IN RE: the Adoption of L.H. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.H. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order granting the petition to adopt L.H. (“Child”) filed by C.C. and J.C. (collectively, “Adoptive Parents”).¹ Father raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the court erred when it determined that his consent to the adoption was not required. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on February 14, 2013. Child has been in the care of Adoptive Parents “off and on since he was born.” Tr. at 20. Sometime in 2017, Father began serving a criminal sentence in Michigan following a conviction for “[o]perating a meth lab.” Id. at 56. In February 2018, Adoptive Parents filed a petition to be appointed Child's guardian, which petition the trial court granted.

[3] In the beginning, Father called “a couple [of] times” to speak to Child. Id. at 21. But after the phone calls, Child “started wetting the bed again,” and he would have problems with “separation anxiety.” Id. Father also initially sent letters to Child. Adoptive Parents read the “first few” letters to Child. Id. at 32. Child had a “very negative reaction to them,” including trouble sleeping and bedwetting, so Adoptive Parents stopped reading them. Id. But Adoptive Parents kept all of the letters. The last letter Father wrote to Child was in 2023.²

[4] On August 28, 2024, Adoptive Parents filed a petition to adopt Child. Adoptive Parents asserted that Father's consent was not required because he had failed to maintain contact with Child. Father responded and alleged that he had “attempted to maintain contact” by writing letters to Child and attempting to call but that Adoptive Parents had “blocked” him from doing so. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 78. Thus, he argued that his consent to the adoption was required.

[5] The court held a hearing on Adoptive Parents’ petition on January 14, 2026. During the hearing, J.C. testified that Father had not called Child in the last “two or three years.” Tr. at 22. She further testified that she had refused phone calls from Father in the past but that Father has not made “any” phone calls recently. Id. at 35.

[6] On February 19, 2026, the court entered its order granting Adoptive Parents’ petition to adopt Child. In its order, the court found that Father, “for a period of at least one (1) year, has failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the [C]hild when able to do so” and that, as a result, Father's “consent to [the] adoption is not required[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 127. The court also found that adoption was in the best interests of Child and granted Adoptive Parents’ petition. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Father contends that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that his consent to the adoption was not required. As our Supreme Court stated:

We generally show “considerable deference” to the trial court's decision in family law matters “because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018) [(citation modified)]. So, “when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” Id. And we will not disturb that decision “unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.” In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). “We will not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.” E.B.F., 93 N.E.3d at 762 (citation omitted). “Rather, we examin the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision.” Id. (citation omitted).

J.P. v. V.B. (In re Adoption of I.B.), 163 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Ind. 2021).

[8] Indiana law generally requires natural parents to consent to adoptions. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. However, as relevant here, a natural parent's consent to an adoption is not required if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, for a period of at least one year, the parent fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so. I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a).

[9] On appeal, Father contends that the court erred when it concluded that his consent was not required based on his failure to significantly communicate with Child. Father does not dispute that he did not call Child in the two or three years prior to the fact-finding hearing on Adoptive Parents’ petition or that his last letter to Child was in 2023. However, Father contends that his failure to communicate with Child was justified because Adoptive Parents had thwarted his attempts to contact Child by not reading his letters to Child and not answering his phone calls.

[10] Father is correct that “ ‘[e]fforts of a custodial parent to hamper or thwart communication between a parent and child are relevant in determining the ability to communicate.’ ” E.W. v. J.W., 20 N.E.3d 889, 896-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Adoption of A.K.S., 713 N.E.2d 896, 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied), trans. denied. But, here, while there is evidence that Adoptive Parents did not read Father's letters to Child or answer all of Father's calls, Father did not present evidence that he had made any effort to contact Child through Adoptive Parents or the court in at least two years. See N.R. v. K.G. (In re Adoption of O.R.), 16 N.E.3d 965, 974 (Ind. 2014) (noting father could have attempted communication with child through either child's guardians’ attorney or the trial court). Indeed, while he was incarcerated, Father sent various letters to the court, but the last letter in which he even referenced an inability to contact Child was sent in May 2020. See Ex. at 6. In the nearly six years prior to the fact-finding hearing, Father did not seek the means to communicate with Child via court order.

[11] In sum, the trial court heard evidence that Adoptive Parents had prevented communication between Father and Child but nonetheless implicitly found that Father's failure to contact Child was not justified by Adoptive Parents’ conduct. While the evidence regarding Adoptive Parents’ actions was relevant in determining Father's ability to communicate, it was not dispositive. The evidence most favorable to the judgment demonstrates that Father has not had nor attempted to have any contact with Child since at least 2023. Father's argument on appeal amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The trial court did not err when it found that Father had failed to communicate significantly with Child without justifiable cause for a period of at least one year and that Father's consent to the adoption was not required. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's mother did not contest the adoption below, and she does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father testified that he sent the last letter in 2020, but J.C. testified that the last letter was in 2023. For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume the later date is correct.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Altice concur. Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.