Jalan X. Carpenter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jalan X. Carpenter appeals his conviction for murder and a sentence enhancement for the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction and the enhancement. He further asserts that his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 26, 2021, Mynae Cole and her sister hosted a celebration of life party at Cole's house in Fort Wayne attended by approximately twenty people, including Cole's boyfriend, John Peterson, and the Craighead sisters, Shania and Shazmin. Everyone at the party was very intoxicated. During the party, one of the attendees, Cole's cousin, Linzell Parham, became so intoxicated that he was vomiting on the couch. Cole took Parham upstairs to her room. At some point Parham's friend, Carpenter, who was not invited to the party, came over to pick up Parham and the two men left the home.

[3] Later that evening, Carpenter and Parham returned to Cole's house. Cole and her sister knew that Peterson “didn't want [Carpenter] there” so they told Carpenter, “You can just leave.” Transcript Volume II at 175. Carpenter and Peterson were “kind of confronting each other” so Cole and her sister “had to separate them” to keep them from fighting because “they were kind of mad at each other.” Id. Parham stayed, but Carpenter left Cole's house again. Cole began dressing because she “was going out to the club.” Id. at 176.

[4] Although Carpenter's cell phone indicated it was using cell towers near Cole's house between 8:18 and 8:56 p.m., at around 9:00 p.m., his cell phone traveled south and began using towers near his residence on Elmdale Drive between 9:15 and 9:25 p.m. Around that time, Carpenter received a text message asking for the address for Old Heads, which was a place to gamble and play cards, and also asking him for “Mally's” phone number. State's Exhibit 353. “Mally” was the nickname for Malachi Dufor. Transcript Volume III at 243, 246. Carpenter's phone stopped recording location data at 9:25 p.m.

[5] Home-security video recorded a large dark SUV near Dufor's residence at about 9:56 p.m. At around 10:31 p.m., the SUV left that area traveling east toward Cole's home. Around that time, Peterson and his friend Jalen Willis, who went by the nickname “Tim, or Timmy,” left Cole's home, and Peterson drove his red Ford Fusion to a Shell gas station. Transcript Volume II at 139. Video from the gas station showed a black SUV located at the side of the building following Peterson's car as it left the gas station. The video depicted the front-seat passenger of the SUV wearing a black hooded garment with small white patches running down the sleeve and a white square emblem on the left chest. The SUV did not have a license plate.

[6] Meanwhile, a fifteen-year-old male who lived on Vance Avenue (“Child Witness”) was awake playing video games when he took a break and went outside. He saw, across the street, a black SUV and a red vehicle pull up to the intersection of Vance Avenue and Reed Road and stop at the red light. The black SUV was slightly behind the red vehicle. Child Witness heard many gunshots that he had “no single doubt” came from the SUV. Id. at 249. He was also “one hundred percent” certain that the driver's window of the SUV was closed and he saw no activity coming from the driver's side of the vehicle. Id. at 250. Child Witness did not see anyone exit the SUV, but “if someone did [exit] or poke their head through the window” to fire shots, “it was on the passenger side.” Id. at 246. After the shots, Child Witness saw the SUV drive away, and he observed that the Fusion “stuttered a bit before driving off, as well.” Id. at 245.

[7] At around 10:49 p.m., surveillance video from Lane Middle School, which was across the street from Child Witness's home, depicted the SUV and Peterson's Fusion at the intersection of Vance Avenue and Reed Road. The video shows a person briefly exiting the front passenger side of the SUV, reentering the SUV as the Fusion began to move, and then leaning out of the passenger side door while bright flashes consistent with gunfire appear on the video.

[8] Willis drove Peterson's Fusion back to Cole's home, banged on her door with blood on his jacket, and told her that Peterson had been shot. Cole called 911 and, when police arrived, they found Peterson dead in the driver's seat of the Fusion that had multiple bullet holes in the front windshield. Peterson had been struck six times, twice in the head and four times in the back and shoulder. At 10:53 p.m., Dufor sent a text message to Carpenter that read, “Where is at? I'm here.” Transcript Volume III at 246.

