IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.M. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.R. (“Mother”) is the mother of J.M., L.A., and M.B. (collectively, “the Children”). A.B. (“Father”) is the father of M.B.¹ The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have the Children adjudicated children in need of services (“CHINS”) after receiving reports that the Children were the victims of neglect and required care that was unlikely to be provided or accepted without coercive intervention of the court. The Children were found to be CHINS on April 17, 2025, after Father admitted that M.B. was a CHINS and Mother admitted that the Children were CHINS. Mother and Father were each ordered to complete certain services, which, for the most part, they did not complete. Eventually, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children and Father's parental rights to M.B.

[2] The case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, with the original hearing date having to be rescheduled after Mother had failed to appear. On January 5 and 6, 2026, the juvenile court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing, for which Mother had again failed to appear. Mother, however, was represented by counsel on both days. On January 31, 2026, Mother moved to reopen the evidence. The juvenile court denied Mother's motion and, on April 17, 2026, issued orders terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children and Father's parental rights to M.B.

[3] Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her motion to reopen the evidence to allow her the opportunity to testify and present additional evidence. For his part, Father contends that the juvenile court's findings are insufficient to sustain its order terminating his parental rights to M.B. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] J.M. was born to Mother on September 4, 2014. L.A. was born to Mother on April 27, 2018. M.B. was born to Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) on December 6, 2021.

[5] Mother has a documented history of substance abuse and, in May of 2017, was convicted of Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe. Mother has previously participated in, and successfully graduated from, Madison County Drug Court. Father also has a documented history of substance abuse; has prior convictions for failure to return to lawful detention, two counts of maintaining a common nuisance, and domestic battery; and, during the pendency of the underlying CHINS and termination proceedings, had pending criminal cases for driving while suspended and possession of methamphetamine. Father had also previously participated in the Madison County Drug Court but had absconded before completing the program.

[6] DCS has previous involvement with the Children. J.M. was adjudicated a CHINS in December of 2014, with that case closed “by reunification on or about” December 17, 2018. Appellant A.R.’s App. Vol. II p. 29. J.M. and L.A. were adjudicated CHINS in September of 2021, with those cases closed “by reunification on or about” March 31, 2024. Appellant A.R.’s App. Vol. II p. 29. M.B. was adjudicated as a CHINS in February of 2022, with that case closed “by reunification on or about” March 31, 2024. Appellant A.R.’s App. Vol. II p. 29. In another case involving the Children, DCS had sought to have Mother compelled to submit to a drug screen and to cooperate with DCS.

[7] On March 7, 2025, DCS petitioned to have the Children adjudicated CHINS, alleging that it had received a report “[o]n or about February 2, 2025,” that M.B. was a victim of neglect because Mother had moved M.B. “in with [an individual] who had tested positive for amphetamines and another substance not known to the report source.” Ex. Vol. pp. 9, 16, 25.² DCS further alleged that Mother “is currently homeless and does not have safe and stable housing[;]” “struggles with illegal substance abuse, including but not limited to methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, benzodiazepine, and THC[;]” “has admitted that she is currently struggling with substance abuse[;]” and “has admitted that she had stopped her mental health services, but she is in need of mental health services.” Ex. Vol. pp. 9–10, 16–17, 25–26. DCS also alleged that, with respect to J.M. and L.A., Mother has, and with respect to M.B., Parents have “DCS and criminal history consistent with substance abuse[;]” “failed to provide the child with a sober caregiver at all times” and have “failed to provide the child with a safe and stable home free of substance use.” Ex. Vol. pp. 10, 17, 26. With respect to M.B., DCS additionally alleged that “[u]nder Cause No. 29D01-2407-F5-005571, Father has pending criminal charges for possession of methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia” and “Father has not cooperated with DCS, and DCS has been unable to safety plan with Father or ascertain Father's sobriety.” Ex. Vol. p. 26. DCS further alleged that the Children need “care, treatment, or rehabilitation that [they are] not receiving and [are] unlikely to be provided or accepted without coercive intervention of the court.” Ex. Vol. pp. 10, 17, 26.

