Aiza Ashraf, Appellant-Petitioner v. Mohsin Mukhtar, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Aiza Ashraf (Mother) and Mohsin Mukhtar (Father) were married and had one child together. Mother filed a petition for dissolution in September 2024. In October 2025, the court awarded Father overnight parenting time and established Father's child support obligation. Mother raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as three: (1) whether a factual finding is clearly erroneous; (2) whether the court erroneously imputed income to Mother; and (3) whether the trial court erred in awarding Father overnight parenting time. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) married in 2018. Parents are both radiologists employed by Indiana University (IU). They each earn two paychecks from IU: one from performing medical care for IU Health, and the other from teaching for IU. Radiologists working for IU may supplement their income by working extra shifts or “moonlighting” for other organizations. Tr. Vol. II p. 40.

[3] Parents have one child together, A.M. (Child), born in August 2024. In the first few days after Child's birth, each parent would wake up throughout the night to care for Child. In September 2024, Mother began sleeping in the nursery, locked Father out of the room, and denied him access to Child. Thereafter, Mother and the maternal grandmother cared for Child.

[4] Mother petitioned to dissolve the marriage on September 4, 2024. In October, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on Mother's petition. At the hearing, Mother requested that Father not begin overnight parenting time until Child turned six months old because Child would “be sleeping more independently” and would not need “to nurse as frequently overnight[ ].” Tr. Vol. V p. 17.

[5] In December, the trial court issued a preliminary order. The court found Father had “not exercised regular care responsibilities for [Child]” and did not award overnight parenting time. App. Vol. II p. 20. It further ordered that any additional parenting time would be “by agreement of the parties only.” Id. The court provided that Father could request overnight visitation when Child turned six months old or when she began eating solid foods.

[6] Father began exercising parenting time pursuant to the preliminary order. He repeatedly requested additional parenting time, but Mother denied his requests. When Mother could not watch Child, she left Child in the care of Child's maternal grandparents rather than arranging additional parenting time for Father. On one occasion, Mother left Child with the maternal grandmother in Texas for two nights.

[7] On March 20, 2025, the trial court held a final dissolution hearing. Parents presented evidence of the facts outlined above. Mother submitted a proposed parenting time plan in which Father's parenting time gradually increased as Child aged, with overnights beginning when Child turned two. Mother believed Child's best interests were furthered by starting overnights at age two because she planned to nurse Child until that age, and she could comfort Child overnight during sleep regressions.

[8] Mother testified that she transitioned from working full time to three-quarters time in January 2025 so she could care for Child. She specialized in breast imaging radiology and did not plan to maintain her credentials for regular diagnostic radiology. Mother stated that she did not have many opportunities to work extra shifts because breast imaging can only be performed during “regular work hours[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. She reported her gross weekly income was $6,677. Mother indicated Father's base weekly pay—excluding any income generated from moonlighting—was $8,811. See Ex. Vol. III p. 23; Tr. Vol. II p. 36. On cross-examination, Mother acknowledged that she earned the same amount as Father before she took maternity leave and subsequently transitioned to three-quarters time.

[9] Father testified he provided initial care for Child after she was born, completed two parenting courses, and regularly exercised parenting time. He requested equal parenting time, including overnights. Father did not believe it was necessary for Mother to work three-quarters time because Child was “out of the newborn period.” Tr. Vol. II p. 102. He stated that Mother would be earning the same base income as he did if she were still working full time because they “have the exact same contract with IU.” Id. at 100. He also indicated that Mother had “the exact same opportunities” to pick up extra work because she “still has the full training, the full capability and full licensure to be able to read general radiology[.]” Id. at 100, 101. He asked the court to find both Parents’ base gross weekly income to be $8,811 and to exclude any money from extra shifts or moonlighting.

