id. at 112.

[7] While Mother had Younger Children on trial home visits, she took M.S. off her medication without consulting a doctor. Mother's home was in “disarray,” and Younger Children were “very dirty” in her care. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 113. Younger Children showed a pattern of “defecating” on themselves. Id. at 116. In 2024, DCS cancelled the trial home visits.

[8] DCS was concerned with Mother's parenting decisions regarding M.W., as well. During visits with M.W. soon after she was removed, Mother “s[neaked] in a cellphone” and allowed M.W. to speak with Father R.W. without DCS supervision. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 131. Mother also “sneak[ed]” in letters from Father R.W. to M.W. Id. Mother allowed M.W. to “request an adult man buy her underwear” and “did not see a problem with this because [M.W.] was okay with it and told Mother that she would do it anyway.” Id. at 134.

[9] Mother's finances—and her dishonesty about them—also presented an obstacle. Mother worked 10 to 15 hours per week through most of the case. Mother “created a misleading budget that did not accurately reflect her income or bills when working with providers.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 112. Mother was dishonest with DCS regarding her unpaid bills, and at one point, Mother's electricity was turned off because she did not pay the power bill. DCS only discovered Mother's power was out because “they went to the home and observed there to be no electricity.” Id. at 109. For several months, Mother drove Children without automobile insurance and while her vehicle registration was expired. After Mother's “food stamps stopped,” she did not reapply for several months “despite being reminded and told how.” Id. DCS providers had to suggest that Mother visit food banks and take her to them so Mother would have sufficient food in the home. Mother eventually paid off her bills with a $5,000 tax refund, but she was unable to account for how she spent “nearly $3,000” of it. Id. at 112. Mother did not take advantage of DCS's help locating resources to get free school supplies for Children, so the supplies “ultimately had to be provided by DCS.” Id. at 113.

[10] Children's “abuse and neglect” manifested in “severely inappropriate behaviors.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 112. M.S. “killed multiple animals and touched other children,” including B.S., “in sexually inappropriate ways.” Id. By the time of the factfinding hearing, M.S. was placed in a “qualified residential treatment facility” while DCS searched for adoptive placement. Id. at 113. B.S. also “touched other children in sexually inappropriate ways and frequently r[an] around naked.” Id. at 112. DCS located an “adoptive family” for B.S. Id. at 113. M.W. “act[ed] sexually inappropriate with other children,” “molest[ed] other children,” and “threaten[ed] to destroy a placement's valuables and harm her animals.” Id. at 136. During a visit with Mother, M.W. “self[-]harmed in the visit provider's car,” “punched” Mother, and used a nicotine vape after “g[etting] into” Mother's purse. Id. at 134. Due to her escalating behaviors, M.W. had to be moved from a residential placement to a group home and then to “emergency shelter care.” Id. at 132.

[11] Mother initially did not believe that Children were victims of sexual abuse. Mother denied or claimed to be unaware of Children's inappropriate behaviors. Children were aware that Mother did not believe them, which created a “serious violation of trust in the parent-child relationship.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 112. After Mother claimed she did believe Children, she maintained that Father D.S. “could be a good dad” and “d[id] not see a reason to cut him out of [Children's] lives.” Id. at 111. Mother claimed that her mother and stepfather, who did not believe Children were abused, were her “biggest supports.” Id. at 112.

Father D.S.

[12] Father D.S. maintained that he did not sexually abuse Children, but he did not attempt to appeal DCS's substantiation of the abuse. Father D.S.’s criminal charges were dismissed after DNA testing revealed semen found on M.W. did not belong to Father D.S.

[13] While incarcerated early in the case, Father D.S. began a fatherhood engagement program, but the service was discontinued because he “refuse[d] to work on goals” with his provider. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 106. The program was also discontinued the second time Father D.S. attempted it because he did not “implement what [was] taught.” Id. at 107. Father D.S. did not keep DCS updated on his address.

Father R.W.

[14] Prior to DCS's involvement, Father R.W. was mostly incarcerated and “uninvolved” in M.W.’s life. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 136. During the case, Father R.W. did not engage in services or visits, even when he was not incarcerated. After his release from prison, Father R.W. had “no contact” with DCS or M.W. Id. at 131.

Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings

[15] In May 2025, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights over Children, Father D.S.’s parental rights over Younger Children, and Father R.W.’s parental rights over M.W. During the ensuing factfinding hearing, Father R.W. did not appear. The trial court granted the termination of parental rights petition for each parent. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Father R.W.’s Due Process Rights

[16] Father R.W. argues that the trial court violated his due process rights.³ A parent's fundamental (but not absolute) right to raise his or her child is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.⁴ In re Z.R., 272 N.E.3d 546, 551–52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing In re I.P., 5 N.E.3d 750, 751–52 (Ind. 2014)), trans. not sought. This means that when the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, “it must do so in a manner that meets due process requirements.” Id. (quoting I.P., 5 N.E.3d at 751).

