D.W. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] D.W. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her sons, D.L. and M.L. (collectively, Sons), who have serious disabilities and have spent much of their lives in the child welfare system. The trial court determined that, after years of services and multiple child in need of services (CHINS) proceedings, Mother has been unable to resolve the physical abuse issues that led to Sons’ removal from her home five years ago. Mother does not challenge that determination. Instead, she argues only that the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in Sons’ best interests.

[2] As the trial court determined, Mother has made progress in a separate Marion County CHINS case involving her three younger children. But the records of Sons’ CHINS cases show a troubling pattern: early periods of progress leading to trial home visits that ended within months amid new reports of abuse or neglect. The evidence also showed that Mother's inconsistent visits with Sons and limited involvement in M.L.’s educational and medical matters are damaging to Sons’ welfare. Because the unchallenged findings support the court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Sons’ best interests, we affirm.

Facts

[3] D.L. and M.L. were born in March 2013 and June 2018, respectively. When M.L. was three months old, he suffered life-threatening injuries—a skull fracture, multiple rib and limb fractures, and a liver laceration—while his father (Father) was caring for him. Both parents, who were living in Tippecanoe County at the time, lied to police about the cause of M.L.’s injuries. Father, who does not participate in this appeal, was convicted of inflicting M.L.’s injuries and remains incarcerated.

[4] D.L., who was about five years old at the time, also had an unexplained healing rib fracture. The Tippecanoe office of DCS substantiated physical abuse of D.L. by Mother and petitioned to find both Sons to be CHINS. The trial court ultimately granted that request. The case closed in June 2020, after Sons were reunited with Mother.

Five months later, DCS substantiated a report that Mother's boyfriend, T.T., struck D.L. in the eye and that Mother told D.L. not to tell anyone. An informal adjustment followed, but Mother and T.T. made little progress. In July 2021, D.L. had cuts on his neck that a child protection team found had been inflicted on him. Sons were removed from Mother's care again based on both the substantiated physical abuse and Mother's failure to follow medical advice or obtain medical examinations for her children. The court again adjudicated Sons to be CHINS in November 2021. It determined that: (1) physical abuse “has been substantiated against” Mother and T.T.; (2) Sons had been exposed to violence; and (3) Mother and T.T. showed “an unwillingness to accept responsibility and/or services necessary to ensure the safety and well-being of the children.” App. Vol. II, p. 38.

[5] D.L. began a trial home visit on November 26, 2022. Within months, DCS sought to end the visit due to physical abuse that had prompted “no fewer than 12 hotline reports,” as well as D.L.’s disclosures that he was “whooped” and denied meals. Exhs. Vol. VI, p. 89. D.L. reported that T.T. had punched and slapped him and that Mother had punched him in the throat. Id. at 92-93. Mother and T.T. denied using physical discipline. The court ended the visit three months after it began, and D.L. has never returned to Mother's care. After therapeutic foster care failed, D.L. was placed in a residential juvenile facility. He remained in such a facility at the time of the trial court's judgment.

[6] By early 2023, Mother had moved her family from Tippecanoe County to Marion County. She twice requested that the Tippecanoe County court transfer the CHINS case to Marion County, but the court denied the requests.

[7] M.L.’s trial home visit began in Marion County in June 2023, a few months after D.L.’s ended. During M.L.’s trial home visit, Mother did not initiate services for speech, occupational therapy, or physical therapy for him despite multiple requests. In November 2023, Mother tested positive for marijuana. By January 2025, Mother had missed a neurology appointment for M.L., had not scheduled his autism testing, had stopped home-based case management, and was not complying with drug screens.

[8] At some point during that period, the family moved in with a woman who, while intoxicated, broke Mother's hand in front of M.L. after Mother and T.T. ended their joint romantic relationship with her. Mother, T.T., M.L., and Mother's three younger children whose father was T.T. moved into a hotel. M.L. missed the next three weeks of school. Mother attributed his absence to paperwork delays. A service provider detected an odor of marijuana when she found Mother and T.T. smoking in their car with the children present. D.L.’s facility also reported that Mother smelled of marijuana during visits with him. Mother attributed the odor to tobacco cigars and denied using marijuana around the children.

[9] During this period, service providers reported that one of Mother's children with T.T. had a facial bruise attributed to T.T. In addition, M.L. had a forehead mark that he said was caused by T.T. holding his head against a wall. T.T. denied the account and instead reported that a younger sibling hit M.L. with a plastic bus.

[10] In February 2025, the court ended M.L.’s trial home visit on an emergency basis. The court found that providers had been refused access to the family's hotel room, “[t]he odor of marijuana has been noted in the family vehicle,” and M.L. “requires constant adult supervision” due to a traumatic brain injury inflicted by Father in 2018. Exhs. Vol. VIII, p. 128. M.L. never returned to Mother's care.