[8] On April 7, 2025, Father admitted that M.B. was a CHINS. In admitting that M.B. was a CHINS, Father agreed, inter alia, to complete a “Substance Use Disorder Assessment and follow all recommendations from that assessment[,]” submit to random drug screens, successfully complete home-based services, keep all appointments with DCS and service providers for both himself and M.B., obtain a legal source of income and safe and stable housing, obey the law, and refrain from using illegal substances. Cause No. 1298 Ex. Vol. p. 52. Father signed the admission and agreement. Two days later, on April 9, 2025, Mother admitted that the Children were CHINS. In admitting that the Children were CHINS, Mother agreed, inter alia, to complete a “Substance Use Disorder Assessment and follow all recommendations from that assessment[,]” submit to random drug screens, successfully complete home-based services, keep all appointments with DCS and service providers for both her and the Children, obtain a legal source of income and safe and stable housing, obey the law, refrain from using illegal substances, and consistently visit with the Children. Ex. Vol. p. 32. The juvenile court accepted Parents’ admissions and approved of the services to which they had agreed to participate and, on April 17, 2025, adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. In the months that followed, Parents failed to complete the agreed-upon services and to make meaningful progress towards reunification.

[9] On September 9, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to J.M., alleging that the juvenile court had found that reasonable efforts towards reunification were no longer required, that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in J.M.’s removal from and continued placement outside Mother's care were not likely to be remedied, and that J.M. had, on two separate prior occasions, been adjudicated a CHINS. On September 24, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to L.A., alleging that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in L.A.’s removal from and continued placement outside Mother's care were not likely to be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of L.A. On October 1, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to M.B., alleging that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in M.B.’s removal from and continued placement outside Parents’ care were not likely to be remedied.

[10] The cases proceeded to a combined evidentiary hearing on November 10, 2025. Despite having been given notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing, Mother failed to appear. In part due to Mother's absence, the juvenile court continued the evidentiary hearing to January 5, 2026, and Mother was provided with notice of the date, time, and location of the rescheduled hearing. Mother, having checked herself into a rehabilitation facility on January 4, failed to appear on January 5, and again on January 6, 2026, on which dates the juvenile court conducted the evidentiary hearing in her absence. Mother was represented by counsel who participated in the proceedings and advocated on Mother's behalf at each of the scheduled dates for the evidentiary hearing.

[11] DCS presented its evidence relating to J.M. and L.A. during the evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2026. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Alycia Hacker testified that Mother's contact with DCS had been “very sporadic[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 73. Mother had a documented history of substance-abuse issues and had tested positive for methamphetamine and THC in October of 2025, and positive for methamphetamine in November of 2025. Mother had also missed appointments with her homebased case worker and had failed to provide evidence of a legal and stable source of income and a safe and stable home, acknowledging to FCM Hacker that her “home wouldn't be appropriate” for the Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 76. FCM Hacker opined that the circumstances were not likely to change if the juvenile court were to give Mother an additional ninety days to complete services and could not “think of” any additional services that DCS could offer to Mother “offhand.” Tr. Vol. II p. 79. Mother had “not been compliant with any services” and was not engaged in visitation with J.M. or L.A. Tr. Vol. II p. 94.

[12] FCM Hacker further opined that it was in J.M.’s and L.A.’s best interests for Mother's parental rights to be terminated and for DCS “to continue moving forward and going through with [ ] adoption.” Tr. Vol. II p. 80. FCM Hacker testified that J.M. was thriving and “doing very well in” his current foster placement, that foster parents are “very supportive of him and his needs and what he needs ․ to be able to succeed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 80. DCS's plan was for J.M. to “stay in” his current placement. Tr. Vol. II p. 81. His foster parents indicated that they “plan to pursue adoption” if Mother's parental rights were terminated. Tr. Vol. II p. 96. FCM Hacker further testified that despite having “a lot going on in his young life[,]” L.A. was “doing very well” and was “very supported” in his current placement. Tr. Vol. II p. 81. L.A.’s placement indicated that while he had not ruled out adoption, L.A. had only been in his home for four months and the two were still getting to know each other. L.A.’s placement further indicated that he believed it would be harmful to “dangle” L.A. in the child-welfare system, noting that the uncertainty with Mother has made it difficult for L.A. to bond with him. Tr. Vol. II p. 104. J.M.’s and L.A.’s placements arranged visits for the two to ensure that a sibling bond remained.

