Franklin Ralph Scott, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After a bench trial, the trial court convicted Franklin Ralph Scott of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement ¹ and Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.² The court sentenced Scott to concurrent terms of one year for each conviction, all executed with credit for time served. Scott raises two issues for our review: (1) Was the evidence sufficient to support his convictions?; and (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing him? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In January 2026, Scott went to Love Chapel Brighter Days Shelter to stay the night. During Scott's intake, case manager Scott Jennings—who had interacted with Scott a few other times at the shelter—noticed he was intoxicated. Being intoxicated is against the shelter's rules, but if someone “come[s] in and seem[s] peaceful ․ we can work with peaceful[;] if they are [a] little erratic we would ask them to leave.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 4. Jennings allowed Scott to stay, but Scott's behavior “festered” and “grew to anger eventually.” Id. Scott wouldn't stay in his bunk as requested; made disruptive noises; and eventually threw a bundle of blankets at Jennings. Jennings asked Scott to leave and called police.

[3] Scott was in the shelter's lobby when Columbus Police Department officers—including Officers Trevor Moon and Clayton Nolting—arrived. Jennings pointed out Scott and said he wanted Scott to leave. Officers gave Scott a chance to go to his bunk and gather his belongings. The video from Officer Moon's body camera shows he followed Scott to the bunk room where Scott tried to explain his grievances against Jennings and the shelter instead of packing. As Officer Moon prepared the trespass form, Scott did gather a few things. When Officer Moon asked Scott to sign the form, Scott declined.

[4] Officers then informed Scott he could not return to the shelter for a year or he would be arrested. Scott became irate, repeatedly accused officers of threatening him, and did not continue packing or leave the shelter even after being ordered to do so multiple times. Officer Nolting told Scott to pack his things or he would leave in handcuffs, but Scott persisted in loudly arguing with officers in profane terms, telling them to quit, to shut up, and to leave him alone. Officer Nolting grabbed Scott's wrist to lead him out, but Scott pulled away. Officers Nolting and Moon then took Scott to the ground. Scott lay on his stomach and pulled his arms under him with his hands to his chest, rebuffing officers’ efforts to get his hands behind his back. When officers finally got control of Scott's arms and handcuffed him, Officer Moon transported him to jail.

[5] The State charged Scott with resisting law enforcement and criminal trespass, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court found Scott guilty of both charges at a bench trial and sentenced him to one year for each conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently.

The State presented sufficient evidence to support Scott's convictions.

[6] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

Resisting Law Enforcement

[7] Scott was charged with resisting law enforcement by forcibly resisting, obstructing, or interfering with Officer Moon. A person commits Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement when the person “knowingly or intentionally: (1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties[.]” I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). The Indiana Supreme Court has determined that “forcibly” is an essential element that modifies all three verbs such that, to obtain a conviction, the State must establish forcible resistance, forcible obstruction, or forcible interference. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 722–23 (Ind. 1993).

[8] A person forcibly resists law enforcement when the person uses “strong, powerful, violent means ․ to evade a law enforcement official's rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Id. at 723. This does not require “an overwhelming or extreme level of force.” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 727 (Ind. 2013). Rather, the element “may be satisfied with even a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence[,]” which can occur even if there is no “actual physical contact” between the officer and the defendant. Id. The statute also “contemplates punishment for the active threat of such strength, power, or violence when that threat impedes the officer's ability to lawfully execute his or her duties.” Id.

[9] Scott challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for resisting law enforcement, arguing he did not forcibly resist law enforcement because “he did not strike out at officers while they attempted to handcuff him.” Appellant's Br. at 9. He compares his case to McNary v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[10] The defendant in McNary allegedly interfered with the arresting officer's ability to arrest her when she hid behind furniture; yelled she was not going to jail; and refused to put her hands behind her back, “pulling against [him]” as he maneuvered her hands behind her. 269 N.E.3d at 1247 (alteration in original). A panel of this Court concluded “[n]one of these actions were strong, powerful, or violent means used to evade arrest and, consequently, [the defendant] did not forcibly resist.” Id. at 1249. Specifically, the Court noted the defendant's refusal to place her hands behind her back “may have been resistance, [but] this lack of cooperation was not forcible resistance.” Id. at 1250. But cases considering whether a person forcibly resisted are “necessarily fact-sensitive” with the facts often “varying only by slight degrees.” Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727.

