IN RE: I.D. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.D. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's adjudication of his son, I.D. (“Child”), as a child in need of services (CHINS). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born in November 2019 to Father and C.R. (“Mother”), who admitted to the CHINS allegations and does not participate in this appeal. The Department of Child Services (DCS) first became involved with the family in 2020, and this case is “the fourth (4th) time the family has been involved in a formal CHINS case.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 86.

[3] Mother was arrested in January and March 2025. She later pled guilty to two counts of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced to prison. In May 2025, Father was awarded sole legal and primary physical custody of Child in the underlying paternity case because Mother was incarcerated.

[4] On September 8, 2025, when Child was five years old, DCS received a report raising concerns about Father's mental health and substance use, a lack of food for Child, and Mother's incarceration. On September 11, DCS assessment worker Alexis Floyd met with Child at school. She also tried several times to reach Father at home and by phone, without success. Floyd talked to family members, who raised the same concerns. They reported that Child rotated among family members and that Father dropped Child off with them for undetermined periods and retrieved him at random times. They also reported that Child was suspended from kindergarten about twice a week for hitting, not listening, and disrupting class and that his “behaviors were getting increasingly worse.” Tr. p. 65. They said Father did not attend school meetings and learned of Child's suspensions only afterward. They added that Child often arrived at their homes dirty, without appropriate clothing, and needing a bath. The family members said they were doing what they could, but they were not authorized to seek treatment for Child.

[5] DCS detained Child on October 17 because of “uncertainty” about where he was staying and because it had been unable to contact Father or inspect his home. Id. at 54, 68. Child was placed with an aunt and uncle. On October 21, DCS petitioned to have Child adjudicated a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and 31-34-1-2. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 17.

[6] At the initial hearing, Family Case Manager (FCM) Tabitha Brady met Father for the first time and noticed “a strong smell of alcohol.” Tr. p. 75. FCM Brady asked Father about it, and he said they “would discuss it later” and then “got breath mints to cover the smell.” Id.

[7] Supervised visits between Child and Father started in November 2025. Three visits were offered that month, but Father attended only one. Before Father arrived for that visit, Child pulled down his pants and told the visit supervisor to “look.” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 29. Child then “touched [the visit supervisor] with his private part.” Id. When Father arrived and the visit supervisor told him about Child's behavior, Father responded that “he was just like that and laughed it off.” Id.

[8] Child also started therapy with Southwestern Behavioral Healthcare in November 2025. Southwestern records show that Child was referred for play therapy during an earlier CHINS case but then show no activity from May 2023 until November 2025. See Ex. Vol. 4 p. 28 (noting that Child “has had prior therapy but discontinued due to lack of follow through by the father”). Southwestern diagnosed Child with, among other things, Oppositional Defiant Disorder.

[9] Child struggled in the home of his aunt and uncle. Child once held a knife to the chest of one of the other children in the home and said he would kill them. Later, he threatened to kill the family and to “chop up” one of their dogs and feed it to the other one. Tr. p. 76. On December 1, 2025, the family took Child to the emergency room, where, according to records, Child said he was “feeling killy.” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 90. He was also “masturbating” and “making inappropriate comments and gestures,” and he “had to be blocked from other patients[’] view.” Id. Child was then admitted to Harsha Behavioral Center for suicidal and homicidal ideation and stayed for a week. Harsha diagnosed Child with Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder and ADHD. Harsha sought to start Child on medication, but Father “denied the medication.” Tr. p. 83. As a result, FCM Brady requested a court order, which the trial court ultimately approved. Child started taking medication after his release from Harsha.

[10] Three days after Child was released from Harsha, his behaviors “resumed,” and he again made death threats to the family. Id. at 78. In January 2026, FCM Brady asked that the case be moved to a different FCM because Father had sent her “inappropriate” text messages. Id. at 80.

