State of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Christopher Johnson, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

Case Summary

[1] After being charged with Level 6 felony marijuana possession, Christopher Johnson entered into a plea agreement with the State, which called for an eighteen-month sentence with twelve months suspended to probation. Pursuant to the plea agreement, and claiming that he had completed his term of probation, Johnson petitioned the trial court to reduce his conviction from a Level 6 felony to a Class A misdemeanor, which was granted. The State argues that the trial court misinterpreted the plea agreement and prematurely granted Johnson's petition. Because we agree, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 13, 2025, the State charged Johnson with possession of at least thirty grams of marijuana, elevated to a Level 6 felony by virtue of a prior drug-related conviction. On June 24, 2025, Johnson entered into a plea agreement with the State, in which he pled guilty to the Level 6 felony charge. The plea agreement, in relevant part, provided as follows:

Defendant will plead guilty to: POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA 30G OR MORE, WITH A PRIOR CONVICTION, A LEVEL [6] FELONY

Sentenced to: 18 MONTHS DOC

Credit for one actual day served plus good time credit of one day 6 MONTHS EXECUTED which may be served on community corrections so long as eligible and at [a] level determined by Tippecanoe [Community Corrections]

12 months suspended to probation supervision

substance abuse terms shall apply during community corrections and probation

$500 fine and court costs

$200 drug interdiction fee

Defendant may petition for and receive modification of conviction to Class A misdemeanor, if he successfully completes all sentence terms within to [(sic)] original time period prescribed.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27 (emphases in original).

[3] On July 17, 2025, the sentencing court held a change of plea and sentencing hearing. During the hearing, the sentencing court read aloud the terms of the plea agreement, and Johnson confirmed that he understood. After finding that there was a factual basis to support Johnson's guilty plea, the sentencing court accepted Johnson's guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction.

[4] The sentencing court then sentenced Johnson to “545 days; 365 of those days are suspended.” Tr. Vol. II p. 11. Thereafter, the sentencing court issued its plea and sentencing order, which stated, “The Defendant is Ordered to serve a sentence of 545 days. 365 days of this sentence shall be suspended.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 35 (emphases in original). The bottom of the plea and sentencing order, however, stated that “the defendant is placed on probation for 90 days[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 35 (emphasis in original). The sentencing court also issued an abstract of judgment, which indicated that Johnson had been sentenced to 545 days, of which 365 days had been suspended to probation.

[5] On March 10, 2026, pursuant to the plea agreement, Johnson petitioned for “Misdemeanor treatment[,]” claiming that as of “February 7, 2026, [he] has timely and successfully completed all terms of probation.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43. The case was then transferred from the sentencing court to the trial court.

[6] On April 21, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on Johnson's motion. At the hearing, Johnson testified that he had been required to complete “[n]inety days house arrest and probation in Tippecanoe, and 90 days probation in Carroll County.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Johnson's counsel explained that Johnson had contacted him multiple times seeking to modify his conviction from a Level 6 felony to a Class A misdemeanor because his probation officer had told Johnson that he had completed probation.

[7] The trial court noted the different timelines provided in the plea agreement and the plea and sentencing order. The State argued that Johnson had not yet completed his probation, pointing out that the plea agreement called for “six months executed, followed by 12 months of probation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 19. After listening to the plea and sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that

[t]he Judge was silent as to the number of days that [Johnson is] to serve on probation. He did state 365 days would be suspended, but didn't say to what term of probation. So, I couldn't tell from the record what was in Judge's mind, whether the 90 days listed on the plea and sentencing order is what he intended to do, or was a scrivener's error and it should've been 365 days.

Tr. Vol. II p. 23. Finding ambiguity in the actual length of Johnson's probation, the trial court granted his petition to modify his conviction from a Level 6 felony to a Class A misdemeanor.

Discussion and Decision

[8] At the outset, we note that Johnson did not file an appellee's brief. In such a case, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the Appellee's behalf.” Miller v. State, 19 N.E.3d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (brackets omitted).

[9] The State argues that the trial court prematurely granted Johnson's petition to modify his conviction because he had not yet completed his full term of probation. Specifically, the State contends that the trial court erroneously determined that the term of probation outlined in Johnson's plea agreement was ambiguous. “[A] plea agreement is a contract, ‘an explicit agreement between the State and defendant,’ which, if accepted by the trial court, is binding upon all parties.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Griffin v. State, 756 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). Contract interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Anderson v. State, 269 N.E.3d 817, 824 (Ind. 2025).

[10] “Like any contract, we ‘begin with its plain language.’ ” Id. (quoting Berry v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1243, 1247 (Ind. 2014). “Any ambiguity is construed against the State, as the agreement's drafter.” Id. The plea agreement, which Johnson signed, provides that he was to be sentenced to eighteen months, with six months executed on community corrections and “12 months suspended to probation supervision.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. The sentencing court read the plea agreement aloud to Johnson during the plea and sentencing hearing, and he subsequently confirmed that he understood. The plea agreement's plain language reflects the parties’ intention for Johnson to complete a full year of supervised probation. Barton v. State, 192 N.E.3d 970, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“The overarching goal of contract interpretation is to determine the intent of the parties when they made the agreement.”), trans. denied.

[11] Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that although the plea agreement “is clear and unambiguous that 12 months of the 18 month sentence was suspended,” it “does not clearly call for 12 months of probation supervision.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 49. We disagree. The plea agreement, in bolded letters, clearly provides for “12 months suspended to probation supervision” to follow Johnson's six months on community corrections. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. The term “supervision” means “the act, process, or occupation of supervising[.]” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2296 (Phillip Babcock Gove et al. eds., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1966). The terms of the plea agreement plainly included twelve months of “probation supervision.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. Moreover, the sentencing court's statements during the guilty plea and sentencing hearing, as well as its abstract of judgment ¹ —which served as its instructions to the Department of Correction regarding the terms of Johnson's sentence—clearly indicate that the sentencing court had understood the terms of Johnson's plea agreement to include a full year of supervised probation and had intended to impose a sentence consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. In granting Johnson's motion to modify his conviction, the trial court erred in determining that the sentencing court's intent in this regard had not been clear.

[12] We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “In Indiana, the trial courts use the Abstract of Judgment to convey the final judgment to the receiving authority.” Robinson v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1202, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.