IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.P. and X.P. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.P. and X.P. (collectively, “the Children”) were found to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) on October 18, 2022, after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports of the transient nature and poor condition of the family's housing, that the Children were the victims of neglect, and that X.P. had been born drug positive and required medical care. L.H. (“Mother”) and E.P. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) were ordered to complete certain services. Parents participated in services but failed to make meaningful progress towards reunification with the Children. On August 18, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights. Parents contend that the juvenile court's findings are insufficient to sustain its order. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents have five children together and Mother has three older children from other relationships. J.P. was born to Parents on January 16, 2019. X.P. was born to Parents on May 29, 2022.

[3] Parents’ first interaction with a department of child services occurred in North Dakota in November of 2016. At the time, Parents were accused of having left two of the older children, who were two years old and nine months old at the time, “home alone in the family's locked apartment” unattended “for approximately 70 minutes.” Ex. Vol. VII p. 66. Parents were charged with and each pled guilty to Class C felony child neglect as a result of the incident.

[4] As it relates to the Children, DCS first became involved with the family, then living in Lake County, after X.P. had tested positive for both cocaine and THC at birth. At that time, DCS filed an informal adjustment (“IA”) regarding the five children that Parents had together, including the Children. The IA was “discharged unsuccessfully” a “few weeks after” it had been opened after Father “was picked up by police for stealing.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32.

[5] DCS petitioned to have the Children adjudicated to be CHINS on July 14, 2022. The CHINS petition alleged that Parents had each tested positive for cocaine and marijuana as recently as June 28, 2022; X.P. had not seen a medical professional since his birth on May 29, 2022, had lost weight since birth, and was suspected of being a failure to thrive; the family is transient, had been living in hotel rooms for at least the preceding five months, and, since June 21, 2022, had resided in three separate hotels; “the condition of the hotel rooms in which the family resides is deplorable, with soiled linens, feces on the floor, and in a general state of disarray[;]” two of the then-school-aged children had never been to school, and all five of the children shared by Parents had lice. Ex. Vol. I p. 70. DCS indicated that it had “safety concerns relating to the medical condition of the [five] children; drug use by [Parents]; lice infestations of all the [five] children; unstable housing; failure to comply with the terms of the IA; and educational neglect of” two of the children. Ex. Vol. I pp. 70–71.

[6] Parents admitted that the Children were CHINS and the juvenile court adjudicated them as such. Following a dispositional hearing, Parents were ordered, inter alia, to complete substance-abuse and parenting assessments, participate in supervised visitation, submit to random drug screens, and provide for the Children's medical needs. In November of 2022, the Children were returned to Parents’ care. However, “[n]ot long thereafter, things began to deteriorate for the family[.]” Ex. Vol. I p. 211.

[7] Parents were arrested for shoplifting on July 14, 2023, after leaving an Aldi grocery store “with about $760-ish dollars worth of merchandise.” Tr. Vol. II p. 19. Parents’ five shared children were present in the vehicle when Parents were taken into custody, leaving them without a caregiver. At the time of Parents’ arrest, their vehicle “reeked” of moldy food and burnt marijuana. Tr. Vol. II p. 21. The Children and their three siblings were dirty and “reeked as they ha[d not] bathed in days.” Tr. Vol. II p. 20. During an evaluation, paramedics located “numerous bruises ․ on the children. They had head lice that you could physically see the head lice in every one of the children's head[s].” Tr. Vol. II p. 20. A Schererville Police Detective later indicated that he had “seen lice numerous times before on children” and that this was “absolutely the worst [he had ever] seen.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Officers obtained McDonald's for the Children who had not “eaten since the day prior.” Tr. Vol. II p. 21. DCS was notified and took custody of the Children and their siblings. On July 18, 2023, the juvenile court ordered the five youngest siblings, including the Children, removed from Parents’ care.¹