[9] After learning that the shooting occurred at the intersection of Vance Avenue and Reed Road, officers went to the scene and recovered twenty-one shell casings. Subsequent forensic examination revealed that all shells were fired from the same firearm. Two of the casings had a “.300 Blackout” headstamp while the other nineteen were marked .223 or 5.56x45 but had been altered to .300 Blackout caliber dimensions by shortening the cartridge case and creating the diameter needed for a .300 Blackout bullet. Id. at 158. Fort Wayne Police Homicide Detective Benjamin MacDonald, an eighteen-year law enforcement veteran, could not recall any other investigation involving .300 Blackout ammunition. Detective Geoff Norton, an eleven-year law enforcement veteran, had only “very rarely” encountered this type of ammunition during a criminal investigation. Id. at 65.

[10] Location data resumed on Carpenter's cell phone at 11:08 p.m. Between 11:08 p.m. and 11:37 p.m., the cell phone was moving south before returning to his residence at 11:42 p.m. The following morning, a person calling himself “Trott” texted Carpenter, “Don't Eva think u alone n dis shit cuz I'm right behind you on all 10,” “Keep your head,” and “Just get back with me so Ik u straight.” Id. at 245 (quoting State's Exhibit 354). Carpenter responded, “Love blood.” Id.

[11] Police released a picture of the passenger in the black SUV to the media. On April 8, 2021, Cole told Detective Scott Studebaker that she believed the person in the picture was Carpenter. Detective Studebaker reviewed video surveillance and developed Carpenter as a “person of interest.” Transcript Volume II at 235. The vehicle of interest was identified as a 2008/2009 Chevrolet Tahoe LT.

[12] On April 16, 2021, Detective Lucas MacDonald conducted a recorded phone interview with Shania Craighead. She told the detective about the confrontation between Carpenter and Peterson at Cole's party, about Carpenter leaving the party and later returning, what kind of vehicle Carpenter was driving, and that she believed Carpenter was wearing a sweatshirt with a Nike symbol.

[13] On May 10, 2021, Detective Benjamin MacDonald conducted a recorded phone interview with Shazmin Craighead. She described witnessing a verbal confrontation between Carpenter and Peterson at Cole's party and stated that she saw that Carpenter had a big gun leaning against the wall in the kitchen.

[14] On June 22, 2021, officers executed a search warrant at the Elmdale Drive residence where Carpenter lived with his mother and brother. Officers encountered Carpenter outside the residence and seized two cell phones from him. In the home, they found a loaded revolver, a box of mixed caliber ammunition and firearm parts including an AR-style bolt carrier group, handgun boxes, high-capacity magazines, and sixty rounds of .300 Blackout ammunition. Several firearms were found, but no firearm capable of firing .300 Blackout ammunition was found.

[15] In May 2023, an individual named Raymond Moore was charged with robbery. In early November 2024, Moore and his attorney spoke with Detective Benjamin MacDonald. Moore told the detective that he had been at the gambling establishment, Old Heads, when someone said something to Carpenter about Peterson's murder. Moore heard Carpenter say that he “was hanging out the window on somebody,” which Moore knew meant “hanging out the window and shooting somebody.” Transcript Volume III at 178-179. On November 15, 2024, police stopped a vehicle Carpenter was driving. Officers found a black AR-style weapon and arrested Carpenter. When questioned about Peterson's murder, Carpenter stated that, on the night of the shooting, he was at home by his curfew, which was at 8:00 or 9:00 p.m.

[16] On November 18, 2024, the State charged Carpenter with murder. The State also filed a firearm sentencing enhancement for the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense. A jury trial began on November 18, 2025. During trial, the court admitted numerous pieces of circumstantial evidence offered by the State over Carpenter's objections. The jury found Carpenter guilty as charged. Following a sentencing hearing, the court found Carpenter's age of eighteen to be a mitigating circumstance but did not give that circumstance great weight. The court found numerous aggravating circumstances, including Carpenter's juvenile and adult criminal history with failed attempts at rehabilitation, his status as a multi-state offender, the impact on Peterson's family, and the nature and circumstances of the crime. The court sentenced Carpenter to sixty-three years in the Department of Correction for murder, enhanced by twenty years for his use of a firearm, for an aggregate sentence of eighty-three years.

