Richard Dajarle Hemphill, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Richard D. Hemphill appeals the two-and-a-half-year aggregate sentence that was imposed following his convictions for forgery, a Level 6 felony, theft, a Class A misdemeanor, and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. Hemphill claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because it did not consider his guilty plea and alleged remorse as mitigating circumstances.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 8, 2025, Hemphill purchased two Lego sets from Walmart in Warsaw with a check totaling $214 that belonged to Joanne and Peter Aitkens. Hemphill did not have permission to spend money from their account. Shortly thereafter, Hemphill drove to Walmart in Schererville where he returned the Lego sets and received $214 in cash.

[4] An investigation ensued and on May 12, 2025, law enforcement was alerted that Hemphill had returned to the Warsaw Walmart. When a Warsaw police officer approached Hemphill, he ran out of the store. The officer yelled for Hemphill to stop, but he continued running across the parking lot. After a brief chase, Hemphill was apprehended and arrested.

[5] On May 14, 2025, the State charged Hemphill with forgery, a Level 6 felony, theft, a Class A misdemeanor, and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. Although Hemphill filed a demand for a jury trial, he pled guilty on the morning of his scheduled trial—April 8, 2026—to all charges without a plea agreement.

[6] At Hemphill's sentencing hearing on May 11, 2026, the trial court identified Hemphill's criminal history as an aggravating circumstance. Hemphill had a juvenile delinquency adjudication for theft and as an adult, he had amassed six prior felony convictions and two misdemeanor convictions across six states. Hemphill's prior convictions include theft and resisting law enforcement. Hemphill also had pending forgery charges in Minnesota, forgery and fraudulent scheme charges in Arizona, and resisting law enforcement, false identity statement, and possession of marijuana charges in Lake County.

[7] The trial court found no mitigating factors and sentenced Hemphill to two years of incarceration for forgery, one year for theft to be served concurrently with the forgery conviction, and to 180 days for resisting law enforcement to be served consecutive to the other counts for an aggregate executed sentence of two and one-half years.

[8] Hemphill now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Hemphill argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because his show of remorse and his decision to plead guilty were not identified as mitigating circumstances. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion in several ways, including “entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 490-91.

[10] When the defendant claims “the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor,” the defendant must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 493. If the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)). Additionally, the trial court is not required to give the same credit or weight to the proffered mitigating circumstance that the defendant does. McBride v. State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[11] Although Hemphill argues that the trial court failed to consider his remorse as a mitigating circumstance, he did not advance that claim at sentencing. Thus, the issue is waived. See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 264 N.E.3d 696, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (if the defendant fails to advance a mitigating circumstance at sentencing, the court will presume that the factor is not significant, and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating circumstance for the first time on appeal).

[12] Waiver notwithstanding, the record shows that the trial court considered Hemphill's “apology[y] for [his] behavior ․ to the court and the victim.” Transcript at 17-18. Following that statement, the trial court responded, “Okay, okay, alright. Thank you, Mr. Hemphill.” Id. at 19. The trial court then identified Hemphill's criminal history as an aggravating factor and imposed the sentence set forth above.

[13] We generally grant the trial court substantial deference in evaluating a defendant's remorse. Howard v. State, 266 N.E.3d 304, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “A trial court's determination of a defendant's remorse is similar to a determination of credibility and, without evidence of some impermissible consideration by the trial court,” we will accept the trial court's determination. Id. (citing Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002)). To be sure, the evaluation of a defendant's remorse is better left to the trial court, which observes the defendant's apology and demeanor firsthand and is therefore better able to assess the defendant's credibility. Hollins v. State, 145 N.E.3d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[14] Although Hemphill apologized abstractly to his victim, he made no attempt to consider how his actions impacted the victim. That is, Hemphill focused entirely on how he had been impacted by his actions. To be sure, the trial court was in the best position to judge Hemphill's demeanor and sincerity, and it was well within its discretion to conclude that Hemphill's expression of remorse was not a mitigating factor. See id. In short, Hemphill has failed to establish that his remorse was significant and clearly supported by the record, and his claim that the trial court should have identified his show of remorse as a mitigator fails.

[15] As for the trial court's rejection of Hemphill's guilty plea as a mitigating factor, we note that a defendant who pleads guilty is entitled to have “some” mitigating weight given to the plea. Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind. 2005). But a guilty plea “is not inherently considered a significant mitigating circumstance.” Primmer v. State, 857 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Rather, the significance of a guilty plea as a mitigator varies from case to case. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221.

[16] While Hemphill pled guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement, the substantial evidence against him reduced the significance of his guilty plea. See, e.g., Primmer, 857 N.E.2d at 16 (a guilty plea may be considered less significant if there was substantial admissible evidence of the defendant's guilt). The record shows that the State intended to call numerous civilian and law enforcement witnesses to testify at trial. It prepared multiple exhibits, including a 911 recording, physical evidence, arrest and booking records, court documents, maps, and other documentary evidence. The trial court was permitted to conclude that, rather than an acceptance of responsibility or a show of remorse, Hemphill's plea of guilty to the charged offenses was a pragmatic decision in light of the substantial evidence against him.

[17] Moreover, Hemphill waited nearly a year before deciding to plead guilty. And his guilty plea occurred on the morning his jury trial was scheduled to begin after jurors had been called and the parties had prepared for trial. To be sure, the significance of a guilty plea is lessened if it is made just prior to trial and after the State has already expended significant resources to investigate and prosecute the defendant. See Gillem v. State, 829 N.E.2d 598, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. For these reasons, Hemphill's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in not identifying his decision to plead guilty as a significant mitigating circumstance is unavailing.

[18] In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not identifying Hemphill's proffered mitigating circumstances as significant and therefore did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him.

[19] Judgment affirmed.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.