Benjamin Paul Woody, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In September 1976, Benjamin Paul Woody pled guilty to two counts of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for each count. In January 2025, Woody moved for a change of judge and petitioned the trial court to modify his sentence. The court denied Woody's motion for a change of judge, finding the presiding judge had no inherent bias against Woody. The trial court also denied Woody's modification petition, finding that Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17(k) prohibits Woody, a violent criminal, from filing a petition to modify his sentence without the consent of the prosecutor. Woody then moved the court to correct error in its denial of his petition for sentence modification and moved the trial court to set aside its denial of his change-of-judge motion. The court denied both motions.

[2] Woody appeals, arguing Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17(k) as applied to him violates Indiana's prohibition against contract impairment and that the court erred in denying his motion to correct error. He also appeals the denial of his motion for change of judge. Finding that the terms of Woody's plea agreement do not authorize the trial court to modify his sentence and that the court did not err in denying Woody's change-of-judge motion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In January 1976, Woody murdered Christine Norton and her four-year-old son by stabbing them to death with a hunting knife while they slept in their beds. The State charged Woody with two counts of first-degree murder. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Woody pled guilty to two counts of second-degree murder. In relevant part, the plea agreement provided:

6. My attorney has also advised me that:

(a) the punishment which the law provides for the charge to which I am pleading guilty is life imprisonment or not less than 15 years nor more than 25 years.

(b) as a result of a plea agreement the prosecutor will recommend: life imprisonment on both Counts of Second Degree Murder.

***

7. I understand that even though the prosecuting attorneys may have agreed to make a recommendation as to my sentence that their recommendation is in no way binding to the Court; (provided, however, I understand that if the Court having received a presentence report from the Probation Officer is unable to accept the above agreement and recommendation, I will be permitted to withdraw my p1ea of guilty and the Court will reinstate a plea of Not Guilty and set the matter for trial before another judge if trial is to the Court.)

App. Vol. II pp. 17-18. On September 29, 1976, the court accepted the plea agreement.

[4] On October 25, 1976, the trial court sentenced Woody to life imprisonment on both counts. At sentencing, the sentencing judge stated:

We have involved here the death of two people and there is nothing that you could do that would ever bring them back. There is no amount of time that you could serve to repay the injustice that you have done. If I felt there was any possibility that the death sentence in Indiana was constitutional, I would never have accepted the plea-bargain agreement that was filed in this particular case․ I feel that you are an amoral person and I believe that you are beyond rehabilitation․ I am also going to make the recommendation that you not be considered for release at any[ ]time․ I will do everything in my power to see that you are not released[.]

PCR App. Vol. III pp. 157-58.¹

[5] Woody subsequently sought post-conviction relief (PCR), then federal habeas corpus relief, arguing his plea was involuntary. Both efforts were unsuccessful. In reviewing the denial of his PCR, our court found that the record “unequivocally establishes that Woody unmistakably knew he was to receive two life sentences.” Woody v. Duckworth, 53 F.3d 334, *3 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (quoting Woody v. State, No. 05A02-9205-PC-204, slip op. at 6 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1993) (mem.)). Our court also found that “the record [was] devoid of any statement by the guilty plea court that Woody would receive anything other than life sentences.” Id. (quoting Woody, 05A02-9205-PC-204, slip op. at 6). Later, in affirming the denial of his habeas petition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Woody understood “before he entered into the plea agreement that he would be sentenced to two life terms, one for each murder.” Id.

[6] On January 20, 2025, Woody petitioned the trial court to modify his sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17. The same day, he filed a motion for a change of judge and attached an excerpt of the original sentencing transcript to his motion. Woody asserted that the presiding judge could not be impartial because he was the son of the sentencing judge who found Woody to be amoral and beyond rehabilitation. The trial court denied Woody's change-of-judge motion on February 25, finding that the sentencing judge's comments would not have disqualified the sentencing judge from ruling on a petition for sentence modification, let alone the presiding judge. The court also found that the relationship between the sentencing and presiding judges did not create an inherent bias or reason for automatic disqualification.

[7] As to Woody's petition for sentence modification, the prosecuting attorney did not consent. But Woody argued that the prosecutor's consent was not needed in his case because that requirement was not in place at the time of his conviction. Woody also asserted that “all parties contemplated that Mr. Woody would be allowed to move to modify within the parameters of the plea agreement[.]” App. Vol. II p. 146. At a hearing, the State argued that the prosecutorial-consent requirement applied to violent offenders who committed an offense or were sentenced prior to July 1, 2014. On June 23, the court denied Woody's petition for sentence modification, holding that section 35-38-1-17(k) required Woody, a violent criminal, to obtain the prosecutor's consent before filing a modification motion.

