James P. Bradshaw, Appellant-Petitioner v. Wells County Clerk of Courts, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] James Bradshaw sued the Wells County Clerk of Courts in her official capacity (the “Clerk”) to compel her to certify common law judge vacancies pursuant to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the 1816 Indiana Constitution. The trial court dismissed Bradshaw's claim and awarded the Clerk attorneys’ fees. Bradshaw now appeals and raises one issue for our review: Whether the trial court violated his right to a fair and unbiased proceeding.

[2] Because Bradshaw's significant noncompliance with Indiana Appellate Rule 46 substantially impedes our review of his claim, he has waived appellate review thereof.

[3] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] On February 2, 2026, Bradshaw sued the Clerk to direct her “to Certify the Vacancies of local Common Law Judges Guaranteed by the Northwest Ordinance to Governor Braun for Appointment.”¹ Appellee's App. Vol. II at 3. On March 17, the Clerk filed a motion to dismiss Bradshaw's complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Bradshaw did not file a response; instead, he filed a motion asserting that the Clerk and trial court “absconded prosecution for their crimes under the color of law by obstructing justice by the denial of ordering a special election to fill the local vacant offices of a local common law court of justice.” Verified Mot. Obj. Prejudice at 3, Bradshaw v. Wells Cnty. Clerk of Cts., No. 90C01-2602-MI-000004 (Ind. Wells Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2026).² The trial court granted the Clerk's motion to dismiss, determining Bradshaw failed to “establish any set of facts under which [the Clerk] could be required to provide the relief requested, because Indiana law does not recognize the claim advanced by” Bradshaw. Appellee's App. Vol. II at 3. The trial court also authorized the Clerk to file a motion for attorneys’ fees. The Clerk filed such a motion, and the trial court granted it.

[5] Thereafter, Bradshaw filed a motion (1) for the trial judge to recuse himself because the judge “is a named defendant in parallel Cause No. 90C01-2602-MI-000007” and (2) to vacate the previously entered orders in the case currently on appeal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) and (8). Appellant's App. Vol. II at 14.³ The trial court denied Bradshaw's motion, concluding Bradshaw failed to identify any cognizable grounds for the trial court to grant Trial Rule 60(B) relief. More particularly, “[n]either the Northwest Ordinance nor the 1816 Indiana Constitution operates to divest this Court of its statutory jurisdiction or to render its orders void. The March 27, 2026[,] and April 23, 2026[,] Orders are valid final orders.” Id. at 40. This appeal ensued.⁴

Discussion and Decision

Bradshaw Waived His Appellate Claim by Failing to Comply with Appellate Rule 46

[6] On appeal, Bradshaw appears to argue that the trial court's orders granting the Clerk's motions to dismiss and for attorneys’ fees should be vacated because the trial judge should have recused himself from deciding the case below. However, we cannot address Bradshaw's claim due to his significant noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46. Although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)). Bradshaw chose to proceed pro se on appeal, so he is “ ‘held to the same standards as a trained attorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)).

[7] Bradshaw fails to support with citations to the record all statements of fact in the Statement of Case, Statement of Facts, and Argument in his opening brief, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), (6)(a), and (8)(a), respectively. We will not search the record to find a basis for the party's argument. Carter ex rel. CNO Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Nealy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 910 N.E.2d 842, 845 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied).

[8] Bradshaw also fails to support the contentions in his opening brief with cogent reasoning, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Bradshaw asks us to vacate the trial court's dismissal and attorneys’ fees orders, arguing that the trial judge violated Bradshaw's due process rights by failing to recuse himself from deciding the case. Bradshaw claims that the trial judge is a named defendant in a “related” cause, but he fails to explain how that separate cause is related or even who the named parties are. Appellant's Br. at 6. “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

[9] For the foregoing reasons, Bradshaw has waived all his claims on appeal, and we will not exercise our discretion to address the merits thereof. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties do not include in their Appendices a copy of the complaint. See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2), (3). Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of this filing. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1162 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27).

2.   Pursuant to Appellate Rule 27 and Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of this filing as well. See Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1162.

3.   Appellate Rule 51(C) provides that “[e]ach Appendix volume shall be independently and consecutively numbered” and “[a]ll pages of the Appendix volume, including the front page ․ shall be consecutively numbered at the bottom starting with numeral one on each volume's front page.” Bradshaw continuously numbered the pages of his Appendix across volumes instead of restarting at one in each volume. To avoid confusion, we cite the page numbers as they appear in the PDF version of each Appendix volume.

4.   Bradshaw does not appeal the merits of the dismissal of his claim or the attorneys’ fees judgment entered against him. Bradshaw attempts to circumvent waiver of his due process challenge by claiming in his reply brief that he is appealing the denial of his Trial Rule 60(B) motion. At no point in his opening brief does Bradshaw frame his appeal in this manner; nor does he challenge the trial court's order denying the Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Accordingly, such claim is waived. See Steele v. Steuben Lakes Reg'l Waste Dist., 168 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1180–81 (Ind. 2016)) (explaining we cannot consider arguments presented for the first time in a reply brief).

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.