[17] Father R.W. specifically contends the trial court violated his due process rights by (a) holding the factfinding hearing in his absence and (b) terminating his parental rights to M.W. without requiring DCS to make reasonable efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship. We address each contention in turn.

a. Holding the Factfinding Hearing in Father R.W.’s Absence

[18] Due process is not tantamount to an “absolute constitutional right ․ to be present at a termination hearing.” Z.R., 272 N.E.3d at 552 (quoting In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 248 (Ind. 2014)). Due process guarantees the “right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. (quoting K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 249). We balance three factors that inform the process due in a termination of parental rights case. Id. (citing I.P., 5 N.E.3d at 751). Those factors are “ ‘(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.’ ” Id. (quoting I.P., 5 N.E.3d at 751–52).

[19] DCS provided notice of the factfinding hearing to Father R.W. via a letter addressed to him at the prison where he resided, and the trial court ruled that this notice was “proper,” Tr. Vol. II at 15.⁵ The trial court was prepared for a virtual appearance by Father R.W. from the prison, but Father R.W. failed to appear. Father R.W.’s counsel stated he had been “advised that [Father R.W.] has refused to participate in any program, so it wouldn't surprise me if he just refuses to appear.” Id. at 14. Father R.W. had a sufficient opportunity to be heard at the hearing; he simply chose not to appear.

[20] As for balancing the three due process factors, “[b]oth a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of a child, and the State's parens patriae interest in protecting a child's welfare are substantial.” Z.R., 272 N.E.3d at 552 (quoting I.P., 5 N.E.3d at 752). The issue is thus whether the trial court's decision to hold the factfinding hearing in Father R.W.’s absence created a meaningful risk of error.

[21] “Counsel's representation of the absent parent's interests at the factfinding hearing ‘vastly reduce[s] the risk of error,’ making the risk of error ‘minimal.’ ” Z.R., 272 N.E.3d at 552 (citing In re C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). “[A] party's due process rights typically are not violated when a court proceeds with the factfinding hearing in the party's absence so long as ․ counsel was able to make argument and cross-examine witnesses.” Id. (citing C.C., 170 N.E.3d at 677). Father R.W. was represented by counsel at the factfinding hearing, and counsel made argument and cross-examined witnesses. Though Father R.W. faults counsel's performance, counsel was put in a tough position because Father R.W. had almost no involvement in M.W.’s entire life. Father R.W. does not explain how his presence would have changed the trial court's findings of fact or legal conclusions. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not violate Father R.W.’s due process rights by holding the factfinding hearing in his absence.

b. DCS's Reasonable Efforts to Preserve the Parent-Child Relationship

[22] “[F]or a parent's due process rights to be protected in the context of termination proceedings, DCS must have made reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit[.]” In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied), trans. denied sub nom. T.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 265 N.E.3d 1009 (Ind. 2025). “[W]hat constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ will vary” in each individual case. Id. (quoting T.W., 135 N.E.3d at 615).

[23] The supervising family case manager (FCM) testified that she offered Father R.W. the opportunity to participate in a fatherhood engagement program while in prison and discussed potential services for him after he was released. After Father R.W.’s release from prison, DCS “never heard from him again.” Tr. Vol. II at 187. DCS made reasonable efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship. Father R.W. did not take advantage of those efforts. The trial court did not violate Father R.W.’s due process rights by failing to require DCS to make further reasonable efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship.

2. The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Parents’ Parental Rights to Children Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[24] Parents challenge the trial court's termination of their parental rights over Children. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[25] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings that the parent does not challenge on appeal.⁶ See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[26] To terminate each parent's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (a) at least one requirement under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is present; (b) termination of the parent-child relationships is in Children's best interests, id. § -4(c)(3); and (c) there is a satisfactory plan for Children's care and treatment, id. § -4(c)(2). We address each element in turn.

a. Subsection (d) Requirements

[27] Parents challenge the trial court's conclusions regarding Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). The trial court concluded for each parent that (1) under Subsection (d)(3), there was a reasonable probability that the “conditions that resulted in the [Children's] removal” would not be “remedied”; and (2) under Subsection (d)(4), the “continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat” to Children's well-being. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 119, 138–39. We address the trial court's conclusions for each parent below.