[11] After M.L.’s removal, Mother did not attend any of his educational conferences. Although M.L.’s caregiver acknowledged she did not coordinate appointment times with Mother, Mother could have obtained school information from the DCS family case manager (FCM), the court appointed special advocate (CASA), or court reports.

[12] In February 2025, the Marion County Office of DCS petitioned to find Mother's three younger children to be CHINS and removed them from her care. Unlike D.L. and M.L., those three children have no special needs. By May 2025, Mother had admitted that these three children were CHINS because she needed DCS's “assistance ․ to provide the children with a safe, stable and appropriate living environment free from inappropriate discipline.” Exhs. Vol. XIV, p. 227. These three children later were returned to Mother's care on a trial home visit.

[13] In the meantime, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights as to Sons in Tippecanoe County in July 2025. Mother thereafter complied with the services ordered in the Marion County CHINS case involving her younger children. But she remained noncompliant with services in the Tippecanoe CHINS case involving Sons. Mother blamed some of her noncompliance on her full-time work as a security shift supervisor on second and third shifts, which limited her ability to schedule visits and services during office hours. Mother's employer bars phone use on duty and can change her work schedule with little notice.

[14] In Tippecanoe County, but not Marion County, Mother was ordered to submit to random drug screens that required daily calls to the test provider. Her compliance was inconsistent. Mother did not undergo any screens for months and tested positive for marijuana multiple times.

[15] By December 2025, Mother had failed to make the daily call to the test provider at least 65 times. Mother blamed the missed calls on a poor memory or oversleeping. Her screen in November 2025 was negative.

[16] D.L., now 13, has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), conduct disorder, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). His behaviors include aggression, elopement, and sexual acting out. He is placed at Damar Services, a residential facility in Indianapolis, and is not expected to finish its program for six to twelve months. Mother told DCS she feared for her other children if he came home, and she presented no plan to protect his younger siblings.

[17] M.L., now 8, has been diagnosed with cerebral palsy, ADHD, a seizure disorder, and developmental delays resulting from his traumatic brain injury. His therapy and medical needs are extensive and growing. He does not handle disruptions of his schedule well.

[18] Even after the termination petition was filed, Mother continued to miss M.L.’s significant medical and educational appointments. For instance, she did not attend his appointment for an MRI on November 5, 2025, though the termination court scheduled a termination hearing for later that day so that Mother could attend the MRI first. Mother reported that she misunderstood the time. M.L. remained placed with T.T.’s relative, who hoped to adopt him.

[19] Mother's visits with Sons throughout the Tippecanoe CHINS case have largely been fully supervised because she “has not exercised visits consistently enough” for DCS to relax supervision. App. Vol. II, p. 40. D.L.’s residential facility is in Indianapolis, and the facility authorized much greater visitation than Mother exercised.

[20] Mother limited her visits to one hour weekly and still missed many that were scheduled, including visits on December 24 and 26, 2025, and January 2, 2026. After Mother's three younger children returned to her home in December 2025, the CASA objected to Mother bringing them to individual visits with Sons. Mother claimed that her inability to bring these three children to her visits was the main reason for her cancellations of visits with both D.L. and M.L.

[21] Whenever Mother's scheduled visits do not occur, D.L. reacts negatively, becoming emotional, agitated, and more defiant. Even after being informed of this negative impact, Mother continued to miss or cancel visits with D.L. After the missed visit on January 2, D.L. was upset and crying, and the supervisor had to sit with and console him.

[22] Mother's visits with M.L., complicated by his living 21/212 hours away, also were limited. Mother mostly visited M.L. virtually and had only four in-person visits during the last half of 2025. In November and December 2025, she visited M.L. only virtually. DCS attempted to accommodate Mother's second and third shift work by offering transportation so that Mother could sleep on the way to M.L.’s visits. Mother declined this option, however, due to a negative experience with one driver and her dislike of traveling with others.

[23] DCS also arranged visits between all of Mother's five children on Sundays in Lafayette beginning in August 2025. Mother was not required to attend these visits. She did not start attending until November 2025, when she perceived DCS and the CASA emphasizing the need to do so. Around that time, Mother faced eviction from her rental home. Though Mother and T.T. both worked full-time, the eviction was averted only through DCS contributing $3,400 toward the $4,500 outstanding rental balance.

[24] The court conducted evidentiary hearings on DCS's termination petition on two days in late 2025 and early 2026. The FCM and the CASA both testified that they recommended termination of Mother's parental rights. Although M.L.’s caregiver wished to adopt him, no prospective adopter had been identified for D.L.

