IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.J.A.G. (Child) and M.G. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.G. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, M.J.A.G. (Child), arguing the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to prove termination was in Child's best interests. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child's mother, C.M. (Mother), has an extensive history of child-related proceedings in Michigan, where she lived until early 2024. In the late 2010s, Mother was married to a man with whom she had three children, M.W., J.M., and T.M. In 2016, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) substantiated allegations of drug use and domestic violence involving Mother and her husband. In July 2019, MDHHS investigated Mother again after she took J.M.—then age two—to the emergency room after he accidentally ingested Klonopin.

[3] In September 2019, Mother's husband was incarcerated, and she was living with a different romantic partner, Savajay Malory. On the 13th of that month, Mother left the children in Malory's care while she went to use drugs with a friend. At that time, T.M., J.M., and M.W., were aged one, two, and four, respectively. When Mother returned home, she found T.M. lying dead on the kitchen floor, having been severely beaten. Malory was arrested and later pled no contest to a charge of manslaughter. The next day, MDHHS removed J.M. and M.W. from Mother's care and petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to them. Mother participated in services for approximately four years but was never reunified with her children. The termination petition was ultimately granted in June 2023, and the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed that termination decision in May 2024.

[4] Meanwhile, Mother began dating Father, and together they had a child, E.G., in April 2023. While in the hospital after Mother gave birth, Father was informed that Mother's husband would be listed on the birth certificate. Father became aggressive with hospital staff, prompting police and security to be called to the scene. Given Father's volatile behavior and Mother's pending termination proceedings, MDHHS removed E.G. from Father and Mother's care and placed her in foster care. Despite being offered services, Father made little, if any, progress toward reunification with E.G. and often became aggressive with case workers. MDHHS petitioned to terminate Father and Mother's parental rights to E.G. in September 2024. That petition was granted in March 2025, and the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed that termination the following September.

[5] Mother gave birth to Child in April 2024. Because Father is a member of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (the Tribe), Child is an Indian child under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. Father and Mother relocated to Indiana shortly before Child's birth to avoid MDHHS involvement. On April 29, while Child was still in the hospital, DCS received a report that Father exhibited volatile behavior during and after Child's birth. DCS also learned that MDHHS planned to remove Child from Mother's care given her history of abuse and neglect of her previous children. DCS removed Child from Father and Mother's care, placed him in foster care, and filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (CHINS). The trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS in August 2024, and this Court affirmed that determination in April 2025. In re M.J.A.G., 24A-JC-2830, 2025 WL 1249686 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2025) (mem.).

[6] After removing Child from Father and Mother's care, DCS offered services to both parents, and Father participated in a parenting assessment. During his assessment, Father intimidated and threatened the evaluator and made her believe he was armed. Father was also incoherent, difficult to follow, and appeared unable to distinguish between past and present or regulate his emotions. On other occasions, Father threatened DCS staff and told case workers: “[I]f you take away my kid you're going to die,” “I will kill people to protect my family and to keep my kid,” “[Y]ou people are going to pay for this,” and “[P]eople are going to die.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 12 at 170.

[7] Because of his conduct toward DCS and other governmental representatives, Father was arrested in June 2024 and charged with Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of justice, Level 5 felony intimidation, and three counts of Level 6 felony intimidation. Father remained incarcerated while awaiting trial. DCS offered services to Father while he was in the county jail, including therapy, anger management, and fatherhood engagement services. However, Father continued to dismiss the need to engage in these services. Given his extensive mental health needs, in April 2025, Father was moved from jail to Madison State Hospital. Once Father went to the state hospital, DCS was no longer able to provide services to him.

[8] In August 2025, a jury found Father guilty as charged in his criminal case. Father was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction, and his earliest possible release date is September 30, 2032. DCS cannot offer services to Father while he is in prison.

[9] On August 14, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father and Mother's parental rights to Child. The trial court held a two-day fact-finding hearing on November 6, 2025, and January 30, 2026. At the hearing, several witnesses testified about Father and Mother's previous involvement with MDHHS and their lack of progress throughout Child's CHINS case. Among them were Lisa Wilks, a DCS family case manager (FCM), and Becky Stewart, Child's court-appointed special advocate (CASA).

[10] The FCM testified that it was in Child's best interests for Mother and Father's parental rights to be terminated. She noted Child had been with his current foster parents for roughly nineteen months, was doing well, and they wished to adopt him. Neither Mother nor Father had progressed beyond supervised visitation with Child, given Father's incarceration and Mother's failure to demonstrate an “ability to make sound and safe decisions for [Child] despite her extensive participation in services.” Transcript at 61.