[11] In Lopez v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, a panel of this Court rejected the defendant's argument that “he simply refused to uncross his arms” when officers commanded him to put his hands behind his back, concluding he “did more than passively resist.” Id. at 1093. After officers took the defendant to the ground because he would not comply with their commands, the defendant “was lying on his hands and would not put them behind his back.” Id. at 1091. Officers struggled with his arms, trying to pull them out from under him and get them behind his back. Relevant to Scott's case, the Court noted, “If the officers were unable to pull his arms out from under him, it is reasonable to infer that he was forcibly resisting their efforts rather than remaining entirely passive.” Id. at 1094. And more recently, a panel of this Court held the State presented sufficient evidence the defendant committed resisting law enforcement “when he pulled his hand away from an officer's grasp and lodged it underneath his prostrate body.” Shepard v. State, 205 N.E.3d 1051, 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[12] Here, Scott did not comply with officer instructions to pack his things, lingering in a place he had been asked to leave. When Officer Nolting grabbed Scott's wrist to escort him out, Scott pulled away. And after officers took him to the ground, Scott lay with his arms under him and refused to let officers pull his hands behind his back so they could handcuff him. This was forcible resistance, not mere lack of cooperation as in McNary. The evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's finding that Scott forcibly resisted officers as they lawfully engaged in their duties.

Criminal Trespass

[13] The trial court also found Scott guilty of criminal trespass. A person who does not have a contractual interest in a property and knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the property after being asked to do so by the owner of the property or the owner's agent commits Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2); see I.C. § 35-31.5-2-12 (2025) (defining “agent” in part as “an adult employee”).

[14] Scott contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his criminal trespass conviction because he was given permission to pack his belongings: “How could he be trespassing when he had [not] yet even had the opportunity to leave?” Appellant's Br. at 12.³ As Scott notes, to be guilty of criminal trespass, a defendant must first have been given a reasonable amount of time to leave of their own volition. Id.; see Lemon v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1190, 1196–97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding no trespass occurred when landowner's agent did not give defendant a reasonable period of time to comply with communication to leave).

[15] Scott seems to argue the clock started on a “reasonable time” when officers arrived and told him to leave. He claims he had no opportunity to leave because officers confronted him before he was able to finish packing his belongings. But Jennings asked Scott to leave before involving law enforcement. Rather than pack his things and leave when first requested, Scott stayed at the shelter and continued to cause a disturbance. And once police arrived and gave him an opportunity to gather his things, he did not do so with any urgency; Officer Moon testified Scott “was stating that he was [packing] but he was not actually [packing]. He was saying one thing and doing another.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 22. Scott had a reasonable time to collect his belongings and leave of his own volition but did not do so. His argument that he did not have a reasonable amount of time invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244. Sufficient evidence supports his criminal trespass conviction.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Scott.

[16] We review a trial court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[17] The trial court sentenced Scott to concurrent terms of one year for each of his two Class A misdemeanor convictions. Under Indiana Code Section 35-50-3-2, a person who commits a Class A misdemeanor “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one year[.]” Scott acknowledges the sentence is within the permissible statutory range but argues the trial court abused its discretion because it did not enter a statement explaining its reasons for the sentence it imposed.⁴

[18] A trial court is not required to articulate and balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing a sentence on a misdemeanor conviction, however. Stephenson v. State, 53 N.E.3d 557, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); cf. Cuyler v. State, 798 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining, under Indiana's previous presumptive sentencing scheme, that misdemeanor sentencing statutes do not establish a presumptive sentence but only state the maximum allowable sentence, and “[w]ithout a presumptive sentence from which to start, trial courts have nothing to enhance or reduce”), trans. denied; see Creekmore v. State, 853 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (applying Cuyler under the advisory sentencing scheme). Further, although trial courts are required by statute to issue a sentencing statement after pronouncing sentence for a felony conviction (unless the court imposes the advisory sentence), see I.C. § 35-38-1-1.3 (2014), no statute requires a sentencing statement following a misdemeanor conviction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not entering a sentencing statement for Scott's misdemeanor sentences.

[19] Citing caselaw describing the factors to be considered when deciding whether a sentence is inappropriate, Scott claims he was “hampered in his ability to challenge” his sentence without a sentencing statement addressing those factors. Appellant's Br. at 13–14 (citing Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). Accordingly, a court on appeal can still review an individual's sentence even when the trial court does not enter a sentencing statement. Ward v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1242, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). We do not review his sentence, however, not because of the lack of a sentencing statement but because Scott does not challenge his sentence on appeal.

Conclusion

[20] Sufficient evidence supports Scott's convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Scott.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2025).

2.   I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2) (2025).

3.   Scott does not dispute he had no contractual interest in the shelter.

4.   Scott also claims the trial court abused its discretion by holding the sentencing hearing immediately following his conviction, giving him and his counsel no opportunity to prepare. The record reflects that after the trial court found Scott guilty, it asked Scott's counsel, “[A]re you ready for sentencing or do you wish to come back?” Tr. Vol. 2 at 43. Scott's counsel answered, “He is incarcerated so we would like to be sentenced today.” Id. at 44. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under these circumstances.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.