[8] On July 23, Woody filed two motions. The first was a motion to set aside the order declining recusal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B), alleging “mistake” and attaching an additional page of the sentencing transcript that he had not attached in his original motion. Id. at 173. The court denied that motion and maintained that there was no basis for a change of judge. The second was a motion to correct error in the denial of his petition to modify, supplementing his argument with additional history on the evolution of the sentence modification statute. The court also denied that motion, finding that it merely supplemented Woody's argument and did not assert any procedural or factual error in the court's ruling. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sentence Modification

[9] Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17 applies to a person who committed an offense or was sentenced before July 1, 2014. Section 35-38-1-17(k) (2024) provides that “a violent criminal may not file a petition for sentence modification without the consent of the prosecuting attorney” after 365 days have elapsed since sentencing.² Woody does not dispute that he is a violent criminal. Instead, he contends that retroactive application of section 35-38-1-17(k) to him violates the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against the impairment of contracts. He argues that his plea agreement, i.e., a contract, “was silent regarding whether he could later pursue a modification of sentence,” Appellant's Br. p. 12, and that application of the prosecutorial-consent requirement imposes a restriction on the plea agreement that was not agreed upon at the time.

[10] However, the State asserts the plea agreement did not authorize modification, arguing that once the trial court accepted the plea agreement it became bound by its terms, including the recommended life sentences for each second-degree murder conviction.³ Although other courts have held that Woody's plea was voluntary because he knew he would be sentenced to life imprisonment on both murder counts, no reviewing court has directly addressed whether the terms of Woody's plea agreement permit modification. We do so here, and we find this threshold issue dispositive.

[11] A trial court's denial of a motion for sentence modification is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Newman v. State, 177 N.E.3d 888, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. However, when the issue turns on the interpretation of a statute or a plea agreement, as it does here, our review is de novo. Wilson v. State, 189 N.E.3d 231, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022); see also State v. Smith, 71 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind. 2017) (plea agreements are contractual in nature and our review is guided by contract interpretation principles).

[12] A trial court generally has no authority over a defendant after sentencing. Newman, 177 N.E.3d at 890. A court's limited authority to modify is purely statutory. See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e) (2024). However, that authority is further constrained when the sentence rests on a plea agreement. “[O]nce a sentencing court accepts a plea agreement, it possesses only that degree of sentencing discretion provided in the agreement.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 794 (Ind. 2019). A plea agreement that leaves the sentence to a range or cap affords the court discretion to sentence within those limits. Id. In contrast, a fixed plea, which specifies the sentence to be imposed, affords a trial court “no discretion to impose anything other than the precise sentence upon which [the parties] agreed.” Id. (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1078 n.4 (Ind. 2006)).

[13] These principles govern modification as well: “the sentencing court possesses only that degree of discretion provided in the plea agreement with regard to imposing an initial sentence or altering it later.” Id. (quoting Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994)). Thus, a court may modify a plea-based sentence only to a sentence that “would not have violated the plea agreement had it been the sentence originally imposed.” Id. (quoting Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d at 1249). Where a defendant agreed to a fixed plea, he may not petition for modification because the agreement authorized the court to impose only a specific sentence. See id.

[14] Woody reads the plea agreement as providing that his sentence “would either be Life or 15 to 25 years imprisonment.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. But the agreement itself does not support that reading. The agreement indicates that Woody's attorney advised him that the punishment allowable under the law for second-degree murder was “life imprisonment or not less than 15 years nor more than 25 years.” App. Vol. II p. 17. But that was simply an advisement of the statutory sentencing range, not an advisement of the sentence agreed to under the plea agreement. The operative term of the plea bargain is contained in the next clause, providing that “as a result of a plea agreement the prosecutor will recommend: life imprisonment on both Counts of Second Degree Murder.” Id. Because the prosecutor's recommendation was for a precise sentence, the agreement was for a fixed plea.

[15] And the prosecutor's use of the term “recommend” does not persuade us otherwise. Our Supreme Court has treated “numerous cases in which plea agreements are quoted or described as recommending a sentence ․ as fixed agreements.” St. Clair v. State, 901 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 2009); see also, e.g., Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d at 1248 (“Once it has accepted a plea agreement recommending a specific sentence, however, the terms of the agreement constrain the discretion the court would otherwise employ in sentencing.”); accord Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 43 (Ind. 2001); Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001); Freije v. State, 709 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. 1999). Ultimately, the St. Clair court held that, on the facts of that case, the court became bound to impose the sentence agreed to in the plea agreement, even where the plea stated the sentence was recommended. St. Clair, 901 N.E.2d at 493.

[16] Here, the plea agreement uses the word “recommend” and “recommendation” only in reference to the sentence. Even the provision addressing the court's rejection of the plea refers to the court being “unable to accept the above agreement and recommendation.” App. Vol. II p. 18 (emphasis added). That use of “and” further indicates the parties intended the guilty-plea agreement and the sentence to be taken either together or not at all. In this context, it is clear the parties intended to present a fixed plea. See St. Clair, 901 N.E.2d at 493-94 (where the plea used “recommend” only in reference to the sentence, it was clear the parties intended a fixed plea).