[13] Ashley Stephenson, the Children's court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”), opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in J.M.’s and L.A.’s best interests. CASA Stephenson testified that

it's clear that mom has the ability to get clean as she has done it in the past but what is also clear is that she does not have the ability to maintain that sobriety and provide a safe stable home for the children and um because of the pattern it is likely that if they were to return to mom's care they would be removed again in the future um which would only lead to more trauma for [J.M. and L.A.].

Tr. Vol. II p. 109. CASA Stephenson noted that J.M. and L.A. have “[v]ery much so” been “in and out of the system like yo-yos[,]” stating that she did not believe this was in their best interests. Tr. Vol. II p. 109. CASA Stephenson indicated that she believed “that if [Mother] really sets her mind to it she could get to a place of sobriety again[,]” but that it had been CASA Stephenson's observation that “for some reason this time [Mother] has not even really tried.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109. At the end of the hearing, Mother's counsel rested her case as it related to J.M. and L.A.

[14] At the beginning of the proceedings on January 6, 2026, Mother's counsel informed the juvenile court that she had received notice that Mother had entered a residential drug-treatment program two days prior. Mother's counsel acknowledged that Mother was not present but requested permission to be able to reopen the evidence as to the Children at some later date, when Mother was available to testify. Noting that Mother had been given notice of the date of the evidentiary hearing and that some of the interested parties who had been present the day before were not present, the juvenile court indicated that if Mother so chose, she could file a written motion to reopen the evidence, at which time the court would consider and rule upon the motion. Mother's counsel did not file a written motion at that time and the evidentiary hearing continued.

[15] Father, who was incarcerated, testified at the evidentiary hearing. Father had approximately twenty days left on his current sentence, at the completion of which he would be sentenced for a pending criminal matter. Despite acknowledging that he had not completed the agreed upon services, Father outlined improvements that he claimed to have made. For instance, Father claimed to be drug-free and to have secured stable housing. Father acknowledged, however, that he had not completed the court-ordered substance-abuse assessment or submitted to drug screens. He had been employed prior to his period of incarceration and planned to return to the same employment after his eventual release.

[16] CASA Stephenson testified that M.B. was “doing fantastic” and was bonded with her foster parents, with whom she had been placed for most of her life. Tr. Vol. II p. 159. CASA Stephenson opined that it would not be in M.B.’s best interests to wait and see if M.B. could potentially be placed in Father's care upon his release from incarceration. CASA Stephenson testified that despite agreeing to complete certain services, Father had not done so. CASA Stephenson did not believe that the circumstances were likely to substantially change if the juvenile court were to give Father an additional ninety days to complete services. With regard to Mother, CASA Stephenson opined that while “there is no doubt that” Mother loves M.B., she did not believe that it would be M.B.’s “best interest to go back to [Mother's] care. [Mother] ․ is not stable, does not have stable housing. [Mother] was employed at the beginning of this case [but] the last update ․ is that she was not employed. A previous homebased case worker communicated that [Mother] was couch surfing.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 110–11. CASA Stephenson recommended that Parents’ parental rights to M.B. be terminated.

[17] FCM Hacker testified that while Father had engaged in visitation with M.B., he had not completed the court-ordered substance-abuse assessment, submitted to random drug screens, or completed the court-ordered homebased case work. FCM Hacker opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in M.B.’s best interests as Father was “not in a place where” he was able to provide “stability and safety and wellbeing” for M.B. Tr. Vol. II p. 171. FCM Hacker further opined that termination of Parents’ parental rights and adoption by her current foster parents, with whom “[s]he's been with ․ essentially her whole life except for a very short amount of time[,]” was in M.B.’s best interests. Tr. Vol. II p. 172. M.B.’s foster mother testified that if Parents’ parental rights were terminated, M.B.’s foster family planned to adopt her. The parties rested at the conclusion of the January 6 proceedings.

[18] On January 31, 2026, Mother moved to reopen the evidence to allow her to testify and present additional evidence. DCS objected, noting that despite having had notice of the date, time, and location of all three of the scheduled evidentiary hearings, Mother had failed to appear at any hearing “at which evidence was taken in this matter.” Appellant A.R.’s App. Vol. II p. 141. The juvenile court denied Mother's motion, stating the following:

1. Mother had actual notice of the date, time and location at which all of the evidentiary hearings were to be conducted.