[10] The trial court dissolved Parents’ marriage at the conclusion of the hearing. On October 13, 2025, the court issued an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court awarded Father parenting time of three days per week, including overnights. It found Mother was “capable of working full-time” and that her earning ability was $8,811 per week. App. Vol. II p. 57. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[11] Mother challenges one of the court's findings of fact and contends the court erred by imputing Father's gross weekly income to her and in granting Father immediate overnights. Indiana has a well-established preference “for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). Where, as here, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Id. at 123. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Id. The trial court's findings are controlling unless the record includes no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Quinn v. Quinn, 62 N.E.3d 1212, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. Id. We set aside a trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. “Clear error occurs here when our review of the evidence most favorable to the judgment leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

II. Challenged Finding

[12] Mother challenges finding 37 on the basis that it is clearly erroneous and not supported by the evidence. This finding provides:

37. Mother and Father both completed medical school and residency training in radiology. Mother and Father have similar training, work for the same employer, in the same department and have the equivalent income earning ability. Subsequent to filing Mother voluntarily chose to reduce her work hours to three-quarters time. Mother and Father have the equivalent opportunity to do moonlighting or additional shifts at Indiana University. Father previously worked at Pro Scan for a few months in 2024 for additional income but is no longer working at Pro Scan.

App. Vol. II p. 57.

[13] Mother challenges the portions of finding 37 providing that Parents have “equivalent income earning ability” and “equivalent opportunity to do moonlighting or additional shifts at Indiana University.” Id. She claims the only evidence regarding her earning ability and opportunity to pick up extra work is her “unrebutted testimony” that she plans to maintain credentials only in breast imaging, which does not provide moonlighting options outside normal business hours. Appellant's Br. p. 17.

[14] At the preliminary hearing, Father indicated that Parents earned the “exact same” compensation. Tr. Vol. V p. 42. At the dissolution hearing, he also testified that Mother and Father would have the same base salary if she still worked full time because they “have the exact same contract with IU.” Tr. Vol. II p. 100. Mother did not rebut either statement, and she acknowledged on cross-examination that she earned the same base income as Father before she took maternity leave. In addition, Father testified that Mother could pick up extra shifts by reading general radiology. While Mother planned to maintain her credentials only for breast imaging, she did not indicate when her general radiology credentials would expire. All this evidence supports the trial court's finding that Parents had equivalent income-earning ability.

III. Imputed Income

[15] Mother argues the trial court erred in finding her voluntarily underemployed and imputing Father's income to her. “Trial courts may impute income to a parent for purposes of calculating child support upon determining that he or she is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.” Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). We will reverse a trial court's decision regarding a parent's unemployment or underemployment and imputation of potential income only for an abuse of discretion. In re Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “In conducting our review, we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses, and we will consider only that evidence and reasonable inferences that favor the judgment.” Walters v. Walters, 186 N.E.3d 1186, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citation omitted).

[16] The Indiana Child Support Guidelines permit imputation to discourage parents from avoiding significant child support obligations. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d at 375. “But the Guidelines do not require or encourage parents to make career decisions based strictly upon the size of potential paychecks, nor do the Guidelines require that parents work to their full economic potential.” Id. (citation omitted). “While the Guidelines clearly indicate that a parent's avoidance of child support is grounds for imputing potential income, it is not a necessary prerequisite.” In re Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d at 766. A trial court should consider a number of factors in determining whether to impute potential income to a parent, “including ‘employment and earnings history, occupational qualifications, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record or other employment barriers, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community.’ ” Walters, 186 N.E.3d at 1193 (quoting Ind. Child Supp. Guidelines § 3(A)(3)). The parent arguing for the imputation of income to another parent bears the burden of persuasion. Id.

[17] Here, the trial court found Mother was “capable of working full-time.” App. Vol. II p. 57. Relying on Father's testimony, the court also found Mother had income-earning ability equivalent to Father's. Accordingly, the court imputed to her a weekly income of $8,811, the same as Father's base weekly pay.

[18] Mother contends that she is not voluntarily underemployed because she elected to work three-quarters time to care for Child. She argues that this choice is the “kind of reasonable parenting decision the Guidelines refuse to punish.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. But the trial court chose to credit Father's testimony that he did not believe Mother needed to reduce her hours to care for Child. Additionally, Mother acknowledged on cross-examination that she could work more hours if she desired. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 59-60. Given the wide discretion we afford trial courts to determine whether a parent is voluntarily underemployed for the purposes of imputing income, we cannot say the court erred in relying on this evidence. See In re Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d at 766.

