Quiana Latrice Pierre, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Nicolas Pierre, Appellee-Respondent. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Quiana Latrice Pierre appeals the trial court's decree dissolving her marriage to Nicolas Pierre, arguing the trial court erred in several respects. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Issues

[2] Quiana presents four issues, which she frames as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding to a final decree without the parties’ complete financial information.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its division of the parties’ marital debt.

III. Whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence.

IV. Whether there existed procedural unfairness and cumulative prejudice.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The parties were married on April 27, 2020, and Quiana petitioned for dissolution of the marriage on April 8, 2025. The court held a final hearing on January 21, 2026, at which Nicolas was represented by counsel, and Quiana was unrepresented.

[4] The court issued its decree on January 31, ordering that each party be responsible for the assets in their possession and any obligations in their name. Specifically, Nicolas was ordered to be responsible for a $50,000 loan he obtained in his name, and Quiana was ordered to be responsible for a $45,000 loan she obtained in her name. Quiana filed a motion to correct error, which was deemed denied. Quiana now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] We first note that Nicolas has chosen not to file a brief. When the appellee fails to submit a brief, we will not develop an argument on his behalf; rather, we may reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Perez v. Mounce, 110 N.E.3d 404, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Prima facie error is error “ ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Santana v. Santana, 708 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).

[6] Additionally, we observe that Quiana is proceeding pro se, just as she did at trial. We have long held that a litigant who proceeds pro se will be held to the same rules of procedure as trained legal counsel and must be prepared to accept the consequences of her action. Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Ramsey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

I. Incomplete Financial Information

[7] Quiana first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding to a final judgment without complete financial disclosure and discovery compliance by the parties. In support of her argument, Quiana states that on January 8, 2026, she filed a motion to compel, asserting that Nicolas had not provided his complete financial information. She recognizes, and the trial court's CCS reflects, that Nicolas filed his financial declaration form with the court on January 20, the day before the final hearing. Quiana asserts, however, that she did not receive notice of this filing until the day after the hearing. She does not provide specifics but instead contends broadly that, as a result of not having this information, she was unable to adequately address financial matters such as debt allocation, housing obligations, retirement interests, and foreign property at the final hearing.

[8] Trial Rule 26(F) provides that before any party files a motion to compel discovery, the party shall:

(1) Make a reasonable effort to reach agreement with the opposing party concerning the matter which is the subject of the motion or request; and

(2) Include in the motion or request a statement showing that the attorney making the motion or request has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with the opposing attorney(s) concerning the matter(s) set forth in the motion or request. This statement shall recite, in addition, the date, time and place of this effort to reach agreement, whether in person or by phone, and the names of all parties and attorneys participating therein. If an attorney for any party advises the court in writing that an opposing attorney has refused or delayed meeting and discussing the issues covered in this subsection (F), the court may take such action as is appropriate.

The court may deny a discovery motion filed by a party who has failed to comply with the requirements of this subsection.

[9] Quiana's motion lacked any showing that she had made a reasonable effort to resolve the discovery dispute before filing the motion to compel. See Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 20 (Motion to Compel). As Rule 26(F) provides, the trial court could have denied Quiana's motion based on her failure to comply with its requirements. Instead, the CCS shows that the court issued notice to the parties of Quiana's filing the next day and set the matter for hearing on January 21, the day of the final hearing.

[10] The CCS does not reflect, and Quiana does not assert, that she filed any further motions or took any affirmative action to enforce her interests after filing her motion to compel on January 8. And she neither objected at the final hearing nor requested a continuance of the hearing. Consequently, she has waived her objection to the court entering the final decree before she had received certain documents through the discovery process. See Bay v. Barenie, 421 N.E.2d 6, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating well-established rule that proper remedy for party who has been denied benefits of discovery process is to seek continuance and failure to do so constitutes waiver of objection).

[11] Moreover, our review of the transcript shows that she addressed the categories of debt allocation, housing obligations, retirement interests, and foreign property in her testimony, as well as in her cross-examination of Nicolas.

II. Division of Marital Debt

[12] Quiana next contends that “the trial court abused its discretion in the division of marital debt, lease obligations, reimbursement claims, and related financial responsibilities.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. Her argument consists of only a summary of her testimony at the final hearing regarding housing leased by the parties during the marriage with no explanation as to the error she is alleging related to this testimony.

[13] To the extent that Quiana's argument is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, we cannot accept. Dierckman v. Dierckman, 225 N.E.3d 185, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (observing that in appeal of trial court's division of marital property in dissolution proceeding, appellate court may not reweigh evidence or assess credibility of witnesses and will consider only evidence most favorable to trial court's disposition), trans. denied.

[14] Further, having failed to present any argument on this issue, Quiana has waived appellate review. When a party—even one proceeding pro se—fails to present cogent argument on appeal, she waives appellate review. McCauley v. Newrez LLC, 274 N.E.3d 1040, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (mandating that argument section of brief contain contentions of appellant on issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning).

III. Exclusion of Evidence

[15] For her third assertion of error, Quiana alleges that the trial court improperly excluded documentary evidence and failed to consider corroborating evidence. Appellant's Br. p. 12. Specifically, she claims the trial court erred in excluding Exhibits D and H-2.