2. Mother failed to appear at all of the hearings, notwithstanding that notice.

3. That Mother elected to sign herself in to a treatment program the day before the final trial setting does not set aside that she had actual notice of the date, time, and location of the trials and elected to fail to appear.

4. The Court's time to take evidence is limited, and the Court is not inclined to further burden [i]ts schedule to take Mother's evidence when she already rejected three separate occasions upon which to be heard.

WHEREFORE, Mother's requests, individually and by counsel, to reopen evidence for a fourth day of hearing is DENIED.

Appellant A.R.’s App. Vol. II p. 143. On April 17, 2026, the juvenile court issued orders terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children and Father's parental rights to M.B.

Discussion and Decision

[19] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[20] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[21] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying Mother's Request to Reopen the Evidence

[22] Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her request to reopen the evidence. “Evidence must be offered during the course of a trial and it is a matter of discretion whether a trial court will permit a party to present additional evidence or testimony once the party has rested, once both parties have rested, or after the close of all of the evidence.” In re D.Q., 745 N.E.2d 904, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “A trial court's decision in this regard will be disturbed only if there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.

[23] Among the factors which weigh in the exercise of discretion are whether there is any prejudice to the opposing party, whether the party seeking to reopen appears to have rested inadvertently or purposely, the stage of the proceedings at which the request is made, and whether any real confusion or inconvenience would result from granting the request.

Flynn v. State, 497 N.E.2d 912, 914 (Ind. 1986).

[W]hen a trial court exercises its discretion in ruling on a party's motion to reopen its case-in-chief, there is no requirement that the court specifically articulate the reasons for its ruling. Furthermore, the trial court is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly. We also note that while the Flynn factors may be helpful in many cases, each case presents its own unique circumstances that a trial court must weigh in exercising its discretion: Matters committed to judicial discretion are those requiring an on-the-spot decision made in light of the trial judge's knowledge, sense of fairness and equity, and the facts and circumstances present in the courtroom.

Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotations omitted), trans. denied. “Upon appeal, we will not substitute our judgments for those of the trial judge.” White v. White, 655 N.E.2d 523, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

[24] The evidentiary hearing was originally scheduled to begin on November 10, 2025. Despite having notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing, Mother failed to appear. The hearing was rescheduled for January 5, 2026, and Mother was provided with notice of the date, time, and location of the rescheduled hearing, at which Mother also failed to appear. At the beginning of the second day of the evidentiary hearing, which was conducted on January 6, 2026, Mother's counsel notified the juvenile court that she had been informed that Mother had voluntarily entered treatment at Fairbanks Behavioral Health and Recovery Center on January 4, i.e., the day before the rescheduled evidentiary hearing had been scheduled to begin. Noting that Mother had been provided with notice of the date of the rescheduled hearing and that some of the interested parties who had been present on the first day of the evidentiary hearing were not present on the second day, the juvenile court indicated that if Mother so chose, she could move to reopen the evidence and that the juvenile court would consider any possible motion at that time. On January 31, 2026, Mother moved to reopen the evidence.

[25] It is well-settled that “[w]hile parents do not have an absolute constitutional right to be present at a termination hearing, they must be afforded various protections to ensure they receive due process of the law[,]” including an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” In re A.R., 271 N.E.3d 1161, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal ellipsis and quotations omitted). We have previously concluded that representation by counsel at an evidentiary hearing in the party's absence is appropriate and satisfies the parent's due-process rights so long as counsel is able to make arguments on the parent's behalf and cross-examine witnesses. See Matter of C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). In this case, Mother was represented by counsel who advocated on her behalf at each hearing. Mother's counsel had represented Mother in both the underlying CHINS and termination proceedings, making counsel well-equipped to represent Mother's interests and advocate on her behalf. In re A.R., 271 N.E.3d at 1170 (noting that the parents’ attorneys had each represented them for a significant portion of the CHINS proceedings and were thus familiar with their clients and the evidence, and they were equipped and given the opportunity to cross-examine DCS's witnesses and defend against termination).

