Donaven D. Hood, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Donaven D. Hood appeals his conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement resulting in serious bodily injury.¹ He raises two issues for appellate review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing his proposed instructions?

2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support his conviction?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Hood and his girlfriend, Jasmine Mountcastle, lived in an apartment complex in Muncie with their son. Sometime in late May 2022, their apartment was burglarized while they were on vacation. Various items were stolen from the apartment, including a surround sound system.

[4] On June 8, Robbie Cline drove to Hood and Mountcastle's apartment with his friend Rivr Niebel. Cline was looking for Mountcastle's mother, with whom he had a dating relationship. Cline knocked on the apartment door while Niebel remained in the car. Hood and Mountcastle were out, but a babysitter and her two friends were watching their son. The babysitter did not let Cline in, but messaged Mountcastle that a man had knocked on the door and window.

[5] Mountcastle and Hood returned home. The couple entered the apartment, and Hood let Cline inside. Hood and Cline smoked marijuana for a bit. Cline “started boasting about a speaker[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 177. Hood became upset and accused Cline of having burglarized the apartment while he and Mountcastle were vacationing. Hood punched Cline in the head and then demanded Cline return the allegedly stolen property. He continued hitting Cline all over his body, including the face and torso. Cline attempted to block the blows with his hands, hurting his wrists in the process. Hood tied Cline's hands with a charging cord. Hood recorded himself questioning Cline and striking him. Cline falsely told Hood he knew where the stolen property was because he “wanted [Hood] to quit hitting” him. Id. at 125. While this was occurring, Mountcastle had the babysitter, the babysitter's friends, and her son hide in the bedroom.

[6] While Cline was tied and sitting on a dining room chair, Niebel knocked on the front door. Hood opened the door, told Niebel he had “seen too much [and] forced him inside.” Id. at 179. He hit Niebel as well and forced him and Cline into the bathroom. Hood handed Mountcastle a steak knife and had her guard the bathroom while he searched the vehicle Cline drove. The car belonged to Mountcastle's mother; a pair of Mountcastle's shoes and the remote to the surround sound system were inside. After going back into the apartment, Hood pushed Cline into the shower and let the water run. At some point, Mountcastle's brothers entered the apartment through the bedroom window, and at Hood's insistence, they too hit Cline and Niebel.² A neighbor witnessed Mountcastle's brothers entering the apartment through the window and called emergency services.

[7] Numerous officers responded to the scene. When the officers arrived, Hood was outside in the parking lot. Hood told the responding officers Cline and Niebel broke into his home, he had fought the two men, and they were still in the apartment. From outside the apartment's back door, the officers instructed Cline and Niebel to exit the property. According to one of the officers, Cline was “almost hunched over” and struggled to walk toward him. Id. at 72. Cline was “making sounds” and as he got closer to the officers, claiming “he was just beat up.” Id. at 73. The officers took him into custody. Cline required treatment for several broken ribs, a head injury, and abrasions.

[8] Following a police investigation, the State charged Hood with Level 3 felony aggravated battery; Level 3 felony criminal confinement resulting in serious bodily injury; and Level 6 felony intimidation, all for his conduct toward Cline.³

[9] Cline and Mountcastle testified to the above events at Hood's jury trial in November 2025.⁴ Cline described the pain he felt during and after Hood's attack. He had pain when breathing and difficulty completing everyday tasks because “it just hurt bad.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 120. Cline testified his wrist injuries continued to produce “sharp pains up [his] arm[.]” Id. The nurse who treated Cline also testified. She confirmed Cline had several rib fractures, a head injury, and abrasions.

[10] Following the close of evidence, Hood moved for a directed verdict on all the charges. The trial court denied his motion as to the charges related to his conduct against Cline.⁵ The jury found Hood guilty of criminal confinement resulting in serious bodily injury; intimidation; and Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a lesser-included offense of battery as charged. At sentencing, the trial court entered judgment of conviction only for criminal confinement and intimidation due to double jeopardy concerns. The court sentenced Hood to a total of sixteen years and a half, executed in the Indiana Department of Correction.

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Hood's proposed instructions.

[11] Hood initially argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give certain proposed instructions. See Appellant's Br. at 11–12.

[12] We review a trial court's decision to give or refuse a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). To determine whether a jury instruction was properly refused, we consider whether the instruction correctly states the law, is supported by the evidence, and is covered in substance by the other jury instructions. McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763–64 (Ind. 2015). We reverse only if the appellant shows the instructional error prejudiced his substantial rights. Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 376. “If the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury on an applicable defense, the error is not harmless.” McBride v. State, 261 N.E.3d 274, 279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 378).