[25] The court ultimately terminated Mother's parental rights as to Sons. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court found that Sons have been involved in CHINS cases almost continuously since 2018, with “ongoing concerns ․ of physical abuse and inappropriate discipline.” Id. at 45. The court also found that Sons “were removed from separate trial home visits due to ongoing violence in the home.” Id. Additionally, the court found that Mother “has a history of appropriately parenting the children while in supervised visits ․ but returning to physical abuse or allowing other[s] to physically abuse the children when the oversight is reduced.” Id.

[26] The court further found that D.L. regressed due to Mother's inconsistent visits and that her pattern of failing to meet M.L.’s medical needs “will cause further delays in his development.” Id. at 46. The court concluded that termination serves Sons’ best interests because they “need permanency, safety, and stability, which neither parent can provide.” Id. at 45-46.

Discussion and Decision

[27] Parents have a fundamental interest in raising their children, but that interest is not absolute and must be subordinated to the children's interests. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Off., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). Parental rights may be terminated when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities by failing to provide for a child's immediate and long-term needs. Id.

I. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

[28] Before parental rights may be terminated, DCS must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) the existence of one ․ or more of the circumstances described in [IC 31-35-2-4(d)];

(2) that a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child exists; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c); In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (clear and convincing standard).

[29] Here, DCS alleged the existence of two subsection (d) circumstances as to D.L., as follows:

• That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied;

• That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.

App. Vol. II, p. 33; see Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (5).

[30] As to M.L., DCS alleged three subsection (d) circumstances, as follows:

• That the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of the local office for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months and, despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

• That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

• That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.

App. Vol. II, p. 33; see Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2), (3), and (5).

[31] The trial court concluded that DCS sufficiently proved the termination elements, including the existence of all the alleged subsection (d) circumstances as to D.L. and M.L.

[32] When reviewing a termination of parental rights judgment, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). Because the trial court was required to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, we confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. Id.

[33] As Mother does not contest any of the court's findings of fact, we accept them as true. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). And because Mother challenges only the conclusion that termination is in Sons’ best interests, we consider only whether that conclusion is supported by the unchallenged findings.

[34] Recommendations of the FCM and CASA to terminate parental rights, together with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in a child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Both the recommendations for termination and the evidence of no remedying of conditions exist here. In addition, the findings as a whole support the trial court's best-interests conclusion.

II. Mother's Arguments

[35] Mother claims termination of her parental rights was not in Sons’ best interests because the evidence shows she has a steady job and appropriate housing and has progressed in the Marion County CHINS case. She contends her noncompliance in the Tippecanoe County case was due to factors largely outside her control, including having Sons in disparate locations while also caring for three other children. She also asserts that the trial court improperly focused on her marijuana use and incorrectly determined that Sons’ needs for permanency justified termination of her parental rights.

[36] The best interests of children are determined by the totality of the evidence. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Permanency is “a central consideration” because “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. In making the best-interests determination, the court must subordinate the parent's interests to the child's and “need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1005.

[37] As part of the best-interests analysis, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into account evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. But the court also must balance recent improvements against “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id.

[38] Although we recognize Mother's challenges, we find her claims unpersuasive.

A. Mother's Progress

[39] As Mother claims, she achieved some success in the Marion County CHINS case. But she avoided eviction only with substantial financial assistance from DCS and offered no plan to protect D.L.’s siblings from his sexual behaviors if he were to return to Mother's care. Moreover, she continues to live with T.T., who was implicated in the abuse findings in both the Tippecanoe and Marion County CHINS cases.

[40] More importantly, the Marion County case is not the one before us. Mother was not compliant in this Tippecanoe County case, which involved only Sons, who have significant disabilities that Mother's younger children involved in the Marion County case lack. Thus, Mother's ability to care for her children without disabilities does not necessarily determine her ability to meet the needs of these children. In any case, the termination court was not required to treat any recent gains in either county as outweighing a long history of inconsistent compliance with services and repeated incidents of violence toward Sons. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[41] The record here shows a troubling pattern of improvement followed by abuse over the five years since the filing of the Tippecanoe CHINS petition. For instance, DCS reported Mother's compliance in December 2022, but D.L.’s visit ended only a few months later after reports of physical abuse. The court in November 2024 found substantial compliance by Mother. Yet by February 2025, the court had ended M.L.’s trial home visit, again after more reports of physical abuse. This is particularly concerning because M.L. nearly died from physical abuse when he was an infant. Noting this pattern, the court found that Mother parents well under supervision but reverts “when the oversight is reduced.” App. Vol. II, p. 45. And because Mother's visits remain sparse and supervised, the court found evaluation of whether her discipline of Sons had improved “has not been possible.” Id. at 40, 45.