Discussion

I. Evidentiary Rulings

[17] Carpenter challenges several evidentiary rulings by the trial court. Generally, we review the trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We may affirm a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh'g denied.

[18] Additionally, when appropriate, we may apply a harmless error analysis. Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) provides:

Harmless Error. No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.

The Indiana Supreme Court has held:

When an appellate court must determine whether a non-constitutional error is harmless, Rule 66(A)’s “probable impact test” controls. Under this test, the party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the case, the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below. See Mason v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1233, 1236-37 (Ind. 1997); [Edward W. Najam, Jr. & Jonathan B. Warner, Indiana's Probable-Impact Test for Reversible Error, 55 Ind. L. Rev. 27, 50-51 (2022)]. Importantly, this is not a review for the sufficiency of the remaining evidence; it is a review of what was presented to the trier of fact compared to what should have been presented. And when conducting that review, we consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case. See Tunstall v. Manning, 124 N.E.3d 1193, 1200 (Ind. 2019). Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.

Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 570 (2024).

A. Photographs

[19] Carpenter first challenges the trial court's admission of certain photographs taken during the search of his home and during the search of the vehicle he was driving at the time of his 2024 arrest, as well as photographs extracted from his cell phone. He argues that the photographs from the search of his home and vehicle depicted weapons and ammunition, none of which were specifically “connected to Peterson's murder.” Appellant's Brief at 20. According to Carpenter, the photographs extracted from his cell phone depicted “[him] and others brandishing firearms, flashing hand signs, and displaying ‘fans’ of US currency” none of which “were connected to the March 26, 2021 killing of John Peterson.” Id. He argues that the court's “decision to admit the evidence was error” because “it was highly prejudicial by its implication that Carpenter was a criminal and engages in violent behavior” and “skewed the jury's assessment of [his] character[.]” Id. at 22-23. The State responds that the “photographs were relevant, not unfairly prejudicial, and not impermissible character evidence.” Appellee's Brief at 28.

[20] Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,]” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “This ‘liberal standard for relevancy’ sets a low bar, and the trial court enjoys ‘wide discretion’ in deciding whether that bar is cleared.” Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Ind. Evidence Rule 402. However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 403. “All evidence that is relevant to a criminal prosecution is inherently prejudicial, and thus the Evidence Rule 403 inquiry boils down to a balance of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial impact of that evidence.” Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “When determining likely unfair prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he balancing of the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice must be determined with reference to the issue to be proved by the evidence.” Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “Evaluation of whether the probative value of an evidentiary matter is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial court.” Id.

[21] Regarding the photographs of weapons and ammunition taken during the search of Carpenter's home and the vehicle he was driving at the time of his 2024 arrest, as argued by the State at trial, such photographs were relevant to show that Carpenter had ready access to weapons of the type used in the murder as well as the capability to have acquired and/or altered the rare ammunition that was used in the crime. As this Court has observed, evidence that a defendant had access to a weapon and/or ammunition of the type used in a crime, even if the proffered evidence may be considered to have been obtained somewhat remote in time, is considered relevant evidence. See Pickens v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (evidence that police officers had seen an assault rifle in Pickens's residence two years before the charged murder was relevant to show Pickens's access to a weapon of the type used in the murder), trans. denied.

[22] In balancing the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice of the evidence, Carpenter objected to the photographs as being “inflammatory,” and he now points to a generalized concern that possessing weapons and ammunition would be viewed unfavorably by the jury. Transcript Volume III at 68. However, as acknowledged by his trial counsel, possession of firearms, ammunition, and money is not unlawful, and the images depicted no violent act. We agree with the trial court that the probative value of evidence that Carpenter had access to assault-style weapons and the rare ammunition used in the murder outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice.