[19] Next, Mother argues that Father failed to present evidence of prevailing job opportunities or earnings levels in the community. We disagree. Father testified that Mother would earn the same base income as him if she worked full time. Mother testified that she previously earned the same base salary as Father, and that she could work additional hours if she desired. The trial court properly relied on Parents’ testimony as evidence of earnings levels and prevailing job opportunities in the community.

[20] Finally, Mother argues that even if the court correctly found that she could make the same base salary as Father, the amount of $8,811 is improper. Specifically, she contends that figure includes Father's moonlighting income. However, Father and Mother both submitted child support worksheets indicating that Father's base weekly pay—excluding any additional income generated from moonlighting or extra shifts—was $8,811. See Ex. Vol. III pp. 23, 51; Tr. Vol. II p. 36. The trial court found that “[n]either parent should be penalized for working more than their equivalent income earning abilities[,]” and imputed Father's base salary to Mother. App. Vol. II p. 59. The trial court did not err in imputing an income of $8,811 to Mother.

IV. Parenting Time

[21] Mother claims the trial court erred in granting Father immediate overnight parenting time. Specifically, she argues the immediate imposition of three overnights, rather than the gradual increase called for in the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, is not in Child's best interests.

[22] We review parenting time decisions for an abuse of discretion. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013). A court's foremost consideration when determining parenting time is the best interests of the child. Id. In reviewing a parenting time determination, “[w]e will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Accordingly, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Hurst v. Smith, 192 N.E.3d 233, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “Indiana has long recognized that the right of parents to visit their children is a precious privilege that should be enjoyed by noncustodial parents, and thus a noncustodial parent is generally entitled to reasonable visitation rights.” Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d at 762 (quotation and citation omitted).

[23] In its dissolution order, the court made the following findings regarding parenting time and Father's ability to care for Child:

5. Both parents are fit and suitable parents to have custody of [Child].

6. Mother primarily cared for [Child] after her birth, but Father participated to the extent Mother would allow Father to participate. Father's contact with [Child] was limited due to Mother restricting Father's access to [Child] (locking him out of the nursery room) while Mother and Father continued to reside together at the marital residence.

7. The Court issued a Preliminary Order providing Father with parenting time as set forth in that Order. At the Preliminary Hearing, Mother testified that she would be cooperative with Father to provide additional parenting time. Once the Preliminary Order was issued, Mother refused to provide Father any additional parenting time in excess of the specific amount of parenting time allowed under the Court order, even when Mother was unable to exercise the parenting time herself. Mother took [Child] to Texas and left [Child] there with maternal grandmother for two nights at a hotel, while Mother returned to Indiana herself and denied Father the opportunity to have overnights.

8. Father exercised all the parenting time allowed by Mother and provided to him under the Preliminary Order.

9. Father has participated in all of [Child's] doctor appointments and has participated in person. Mother also participated in [Child's] doctor's appointments but participated more virtually.

***

12. Mother and Father took the four hour parenting class required by the Court and Father took an additional twelve hour parenting skills class for children ages zero to five, which he filed notice of with the Court.

13. The Court's Preliminary Order contemplated that Father could begin overnights at age six months or when [Child] started some solid foods, whichever comes first. The Preliminary Order stated that Father could request further review of this issue at that time. At six months Father requested overnight parenting time from Mother. Mother refused to provide Father any additional parenting time at age six months and when [Child] was consuming some solid foods.

***

19. The Court observed videos prepared by Mother and Father regarding their care and relationship with [Child]. It appears both parents have a good relationship with [Child] and equivalent ability to care for her.

20. Both parents have appropriate living accommodations for [Child] at their respective residences.

21. The evidence supports that Father should have greater parenting time than provided by the Guidelines. The evidence suggests Mother has thus far thwarted Father's attempts to have greater parenting time than what the letter of the Court's provisional order allows.

22. Father shall have parenting time, three days per week, which shall be overnights․

***

31․ The Court acknowledges this amount of parenting time is in excess of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. However, Mother has demonstrated to the Court during the provisional period that if the Court does not specifically award Father parenting time, Mother is unlikely to offer Father additional parenting time. Whereas the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines contemplate a gradual increase in parenting time with a young child, this is predicated on the custodial parent allowing additional parenting time. The Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines are the minimum amount of parenting time a noncustodial parent should receive. Thus far, Mother has interpreted the Court's Orders and the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines to be the maximum amount of parenting time Father should receive. Since there is unlikely to be a natural progression of more parenting time for Father, the Court finds this parenting time order is in [Child's] best interest.