[11] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing in February 2026. FCM Brady testified that she was never able to inspect Father's home or confirm his employment due to his lack of cooperation. She also testified that Father did not attend any of the child-and-family team meetings despite having notice of them. She said that Child's behaviors had improved somewhat since being placed on medication and that he was no longer making “threats of ․ murder.” Id. at 83. Both assessment worker Floyd and FCM Brady believed that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary to provide services to Child because he had not received any services while in Father's care. Id. at 57-58, 79, 86.

[12] Father testified and acknowledged that Child has had “behavior issues since he was the age of two.” Id. at 89. Father otherwise disputed DCS's evidence, claiming that he had been addressing Child's needs. See id. at 112, 114.

[13] In March 2026, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS.

[14] Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's determination that Child is a CHINS. When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). “Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and [the] reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 578 (quotation omitted). When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Id. “We consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

I. The findings of fact are not clearly erroneous

[16] Father challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact. A finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no evidence to support it, either directly or by inference. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[17] Father first argues that Findings 10 and 11 merely recite what Floyd testified to. For example, Finding 10 provides:

FCM Alexis Floyd, with Warrick County DCS, testified she was employed at the Vanderburgh County DCS office and conducted the assessment regarding Child in September, 2025. FCM Floyd testified she has an Associates Degree in Early Childhood Development and had received twenty-four (24) hours training each year through DCS. She testified that the report in September 2025 was in reference to Father's mental health, substance abuse, Child's concerning behavior, lack of food in the house and mother's incarceration. She also testified that she interviewed members of Father's family and they also expressed concerns regarding these same issues. FCM Floyd testified that despite several attempts to meet with Father and to view the home, she was never able to get Father to cooperate or meet with her. During her investigation/assessment, FCM Floyd learned from family members that Father would drop Child off with them for an indeterminate length of time and would randomly retrieve Child.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 87-88 (emphases added).

[18] “Critically, findings which indicate that the testimony or evidence was this or the other are not findings of fact.” In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quotations omitted). “Rather, findings must indicate, not what someone said is true, but what is determined to be true, for this is the trier of fact's duty.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[T]he trier of fact must adopt the testimony of the witness before the finding may be considered a finding of fact.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[19] Here, although Findings 10 and 11—like several others—set forth what DCS's witnesses testified to, it is apparent from the whole order that the trial court did not simply recite their testimony but credited it and adopted it as true. Father testified, largely disputing DCS's evidence, but the court rejected his testimony. Specifically, in Finding 23, the court found that Father's “testimony lacks credibility, in that there is substantial credible evidence that contradicts” it— i.e., the DCS witnesses and exhibits. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 91 (emphasis added). Because the court resolved the credibility contest against Father and in favor of the witnesses whose testimony these findings recite, it adopted that testimony, and the findings may be treated as findings of fact. We thus find no error on this basis. See In re A.T., 219 N.E.3d 90, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that an accurate summation of a person's testimony that the court found credible is not a mere recitation). We next address Father's other challenges to the findings.

[20] Father's challenges to Findings 10, 11, 12, and 18 ask us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Father does not contend that no evidence supports these findings; he contends that the evidence should have been read in his favor. But a finding is clearly erroneous only when no evidence supports it, A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156, and the testimony of the DCS witnesses and exhibits—which the trial court credited in Finding 23—supplies that support. That Father offered contrary evidence does not render the findings clearly erroneous.

[21] Father's challenge to Findings 10, 14, and 23, which focus on his unwillingness to cooperate with DCS, is different in kind. He concedes that “it is true that [he] was unwilling to comply with DCS.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. He argues only that such non-cooperation, standing alone, cannot support a CHINS adjudication. That is an argument about legal sufficiency, not clear error, and we address it in Part II. Because Father does not dispute the accuracy of these findings, they are not clearly erroneous.