[23] As for the photographs extracted from Carpenter's cell phone, the record reveals that the photographs show Carpenter wearing a black hooded sweatshirt with white emblems down the arm and a white crest on the upper left chest. According to State witness Detective Benjamin MacDonald, the “very distinct hoodie” depicted in the photographs had “without a doubt” the same pattern as the sweatshirt worn by the front-seat passenger of the black SUV on the Shell gas station surveillance video recorded minutes before the passenger shot Peterson. Id. at 242. Carpenter admits that the central contested issue in this case was the identity of the person who fired shots from the SUV and thus, photographs of Carpenter wearing what appears to be the same sweatshirt were highly relevant to establish Carpenter's identity as the shooter. We cannot say that the other images captured in the photographs, such as Carpenter or others flashing hand signs and displaying fans of US currency, rendered the photographs unfairly prejudicial.

[24] To the extent Carpenter suggests on appeal that the photographs constituted impermissible character evidence, we must disagree. Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits a trial court from admitting evidence of another crime, wrong, or act “to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” “The purpose of the rule is to protect against the ‘forbidden inference -- that the defendant acted badly in the past, and that the defendant's present, charged actions conform with those past bad acts ․’ ” Erickson v. State, 72 N.E.3d 965, 973-974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted). As observed by the State, the mere “[l]awful possession of firearms and accessories in one's own home is not a ‘crime, wrong, or act’ ” as contemplated by the rule. Appellee's Brief at 31. Moreover, Carpenter did not specifically object to the admission of the photographs on these grounds, and thus we decline to address the argument any further.¹ See Grace v. State, 731 N.E.2d 442, 444 (Ind. 2000) (observing that grounds for objection must be specific and any grounds not raised in the trial court are not available on appeal), reh'g denied.

[25] Finally, even assuming error in the admission of some of the photographs (Carpenter does not assert that all of the photographs should have been excluded), we find such error harmless. As we discuss further below, the circumstantial evidence presented in this case was overwhelming and, considering the entire record, we find that the error's probable impact would have been sufficiently minor. Carpenter has not met his burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the case, the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.

B. Note

[26] Carpenter next argues that the court “erred in admitting what purports to be lyrics to a rap song extracted from [his] cellphone and allowing a State's witness to interpret said lyrics.” Appellant's Brief at 24. Specifically, the State introduced a note from Carpenter's phone that was created at 5:31 p.m. on March 26, 2021, the day of the shooting, and last modified on May 7, 2021. The note appears to be written in the style of rap lyrics and contains profane and violent language. Some of the lyrics included: “If I see a opp out imma take his head,” “See me in the streets boy better play it right,” “Stg I'll leave a n***** at a light,” “Boyz got behind me so I had to take flight,” “Hit a left and 2 right now we out of sight,” “Last n***** played tuff got left at the light,” “Lil Tim check the score,” and “Blow his head off that's what I meant to do.” State's Exhibit 310, Exhibits Volume II at 81-83.

[27] The record reveals that when the State offered the note from Carpenter's cell phone into evidence, defense counsel argued that “songs and art are not evidence of a crime, and I think it's inflammatory to give something to the jury and present it as evidence of a crime, when it is art, so I'm objecting.” Transcript Volume III at 204. The prosecutor responded that the defense was “free to characterize it however he wishes in closing. I think the objection would go to the weight and not to the admissibility of it.” Id. The court admitted the note over Carpenter's objection, stating “I think the objection goes to the weight, rather than admissibility, since it was, in fact, on his phone.” Id. at 205.

[28] On appeal, Carpenter initially contends that the note is “artistic expression” protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that such evidence is inadmissible “if it is not relevant to any issue before the court.” Appellant's Brief at 26 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992)). However, Carpenter did not object on these grounds at trial. Accordingly, this claim is waived. See Ko v. State, 243 N.E.3d 1153, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (observing that it is well established that a party may not object on one ground at trial and raise a different ground on appeal; this results in waiver of the issue on appeal), trans. denied.

[29] As for the note's general admissibility on relevance grounds, the tendency of the evidence to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, Carpenter argues that, “[a]s a general proposition, there is not a correlation between an individual's enjoyment of a particular piece of music, and the individual's behavior.” Appellant's Brief at 27.² However, this case concerns more than simply Carpenter's affinity for a particular piece of music or genre. The note on his phone appears to be lyrics personally penned by him prior to Peterson's murder, and edited after the murder, that tell a story with details strikingly similar to the murder, with one line referencing being stopped at a traffic light, blowing someone's head off, and another line seeming to specifically reference Peterson's friend Willis, a/k/a Tim, who survived the shooting. The highly probative value of the note cannot be ignored. See Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (lyrics from two rap songs written by defendant were deemed relevant as an indication of defendant's intent regarding victim's murder), trans. denied.

