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John Tuttle, Appellant-Defendant v. TRS99, LLC, Appellee-Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] TRS99 LLC (Landlord) initiated a small claims action against its former tenant, John Tuttle, seeking unpaid rent and compensation for damage Tuttle caused to the apartment he leased. Tuttle filed a counterclaim alleging Landlord failed to send him an itemized list of damage done to the apartment as required by Indiana's security deposit statutes and had lost or destroyed various items of Tuttle's personal property. After a bench trial, the trial court granted Landlord's claim, denied Tuttle's counterclaim, and awarded Landlord a $6,200 judgment.
[2] We affirm the denial of Tuttle's counterclaim, as the trial court did not clearly err in concluding Tuttle failed to present evidence to quantify his claimed damages. We also partially affirm the court's judgment for Landlord in the amount of $2,400—the amount of unpaid rent outstanding at the end of the tenancy. However, we reverse the sums awarded to Landlord for cleaning and repairing the premises, as Landlord's admitted failure to comply with the security deposit statutes barred that aspect of its claim.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] From 2024 to early 2026, Tuttle leased an apartment owned by Landlord, a limited liability company managed by its member, Bruce Skiles. In January 2025, Tuttle fell behind on rent, and by January 2026, he had accumulated an outstanding balance of $2,400. On January 3, 2026, Skiles sent Tuttle a text message informing him the lease would terminate at the end of the month. On the 24th, Tuttle sent Skiles a text message asking to extend the lease for “one more week” because he was “not sure that [he could] be done [moving] by the 31st.” Exhibits at 47. When Skiles pushed back, Tuttle ultimately agreed to “be out by the end of the 31st” as requested. Id. at 48.
[4] Skiles arrived at the apartment on the afternoon of January 31 and found it “in [an] extremely unsanitary and damaged condition.” Transcript at 8. Specifically,
[t]he unit was neither emptied nor clean․ There was a strong odor of tobacco smoke throughout the unit. Food had been left to rot in pots, pans[,] and appliances. The refrigerator contained spoiled food and milk creating an overwhelming stench. The kitchen sink and bathroom toilet were damaged and unusable. The overall condition of the apartment demonstrated severe neglect and disregard for basic cleanliness and lease obligations.
Id. at 8-9. Skiles stayed at the apartment for the rest of the day, but Tuttle never arrived to clean it or remove his personal property.
[5] Just three days later, on February 3, 2026, Skiles filed a small claims notice against Tuttle, seeking compensation for unpaid rent and expenses incurred in cleaning and repairing the apartment. On April 27, Tuttle filed a counterclaim alleging Landlord “prevented [him] from removing his property from the rental unit” and had “destroyed” certain items of his personal property. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 28-29. Tuttle also alleged Landlord had “retained” his security deposit without providing “an itemized list of damages within forty-five (45) days after the termination of occupancy” as required by the security deposit statutes. Id. at 29.
[6] The parties appeared for a bench trial on May 6, 2026. Skiles testified that Tuttle owed $2,400 in unpaid rent and had breached the lease by smoking inside the apartment and causing “damage and neglect” that “far exceed[ed] normal wear and tear.”1 Tr. at 9. Skiles offered a summary of expenses incurred in cleaning and repairing the apartment, totaling $13,183 in labor and supplies. On cross-examination, Skiles had the following exchange with Tuttle's attorney:
Q. Did you return Mr. Tuttle's security deposit?
A. I did not.
Q. Did you provide notice that you were withholding the security deposit to Mr. Tuttle [with] an itemized list of damages?
A. I did not.
Id. at 13.2
[7] In Tuttle's brief testimony, he claimed he failed to move out of the apartment by the end of January 31, 2026, because “[t]here was a snowstorm expected.” Id. at 14. He also said he “didn't have enough time” to “get all of [his] stuff out of the apartment.” Id. While he did not know what happened to his “stuff” after the lease ended, he claimed Skiles told him he “would destroy it or dispose of it as he saw fit.” Id. Throughout Tuttle's testimony, both he and his attorney repeatedly referred to Tuttle's “stuff,” but neither presented any testimony or other evidence specifying what personal property had been left in the apartment or the value of the property left behind.
[8] Ultimately, the trial judge ruled from the bench that it would award Landlord $2,400 in unpaid rent, $2,900 for the cost of repairs, and $900 in dumpster rental, for a total judgment of $6,200 plus court costs. Regarding Tuttle's counterclaim, the court explained it was “not going to address” Tuttle's personal property claim because he failed to present “any evidence” quantifying his damages. Id. at 21. The court similarly reasoned it “[d]idn't hear any testimony concerning the damage deposit ․” Id. After the hearing, the court issued a written order consistent with its oral ruling.
