Christopher G. Platter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After a jury trial, the trial court convicted Christopher G. Platter of Level 6 felony residential entry.¹ The court sentenced him to two years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). Platter raises two issues for appellate review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing his proposed consent instruction?

2. Is his sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Platter and Leroy Bure had known each other for years. On December 17, 2024, Platter called Bure about returning magnetic lights he had borrowed and that Bure wanted back. Bure informed Platter he was out for lunch. Platter abruptly ended the call, and then drove to Bure's house.

[4] April Hook was alone at Bure's home cleaning. Hook and Platter had been in a dating relationship which ended sometime in November. Platter had introduced her to Bure, and she had recently moved into Bure's home. Hook's car was parked across the street from the house. From a bedroom window, Hook noticed Platter's truck parked in the driveway. Shortly afterward, she heard Platter walking inside the house and calling her name. Hook shut the bedroom door and contacted Bure, who told her to call 9-1-1.

[5] Platter left the house momentarily, only to return. He walked to the bedroom where Hook was and opened the door. Hook told Platter he was not allowed inside the house. Platter claimed he had permission to be there but returned to his truck. He remained in the vehicle for some time before driving off. Law enforcement detained him not far from Bure's property. Platter admitted he had entered Bure's home.

[6] The State charged Platter with Level 6 felony residential entry, alleging he knowingly or intentionally broke and entered Bure's home.

[7] Hook and Bure testified at Platter's trial. Hook testified the front door was closed the day of the incident, but clarified “it was just unlocked.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 138. She testified Bure always “closed his doors” when leaving because otherwise his two dogs would escape from the house. Id.

[8] Bure testified he had recently hired Platter to do some landscaping and cleaning work. Whenever Platter borrowed Bure's equipment to complete this work, Bure stated Platter would “[p]ut it back in the trailer.” Id. at 166. Bure testified Platter had been permitted inside his house many years earlier to remodel a sunroom but lacked permission to enter the day of the offense. According to Bure, Platter never returned the lights he borrowed.

[9] The State also introduced into evidence recordings of phone calls Platter made from the county jail. In one of the recordings, Platter claimed the front door was wide open; in another, he threatened to kill Bure if Bure did not drop the charge. The trial court admitted the recordings. Platter did not testify.

[10] After the parties rested, the trial court heard arguments from the State and Platter about the proposed jury instructions. Platter asked the court to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of consent and the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. The trial court denied the request as to the consent instruction, concluding “there was no testimony that there was any consent.” Id. at 195. The court was going to give the criminal trespass instruction, but Platter's counsel moved to withdraw it, stating:

[I]n light of ․ the ruling removing the proposed jury instruction for consent, ․ and after conferring with Mr. Platter, ․ we would request to withdraw the proposed jury instruction for the lesser included.

Id. at 196. The trial court granted the withdrawal. The jury found Platter guilty as charged.

[11] At the time of sentencing, Platter was forty-eight years old. The presentence investigation report shows he has a record of criminal activity, starting with juvenile adjudications for burglary and theft. As an adult, Platter has eight misdemeanor convictions, including convictions for possession of marijuana, criminal conversion, domestic battery, resisting law enforcement, leaving the scene of an accident, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He has four felony convictions: possession of methamphetamine, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and possession of a firearm by a felon.² Platter has had probation revoked three times and a suspended sentence and home detention placement both revoked once.

[12] The trial court heard from Platter, who stated: “I would just like to put this behind me and get on with my responsibilities, and my liberties.” Id. at 219. He pointed to his employment history, low Indiana Risk Assessment System (“IRAS”) score, and his financial support of a daughter in college as mitigating factors. He asked the trial court to impose a one-year sentence suspended to probation.

[13] Although the trial court found Platter's low IRAS score mitigating, the court determined his history of criminal activity and failed rehabilitation efforts were key aggravators. Concluding the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the trial court sentenced Platter to two years executed in the DOC.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Platter's proposed consent instruction.

[14] Platter first argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of consent. Platter argues his years-long acquaintance with Bure, the recent landscaping work, the call he made to Bure the morning of the incident, his claim that the front door was wide open, and Bure's request for him to return the magnetic lights were “sufficient evidence to support the instruction[.]” Appellant's Br. at 9. He asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial.

[15] We review a trial court's decision to give or refuse a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015); see also McKinney v. State, 873 N.E.2d 630, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting an abuse of discretion standard of review applies when the trial court refuses an instruction on the grounds that there is no serious evidentiary dispute), trans. denied. To determine whether a jury instruction was properly refused, we consider whether the instruction correctly states the law, is supported by the evidence, and is covered in substance by the other jury instructions. McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763–64 (Ind. 2015). We reverse only if the appellant shows the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights. Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 376. “If the court improperly declined to instruct the jury on an applicable defense, the error is not harmless.” McBride v. State, 261 N.E.3d 274, 279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 378).