[30] Regarding prejudice, Carpenter generally argues that relevant evidence “may” be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Appellant's Brief at 28 (citation omitted). However, he offers no further explanation tying the admission of the note to any of these things. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the note.

[31] As for Detective Benjamin MacDonald's very brief testimony regarding the lyrics and the meaning behind certain verbiage, prior to that testimony, Carpenter objected to the “entire line of questioning” on the grounds that he did not “think a homicide detective is gonna be qualified to look at song lyrics and interpret what the author meant.” Transcript Volume III at 250. The prosecutor agreed and stated, “I don't think he can interpret the lyrics, I'm just asking him to provide any specialized knowledge he may have to assist the jury on street terminology[.]” Id. The court permitted the detective's testimony provided the State's questioning was limited to the detective's knowledge of street terminology. As observed by the State, Ind. Evidence Rule 701, which addresses opinion testimony by lay witnesses, provides that “testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness's perception; and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or to a determination of a fact in issue.” We cannot say that the court's ruling permitting the detective's limited testimony on this issue was an abuse of discretion.

C. Recorded Statements

[32] Shania and Shazmin Craighead each reluctantly testified at trial regarding their recollections of the party they attended at Cole's house on the evening of the murder. Each claimed to be unable to recall many specifics from the evening, and neither had any recollection of the confrontation between Carpenter and Peterson. Following their testimony, the State moved to call as witnesses the detectives each sister had given recorded statements to in the weeks following the murder and to play the recorded statements for the jury. Carpenter challenges the court's admission of the recorded phone interviews over his hearsay objection.

[33] Ind. Evidence Rule 801 states that “hearsay” is a statement “not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing” that “is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 802 generally prohibits the introduction of hearsay evidence, but that Rule is subject to exceptions. Ind. Evidence Rule 803(5) defines an exception to the rule against hearsay for recorded recollections, and it allows the admission of a record if it:

(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately;

(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's memory; and

(C) accurately reflects the witness's knowledge.

We review a trial court's decision to allow hearsay evidence pursuant to one of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay for an abuse of discretion. McMillen v. State, 169 N.E.3d 437, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[34] First, Shania and Shazmin's recorded statements were made on a matter each witness knew about but now, five years later, could not recall well enough to testify fully and accurately. Each sister claimed to be unable to recall what they originally told police about Cole's party and appeared to remember only generalities about the evening. Shania claimed to not recall what she had told police about Peterson, Carpenter, the confrontation between the two men, Carpenter being told to leave, Carpenter returning, or the vehicle he drove. Shazmin claimed that she “[k]ind of” remembered speaking to a detective, but she did not recall what she told police about Peterson, Carpenter, or a gun. Transcript Volume II at 190.

[35] Second, each statement was made while the matter was fresh in the witnesses’ memories. Shania was interviewed just three weeks after Cole's party and Shazmin was interviewed around six weeks after the party.

[36] Third, the recordings accurately reflected each witness's knowledge because their recorded accounts matched independently corroborated evidence. Cole testified that Carpenter was not invited to the party, was told to leave and confronted Peterson, and the two men had to be separated. Both Shania and Shazmin essentially described the same sequence of events. As all three requirements of Ind. Evidence Rule 803(5) were met, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the recorded statements as an exception to the rule against hearsay.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[37] Carpenter asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions “for murder and having used a firearm in committing the offense.” Appellant's Brief at 32. When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[38] To prove the offense of murder, the State had to prove that Carpenter knowingly or intentionally killed Peterson. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). To prove the firearm sentencing enhancement, the State had to prove that Carpenter knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11. Carpenter asserts that “the only element in dispute is the identity of the shooter” and “the State failed to present substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that he was the shooter of Peterson beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant's Brief at 33.