[11] The CASA similarly testified that termination of Father and Mother's parental rights and adoption by his foster parents was in Child's best interests. She highlighted Child's bond with his foster parents and that Child has “high needs physically and emotionally,” which his foster parents provide. Id. at 140. She also discussed Child's need for permanency, as he has been at his current placement since he was roughly six weeks old and has never been in Father's care.

[12] Also present at the hearing was Amanda Gil, a representative of the Tribe. Gil testified that terminating Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest because Father “has no bond with [Child]” and Child “deserves to have stability, nurturing, [and] safety” which Father cannot provide. Id. at 156. Gil also testified that the Tribe's Child Welfare Committee recommended termination.

[13] After the hearing, the trial court issued a detailed order terminating Father and Mother's parental rights to Child. Father now appeals.¹

Discussion and Decision

[14] When reviewing a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We apply a deferential, two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. We first “determine whether the evidence supports the findings” and then “whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). We will affirm the court's judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. A decision to terminate parental rights “is clearly erroneous when the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision.” Id.

[15] Parents have a fundamental liberty interest “in the care, custody, and control of [their] children” which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Reflecting the importance of the parent-child relationship, before a parent's parental rights can be terminated, our General Assembly requires DCS to allege and prove that: (1) “there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child;” (2) “termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests;” and (3) one or more additional enumerated circumstances apply.² Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2025). If the trial court finds that DCS proved these allegations by clear and convincing evidence, it must terminate the parent-child relationship.³ Ind. Code §§ 31-35-2-8(a) (2012) (amended 2026), 31-37-14-2 (1997).

[16] Father's sole argument on appeal is that DCS “failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in [Child's] best interests.” Appellant's Brief at 9. Father does not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact, so we accept the court's findings as true. See In re De.B., 144 N.E.3d 763, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Any unchallenged findings stand as proven.”).

[17] In making its best-interests determination, the trial court must “subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children” and consider the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability[,] and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In other words, termination is appropriate when parents “are unable or unwilling to meet[ ] their responsibility as parents.” Id. (quoting Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 374).

[18] Here, the trial court found that Father refused to engage with services before and during his incarceration. Before his arrest, Father “was confrontational, defensive, and volatile” with DCS workers and providers. Appellant's App. Vol. 12 at 171. Father acted similarly in the prior child-related proceedings in Michigan, as he “exhibited inappropriate, volatile, intimidating[,] and abusive behaviors towards MDH[H]S authorities and other involved parties.” Id. at 172. Moreover, despite Father's participation in services during pre-trial incarceration in his criminal case, the court found “specific concerns” about

whether Father can regulate his emotions and understand his reactions, whether he can differentiate between past and present, and whether he is aware of his past trauma or not. His past trauma could result in him harming [Child].

Id. at 171.

[19] Based on Father's lack of progress in services, the court concluded “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of Father will not be remedied.” Id. at 179. Moreover, the FCM, CASA, and Tribe representative each testified that terminating Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Such recommendations, when paired with evidence showing “the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, [are] sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[20] Nonetheless, Father asserts termination wasn't in Child's best interests because he “demonstrated a clear commitment to participating in services” and “continued to participate in available services while incarcerated until his transfer to Madison State Hospital in April of 2025[.]” Appellant's Br. at 13. These assertions are not supported by the record and contradict the trial court's unchallenged findings about Father's lack of engagement with services.

[21] In any event, a child's need for permanency is central to the best-interests analysis. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Children cannot be made to “wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification—and courts ‘need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental[,] and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 648 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235 (Ind. 2013)). Here, with these principles in mind, the trial court appropriately reasoned as follows:

With Father's lengthy prison sentence and his history of aggression, intimidation, and unwillingness to participate in services offered by child welfare authorities, it will be years before Father may be in a position to properly care for [Child], if ever. [Child] deserves permanency.

Appellant's App. Vol. 12 at 179. This conclusion is supported by the court's unchallenged findings, so it is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[22] For these reasons, the trial court did not clearly err in determining termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. We therefore affirm the court's decision to terminate the parental relationship between Father and Child.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Here, the trial court concluded “that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of Father will not be remedied.” Appellant's App. Vol. 12 at 179; see Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2025). Father does not challenge this conclusion.

3.   Additionally, because Child is subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act, DCS had to prove, “by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1978). The trial court concluded DCS satisfied this heightened burden, and Father does not challenge that conclusion in this appeal.

DeBoer, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.