Ivan Norman Malone, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Ivan Norman Malone appeals his sentence following his plea of guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter, as a Level 2 felony. Malone raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 2, 2019, Malone “aimed at and knowingly fired a handgun at Ervin Pirtle, striking him six (6) times.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 59. Pirtle died as a result of the gunshot wounds.

[3] The State charged Malone with murder. Thereafter, the State amended the charging information to additionally charge Malone with voluntary manslaughter, as a Level 2 felony. Malone and the State entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Malone pleaded guilty but mentally ill to the manslaughter charge in exchange for the State's dismissal of the murder charge. Malone stipulated that he had “knowingly killed” Pirtle while “acting under a sudden heat caused by anger due to his mental health diagnosis of schizophrenia and suffering from an episode at that time.” Id.

[4] At a sentencing hearing, the court accepted Malone's guilty plea and entered judgment of conviction accordingly. During the hearing, Pirtle's sister read a letter from Pirtle's daughter. Pirtle's daughter wrote that, at the time of the offense, she was eleven years old and had a two-year-old and an eight-year-old brother. She further wrote that their world “crashed and burned” when their father was killed. Tr. at 23. In addition, Pirtle's sister provided her own statement, during which she said that Pirtle was a “devoted father” to six children, three of whom still lived at home; that the two youngest boys have “special needs”; and that Pirtle was “actively involved in their care.” Id. at 26, 28.

[5] At the conclusion of the hearing, the court identified as aggravating factors the harm, injury, loss or damage suffered by the victim, including the impact on Pirtle's family. The court specifically noted that Pirtle

had six children. The younger three children were two, eight, and 11 when their father was killed. They continue to suffer profound loss because of the tender age, especially of his sons, who were two and eight. They suffered additional loss because of their limited memories of him, and the fact that they are both special needs individuals.

Id. at 39. The court also identified as aggravating Pirtle's “relatively significant criminal history”; that he was on pretrial release from a case in Minnesota when he committed the instant offense; the nature and circumstances of the crime, being that Malone “pulled out a gun and ․ just started shooting at Mr. Pirtle for no ․ acceptable or understandable reason”; and that Malone engaged in repeated rule violations while incarcerated. Id. at 40.

[6] In mitigation, the court identified Malone's acceptance of guilt by means of the plea agreement, that he expressed remorse, and that he “suffer[s] from mental illness.” Id. at 41. But the court found his mental illness to be “of relatively low weight” because he had “not pursued proper medical treatment for” his condition. Id. The court further noted, though, that it “still is given some weight[.]” Id. at 42. The court then sentenced Malone to twenty-seven years, with twenty-five years executed in the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Malone contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted).

[8] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.)), clarified on reh'g on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

[9] The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is ten to thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Here, the trial court identified five aggravators: the harm, injury, loss or damage suffered; Malone's criminal history; that he was on pretrial release when he committed the offense; the nature and circumstances of the crime; and his rule violations while incarcerated. In mitigation, the court identified Malone's guilty plea, remorse, and mental illness, though the court gave relatively low weight to his mental illness. Based on those factors, the court sentenced Malone to twenty-seven years, with twenty-five years executed and two suspended to probation.

[10] On appeal, Malone first contends that the court abused its discretion when it identified the impact on Pirtle's family to be aggravating. In particular, Malone contends that the “court did not explain how the consequences here went beyond those which would be expected of a family who had experienced the death of a parent.” Appellant's Br. at 10. Malone contends that the court “seemed to confuse two concepts: the injury suffered by a victim and the nature and circumstances of the offense.” Id. at 8-9. Thus, it appears as though Malone challenges both of those aggravators.

[11] Our Supreme Court has held that “the nature and circumstances of a crime is a proper aggravating circumstance.” Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 853 (Ind. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the nature and circumstances of the crime included the fact that Malone killed Pirtle, who had three young children, including two who had special needs and for whom Pirtle was actively involved in their care and treatment. That is an appropriate circumstance to elevate Malone's sentence.

[12] Regarding the injury suffered by Pirtle, we need not determine whether that is an appropriate aggravator. It is well settled that, where the trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant, we need not remand for resentencing if we can “say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Here, in addition to the harm to Pirtle, the court also identified as aggravating Malone's criminal history, which includes four prior misdemeanor convictions and one prior felony conviction; that he was on pretrial release from a case in Minnesota when he committed the instant offense; and Malone's repeated rule violations while in custody prior to trial. And Malone does not challenge any of those aggravators. In addition, as discussed above, the nature and circumstances of the crime was an appropriate aggravator. Based on the remaining aggravators, we can say with confidence that, had the court not considered the harm to Pirtle, it would have imposed the same sentence.

[13] Still, Malone also contends that the court abused its discretion when it did not adequately consider his mental health as mitigating. Specifically, Malone alleges that “no consideration was given to [his] mental health, other than he failed to seek help for his condition,” which is something “over which [he] had no control.” Appellant's Br. at 12. However, during the sentencing hearing, the court stated as follows:

Finally, you do suffer from mental illness. I find that [to be a] mitigating factor, however, to be of relatively low weight because you have not pursued proper medical treatment for your condition. It still is given some weight because, again, as [defense counsel] appropriately points out, you were diagnosed at an age where your family - - I don't want to denigrate your family, but if you had a father like Mr. Pirtle, maybe somebody would have given you more help, but you didn't get proper medical treatment.

Tr. at 41-42.

[14] Thus, contrary to Malone's argument on appeal, the court's statements at the sentencing hearing demonstrate that it fully considered his mental health and potential reasons for adequate mental health care. To the extent that Malone argues that the court did not give enough weight to his mental illness, that determination is not subject to appellate review. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.

Conclusion

[15] Even if the court improperly considered the victim impact statement as aggravating, we can say with confidence that the court would have imposed the same sentence based on the other identified aggravators. And the court considered Malone's mental illness when it sentenced him. As such, we affirm Malone's sentence.

[16] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.