A. Citizen's arrest proposed instruction

[13] First, Hood argues the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the use of force to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape—the so-called citizen's arrest defense. See Appellant's Br. at 18.

[14] Hood's proffered instruction read in part:

The felony of Criminal Confinement is defined as the knowing or intentional confinement of another person without the person's consent. It is a defense to the charge of Criminal Confinement that

1. The felony of Burglary and/or Residential Entry had in fact been committed, and

2. The Defendant knew that Burglary and/or Residential Entry had been committed, and

3. Based on all the circumstances known to the Defendant there was a reasonable probability [Cline] had committed the felony, and

4. The Defendant used reasonable nondeadly force to arrest [Cline] and to prevent [him] from escaping.

The State has the burden of disproving this defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 222 (citing I.C. § 35-41-3-3 (2021)). Hood argues the trial court's refusal to give the instruction violated his substantial rights because “the evidence supported that [Cline] had committed a felony[.]” Appellant's Br. at 20.

[15] Under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-3(b), a person other than a law enforcement officer is justified in using reasonable force against another to effect an arrest or prevent the other person's escape when: (1) a felony has been committed; and (2) there is probable cause to believe the other person committed that felony; see also I.C. § 35-33-1-4(a)(2) (1982) (authorizing “any person” to arrest “any other person” under similar circumstances). An arrest is defined as “the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a crime.” I.C. § 35-33-1-5 (1983). A private citizen making an arrest acts at his own peril, and he is “privileged to make an arrest only when he has reasonable grounds for believing in the guilt of the person arrested and a felony has in fact been committed.” Fitzgerald v. State, 26 N.E.3d 105, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting United States v. Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied).

[16] In Smith v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court considered a claim from a defendant who argued he was entitled to a similar jury instruction because he shot the victim while attempting to effectuate a citizen's arrest. 730 N.E.2d 705, 706 (Ind. 2000). Smith had been robbed of several hundred dollars in winnings from a dice game, and he alleged the victim was involved in the crime. Id. at 707. Discerning no abuse of discretion in the trial court refusing to give the citizen's arrest instruction, the Court concluded: “At most, the evidence reflects that the defendant was engaged only in self-help to recover his property, not in assisting law enforcement.” Id.

[17] Hood's behavior does not indicate he attempted to take Cline into custody so “that he may be held to answer for a crime.” I.C. § 35-33-1-5. Hood never called the police. Cf. I.C. § 35-33-1-4(b) (stating a person making an arrest shall, “as soon as practical, notify a law enforcement officer and deliver custody of the person arrested to a law enforcement officer”). He battered Cline repeatedly with no more than a hunch that Cline had committed the burglary. Cline falsely admitted knowing where the stolen property was because he wanted Hood to “quit hitting” him. Tr. Vol. 2 at 125. Only after tying up and putting Cline in the bathroom did Hood search the vehicle Cline drove. He urged Mountcastle's brothers to batter Cline, too. And after a neighbor called law enforcement, Hood lied to the responding officers, claiming Cline had broken into the apartment shortly before the officers arrived. We have little trouble concluding Hood “engaged only in self-help to recover his property, not in assisting law enforcement.” Smith, 730 N.E.2d at 707. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Hood's proposed citizen's arrest instruction because the evidence does not support the instruction.

B. Permanent and disfigurement proposed instructions

[18] Second, Hood argues the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury his “proposed instructions on the terms ‘permanent’ and ‘disfigure[.]’ ” Appellant's Br. at 22; see also Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 224–25 (Hood's instructions).

[19] The trial court's Instruction No. 11 provided the jury with the following definition:

The term “serious bodily injury” is defined by law as meaning bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, unconsciousness, extreme pain, permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ, or loss of a fetus.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 237; see also I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292 (2012) (defining “serious bodily injury”). Hood's “concern” is that his conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement “might have been based on a misunderstanding of what the term ‘permanent disfigurement’ means.” Appellant's Br. at 23.

[20] When determining whether an element of an offense has been proven, the trier of fact “may rely on its collective common sense and knowledge acquired through everyday experiences[.]” Clemons v. State, 83 N.E.3d 104, 108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “The trial court has a duty to give further instructions defining words used in other instructions only if the words are of a technical or legal meaning normally not understood by jurors unversed in the law.” Id. (quoting Martin v. State, 314 N.E.2d 60, 70 (Ind. 1974)). “The purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Monjar v. State, 876 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

[21] Instruction No. 11 correctly defined “serious bodily injury” for the jury based on the applicable statute. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 237; I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292. Cline testified regarding the injuries he suffered. The nurse who treated Cline corroborated his testimony. Jurors were free to rely on their common sense and knowledge to determine whether the State met its burden without the need for an additional breakdown of terms. See Clemons, 83 N.E.3d at 108. As the State argues, “[b]ecause the terms were being used for their plain and ordinary meaning, it was reasonable for the trial court to presume that the jury would understand” commonly used words “without any risk of confusion.” Appellee's Br. at 22–23; see also Monjar, 876 N.E.2d at 797. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the terms “permanent” and “disfigurement.”