[26] Mother asserts that “[t]he denial of the motion to reopen the evidence was unreasonable and prejudicial to [her].” Appellant A.R.’s Br. p. 9. Mother further asserts that “DCS made no claim of any real prejudice if [she] was allowed to present her evidence.” Appellant A.R.’s Br. p. 11. Mother acknowledges that she has suffered prior relapses following treatment but claims that

[i]t cannot properly be determined that the last resort had been reached without evidence from [Mother] on her current condition. In prior CHINS cases [Mother] was reunited with her children. If [Mother] had been allowed to present her evidence she might have been able to persuade the court to either deny or stay the termination petitions in order for her to show that she has finally resolved her substance abuse problem.

Appellant A.R.’s Br. p. 12.

[27] On the last day of the evidentiary hearing, however, CASA Stephenson observed that “it's just a pattern with [Mother] that we're seeing kind of again instead of doing the consistent work to get to a place of sobriety and being healthy for her children[,] it's frantically checking yourself in when you know you have no other options.” Tr. Vol. II p. 165. Thus, while it is certainly possible that Mother may have finally committed to getting the help she needs to overcome her substance-abuse issues, the juvenile court heard testimony supporting the reasonable inference that Mother's decision to wait until the day before the evidentiary hearing was scheduled to begin to seek substance-abuse treatment was as an attempt to delay the termination proceedings rather than a good faith effort by Mother to resolve her well-documented substance-abuse issues.

[28] The record demonstrates that Mother was given the opportunity to participate in the evidentiary hearing on three separate dates but failed to appear on each date. Mother has provided no explanation for her failure to appear for the first scheduled date and chose to admit herself to a treatment program on the eve of the second and third dates. We have previously “recognized that delays in the adjudication of a case impose significant costs upon the functions of government as well as an intangible cost to the lives of the children involved.” Matter of C.C., 170 N.E.3d at 678 (internal quotation omitted). In requesting permission to reopen the case, Mother has provided no indication of when she might be available to participate in additional proceedings as she gave no assertion that she had completed her substance-abuse treatment or any indication of when she might do so. In contrast to the uncertainty regarding when Mother might be available to appear, the juvenile court heard evidence indicating that the Children required permanency, supporting its decision to not delay proceedings to allow Mother to testify at some unknown point in the future.

[29] Additionally, while Mother claims that a “crowded calender [(sic)] should not be a proper reason to refuse to reopen a case[,]” Appellant A.R.’s Br. p. 13, the record before us indicates that the juvenile court did not deny Mother's motion for this reason. While the juvenile court noted that its “time to take evidence is limited” and that it was “not inclined to further burden [i]ts schedule” to “reopen evidence for a fourth day[,]” the juvenile court's order indicates that its decision to deny Mother's request to reopen the evidence was based on the fact that Mother had “already rejected three separate occasions upon which to be heard.” Appellant A.R.’s App. Vol. II p. 143.

[30] Moreover, we disagree with Mother's assertion that her right “to defend [the] termination action[ ] is also an empty formality if [her] request to reopen the case to be able to present evidence is denied[,]” Appellant A.R.’s Br. p. 13, again noting that Mother (1) had been given three opportunities to appear before the trial court for an evidentiary hearing but had failed to appear and (2) had been represented by counsel who had advocated on Mother's behalf and had cross-examined the witnesses at each hearing. While the juvenile court ultimately decided to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children, the record demonstrates that its decision was not an “empty formality” but rather was based on the evidence outlining Mother's failure to successfully complete services or make progress towards reunification with the Children.

[31] Prior to considering Mother's motion, the juvenile court had heard evidence detailing Mother's pattern of engaging in delay tactics, failure to participate in services, and failure to successfully and permanently eradicate her substance-abuse issues despite significant services having been offered by DCS in both the underlying and additional CHINS proceedings involving the Children. The juvenile court had also heard evidence establishing the Children's need for permanency. Based on the facts and circumstances before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying Mother's request to reopen the evidence following the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing.

II. The Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain the Juvenile Court's Order as to Father

[32] For his part, Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to M.B.³ In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3). Of relevance to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of the following circumstance: “[t]hat there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). Father does not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that it has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of M.B., with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of his parental rights to M.B., Father argues only that DCS failed to prove Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(3).

A. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[33] Father argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove both that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in M.B.’s continued placement outside of his care will not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to M.B.’s well-being, safety, physical health, or life. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), -4(d)(4). We note, however, that in its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to M.B., DCS alleged only that there is a reasonable probability that the reason for removal and continued placement outside Father's care will not be remedied. In any event, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to allege and prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to M.B. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[34] Pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in M.B.’s continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied. Moreover, a juvenile court must balance

a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. We entrust that delicate balance to the [juvenile] court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (brackets, citation, footnote, and quotation omitted, bracketed material added). The juvenile court “may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[35] With respect to Father's involvement during the underlying CHINS proceedings, the juvenile court found that Father had failed to comply “with a number of the Orders of the CHINS court,” including that he initiate contact each week with the FCM and notify the FCM of any changes in his address, household composition, employment, or telephone number within five days of the change; complete a substance-use-disorder assessment and follow all recommendations; complete homebased case work and comply with all reasonable recommendations; obtain and maintain safe, stable, and appropriate housing; meet M.B.’s basic needs; and engage in random drug screens. Appellant A.R.’s App. Vol. II p. 29. The juvenile court found that Father was incarcerated on the date of the evidentiary hearing; has a criminal history including prior convictions for failure to return to lawful detention, two counts of maintaining a common nuisance, and domestic battery; and pending criminal charges for driving while suspended and possession of methamphetamine, for which a guilty plea had been entered but Father had failed to appear for sentencing. The juvenile court further found as follows:

21. Father admits that he is an alcoholic and that he previously used methamphetamine, with his last claimed use of that substance being in July 2024.

22. Father testified that he no longer uses methamphetamine, however this Court places little weight on that testimony in light of his record and failure to engage in random drug screens.

23. Father was a participant in the Madison County Drug Court in 2018 before he absconded. Father was subsequently arrested and incarcerated in the DOC where he participated in Recovery While Incarcerated (RWI).

24. Father never successfully completed the Madison County Drug Court program.

25. The Court further notes that while Father has had periods of incarceration while the CHINS case was pending, he has also had periods during which he was at liberty or semi-liberty (while on work release). Therefore, Father's periods of incarceration do not support an inference that Father has not, therefore, used methamphetamine during the pendency of the CHINS case. 26. While Father was not the reason for initial DCS involvement, he [was] also unable to take placement of [M.B.] at the time of detention or at any point since.

27. Father has been on notice since September of 2025 that adoption was a formal possibility in [M.B.’s] case, but it did not cause Father to substantially alter his behavior to reflect that he was by then able to successfully parent the child.

28. Father is currently serving a 90-day contempt sanction from a child support court dealing with [another child's] case upon which there is an arrearage of more than $18,000.

****

34. CASA notes that Father expressed that he didn't need to do the services to which he had agreed because he didn't sign the agreement (notwithstanding the signed agreement is a part of the evidence in this case).

****

44. Since the child's detention, Father and Mother have made little progress, let alone substantial progress, toward reunification with [M.B.].

45. The only evidence that Father has consistent employment or other resources with which to support himself and meet the child's basic needs or that his substance use problems are in long-term remission is his own self-serving testimony, on which this Court places little weight.

****

48. The Court finds that neither [Father] nor [Mother] has shown an ability to safely parent this child now or in the near future. 49. This Court is unwilling to send [M.B.] into Father's care as he has not exhibited that he has followed through with virtually any of the CHINS court's orders to bring about reunification, is incarcerated for contempt after failing to support another of his children, and is still awaiting sentencing on a felony drug charge. 50. Father's focus is self-centered on what he now thinks he should have to do to get [M.B.] into his care rather than [M.B.]- centered on compliance with the CHINS court's express orders (to which he had agreed) to accomplish that goal.

****

54. Finally, the Court finds by the same clear and convincing standard that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [M.B.’s] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

Appellant A.R.’s App. Vol. II pp. 30–32. Father does not challenge the majority of these findings, and we accept the unchallenged findings as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as correct).

[36] Father challenges only the juvenile court's findings that he has been unable to meet M.B.’s basic needs and has been unable to take placement of M.B., asserting that these findings “are not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Appellant A.B.’s Br. p. 16. In challenging these findings, Father points to his self-serving testimony that he had addressed his substance-abuse issues and had secured a safe and stable home. The juvenile court, however, was not required to believe Father's testimony and apparently did not. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”). Despite claiming that he had addressed his substance-abuse issues, Father acknowledged that he had not completed a substance-use-disorder assessment or participated in random drug screens. Father also acknowledged that, at the time of the evidentiary hearing, he was incarcerated and, upon completing his then-current term of incarceration was scheduled to be sentenced on his conviction for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine in Hamilton County, which contradicts his claim that he had secured stable housing where he could care for M.B.