i. Mother

[28] Mother only challenges the trial court's conclusion under Subsection (d)(3) that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children's removal will not be remedied. However, DCS alleged and the trial court concluded not only that the circumstances in Subsection (d)(3) exist, but also that the circumstances in Subsection (d)(4) exist—that is, there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to Children's well-being. Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 103, 119, 126, 138–39. DCS only needed to prove either of these conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his [or her] behalf.” See Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Because Mother does not challenge the trial court's Subsection (d)(4) conclusion, Mother has waived any challenge thereto, and that conclusion alone is sufficient to establish that one of the Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) requirements is present. Consequently, we need not address Mother's arguments regarding Subsection (d)(3). We nevertheless note that Mother's arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124); see also infra ¶¶ 33–34.

ii. Father D.S.

[29] Father D.S. challenges the trial court's conclusion that the circumstances in Subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) exist.⁷ Like Mother, Father D.S. does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that the circumstances in Subsection (d)(4) exist, so he has waived any challenge to that conclusion and we need not address his arguments regarding Subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3). Even if we did address Father's arguments thereon, they are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124).

iii. Father R.W.

[30] Father R.W. challenges the trial court's conclusion that the circumstances in Subsection (d)(4) exist. Father R.W. has a felony conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor and several felony convictions for failing to register as a sex offender. Father R.W.’s criminal history presents a threat to M.W., especially given its nexus to the sexual abuse M.W. suffered. The trial court's threat conclusion is not clearly erroneous as to Father R.W.,⁸ and the trial court did not clearly err by finding that at least one Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) requirement supported the termination of Parents’ parental rights.

b. Best Interests

[31] Parents also challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination of their parental rights is in Children's best interests. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). “[T]he recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). We address the trial court's best-interests conclusion for each parent in turn.

i. Mother

[32] The trial court concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests primarily based on the recommendations of DCS and the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) along with the evidence that Mother failed to appreciate threats of sexual abuse to Children. The supervising FCM had concerns regarding Children's “mental health” if they “maintain[ed] contact” with Mother because Mother did not initially believe Children's claims of sexual abuse. Tr. Vol. II at 187. The FCM was also concerned that Mother was not implementing parenting skills because she did not have a “cleaning schedule, bathing schedule, [or] sleep schedule” for Children; Children had “hygiene issues” in Mother's care; and “the home was often in disarray.” Id. at 203. The CASA met with Children frequently throughout the case, and she testified that based on Children's “history of ․ abuse and neglect, ․ to put them back in the home where all of this abuse and neglect took place would be incredibly damaging for all three of them,” Tr. Vol. III at 242. The CASA did not believe Mother understood “the depth of the mental health issues and the emotional issues with the children based on their trauma.” Id. at 244.

[33] Additionally, there was evidence that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal would not be remedied. Children were removed from Mother because M.W. alleged that Father D.S. sexually abused her and Mother did not believe M.W.’s allegations or take measures to protect her. M.W. displayed sexually inappropriate behavior, and by the time of the factfinding hearing, she required extensive treatment in “emergency shelter care.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 132. As the case progressed, Younger Children also displayed sexually inappropriate behaviors and alleged sexual abuse by Father D.S.

[34] Despite Children's allegations and behavior, Mother failed to appreciate the threat of sexual abuse and prioritize Children's protection. Mother did not initially believe Children's allegations regarding Father D.S., and even after she did, she maintained that Father D.S. could be a “good dad” if he engaged in services. Tr. Vol. II at 140. Mother allowed M.W. to “request an adult man buy her underwear” and “did not see a problem with this because [M.W.] was okay with it and told Mother that she would do it anyway.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 134. Mother failed to follow the safety plan aimed at protecting Younger Children from sexually inappropriate behavior toward one another, and she took M.S. off her medication without consulting a doctor. Mother also allowed Boyfriend to be around Younger Children without him completing a background check.

[35] Mother's best-interests arguments are all invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124). For example, Mother argues that she “had no memory of completing a plan” requiring a background check before other adults could be around Children and that after she was “informed ․ that [Boyfriend] could not be in the home, she never allowed him back.” Mother's Br. at 19. The supervising FCM testified that Mother was told “several times that anybody that's in the home has to be background checked.” Tr. Vol. II at 163. Moreover, Mother knew about Boyfriend's sex offender status and still allowed him around Younger Children. Mother believed Boyfriend's “version of the story ․ that it was a misunderstanding.” Id. at 179. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Children's best interests.

ii. Father D.S.

[36] The trial court concluded that termination of Father D.S.’s parental rights was in Younger Children's best interests based on the allegations of sexual abuse against him and his lack of participation in the case. The trial court noted that the CASA recommended termination of Father D.S.’s parental rights.