[16] We review a trial court's decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Matter of V.H., 276 N.E.3d 663, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. Even if we determine that a trial court erred by excluding evidence, this Court will reverse only if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Woodgett, 59 N.E.3d 1090, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[17] Quiana represented that Exhibit D is a collection of text messages between her and Nicolas regarding a loan she obtained and correspondence between Quiana and the lender. Ex. Vol. 1, pp. 37-44. Nicolas’ counsel objected to the admission of Exhibit D as “a collection of emails that are not really properly established.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 31. Quiana contends that the exhibit was properly authenticated and that the trial court erred by excluding it.

[18] Evidence Rule 901 provides that in order to satisfy the requirement of authenticating an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a). Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be, by a witness with knowledge, may satisfy the requirement. Evid. R. 901(b). “The sufficiency of an evidentiary foundation is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” Reef v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 43 N.E.3d 652, 653-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[19] At the final hearing, Nicolas testified that he obtained a loan for $50,000, of which he still owed $45,000. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 6. And he requested the court to hold him solely responsible on that loan. Id. Quiana cross-examined Nicolas and then testified on her own behalf.

[20] She testified that Nicolas requested that she take out a loan and that he paid a friend to do the loan processing. Id. at 19. She stated that the loan was processed using Nicolas’ phone number such that she did not have access to the account. Id. Access codes for the account were sent to Nicolas’ phone, but he would not provide her with the code. Id. She further testified that she had evidence of this information concerning the loan and that the bulk of the loan proceeds went for groceries and clothes for Nicolas’ daughters. Id.

[21] On cross-examination, Quiana acknowledged that Nicolas obtained the loan for $50,000 to assist in bringing his daughters from Haiti. Id. at 22. She also agreed that she obtained a loan for $45,000 but reiterated that Nicolas requested she obtain the loan and that she had messages “to coincide with what [she was] saying.” Id.

[22] Therefore, even if Quiana's testimony properly authenticated Exhibit D such that it was error for the exhibit to be excluded, reversal is not required. Contrary to her assertion on appeal that the exclusion of Exhibit D prevented the trial court from fully evaluating her testimony concerning the loan obligations, the court heard Quiana testify in detail about the loan, the loan process, text messages with Nicolas concerning the loan, and the fact that she is in default on the loan. Therefore, the trial court's ruling excluding Exhibit D is not inconsistent with substantial justice.

[23] We now turn to the exclusion of Exhibit H-2. Quiana represented that Exhibit H-2 contains photos of injuries she alleges were caused by Nicolas and a photo of some damaged furniture. Ex. Vol. 1, pp. 63-68. Like Exhibit D, Quiana testified, and the court heard her thorough testimony about the injuries and the events surrounding the injuries. See Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 31-33. Furthermore, this evidence is not germane to the distribution of the parties’ assets. Accordingly, even if it was error for Exhibit H-2 to be excluded, such ruling is not inconsistent with substantial justice.

IV. Procedural Fairness and Cumulative Prejudice

[24] Quiana next argues that the cumulative effect of procedural irregularities deprived her of an opportunity to fully litigate the financial issues in the trial court.

[25] She first asserts that her counsel moved to withdraw prior to the originally scheduled final hearing but was not formally withdrawn until after that hearing date had passed. In contrast, Nicolas’ counsel moved to withdraw, and the motion was granted the same day. Quiana suggests that this shows materially different treatment of similar requests.

[26] Quiana fails to explain how the trial court erred and how the alleged error prejudiced her. Consequently, she has waived review of this issue. See McCauley, 274 N.E.3d at 1043 (quoting Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984) (failing to present cogent argument, waives appellate review).

[27] She further claims that “[f]ollowing counsel's withdrawal, [she] repeatedly advised the trial court that she was attempting to obtain representation and requested additional time to secure counsel. Despite those efforts, [she] ultimately proceeded without counsel during critical stages of the proceedings.” Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[28] Quiana does not specify when she allegedly filed her motions to continue. The CCS shows that the court granted the withdrawal of Quiana's counsel on October 29, 2025. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 6. On November 14, Quiana filed a motion with the court requesting, among other things, a continuance until she could be assigned counsel by Legal Aid. Id. at 6-7, 16-19. The court granted her request and reset the final hearing for January 21, 2026. Id. at 7. The CCS reflects no other requests to continue the final hearing after Quiana's November 14 filing. Moreover, at the final hearing on January 21, Quiana did not request a further continuance and responded affirmatively when the court asked the parties if they were ready to proceed. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 2.

[29] Accordingly, to the extent that Quiana's argument alleges trial court error for failing to grant her a continuance of the final hearing, we find no error as there was no pending motion before the court.

[30] Lastly, Quiana again states that there were unresolved discovery disputes and outstanding requests for financial information and subpoenas. However, we addressed this argument in Issue I, above, and we confirm our conclusion. See Issue I, supra.

[31] Thus, we conclude there has been no cumulative prejudicial effect to Quiana based on these asserted errors.

Conclusion

[32] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Quiana has shown no reversible error, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[33] Affirmed.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.