[39] It is well-settled that, even on the issue of identity, “circumstantial evidence alone” can sustain a murder conviction. Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244-1245 (Ind. 2024) (citing Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016)). The jury here was presented with ample circumstantial evidence supporting Carpenter's conviction as Peterson's murderer. Carpenter and Peterson were involved in an angry confrontation at Cole's home, and the men had to be separated to prevent them from fighting. A text message to Carpenter's phone at 9:14 p.m. asked for Dufor's phone number, Carpenter's location services were turned off, and an hour and a half later, a dark SUV left the area of Dufor's residence. A dark SUV was seen following Peterson's car from a Shell gas station, stopped behind it at a red light, and shots were fired from the passenger side of the SUV into Peterson's car. The SUV's passenger was caught on video wearing a distinctive sweatshirt matching a sweatshirt recently worn by Carpenter. Four minutes after the shooting, Dufor texted Carpenter's phone, and the morning after the shooting, a friend of Carpenter's sent him a text of support. Moore testified that, when discussing the murder, he heard Carpenter say that he “was hanging out the window on somebody,” which Moore knew meant “hanging out the window and shooting somebody.” Transcript Volume III at 178-179.³ This evidence was consistent with video surveillance from the middle school and what Child Witness reported. The shooter used rare and altered ammunition, and three months later police found numerous rounds of that caliber, firearm parts, and mixed caliber ammunition in Carpenter's residence. Finally, the note on Carpenter's phone created on the day of the shooting contained eerily similar details to the murder. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find Carpenter guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. Sentence

[40] Finally, Carpenter contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[41] Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 provides that a person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five and sixty-five years with the advisory sentence being fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(g) provides a sentencing enhancement for the use of a firearm of an additional fixed term of five to twenty years imprisonment. Carpenter's eighty-three-year aggregate sentence is two years below the maximum allowable sentence. On appeal, Carpenter asks that we reduce his sentence to the minimum sentence of “forty-five (45) years executed on the murder and enhanced by five (5) years for the use of a firearm, for a total of fifty (50) years.” Appellant's Brief at 41.

[42] Our review of the nature of the offense reveals that Carpenter murdered Peterson out of vengeance after being told he was unwelcome at the celebration of life party at Cole's home. Less than an hour after leaving the party, Carpenter traveled back toward Cole's home, waited for Peterson to leave, and pursued him until he was stopped at a red light just yards outside a residential neighborhood before leaning out the passenger window of the black SUV and firing twenty-one rounds into Peterson's vehicle, six rounds striking Peterson. Two rounds struck Peterson in the head and four rounds struck him in the torso. Carpenter then sped away, leaving Peterson to die. Peterson's passenger, Willis, who was clearly endangered but amazingly unharmed by the barrage of bullets, had to drive his dying friend to obtain help. The court heard evidence regarding the devastating impact of the crime on Peterson's sister and godmother.

[43] Our review of the character of the offender reveals that Carpenter was eighteen years old at the time of the murder. The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) indicates that, before turning eighteen, Carpenter was adjudicated a delinquent for carrying a handgun without a license. As an adult, and prior to his arrest in the instant case, he amassed four misdemeanor drug convictions including Indiana convictions for possession of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor and possession of a controlled substance as a class A misdemeanor, and Ohio convictions for trafficking in drugs and deception to obtain dangerous drugs. The PSI indicates that after his delinquency adjudication and placement in the “Detention Alternative Program,” Carpenter was ultimately unsatisfactorily discharged from probation. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 114. The Indiana Risk Assessment System places Carpenter in the moderate risk to reoffend category. After due consideration, we conclude that Carpenter has not sustained his burden of establishing that his aggregate sentence, which is below the maximum allowable sentence, is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[44] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Carpenter's murder conviction, sentence enhancement, and sentence.

[45] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although defense counsel referred to the photographs as “a character assassination,” he did not object to the photographs on Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) grounds. Transcript Volume III at 207. Additionally, defense counsel conceded that neither the possession of firearms nor the possession of money constituted crimes.

2.   Although not immediately cited after the above-mentioned quote, Carpenter appears to rely on a statement made in Houser v. State, 823 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Ind. 2005), as the source for this general proposition.

3.   The jury heard evidence that Moore received a favorable plea agreement on unrelated criminal charges in exchange for his testimony.

Brown, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.