[16] A defendant who knowingly or intentionally breaks and enters the dwelling of another person commits Level 6 felony residential entry. I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5. The opening of an unlocked door is sufficient to establish a breaking occurred. Young v. State, 846 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Lack of consent is not an element of residential entry. Griesinger v. State, 699 N.E.2d 279, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. It is the defendant's burden to raise consent as a defense. Holman v. State, 816 N.E.2d 78, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Once the defense is raised, the State bears the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “A defendant's belief that he has permission to enter must be reasonable in order for him to avail himself of the defense of consent.” Id.

[17] Platter's proposed instruction read in part:

The Defendant has raised the affirmative defense that he had consent to engage in the acts charged.

It is a defense that the Defendant had consent to enter into the dwelling of Leroy Bure.

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not have consent to enter into the dwelling of Leroy Bure.

A defendant's belief that he has permission to enter must be reasonable in order for the defendant to avail himself of the defense of consent. [․]

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 95.

[18] The parties do not dispute whether the tendered instruction is an accurate statement of law or whether the substance of the instruction was covered by another instruction; therefore, the sole issue before us is whether there was evidence in the record to support giving the consent instruction. Bure testified Platter did not have permission to enter his home. Platter knew Bure was not at the house after their phone call, yet he drove there, opened the unlocked door, entered the house, and called out Hook's name. He walked toward one of the bedrooms, opened the bedroom door, and encountered Hook. Neither Platter's past relationship with Hook nor his years of acquaintance with Bure granted him permission to enter and move about the house. In light of the evidence, it was not reasonable for Platter to believe he had permission to enter, and therefore, he could not avail himself of the defense of consent. See Holman, 816 N.E.2d at 81.

[19] Platter contends the tendered instruction should have been given because one of the admitted recordings created “a factual dispute” about whether the front door was open or shut. Appellant's Br. at 8. But as the State counters, “an open door goes to the element of breaking, not to whether Bure agreed to the entry.” Appellee's Br. at 15. Platter asserting the door was wide open was insufficient to satisfy his burden when raising consent as a defense. See Holman, 816 N.E.2d at 81. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the proposed consent instruction because the evidence does not support the instruction.³

Platter's sentence is not inappropriate.

[20] Platter next asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[21] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[22] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[23] “When assessing the nature of an offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point that the legislature selected as an appropriate sentence for the particular crime committed.” Hollins v. State, 145 N.E.3d 847, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is from six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2- 7(b) (2019). The trial court sentenced Platter to two years executed in the DOC. His sentence is six months below the maximum allowed.

[24] As for the nature of the offense, Platter was aware Bure was not home when he entered Bure's house. He opened the closed door and twice entered the property without permission. During the second entry, Platter reached one of the bedrooms, opened the bedroom door, and contradicted Hook when she stated he lacked permission to be there. He never returned the magnetic lights he purportedly wanted to return. Platter argues a revision of his sentence is warranted in part because he “did not engage in any act of violence.” Appellant's Br. at 14. “[B]ut the absence of violence is already factored into the level of the offenses.” Thomas v. State, 249 N.E.3d 1118, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Had Platter committed violent offenses, “the State presumably would have charged [him] accordingly.” Id. at 1122. The nature of the offense does not suggest his sentence is inappropriate.

[25] Regarding Platter's character, he has a substantial record of criminal activity, which began with two juvenile adjudications. As an adult, he has eight misdemeanor convictions and four felony convictions. Even a short criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 700.

[26] Platter also has a history of probation violations, and has had both a suspended sentence and a home detention placement revoked. As the trial court concluded, he has not been successful at previous efforts at rehabilitation. His statement in allocution of wishing to get on with his “responsibilities” and his “liberties” is not the remorseful statement he makes it out to be. Tr. Vol. 2 at 219; see also Appellant's Br. at 15. At any rate, the trial court did not make a finding about remorse, and we accept the court's determination. See Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1002–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (observing appellate courts review a trial court's determination of a defendant's remorse similar to a court's credibility judgment), trans. denied. And the trial court need not weigh or credit Platter's low IRAS score or any other potentially mitigating factor in the same manner Platter does. See McKinney, 873 N.E.2d at 645–46 (stating a trial court is not obligated to weigh or credit mitigating factors in the manner a defendant suggests).

[27] In short, Platter has not provided compelling evidence depicting his offense in a positive light or showing “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” to persuade us his sentence warrants revision. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

Conclusion

[28] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury, and Platter's sentence is not inappropriate.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5 (2014).

2.   Platter's conviction for possession of a firearm took place in Michigan.

3.   Platter also appears to argue the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. See Appellant's Br. at 16. When the charging information alleges a defendant broke and entered a dwelling, the charge is sufficient to make criminal trespass a factually included lesser offense of residential entry. Young, 846 N.E.2d at 1062–63. Here, the trial court was prepared to give Platter's criminal trespass instruction. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 192 (the court stating, “Alright, I'll give it. I think ․ in his jail call [Platter] said the door was wide open[.]”). But Platter asked the trial court to withdraw the instruction. See id. at 196. Having moved to withdraw the instruction, he cannot now claim the court erred by failing to give it.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.