Terri Young-Moses, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In January of 2024, the State charged Terri Young-Moses with various offenses following a 2021 crime spree, which culminated in the murder of Dezmond King. Following a jury trial, Young-Moses was convicted of murder, Level 3 felony armed robbery, three counts of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and two counts of Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, and found to be a habitual offender and to have used a firearm in King's murder. The trial court sentenced Young-Moses to an aggregate 106-year term of incarceration. Young-Moses argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a witness was unavailable and admitting her deposition testimony at trial. He also contends that his 106-year sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2021, Young-Moses lived at 5857 Sebring Court (“the Apartment”) at The George Apartment Homes (“The George”) on the northwest side of Indianapolis with his girlfriend, Asia Tobar, and her mother, Alicia Easterling. On August 8, 2021, Young-Moses and Tobar were arguing in The George's parking lot. At some point, Young-Moses walked back into the Apartment. A few seconds later, Young-Moses returned to the parking lot and pulled a neck gaiter over his head to cover his face. As Tobar drove away, Young-Moses fired shots at her and her car, which struck the car door and a nearby resident's bedroom wall and deflated Tobar's front passenger tire. Members of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) later recovered seven .40 caliber Smith & Wesson shell casings from The George's parking lot.

[3] On November 9, 2021, Young-Moses arranged to meet with Marvell Townsend, apparently using a dating app as a ruse. When Young-Moses arrived to meet Townsend, Young-Moses entered the passenger side of Townsend's car, pointed a “beige and black” gun at him, and told him to drive. Tr. Vol. II p. 212. Young-Moses then ordered Townsend out of the car, stole his purple backpack, which contained his “ID, Social Security card, and ․ debit card[,]” and fled. Tr. Vol. II p. 214.

[4] On November 26, 2021, IMPD responded to The George for a reported shooting. Upon arriving, officers found Dezmond King deceased on his back patio with “a gunshot wound to the temple[,] ․ and a significant pool of blood just underneath his head[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 7. IMPD recovered five fired bullet cartridges and at least two spent bullets from the back patio. An autopsy confirmed that King had suffered from multiple gunshot wounds to his temple, hand, forearm, neck, and chest.

[5] On November 30, 2021, the fired cartridge casings recovered from the scene of King's homicide were preliminarily determined to be a match and fired from the same gun as the casings recovered after the August 8 incident. On December 3, 2021, IMPD and SWAT executed a search warrant at Young-Moses's residence, which produced a black and tan .40 caliber Smith & Wesson firearm, ammunition, and a bag containing Townsend's driver's license, debit cards, and Social Security card.

[6] On January 30, 2024, the State charged Young-Moses with murder, Level 3 felony armed robbery, three counts of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and two counts of Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. The State also alleged that Young-Moses was a habitual offender and sought a firearm enhancement for his use of a firearm in King's murder.

[7] A three-day jury trial was held on December 8 to 10, 2025. During the first day, the State asked the trial court to find Easterling to be an unavailable witness. To show that it had made reasonable efforts to secure Easterling's appearance, the State argued that IMPD had visited her last known address at least twice, contacted her soon-to-be ex-husband, tracked her vehicle on Flock cameras, and worked with the United States Marshal Service to surveil her home, all to no avail. Young-Moses objected, arguing that Easterling was not truly unavailable because Tobar had stated that Easterling was working as a nurse and could not leave work that day. The State did not ask the court to issue a bench warrant to secure Easterling's appearance. The trial court found Easterling to be unavailable and later admitted her deposition testimony, in which she identified Young-Moses as the individual seen on surveillance footage firing shots at Tobar's car on August 8, 2021.

[8] The jury found Young-Moses guilty as charged and found that he was a habitual offender and had used a firearm in King's murder. The trial court sentenced Young-Moses to an aggregate term of 106 years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Finding that Easterling was Unavailable

[9] Young-Moses argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Easterling was unavailable to testify because the State had not shown “that it made good faith efforts to secure Easterling's appearance.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. Young-Moses specifically contends that the trial court's admission of Easterling's deposition testimony violated Indiana Evidence Rule 802 and his constitutional right of confrontation under the federal and state constitutions.

[10] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “[W]e will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “However, when a claim of error in the admission of evidence is based upon the violation of a constitutional right, our standard of review is de novo.” Doyle v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1113, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[11] The State argues that Young-Moses has waived his constitutional claims because he failed to object on these grounds at trial and has not argued fundamental error on appeal. We agree. See Turner v. State, 183 N.E.3d 346, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (providing that a party may not present an argument on appeal that is not raised before the trial court), trans. denied; Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (providing that a party must claim fundamental error on appeal to preserve a claim that was not raised at trial). Therefore, we address Young-Moses's claim only under Rule 802.

[12] “ ‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid. R. 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible unless these rules or other law provides otherwise.” Evid. R. 802.

Prior testimony is hearsay, but Indiana Rule of Evidence 804 provides a hearsay exception for the prior testimony of a declarant who is unavailable as a witness. Specifically, Indiana Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)(A) provides that, where a declarant is unavailable as a witness, the hearsay rule does not exclude the declarant's former testimony which was given at a lawful deposition and is now offered against a party who had the opportunity to cross-examine it. A declarant is unavailable for purposes of this exception if the declarant is absent from trial and the State has not been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant's attendance.

Davis v. State, 13 N.E.3d 939, 945–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied. “The decision to invoke the rule allowing admission of prior recorded testimony such as a deposition, is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. 2002).