[37] Father D.S. appears to argue that the trial court found that he sexually abused Children, and in doing so, the trial court shifted the “burden to disprove” the abuse allegations onto him.⁹ Am. Father D.S.’s Br. at 21. The trial court did not expressly find that Father D.S. sexually abused Children. Specifically, the trial court found that Father D.S. “still claims he did not sexually abuse any of the children. He was substantiated early on for sex abuse by DCS, was provided the legally required paperwork notifying him of his rights and his rights to appeal the substantiation, and he never attempted to appeal the substantiation.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 113. The trial court acknowledged that DNA testing excluded Father D.S. as the contributor of semen found on M.W.; however, the trial court found that “[t]his DNA exclusion also does not disprove that [Father D.S.] sexually abused one or more of the children just because that particular DNA collection was not his.” Id. at 115.

[38] The evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision show that “all three children” made allegations about the same “single event” of sexual abuse by Father D.S. Tr. Vol. II at 249. Children disclosed “at different times” while “in different placements.” Id. Children all displayed sexually inappropriate behavior, which they perpetrated on each other and other children. According to the CASA's report, M.S. reported that Father D.S. touched her “in places where [her] clothing covered,” Tr. Vol. VI at 216, and B.S. reported that Father D.S. touched his “privates,” id. at 218. The CASA further reported that M.W. “did not want to have to sleep in the same bed [where] abuse had apparently occurred.” Tr. Vol. IV at 13. Father D.S. did not appeal DCS's substantiation of M.W.’s sexual abuse allegation.

[39] The trial court could reasonably find that an innocent parent would contest a substantiation of sexual abuse of a child in the parent's care, and Father D.S. provides no reason why he did not attempt to do so. As for the exclusion of Father D.S. as the source of semen found on M.W., these results do not shed light on whether Father D.S. (1) sexually abused M.S. or B.S., (2) sexually abused M.W. without leaving semen, or (3) sexually abused M.W. on an occasion that did not lead to DNA collection. To the extent the trial court found that Father D.S. sexually abused Children, record evidence supports this finding.

[40] Father D.S.’s remaining best-interests arguments are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124). For example, Father D.S. argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that he refused to work on goals in, and did not complete, the fatherhood engagement program because his lack of focus on the reunification goal was “understandable for a man sitting in jail on charges that DNA evidence would later show he did not commit,” his participation declined because DCS “suspended his visitation,” and he did not know about the program's “two-cancellation policy.” Am. Father D.S.’s Br. at 19. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination of Father D.S.’s parental rights is in M.S.’s and B.S.’s best interests.

iii. Father R.W.

[41] The trial court concluded that termination of Father R.W.’s parental rights to M.W. was in her best interests because Father R.W. was uninvolved in her life, he refused to engage in services, and he was a sex offender with several convictions for failure to so register. Father R.W.’s failure to participate in services is evidence that termination of parental rights is in M.W.’s best interests, see J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1046–47, and demonstrates his lack of fitness to parent a child with high needs such as M.W. Moreover, Father R.W.’s sex-offense history is troubling given the sexual abuse M.W. suffered.

[42] Father R.W. argues that he was not “given a chance to participate in services or visits.” Father R.W.’s Br. at 17. Father R.W. was informed that services could begin after his release from prison, but after his release, he never contacted DCS. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination of Father R.W.’s parental rights is in M.W.’s best interests.

c. Satisfactory Plan

[43] Last, Parents challenge the trial court's conclusion that adoption is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(2) does not require DCS to present and prove a particular plan is the best plan or more satisfactory than alternative plans; instead, that provision requires only that DCS present and prove a particular plan is “satisfactory.” DCS's plan does not need to “be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.” In re C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added) (citing In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied), trans. denied. In general, “adoption is a ‘satisfactory plan’ for the care and treatment of a child.” In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).

[44] Mother argues that the plan of adoption is not satisfactory based on In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2009), reh'g denied, and In re H.G., 959 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh'g denied, trans. denied. In G.Y., despite the mother's incarceration, she made extensive efforts to participate in services and work toward reunification. G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1262–66. H.G. involved multiple parents, some of whom were incarcerated, who similarly cooperated with DCS and made progress toward reunification. 959 N.E.2d at 291–94. At least one of the children in H.G. indicated he would not consent to adoption. Id. at 293. The courts in G.Y. and H.G. rejected the adoption plans because termination of parental rights was not in the children's best interests. G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1265–66; H.G., 959 N.E.2d at 294.

