Ryan J. King, Appellant-Defendant v. Bank of America, N.A., Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Bank of America, N.A. (“the Bank”) filed suit against Ryan J. King in January of 2024, after King had failed to pay his credit-card debt. The Bank sought, and was granted, summary judgment. King's motion to reconsider was denied by the trial court, and King did not file a timely direct appeal of the trial court's decision. On January 28, 2026, King moved for relief from the trial court's judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6), arguing that the trial court's judgment was void. The trial court denied King's motion. On appeal, King argues that the trial court's underlying order granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank was void. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 4, 2024, the Bank filed suit against King, alleging that King had “applied for and received a credit account” (“the Account”), had failed “to make periodic payments as required[,]” and the then-current balance of the Account, $3430.73, was “presently due and payable in full.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 18. The Bank subsequently moved for summary judgment. In support, it designated the credit-card agreement associated with the Account and periodic statements detailing account balances.

[3] The Bank also designated the affidavit of Crystal Morris, a Bank employee who was “familiar with the recording keeping practices of [the Bank]” and “authorized by [the Bank] to make the following representations[:]”

1. [The Bank] or a predecessor in interest is the original owner of this debt. [The Bank] is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bank of America Corporation and the successor-in-interest to FIA Card Services, N.A., formerly known as MBNA America Bank, N.A. (“FIA”). FIA was merged into and under the charter and title of [the Bank] effective October 1, 2014.

2. [King] has an unpaid balance of $3430.73 on [the Account]. That amount is due and owing to [the Bank].

3. The Account was opened on 11/24/2019. The last payment from [King] was received on or about 11/21/2022, on which date the total amount of $148.57 was paid.

4. The specifics of the Account include:

[X] Credit card account (i.e. Visa, MasterCard, etc.) issued by [the Bank.]

[ ] Other, as follows: non-card unsecured consumer finance account[.]

5. The Account balance includes no late fees or interest accruing after the charge-off date, which was 06/30/2023.

6. Pursuant to federal regulations, periodic statements reflecting the amount due on the account were provided to [King] in the ordinary course of business. A true and correct copy of the last periodic statement for the Account generated prior to charge-off is attached hereto. The attached is a true and correct copy from [the Bank's] books and records relating to the Account save for any marking intended to redact certain information.

7. [The Bank] is not seeking attorney's fees.

8. To the best of my knowledge and belief, which belief is predicated on information provided by [the Bank's] counsel, [King] is not a minor, is not incompetent, and is not mentally incapacitated.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 25–26. The last statement for the Account confirmed that the balance due on the Account was $3430.73.

[4] On October 22, 2024, King opposed the Bank's summary-judgment motion, arguing that the Bank had failed to establish that there had been a proper assignment of the debt to the Bank and the Bank's internal accounting records were insufficient to establish the debt owed. On November 6, 2024, King moved to strike Morris's affidavit, claiming that Morris had lacked the personal knowledge required to aver to the statements contained in the affidavit. King also claimed that there was an insufficient “foundation to support the reliability of [Morris's] statements” and the affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47. Also on November 6, 2024, King moved to compel discovery. On November 12, 2024, the trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment.

[5] On November 25, 2024, King moved the trial court to reconsider its summary-judgment order, which motion the trial court denied two days later. In January of 2025, King requested but was denied permission to file a belated appeal.

[6] On January 28, 2026, King moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6), claiming that the judgment was void as it had been “procured through” fraud on the court. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 59. In filing this motion, King largely restated his previously-raised foundational and hearsay arguments. King requested that the trial court grant him relief from the judgment, vacate the summary-judgment order, and strike Morris's affidavit. The Bank opposed King's motion, noting that the motion “merely makes arguments pertaining to his allegations that [the Bank's] Affidavit of Debt is insufficient” and “is merely an improper attempt to relitigate issues that were previously raised, or could have been raised, in opposition to [the Bank's] Motion for Summary Judgment or on appeal.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 69. The Bank further noted the Indiana Supreme Court's ruling in In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010), that “a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) is not a substitute for a direct appeal.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 69. On April 7, 2026, the trial court denied King's motion for relief from judgment.

Discussion and Decision

[7] As an initial matter, we note that King proceeds pro se.

A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Rather, it is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.

Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal brackets, citation, and quotation omitted). “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).

[8] King contends that the trial court erred in denying his 60(B)(6) motion for relief from the trial court's judgment.

Under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6), the trial court may relieve a party from a judgment if the judgment is void.․ Our standard of review regarding a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B)(6) requires no discretion on the part of the trial court because either the judgment is void or it is valid and, thus, our review is de novo. To prevail under Rule 60(B)(6), the party must demonstrate the prior judgment was void, and not merely voidable.

Koonce v. Finney, 68 N.E.3d 1086, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis in original, internal citation and quotations omitted), trans. denied. “The distinction between the terms void and voidable is critical in this context.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “A decision that is void has no legal effect at any time and cannot be confirmed or ratified by subsequent action or inaction and is subject to a collateral attack.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “A decision which is voidable has legal effect until such time as challenged in the appropriate manner and can be ratified or confirmed by subsequent action or inaction and may only be attacked through a direct appeal.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Stated plainly, “[w]hile a void judgment is a complete nullity without legal effect from its inception, ․ a voidable judgment is capable of confirmation or ratification, making it subject to ordinary appellate or other direct procedures to correct it[.]” T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 726 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted).

[9] In T.D., the Indiana Supreme Court explained that

[i]t is well-settled that judgments rendered by a court lacking either personal or subject matter jurisdiction are void, ․ so well-settled in fact that we have previously held a judgment is void only if the court lacks personal or subject matter jurisdiction[.] We explained that any other error in a judgment is legal error, rendering the judgment voidable. But since those pronouncements, our appellate courts have held, on multiple occasions, that a judgment is also void if the issuing court lacked the authority to render the judgment.

For example, a judgment is void if it grants rights or relief to a party that the court is not legally authorized to provide. Similarly, a judgment is void if it grants rights or relief to a party that does not have standing to pursue the action. Or, as we recently held, a judgment is void if it interferes with issues pending on appeal. In each of these circumstances, the trial court lacked the authority to render the judgment from the outset—a hallmark of a void judgment and akin to a jurisdictional defect rather than a legal error.

Accordingly, we clarify that a trial court's judgment is void if the court lacks personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or the authority to render the judgment. That said, we construe “authority” narrowly to distinguish void errors from voidable legal or procedural errors. There is a distinct difference between a judgment that the law does not authorize under any circumstances (a void judgment), and a judgment authorized by law but derived in violation of law (a voidable judgment). In the latter scenario, the trial court still has the requisite authority to act, and thus, the error is a procedural irregularity that can be cured.

219 N.E.3d at 726–27 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[10] King does not argue that the trial court was not authorized to grant an award of summary judgment under any circumstance. In arguing that the trial court erred in denying his Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion, King claims that Morris's affidavit lacked personal knowledge, the credit-card agreement designated by the Bank was inadmissible hearsay, and Morris's affidavit was “a deceptive ‘robo-signed’ instrument that worked a fraud on the court[,]” as it “was executed in Guilford County, North Carolina—a notorious national hub for the mass-production of bulk litigation affidavits[.]”¹ Appellant's Br. p. 17. King's claims, at most, support the argument that the trial court's underlying summary-judgment order was entered in violation of law, making it a voidable judgment. See T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 727. As such, even if the trial court had erred by considering inadmissible evidence in granting the Bank's request for summary judgment, such error could have been corrected on appeal and, therefore, would merely make the trial court's order voidable, not void. King was therefore not entitled to relief from the trial court's judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6).

[11] Additionally, we note that in an apparent attempt to prove that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties, King also claims that the Bank failed to establish that it had standing to bring the underlying lawsuit because it failed to connect the Account to the 2014 merger between the Bank and FIA. The designated evidence establishes that FIA merged with the Bank on October 1, 2014, and that the Account was not opened until November 24, 2019, i.e., more than five years after the merger between the Bank and FIA. The designated evidence therefore also establishes that the Bank is the original owner of King's debt. King has not provided any authority indicating that the Bank, as the original owner of the debt, did not have standing to bring suit to collect the debt.

[12] Having concluded that the trial court's underlying judgment was, at best, merely voidable, and not void, the trial court did not err in denying King's Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion for relief from judgment.²

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   King identifies no designated evidence to support these assertions.

2.   We note that King argues that the underlying entry of summary judgment was inappropriate because he had requested discovery and had made a demand for a jury trial. King, however, has failed to establish that the existence of these pre-trial procedural requests rendered the trial court's order void as only a genuine issue of material fact precludes an award of summary judgment. See Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) (“The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”).

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.