[13] Young-Moses does not dispute that Easterling was subject to cross-examination during her deposition, but instead only argues that the State did not make a good faith effort to secure Easterling's appearance. “Whether the State has satisfied the good faith effort requirement is a question of reasonableness, and the ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness.” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 456 (Ind. 2026) (internal quotations omitted). The record is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the State satisfied this requirement.

[14] Before trial, IMPD “had been to [Easterling's] last known address on multiple occasions, two of which times someone answered the door and stated that she wasn't there.” Tr. Vol. II p. 110. The State had also “searched law enforcement reports and MyCase to see if there were any law enforcement contacts” that would lead to Easterling's location and contacted her “soon-to-be-ex-husband ․ to see if he had a new phone number or different address that we could try” for Easterling. Tr. Vol. II pp. 110–11. The State had also sought the Marion County Prosecutor's Office's assistance “in obtaining [Easterling's] vehicle registration and then using Flock cameras to try to find her in the city.” Tr. Vol. II p. 111. Locally, Easterling's vehicle had only been seen on Flock cameras near the address that IMPD had already visited but had been located “heading northbound into the Chicago area” on November 26, 2025. Tr. Vol. II p. 111. After Easterling's vehicle had been detected again in the Indianapolis area, the State had asked a U.S. Marshal to surveil her home in the days before Young-Moses's trial, but the Marshal had been “unable to see [Easterling] coming or going.” Tr. Vol. II p. 111. The record demonstrates that the State made multiple attempts to locate Easterling and to secure her presence at trial, and the trial court found these attempts to be reasonable. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Easterling was unavailable after the State had made reasonable efforts to procure her presence. Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 456.

II. Young-Moses's Sentence is Appropriate

[15] Young-Moses also argues that his 106-year sentence is inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of this case to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[16] The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). The sentencing range for the habitual-offender enhancement is eight to twenty years, and for the firearm enhancement, five to twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(g). The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is three to sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two to twelve years, with the advisory sentence being six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. Finally, the sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b).

[17] The trial court imposed a sixty-year sentence for murder, enhanced by fifteen years by virtue of Young-Moses's habitual-offender status and an additional fifteen years by virtue of his use of a firearm in its commission. The trial court also sentenced Young-Moses to twelve years and four years of incarceration for his Level 3 felony armed robbery and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness conviction, respectively, to be served consecutively with the above.¹ Finally, the trial court imposed three nine-year sentences for each of Young-Moses's Level 4 felony unlawful firearm possession convictions to be served concurrently with the above. Although each of these sentences are longer than the advisory, Young-Moses's aggregate 106-year sentence is below the maximum he could have received.

[18] “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances surrounding the offense and the defendant's participation therein.” Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. To minimize the seriousness of his offenses, Young-Moses acknowledges that they are “certainly serious,” but argues that “they are not the most heinous of their type.” Appellant's Br. p. 27. Focusing only on the sentence imposed for murder, Young-Moses seems to argue that the fact that King was “killed for unknown reasons” supports a lesser sentence. Appellant's Br. p. 28. We are unpersuaded. Young-Moses shot King five times, two of which would have been fatal, while King had been sitting on his back patio in the early morning following Thanksgiving Day. If anything, Young-Moses's lack of apparent motive does not negate the brutality of the offense, it makes it more egregious. The nature of Young-Moses's offenses does not warrant a sentence reduction.

[19] As for Young-Moses's character, “[t]he character of the offender portion of the Rule 7(B) standard refers to general sentencing considerations and relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and permits a broader consideration of the defendant's character[.] A defendant's life and conduct are illustrative of his or her character.” Woodcock, 163 N.E.3d at 878 (citations and quotations omitted). “In examining a defendant's character, one relevant factor is his or her criminal history, the significance of which varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Additionally, although a record of arrests by itself is not evidence of a defendant's criminal history, it is appropriate to consider such a record as a poor reflection on the defendant's character, because it may reveal that he or she has not been deterred even after having been subjected to the police authority of the State.” Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[20] Young-Moses, born in 1995, was first convicted of adult crimes in Illinois in 2013, namely, Class B misdemeanor criminal trespass, felony aggravated fleeing, and felony armed robbery, for which he received a twelve-year sentence. At the time Young-Moses committed the offenses in this case, he was on parole after having completed his lengthy sentence for armed robbery in Illinois. Moreover, Young-Moses's release for that sentence was postponed for one year because of his poor conduct while incarcerated, and his mere presence in Indiana was a parole violation. The pre-sentence investigation report also listed several incidents of Young-Moses's poor behavior as he awaited trial, including assault, disrupting jail operations, and being found in possession of contraband. Young-Moses's criminal behavior and defiance have clearly not been deterred by his prior contacts with the criminal-justice system. Id.

[21] Young-Moses argues that he never knew his father, who had been killed one month before Young-Moses's birth, and that he was sexually abused as a child by his uncle. No evidence in the record indicates a nexus between his mental health and the nature of the offenses he committed, however, and Young-Moses does not otherwise explain how this shows good character. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Ind. 2024) (declining to revise a defendant's sentence where no evidence showed a nexus between his mental health history and his criminal conduct). As evidence of his good character, Young-Moses points only to a “four-year scholarship to the prestigious School of the Art Institute of Chicago[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 27. To the extent that his scholarship may be indicative of Young-Moses's good character, we are unconvinced that it outweighs or offsets the egregious nature of his many offenses, including a seemingly senseless murder. Young-Moses has failed to convince us that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.

[22] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Young-Moses was convicted of two counts of Level 5 felony criminal recklessness, the trial court merged the counts into one for sentencing.

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur