Kevin Edward Boyle, Appellant-Respondent v. Meghan Black, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kevin Edward Boyle (Father) appeals the trial court's order finding him in contempt for failure to pay child support. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Meghan Black (Mother) have three children in common: C.B., born in 2012; L.B., born in 2014; and E.B.. born in 2016 (collectively, Children). Following their divorce in 2023, Mother and Father shared joint legal and physical custody. In August 2024, the court granted legal and primary physical custody of Children to Mother and parenting time consistent with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines to Father.

[3] On January 17, 2025, the court modified child support and ordered Father to pay $230 per week to Mother. The court also found that Mother was entitled to reimbursement of $1,989 for previous overpayments to Father and ordered Father to pay Mother an additional $20 per week toward that reimbursement. In April, Mother filed a petition for rule to show cause, asking the court to order Father to appear and show why he should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the court's support order. In May, the State, as intervenor, filed an affidavit for contempt also requesting that Father be ordered to appear and show cause for his failure to pay support.

[4] On December 8, the court held a hearing on Father's failure to comply with its support order. Father testified that he understood he was ordered to pay $250 total per week to Mother. He confirmed his total income was $4,625.91 per month, or $1,156.48 per week, in disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). He admitted that he had made only one payment of $27.40 since the January 2025 order was issued. And he acknowledged that the only other payments made toward his support order resulted from the State's three interceptions of a “USDA grant” distributed to Father in July 2025, in the amounts of $2,400, $745, and $696. Tr. Vol. II p. 6.

[5] On December 18, the court issued its order concluding that Father had knowledge of the January 2025 support order and calculating an arrearage of $6,711.60 as of December 5, 2025. The court found Father in contempt and sanctioned him with 180 days in jail. However, the court stayed Father's incarceration and indicated he could purge his contempt if he paid $270 per week to Mother ($230 toward his support obligation, $20 toward his arrearage, and $20 toward Mother's overpayment), sought and maintained employment, cooperated with the prosecutor's child support division, and appeared for a review hearing. This appeal ensued.¹ Additional facts are provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Father argues that the court erred by finding him in contempt because “the order contains no finding that [Father] had the present ability to satisfy the purge payments of $230 per week[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Father contends that, without such a finding, the order is punitive and not coercive. Mother contends that, although there was no written finding about Father's willful noncompliance or present ability to pay, the court's contempt finding was not erroneous because the record contains evidence to support it. We agree with Mother.

[7] “Child support obligations have long been enforceable by contempt in Indiana.” Pettit v. Pettit, 626 N.E.2d 444, 445 (Ind. 1993). In addition, the Indiana Legislature has recognized that contempt is an available tool to enforce child support payments. See Ind. Code § 31-16-12-1 (2006). “Only upon a finding by the court that the delinquency was the result of a willful failure by the parent to comply with the support order and that the delinquent parent has the financial ability to comply is contempt available.” J.M. v. D.A., 935 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Pettit, 626 N.E.2d at 447), reh'g denied. “A parent who has failed to comply with a child support order has the burden of proving that the failure to comply was not willful or was otherwise excused.” Id.

[8] Whether a party is in contempt is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review a contempt decision for an abuse of that discretion. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). “A court has abused its discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or is contrary to law.” J.M., 935 N.E.2d at 1243. We will not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. “We will affirm unless, after a review of the entire record, we have a firm and definite belief that a mistake has been made by the trial court.” Id. The trial court's contempt finding “is a negative judgment which will be reversed only if there is no evidence to support the trial court's conclusion.” Id. (quoting Esteb v. Enright by State, 563 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)); Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124.

[9] The crux of Father's argument is that the contempt order does not contain written findings as to his willful non-compliance and present ability to pay. But he overlooks the critical aspect of our review: that we will reverse a contempt finding only if there is no evidence in the record to support it. See, e.g., Branum v. State, 829 N.E.2d 622, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (remanding for new contempt hearing where there was no written finding and our court's review of the record did not indicate whether the court inquired into the parent's ability to pay); J.M., 935 N.E.2d at 1243 (reversing contempt finding where the trial court did not make a finding regarding a parent's ability to pay and the record did not support such a finding). In other words, we will not reverse the contempt finding if the record contains evidence to support both Father's willful noncompliance and his financial ability to comply with the support order and to satisfy the purge conditions. See Branum, 829 N.E.2d at 623; J.M., 935 N.E.2d at 1243. Here, the record contains ample evidence demonstrating that Father willfully disobeyed the court's child support order and that he is able to pay under the support order, including the additional $20 per week toward his arrearage.

[10] At his contempt hearing, Father conceded that the court issued a clear order to pay $230 in weekly child support, plus $20 to reimburse Mother for an overpayment. He testified that his monthly VA disability income was $4,625.91, or about $1,156.48 per week. Father did not contend that his VA benefits should not be used to calculate his support payment; rather, he argued his income was insufficient for him to make the payments. He asserted that his “monthly bills equal about the exact amount for necessities [as] what [he gets] each month from the VA.” Tr. Vol. II p. 10. Father's expenses included supporting his stepchildren and his current wife, who is not employed, and payment of his mortgage and utilities.

[11] Nevertheless, the court heard evidence detailing many discretionary purchases Father made during the time that he was not paying his child support. Father made multiple restaurant purchases and regularly paid for subscriptions to Amazon Prime, video channels, and Microsoft Xbox. In February 2025, Father spent $550 on a testosterone supplement from “New Form Health and Wellness[.]” Id. at 29. A few months before his contempt hearing, Father received a $4,000 reimbursement from his former homeowner's insurance company; however, he did not use that money to pay for new homeowner's insurance or his child support. Instead, he used it to purchase a 1989 Econoline van. In addition, Father regularly purchased feed to maintain numerous animals on his property, including a goat, a horse, a donkey, sheep, rabbits, chickens, livestock dogs, peacocks, and bees. Although he claimed some animals were used to feed his family, he conceded that others were not. For example, Father admitted the cost of feeding his horse was a “loss” and the maintenance of the peacocks was “another expense instead of paying for [his] children.” Id. at 33, 34. He also indicated he did not currently use the livestock to generate income.

[12] Regarding his potential for earning additional income, Father claimed that “[t]he VA says [he] can't work.” Id. at 41. But Father did not present evidence that the VA rules barred him from working in order to continue receiving benefits or that he was physically incapable of working. To the contrary, the court heard evidence indicating that Father was physically capable of working. Father testified that he sometimes works on his own property lifting things, building fences, building barns, and installing insulation. He also confirmed that he can “see properly” and is able to type on a computer. Id. at 41.

[13] Considering the totality of Father's discretionary spending against his disability income, the evidence shows that Father had the ability to pay his $250 total support obligation and that he willfully chose not to do so. Father failed to meet his burden to prove otherwise. Given that Father's disability income has not changed and that the evidence demonstrates he is able to generate additional income, the evidence further supports that Father continues to have a present ability to pay his weekly support obligation, plus arrearage, to purge his contempt. As such, the court's purge conditions are not punitive.

[14] Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in finding Father in contempt. Father's argument to the contrary is supported by requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. J.M., 935 N.E.2d at 1243. Because there is ample evidence to support the court's contempt finding, we affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Between January and December 2025, Mother and Father filed several additional motions and competing petitions for rules to show cause. The trial court held a hearing on all these motions and issued a final order in March 2026, which Father also appealed. In May 2026, we granted Father's motion to consolidate his appeals. Now, Father's sole contention is that the court erred in finding him in contempt; he does not challenge any of the court's rulings from its March 2026 order on the parties’ other motions.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.