[17] Moreover, although we need not look at extrinsic evidence to reach this interpretation of the plea, such evidence would support the same conclusion. At his December 1991 post-conviction relief hearing, when asked about the plea offer, Woody recalled, “And so then [my lawyer] said, ‘The State has offered a plea agreement, a plea bargain.’ And I said, ‘What is that?’ He says, ‘They will offer you second degree and recommend life for each charge.’ ” PCR App. Vol. II p. 96. Woody's post-conviction attorney then asked, “Okay, so [the State] offered you life sentences, two life sentences?” Id. at 97. Woody replied, “Yes.” Id. Like the courts that reviewed the voluntariness of Woody's plea, we infer from this evidence that Woody understood the agreement was for a precise sentence of life imprisonment on both counts.

[18] The trial court accepted Woody's plea on September 29, 1976. Although the unaccepted plea agreement provided that the prosecutor's recommendation was “in no way binding to the Court[,]” the recommendation became binding after the trial court accepted the plea. App. Vol. II p. 18. And once the trial court accepted the agreement, it was constrained to impose the sentence agreed upon by the parties. Rodriguez, 129 N.E.3d at 794. Thus, a court could later modify Woody's sentence only in a way that was authorized at the time of sentencing. Id. Woody agrees this “is an accurate statement of the law.” Appellant's Reply Br. p. 7. Unlike his other arguments, Woody does not assert that this principle does not apply to him due to its post-1976 establishment. Even if he had, in 1976, a guilty plea for a fixed sentence already bound the court to that exact sentence. See St. Clair v. State, 901 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 2009) (citing State ex rel. Goldsmith v. Marion Cnty. Superior Ct., Crim. Div. No. 1, 419 N.E.2d 109, 114 (Ind. 1981) (interpreting I.C. § 35-5-6-2 (1975) (repealed), the then-effective plea agreement statute, as “dictat[ing] compliance with a written plea bargain recommendation filed by the prosecutor pursuant to I.C. 35-5-6-1, et seq. [(repealed)] if the trial court accepts the recommendation.”)).

[19] Having determined that the plea was fixed, we conclude the only sentence the court could have imposed on October 25, 1976, was life imprisonment on both counts. Woody cannot now petition to modify his sentence because no other sentence would have been permissible at the time of sentencing. Because the trial court could not modify Woody's sentence as a matter of law, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Woody's petition for modification or his subsequent motion to correct error.⁴

II. Change of Judge

[20] Woody also contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of judge.⁵ A judge is presumed to be unbiased, and we review a judge's decision declining to recuse for clear error. Seabolt v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2024). When a judge is considering whether there is an inference of bias, they “must evaluate whether an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a reasonable basis for doubting the judge's impartiality[.]” Id. at 1260. And “we don't afford any deference to the judge's evaluation of whether an objective observer would reasonably doubt the judge's impartiality based on the facts that the judge must accept as true.” Id. at 1261.

[21] Woody moved for a change of judge under Criminal Rule 2.4(B) and Indiana Code section 35-36-5-2, which impose the same relevant standard: that a defendant may request a change of judge for bias or prejudice.⁶ Criminal Rule 2.4 requires the defendant to file an affidavit setting forth facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists. The judge must recuse “if the facts recited in the affidavit support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.” Ind. Crim. Rule 2.4(B). And a judge must treat the historical facts in a defendant's affidavit as true. See Seabolt, 240 N.E.3d at 1259.

[22] In addition, a “judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned[.]” Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11. The Rule enumerates instances requiring recusal, including if a judge has a “personal” bias or prejudice, Jud. Cond. R. 2.11, which is a bias that “stems from an extrajudicial source—meaning a source separate from the evidence and argument presented at the proceedings,” Seabolt, 240 N.E.3d at 1259 (citation omitted). Moreover, comment 1 to Rule 2.11 provides that “a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions [of the rule] apply.” Jud. Cond. R. 2.11, cmt. 1.

[23] Here, Woody's change-of-judge request is directed at the views of the sentencing judge, not the presiding judge. In his affidavit, Woody asserted that the sentencing judge made two concerning statements: first, that the judge “said he would have rejected [Woody's] plea and instead given [him] the death penalty[,]” and second, that “he thought [Woody] was an amoral person incapable of rehabilitation and that he would never give [Woody] a sentence modification no matter how much time passed.” App. Vol. II p. 149. Woody never asserts that the presiding judge made a comparable statement or had been influenced outside of the proceedings by the sentencing judge's position.