B. Circumstances Allegedly Outside Mother's Control

[42] Mother also argues that DCS, providers, and the court should have assisted her more, including transferring the Tippecanoe County case to Marion County. If such transfer had occurred, she asserts that she would have been able to comply with services while living in the Indianapolis area and working a job with irregular hours. But Mother does not argue that the court's denial of transfer was error, and the court found she received significant services including transportation and eviction assistance.

[43] Mother attributes missed visits and limited involvement in medical and educational appointments to a variety of factors—her job, the distance to Sons’ residences, her obligations to her younger children, and the CASA's objection to having those children accompany her to visit Sons. The court heard this evidence and found that these factors did not fully explain Mother's inconsistent visits.

[44] Although Mother's unusual work schedule was constraining, the Marion County Office of DCS and its service providers managed to work around it. But part of the difficulty in Tippecanoe County was that Mother was so inconsistent with her visits with Sons that Mother never progressed from supervised visits after Sons’ final removals. Unsupervised visits would have allowed Mother to schedule visits around her work schedule more easily.

[45] Also, distance does not explain the number of missed visits with D.L., who lives in Indianapolis. To the extent visits were missed due to reasons not attributable to Mother, the trial court accounted for that. As to M.L., DCS arranged transportation that Mother declined, and the record shows few in-person visits. The CASA's objection to Mother's younger children being present at individual visits with Sons did not arise until December 2025, long after Mother's pattern of sparse visits emerged.

[46] Mother's limited visits also were part of a broader pattern of inattention to Sons’ needs. Mother failed to initiate M.L.’s therapies during his trial home visit and missed other medical appointments. Since M.L.’s last removal, she also has failed to attend school conferences and some of his medical appointments, including for the MRI.

[47] Granted, some of these absences are attributable to the failure of M.L.’s caregiver to coordinate appointments with Mother. In addition, the record shows that Mother obtained some referrals for M.L. in 2024. However, the court found that Mother was authorized to attend the missed appointments, that none of the missed appointments resulted from the unavailability of supervisors, and that she could have obtained school information from the FCM, the CASA, or court reports. The record bears this out. Mother's failure to attend the MRI was not due to any of the factors that she cites to excuse her inattention to Sons’ needs. She was solely to blame for her absence at the MRI. Yet the trial court had specially scheduled the termination hearing to allow her to attend that appointment.

[48] Mother also fails to recognize that her lapses harm Sons. D.L. becomes distraught and regresses when Mother cancels or otherwise fails to appear for scheduled visits. M.L.’s specialized medical care is critical to his health and development. Although Mother's burdens may be heavy as a parent of five children, including two with disabilities living in disparate locations, the trial court appropriately determined that Mother largely was responsible for her inconsistent visitation with Sons and her limited medical and educational involvement with M.L.

C. Marijuana Use

[49] Mother argues that the trial court, when determining Sons’ best interests, erroneously focused on her marijuana use. But the court did not terminate Mother's parental rights because she used marijuana. It treated her noncompliance with court-ordered screens as another example of inconsistency.

[50] The missed calls numbered at least 65 by December 2025. Her employer's restrictive phone policy may excuse some of her failures to call. But this circumstance does not excuse months of missed calls and screens. The trial court's weighing of this evidence in favor of a finding of inconsistency was not error. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (“Requiring trial courts to give regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior”).

D. Permanency

[51] Mother finally argues that Sons love her and can wait for reunification, particularly given the lack of an identified adoptive home for D.L. She points to the CASA's testimony showing that Mother's relationship to D.L. was “vital” to D.L. Tr. Vol. II, p. 110.

[52] A parent's liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of a child “does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). But a parent's bond with a child is not dispositive, especially when the parent cannot keep the child safe and meet the child's needs. And despite testifying that maintaining Mother's relationship to D.L. was “vital,” the CASA recommended termination of Mother's parental rights. Tr. Vol. II, p. 110.

[53] Sons have been involved in CHINS cases almost continuously since 2018 and have largely remained outside Mother's care during that time. Each trial home visit ended in removal for concerns resembling the prior interventions, namely, violent conduct, abuse, or inappropriate discipline. After Sons had lived years outside Mother's care, the court could conclude that children “need[ ] permanency even more than they need[ ] a final effort at family preservation.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 649.

[54] The absence of an identified adoptive home for D.L. is concerning, but a plan of adoption may be satisfactory even without a specific adoptive family in place. A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007. This is so because a plan “need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated,” and the suitability of any adoptive placement is for the adoption court. Id. Mother does not challenge the conclusion that adoption is a satisfactory plan, and she offers no safe alternative for reuniting D.L. while protecting her younger children from his sexual behaviors. M.L., meanwhile, has a stable caregiver ready to adopt. Mother's permanency claims are unpersuasive.

Conclusion

[55] Because the unchallenged findings support the only conclusion challenged by Mother—that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of D.L. and M.L.—we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.