II. The trial court did not clearly err in finding Child to be a CHINS

[22] Here, DCS alleged that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1.¹ A child is a CHINS under this section if, before the child turns 18,

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. An adjudication under this statute “requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. Father challenges whether he seriously endangered Child and whether the coercive intervention of the court is necessary, so we address those elements. See Appellant's Br. pp. 13, 16.²

[23] Father first contends that the evidence failed to show that he seriously endangered Child, emphasizing that Child's basic needs were being met and that DCS never established that his home was unsafe. But Father did not cooperate with DCS's efforts to contact him or see his home, leaving DCS unable to assess the very conditions that had prompted Child's removal. See In re J.J., 259 N.E.3d 328, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (explaining that a parent's refusal to allow DCS to view the home casts doubt on the home's safety). More troubling still, Father downplayed and failed to address Child's escalating behavioral problems: despite concerns raised by family members and Child's multiple suspensions from kindergarten, Father dismissed Child's behavior. For example, when the visit supervisor told him that Child had exposed himself and touched the supervisor with his genitals, Father responded that “he was just like that and laughed it off.” The trial court also found that Father's “lack of insight into the complexity and severity of his Child's trauma, instability, behavioral and emotional disorders” has “an adverse and lasting effect on Child.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 91. Child's mental condition, meanwhile, was deteriorating: he made death threats, was hospitalized for suicidal and homicidal ideation, and was diagnosed with Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder. Yet Father refused to consent to the medication Harsha recommended, and DCS had to obtain a court order. A parent's persistent failure to address a child's serious conditions, and refusal of the treatment those conditions require, supports a finding of endangerment. See J.J., 259 N.E.3d at 335 (finding endangerment where mother “was not appropriately addressing [her child's] precarious physical condition,” was not taking him to follow-up medical appointments, and had “expressed her disagreement with his medical treatment”). The trial court could reasonably find that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously endangered.³

[24] Father next challenges the element our Supreme Court has described as the most critical: whether Child's needs are unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court. S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. A CHINS adjudication “must be reserved for families who cannot meet those needs without coercion—not those who merely have difficulty doing so,” and “when that coercion is not necessary, the State may not intrude into a family's life.” Id. at 1285, 1291. Here, the trial court found that Father's unwillingness to cooperate “reinforces the need for the coercive intervention of the court.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 91. Father claims that the “only evidence” of a need for coercion was FCM Brady's statement to that effect. Appellant's Br. p. 17. But both assessment worker Floyd and FCM Brady testified that coercive intervention was necessary, and FCM Brady testified that Child “wasn't getting any services while in the care of his father.” Tr. p. 79.

[25] Father also invokes the principle that “[r]efusal to cooperate with the government is not, by itself, a basis” for State intervention. In re T.H., 856 N.E.2d 1247, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). But the record shows more than noncooperation. Father refused services Child needed—such as the medication Harsha recommended to address Child's suicidal and homicidal ideation and other issues—while insisting that he had been addressing Child's needs himself. See Tr. pp. 112, 114. Unlike a bare failure to cooperate, Father's resistance was directed at the very care required to meet Child's needs, such that Child would not receive it absent the court's intervention. Because the evidence supports the elements Father challenges, the trial court's determination that Child is a CHINS is not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   DCS also alleged that Child is a CHINS under Section 31-34-1-2. But because we affirm the trial court's CHINS adjudication under Section 31-34-1-1, we need not address whether Child is also a CHINS under Section 31-34-1-2. See Q.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 92 N.E.3d 1092, 1103 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

2.   Although Father doesn't explicitly challenge the second element—whether Child's needs are unmet—it is easily satisfied here. See, e.g., Tr. p. 79 (FCM Brady testifying that Child wasn't receiving any services in Father's care).

3.   Father points out that the trial court made no specific finding or conclusion of serious endangerment. Father cites no CHINS case holding that this omission requires reversal; he relies on a custody case, Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), for the general point that a court must make adequate findings. See Appellant's Br. p. 15. In any event, the court's findings—that DCS was never able to meet with Father or see his home, that Father denied Child medication, and that Father lacked insight—support the CHINS determination.

Vaidik, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and May, J., concur.