[9] Tuttle now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[10] We review small claims judgments for clear error, “with due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess witness credibility.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ind. 2006). We show great deference to the trial court's factual determinations, as small claims “trials are designed to speedily dispense justice by applying substantive law between the parties in an informal setting.” Hetty Inc. v. Weems, 237 N.E.3d 701, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Berryhill v. Parkview Hosp., 962 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)), reh'g denied. This deference does not extend to the trial court's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. Id. Moreover, while “the method of proof may be informal, the party bearing the burden of proof must demonstrate that he is entitled to the recovery sought.” Id.
[11] On appeal, Tuttle concedes he owes Landlord $2,400 in unpaid rent and thus does not challenge that aspect of the trial court's judgment. He contends, however, that the court erred in awarding Landlord compensation for cleaning and repairing the physical damage to the apartment because Landlord did not provide Tuttle an itemized list of its claimed damages as required by the security deposit statutes. Tuttle also argues the court erred in denying his counterclaim, which sought return of the security deposit, attorney's fees, and compensation for his disposed-of personal property. We address each argument in turn.
1. Landlord's failure to provide Tuttle an itemized list of damages bars its claim for physical damage to the apartment.
[12] Indiana Code section 32-31-3-14 provides that no later than forty-five days after the tenant's occupancy ends, “a landlord shall mail [the former tenant] an itemized list of damages claimed for which the security deposit may be used ․” The landlord must also return the security deposit, minus any allowable deductions. Ind. Code § 32-31-3-12(a) (2002). A landlord's failure to timely provide the tenant an itemized, written notice of such deductions “constitutes agreement by the landlord that no damages are due, and the landlord must remit to the tenant immediately the full security deposit.” Ind. Code § 32-31-3-15 (2002). However, this “precludes the landlord only from recovering damages for physical harm to the rented premises and does not bar the landlord from seeking unpaid rent and other damages.” Klotz v. Hoyt, 900 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2009).
[13] Here, because Skiles admitted as much on cross-examination, it is undisputed that Landlord failed to send Tuttle an itemized list of expenses incurred in cleaning and repairing the apartment. Yet for the first time on appeal, Landlord argues “[t]here is no evidence that Tuttle ․ supplied Skiles with a mailing address in writing to deliver ․ the itemization ․” Appellee's Br. at 9. Indeed, a “landlord is not liable under [the security deposit statutes] until the tenant supplies the landlord in writing with a mailing address to which to deliver the notice and amount prescribed by this subsection.” I.C. § 32-31-3-12(a). However, the record is silent on this point because Landlord did not raise it to the trial court. It is well-settled that “a party may not present an argument or issue on appeal unless the party raised that argument or issue before the trial court.” Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004). Whether Tuttle provided a mailing address to Landlord or not—that argument is waived for our review because Landlord did not assert it below.
[14] Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in awarding Landlord compensation for physical damage Tuttle caused to the apartment, given Skiles’ admission that Landlord did not comply with the security deposit statutes.
2. The trial court did not clearly err in concluding Tuttle failed to present evidence supporting his claimed damages.
[15] Next, Tuttle argues the trial court erred in denying his counterclaim, which requested: (1) the return of his security deposit and attorney's fees under the security deposit statutes and (2) damages equal to the value of the personal property Landlord disposed of. On the first point, Tuttle relies on Indiana Code section 32-31-3-16, under which a landlord who fails to comply with the security deposit statutes as outlined above “is liable to the tenant in an amount equal to the part of the deposit withheld by the landlord plus reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.” On the second point, Tuttle argues Landlord was statutorily prohibited from disposing of his personal property because he had not abandoned it. See Ind. Code § 32-31-4-2(a) (2007) (“A landlord has no liability for loss or damage to a tenant's personal property if the tenant's personal property has been abandoned by the tenant.”).
[16] However, the trial court denied both aspects of Tuttle's counterclaim not because Tuttle failed to prove Landlord violated the landlord-tenant statutes, but because Tuttle failed to present evidence quantifying his damages. Indeed, “[i]t is incumbent upon the party who bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that it is entitled to the recovery sought.” LTL Truck Serv., LLC v. Safeguard, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). On his counterclaims, Tuttle had “the burden of proof with respect to damages ․” Id. Yet he offered no evidence about the amount of the security deposit he paid Landlord at the outset of the tenancy or the value of the personal property of which Landlord disposed. The trial judge, as the fact-finder, could “not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture or speculation.” Id. Without evidence to quantify the amount of damages Tuttle sought, the court's decision to deny Tuttle's counterclaim was not clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[17] For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Tuttle's counterclaim, partially affirm the judgment for Landlord in the amount of the unpaid rent ($2,400), reverse the award of damages for cleaning and repairs to the leased premises, and remand with instructions for the trial court to amend its judgment accordingly.
[18] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FOOTNOTES
1. While neither party offered a copy of the lease into evidence, Tuttle did not contest Skiles’ testimony that the lease prohibited smoking inside the unit and made Tuttle liable for damage beyond normal wear and tear
2. This exchange was the only evidence Tuttle offered about the security deposit.
DeBoer, Judge.
Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-SC-1309
Decided: October 29, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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