[22] Even if the trial court erred, Hood has failed to convince us any error impacted his substantial rights. See Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 376. Because Section 35-31.5-2-292 is written in the disjunctive, the State needed to prove only one type of injury to establish Cline suffered serious bodily injury. See Davis v. State, 819 N.E.2d 91, 100–01 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding loss of consciousness alone was sufficient to establish serious bodily injury), trans. denied. As discussed below, the testimony indicated Cline suffered—at the very least—extreme pain during the confinement. Any error in the trial court's refusal to give the instruction was harmless. Ndiaye v. State, 234 N.E.3d 906, 911 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (noting because there was no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted the defendant given the evidence, any error in instructing the jury was harmless).

2. Sufficient evidence supports Hood's conviction for criminal confinement resulting in serious bodily injury.

[23] Hood next argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement resulting in serious bodily injury. Hood does not dispute he confined Cline; instead, he argues the “evidence did not support the conclusion that there was a serious bodily injury, nor did it support the conclusion that the serious bodily injury occurred during or as the result of the confinement.” Appellant's Br. at 11.

[24] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[25] A person who knowingly or intentionally confines another without the other person's consent commits criminal confinement, which is a Level 3 felony if the criminal confinement “results in serious bodily injury to a person other than the confining person[.]” I.C. § 35-42-3-3(b)(3)(B). Serious bodily injury includes bodily injury that causes, among other things, extreme pain. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292(3). Confinement requires proof of a substantial interference with a person's liberty. I.C. § 35-42-3-1 (1977). “[A]ny amount of force can cause a confinement because force, however brief, equals confinement.” Dorsey v. State, 262 N.E.3d 181, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted), trans. denied.

[26] The evidence shows Cline suffered serious bodily injury. Cline left Hood's apartment with three broken ribs, a head injury, and various abrasions. He testified his rib injuries “hurt really bad” every time he took a breath, which interfered with his ability to engage in “any type of movement” and complete ordinary tasks. Tr. Vol. 2 at 120. Cline also testified he was still experiencing “sharp pains” in his wrists and arms years after the incident. Id. Cline's testimony was sufficient for the jury to find the confinement resulted in serious bodily injury. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292(3) (extreme pain); see also Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting appellate judges give “considerable deference” to the factfinder when determining whether a bodily injury is “serious”), trans. denied.

[27] Hood also argues the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to prove any injury Cline suffered occurred during the confinement. He argues there must be a “temporal link” between the confinement and the injury, suggesting the State needed to prove Cline's injuries occurred while he was tied up. See Appellant's Br. at 16–17.

[28] During Hood's trial, the State presented evidence revealing Hood's battery of Cline was part-and-parcel of the confinement. The testimony demonstrates Hood repeatedly hit Cline before and after binding his hands. Hood recorded himself striking Cline as Cline sat on a chair with his hands tied up. See Ex. Vol. 1 page 6 (Snapchat video). Hood then placed Cline in the bathroom. He substantially interfered with Cline's liberty through force. I.C. § 35-42-3-1; Dorsey, 262 N.E.3d at 186. We conclude the State presented sufficient evidence showing a “temporal link” between Cline's injuries and the confinement such that they constituted one incident. See Mickens v. State, 115 N.E.3d 520, 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (concluding the evidence showed injury occurred during one incident of confinement because “the order of events could be viewed as confinement, injury, and additional confinement”), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[29] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury, and sufficient evidence supports Hood's conviction for criminal confinement.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(3)(B) (2019).

2.   Mountcastle stated her brothers showed up angry with her. Hood told the brothers not to be mad at Mountcastle and that they “need[ed] to be mad at” Cline and Niebel instead. Id. at 181.

3.   The State charged Hood with two additional counts for his conduct toward Niebel: Level 5 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.

4.   Prosecutors similarly charged Mountcastle with criminal confinement and aggravated assault. In exchange for Mountcastle's testimony in this case, the State agreed not to use her testimony against her during her own criminal proceedings, with limited exceptions. See Ex. Vol. 1 at 148–50 (use immunity agreement).

5.   Because Niebel did not testify at trial, the court granted the motion regarding the charges related to him.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.