[45] The facts of G.Y. and H.G. are distinguishable. Here, termination of parental rights is in Children's best interests, see supra ¶¶ 31–42, and there was no evidence that Children would not consent to adoption.

[46] Parents raise an additional argument—adoption is not a satisfactory plan because Children exhibit inappropriate behaviors and M.S. and M.W. were not in pre-adoptive placements at the time of the termination hearing. In other words, Parents argue that adoption is unrealistic and permanency will not be achieved.

[47] By the termination hearing, DCS had “located an adoptive family for B.S.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 113. M.S. and M.W. “remain[ed] in qualified residential treatment facilit[ies] due to [their] behaviors and DCS continue[d] to diligently search for an adoptive placement for [them].” Id. at 113, 137. Although M.S. and M.W. were not in a pre-adoptive placement, the absence of “a specific family in place to adopt the children does not make the plan unsatisfactory.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied). Furthermore, although Children will no doubt require special attention and care as they work through their trauma and special needs, the trial court considered these circumstances. Rehabilitation and adoption remain possible for Children. The trial court did not clearly err by concluding that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Children.

Conclusion

[48] In sum, the trial court did not violate Father R.W.’s due process rights, and the trial court did not clearly err by terminating Parents’ parental rights to Children. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[49] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   M.W. was born on March 3, 2011; M.S. was born on November 11, 2015; and B.S. was born on November 8, 2018.

2.   Children told DCS about Boyfriend being in the house even though Mother told Children not to disclose that information.

3.   Father R.W. did not raise a due process argument at the trial level, so he did not provide the trial court “a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits” of his claims before seeking an opinion on appeal. In re Z.R., 272 N.E.3d 546, 551 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004)), trans. not sought. Accordingly, Father R.W. has waived this issue for our review by raising it for the first time on appeal. See Expert Pool Builders, LLC v. Vangundy, 224 N.E.3d 309, 313 (Ind. 2024) (citing Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013)) (“Generally, we limit appellate review to arguments the parties first presented to the trial court.”). We nevertheless choose to address the merits of Father R.W.’s due process claim, see Plank, 981 N.E.2d at 54 (citing Morse v. State, 593 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ind. 1992)) (“[A] reviewing court may exercise its discretion to review a constitutional claim on its own accord.”), particularly because Father R.W.’s parental rights are at stake here, see In re M.I., 127 N.E.3d 1168, 1170–71 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child., 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)) (“[T]he parent–child relationship ‘is one of the most valued relationships in our culture.’ ”).

4.   Father R.W. argues that the trial court violated his due process rights under the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, but he argues the analysis is the “same” under both. Father R.W.’s Br. at 21. For the purposes of this case, we need not undertake the task of determining if the due process requirements differ under each constitution.

5.   Father R.W. does not argue that DCS's notice was insufficient under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6.5, which governs statutory notice requirements in termination of parental rights proceedings.

6.   Mother argues that we should disregard as surplusage almost all the trial court's findings because they “are merely a regurgitation of witness testimony.” Mother's Br. at 15. A finding is generally deemed “surplusage” if it merely recounts or reports who testified and what they testified to; hallmarks of such findings are terms like “testified that,” “stated that,” “reported that,” “described,” “expressed,” or “believed.” In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. not sought. On the other hand, a finding in which the trial court “adopt[ed]” a witness's testimony “may be considered a finding of fact.” Id. (quoting Parks v. Delaware Cnty. Dep't Child Servs., 862 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).Here, several of the trial court's findings described witness testimony, but the trial court expressly “adopted” this testimony “as the Court's own finding[s] of fact.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. II at 118, 138. Moreover, the trial court included in its order other findings that go beyond describing testimony and demonstrate that the court analyzed the evidence. We therefore cannot say the trial court's findings are surplusage that we should disregard.

7.   Under Subsection (d)(2), DCS must prove that “the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months” and “despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2).

8.   Father R.W. also challenges—in one sentence—the trial court's conclusion under Subsection (d)(3) that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in M.W.’s removal will not be remedied. Because the trial court did not clearly err by concluding the circumstances in Subsection (d)(4) exist, we need not address Father R.W.’s argument regarding Subsection (d)(3). However, we note that Father R.W.’s arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016)).

9.   To the extent Father D.S. argues that the supervising FCM improperly “testified to prejudicial out-of-court statements and offered her personal opinion that the children's disclosures ‘couldn't have been coached,’ ” Am. Father D.S.’s Br. at 22, Father D.S. does not support this argument with “cogent reasoning,” as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Father D.S. does not explain with citations to authority the reason the FCM's testimony was improper. Father D.S. has thus waived this argument. See Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

Felix, Judge.

Foley, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.