App. Vol. II pp. 50-56. Mother does not challenge these findings of fact, so we accept them as true. See Johnson v. Johnson, 181 N.E.3d 364, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[24] Mother contends the trial court “abused its discretion by ordering an immediate leap from zero overnights to three per week.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. She argues immediate overnights were not in fourteen-month-old Child's best interests given her young age and Father's lack of experience with overnights. Instead, she contends the trial court should have imposed a gradual increase in parenting time as outlined in the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

[25] As the trial court noted, its award of three overnights is a deviation from the Guidelines. Specifically, “Section II.B of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines does not recommend overnight parenting time before age three if a noncustodial parent has not exercised regular caretaking responsibilities unless” certain requirements are met. Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); see also Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines § II.C (providing that a noncustodial parent who has exercised regular care responsibilities should exercise only one twenty-four-hour period of overnight parenting time per week until the child is at least nineteen months old). Further, the commentary to the Guidelines provides that “[w]hen a parent has not provided regular hands-on care for the child prior to separation, overnight parenting time is not recommended until the parent and the child have developed a predictable and comfortable daytime care taking routine.” Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines § II.C, cmt. 4.

[26] However, the Parenting Time Guidelines are just that: guidelines. A trial court may deviate from the Guidelines in establishing a parenting time schedule that is in a child's best interests. See In re Paternity of C.H., 936 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“While the Guidelines provide courts with specific parenting times for a child of a given age, the Guidelines themselves clearly state that ‘the purpose of these guidelines is to provide a model which may be adjusted depending upon the unique needs and circumstances of each family.’ ” (quoting Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines, Preamble)). A deviation from the Guidelines alone is not an abuse of discretion.

[27] In addition, the unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusion that the immediate overnights are in Child's best interests. Father provided initial overnight care to Child after she was born and stopped only after Mother prevented him from doing so. Thereafter, Father regularly exercised parenting time with Child and attended every doctor appointment for her. He not only completed the court-ordered parenting class but also completed an additional twelve-hour parenting class specifically on children under the age of five. Father had appropriate living accommodations to care for Child at his residence, and the court found he was just as capable of caring for Child as Mother. Given this evidence and the considerable deference we afford our trial courts in family law matters, we cannot say the court abused its discretion here.

[28] Mother also argues the trial court based its decision not on Child's best interests but on her unwillingness to agree to parenting time beyond what the preliminary order required, and that it is improper to “conflate a parent's lack of cooperation with the best interests determination.” Appellant's Br. p. 15 (quoting Stafford v. Stafford, 256 N.E.3d 595, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)). But the court considered that conduct in assessing whether the gradual increase in parenting time contemplated by the Guidelines would occur, an outcome it found “unlikely[.]” App. Vol. II p. 56. That was a proper consideration in its best-interests determination. See Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines § II.A cmt. (identifying “ ‘gatekeeping’ behavior intended to keep the other parent and the child apart” as a factor that may be considered in determining whether a parenting plan exceeding the minimum is in a child's best interests); cf. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (recognizing that a parent's behavior toward the other parent that places the child's welfare at stake may support a custody modification), trans. denied.¹ Moreover, even if the court improperly considered Mother's conduct, it made other findings supporting its determination that the parenting time award was in Child's best interests. See In re Paternity of M.P.M.W., 908 N.E.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming custody modification where, although the trial court's order included language regarding punishing mother for violating a court order, the court also based its decision on proper considerations).

Conclusion

[29] The trial court's challenged finding is supported by the evidence. The court did not err in imputing income to Mother or in awarding Father immediate overnight parenting time. We affirm.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This case is thus unlike Stafford v. Stafford, 256 N.E.3d 595, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), where the elimination of overnights appeared related to a parent's failure to comply with court orders; here, in fashioning its parenting time award, the court considered Mother's conduct for a forward-looking purpose: to assess whether Child's relationship with Father would develop.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.