[37] The evidence most favorable to the juvenile court's order establishes that Father has failed to complete services aimed at reunification with M.B. or demonstrate an ability to adequately care for M.B. and provide her with a safe and stable home environment, that he will refrain from engaging in criminal acts, or that he will remain drug- and alcohol-free long term. As such, the evidence establishes that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in M.B.’s continued placement outside his care will not be remedied. Father's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[38] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[39] FCM Hacker testified that while she did not have any doubt that Father loves M.B., she was not of the opinion that Father was “in a place where [he is] able to provide the stability and safety and wellbeing for [M.B.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 171. FCM Hacker further opined that she did not believe that Father could “safely care for [M.B.] at this time” or that anything would change “if the Court were to give [Father] another ninety (90) days” to complete services. Tr. Vol. II p. 171. FCM Hacker also opined that “what's best for [M.B.] is [to stay] where she is currently” with foster parents who have expressed a willingness to adopt her. Tr. Vol. II p. 172. Similarly, CASA Stephenson opined that it would not be in M.B.’s best interests to wait and see if she could safely be placed in Father's care after he completes his term of incarceration. CASA Stephenson stated that while Father has bonded with M.B., he has not demonstrated a willingness to participate in services aimed at ensuring that he can adequately provide for M.B., despite agreeing to complete the services. CASA Stephenson did not believe that “giving [F]ather another ninety (90) days [would] substantially change the circumstances before the Court[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 160.

[40] CASA Stephenson stated that M.B. is “doing fantastic” and is “[v]ery much so” bonded with her foster family, with whom she has been placed for most of her life. Tr. Vol. II p. 159. CASA Stephenson opined that

it's not a question of whether or not [Father] loves her. It's this CASA's opinion that he 100% does. Um but he also made the point that he would jump through hoops for her, and he has made it clear that he would not. So, it would be in [M.B.]’s best interest to have [Father's] rights be terminated.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 166–67. FCM Hacker's and CASA Stephenson's testimony support the juvenile court's determination that termination of Father's parental rights was in M.B.’s best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests).

[41] In addition to FCM Hacker's and CASA Stephenson's testimony, the juvenile court's unchallenged findings discussed with regard to whether the conditions that have resulted in M.B.’s continued placement outside of Father's care also support the juvenile court's best-interests determination. The unchallenged findings establish that Father had not completed the services to which he agreed and was incarcerated at the time of the evidentiary hearing, with the prospect of additional incarceration or supervision after he completed his then-current term of incarceration. Father has demonstrated a historical inability to provide appropriate care for M.B. While Father points to his testimony that he was bonded with M.B. in support of his claim that termination of his parental rights was not in M.B.’s best interests, the juvenile court, again, was not required to credit Father's testimony. See Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149 (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”). The evidence most favorable to the juvenile court's order is sufficient to prove that termination of Father's parental rights was in M.B.’s best interests. Father's claim to the contrary again amounts to nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[42] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.M.’s father is believed to be deceased. Throughout both the CHINS and termination proceedings, L.A.’s father's whereabouts were unknown.

2.   We note that there are two Exhibit volumes in the record, one associated with Appellate Cause Number 26A-JT-1372 (“Cause No. 1372”) and the other associated with Appellate Cause Number 26A-JT-1298 (“Cause No. 1298”). Because Cause No. 1298 was consolidated with Cause No. 1372, unless otherwise noted, all references to the Exhibit volume refer to the volume filed in Cause No. 1372.

3.   To the extent that Father claims that he had been denied due process by an alleged failure by DCS to provide him with adequate reunification services during the pendency of the CHINS and termination proceedings, Father has waived this claim by failing to raise it below. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.”). Father does not attempt to overcome waiver by asserting fundamental error and has waived his opportunity to do so. See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (providing that the failure to allege fundamental error in a principal appellate brief results in waiver of the issue). We therefore decline to consider Father's due-process claim.

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.