[24] As the presiding judge stated in denying Woody's motion, the comments are not “clearly indicative of any inherent bias or prejudice that would clearly disqualify” the sentencing judge, let alone the presiding judge. Id. at 152. Indeed, a judge's opinion on a case or defendant expressed within the proceedings, standing alone, is not disqualifying because it “does not derive from an extrajudicial source.” Seabolt, 240 N.E.3d at 1259-60. Woody has failed to show how the sentencing judge's comments, made within the proceedings, reflect bias on the part of the presiding judge.

[25] Woody's remaining contentions rest on the familial relationship between the two judges. Our appellate courts have recognized that neither a social acquaintance, a friendship, nor a professional relationship is sufficient alone to require recusal. See, e.g., id. at 1262, 1263 (a judge who previously served as a prosecutor is not automatically disqualified from cases involving their former office or colleagues from that office; that a judge is socially acquainted or friends with a party, attorney, or witness does not create “a cognizable basis for questioning the ability of that judge to be impartial” on its own). The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates disqualification based on familial relationships within the third degree when the related person is a party, a lawyer, a material witness, or a person with more than a de minimis interest in the proceeding. See Jud. Cond. R. 2.11(A)(2). None of these principles suggest that a judge is automatically disqualified from serving when his relationship—whether it be professional, friendly, or familial—is with another judge who previously presided over the case.

[26] Woody nevertheless claims the sentencing judge has more than a de minimis interest in the outcome but fails to provide any information demonstrating such an interest. He likewise fails to provide any circumstances surrounding the two judges’ relationship and relies solely on its mere existence. Accordingly, we cannot say Woody has overcome the presumption of impartiality. See Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (noting the standard requires an objective person knowledgeable of all the circumstances to have a basis to doubt the judge's impartiality; concluding the petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of impartiality where he did not provide information concerning the circumstances surrounding a judge's employer-employee relationship to a testifying witness, who was a magistrate on the same court), trans. denied. Woody has failed to show clear error in the judge's decision not to recuse.⁷

Conclusion

[27] Because no sentence other than life imprisonment could have been imposed at the time of sentencing, Woody cannot now petition to modify his sentence. We thus affirm the trial court's denial of his petition to modify. See State v. Chavez, 956 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“[W]e may affirm on any basis supported by the record.”). We also affirm the court's denial of Woody's motion for change of judge because he failed to show clear error in the court's ruling.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to the State's motion, we incorporated the record from Woody's post-conviction relief (PCR) case, 05A02-9205-PC-204, into the record for this case. We refer to the record from Woody's PCR case with the designation “PCR.”

2.   This section was amended effective July 1, 2026, changing the definition of violent criminal from a person convicted of any offense on an enumerated list to a person convicted of an offense as defined in another section of the Indiana Code. Compare Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17 (2024) with I.C. § 35-38-1-17 (2026). A person convicted of murder meets the definition of violent criminal under both versions of the statute. The prosecutorial-consent requirement remains unchanged. We use the version of the statute in effect when Woody filed his petition for modification.

3.   The State subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Woody's appeal is moot because sentence modification is barred by the terms of the plea agreement. But the terms of the plea are disputed by the parties, which presents a legal question of interpretation that we resolve. Accordingly, we deny the State's motion to dismiss.

4.   Because this issue is dispositive, we do not reach Woody's constitutional argument. See Edmonds v. State, 100 N.E.3d 258 (Ind. 2018) (“[C]onstitutional issues are to be avoided as long as there are potentially dispositive statutory or common law issues still alive.”). We also now deny Woody's request for oral argument, which he requested specifically to argue the constitutional issue. Likewise, we do not reach Woody's challenge to the court's denial of his motion to correct error, asserting the order omitted relevant statutory history regarding post-1976 laws; that history is immaterial to the outcome because Woody's plea barred modification upon its acceptance.

5.   Woody frames this issue as challenging the court's denial of his Trial Rule 60(B) motion, and both parties assert the standard of review for a denied 60(B) motion is abuse of discretion. Considering the substance of Woody's argument, Woody challenges the original reasons the court denied recusal and the reasons the trial court did so again in its order on his 60(B) motion; he does not challenge the procedural reasons for denying the 60(B) motion. We thus apply the standard for reviewing the denied recusal, i.e., the clear error standard.

6.   Woody also requested a change of judge “pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” App. Vol. II p. 147. He does not raise this reasoning on appeal, so we do not address it.

7.   In his reply brief, Woody also asserts that the presiding judge should recuse because his father, the sentencing judge, previously recused on change-of-judge motions that Woody filed in his post-conviction proceedings. In general, “once a judge concludes their recusal is mandatory, they must continue recusing in future cases when confronted with the same concern that led them to recuse in the prior case.” Seabolt, 240 N.E.3d at 1259. However, that principle applies to the same judge. Woody has provided no authority to support his assertion that the sentencing judge's recusal should dictate the presiding judge's recusal simply because they are related, and we find none.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.