[8] At some point, Parents moved into an apartment. In the summer of 2025, Mother's three eldest daughters started a trial home visit in Parents’ apartment while the five youngest siblings remained removed from Parents’ care. In the fall of 2025, DCS discovered that Parents’ apartment was infested with cockroaches. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Diana Sargent discovered the cockroaches during a home visit when Mother “went to remove” a package of moldy bread “and there were tons of cockroaches just underneath” the package. Tr. Vol. II p. 49. DCS contracted an exterminator to treat Parents’ apartment, but the exterminator was only able to complete the first two of four treatments before Parents cancelled the remaining treatments. The infestation continued and, on February 27, 2026, FCM Sabrina Jordan noted cockroaches in several locations in the apartment. It was reported that after being returned to Mother's care, her three eldest daughters “get sick a lot[,]” raising a concern for the effect the cockroaches have on the safety and condition of the apartment. Tr. Vol. II p. 67.

[9] Other concerns for the apartment's safety include missing covers from electrical outlets and the door to the room storing the furnace being off its hinges, posing a safety risk for the Children. In addition, there was water damage in the only bathroom in the apartment. All the food also had to be removed from the cabinets because of an insect infestation, and the refrigerator door would not stay closed.

[10] Starting in July of 2025, Parents and all eight children participated in weekly supervised visitation on Saturdays with Epiphany and Company Counseling Services. From July until December of 2025, the visitation occurred in Epiphany's main office. However, visitation eventually had to be moved to a different location because “the family was bringing roaches” into Epiphany's main office, causing an infestation. Tr. Vol. II p. 95. In order to allow Parents to continue their visitation, Epiphany rented a home to use for the weekly visitation sessions. In order to cut down on transmission of roaches to the new location, Mother's bags were checked for roaches prior to visitation and Mother was allowed to store some items at the rented home so that items were “not taken back and forth to the family home[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 98.

[11] Headlice was an ongoing issue for the family, with Parents and all attending children having to be checked for lice before every visit. There was an incident involving lice in spring of 2025. Three visits had to be canceled in July of 2025 because Mother had been infested with lice. An additional three visits were canceled in November of 2025 “because of lice.” Tr. Vol. II p. 114.

[12] During one visit in August of 2025, Mother attempted to pressure J.P. into saying that dogs had attacked him at his foster home and that he did not like his foster parents. J.P. did not want to say those things. Mother and a service provider “clashed at that point[,]” with Mother yelling at the visitation provider in front of J.P., scaring him and causing him to cry. Tr. Vol. II p. 74. During this incident, “neither parent actually went to go and help [J.P.] ․ calm down.” Tr. Vol. II p. 69.

[13] Epiphany staff also had to redirect the children “quite a bit” and Parents often had “to be told” to redirect the Children. Tr. Vol. II pp. 99, 112. Mother would not “take redirection very well” and would “just keep doing whatever” she had been doing. Tr. Vol. II p. 122. Father was more open to redirection. Other visitation issues included that Parents would overfeed the Children during visitation, causing the Children to have “very upset tummies when they went home” from visits. Tr. Vol. II p. 122. Also, Mother's eldest three daughters would sometimes become argumentative or violent with Parents and the tension from these episodes would “spill over into” visits. Tr. Vol. II p. 176. One of the eldest daughters was even banned for two visits after she “pushed a staff member that was conducting the visit[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 52.

[14] The final visit occurred on February 20, 2026, during which Epiphany staff had to do “a lot of redirection.” Tr. Vol. II p. 103. Mother's “mask came off” and she was no longer nice to Epiphany staff and was not treating them appropriately. Tr. Vol. II p. 104. Mother also questioned why the staff was watching her and telling her what to do.

[15] Meanwhile, on August 18, 2025, DCS had petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 12, 2026. During the evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court heard evidence indicating that although Parents had participated in services, they had not made substantial progress towards reunification with the Children. For instance, Epiphany owner and clinical director Francesca Cooley testified that she did not believe that Parents had the ability to pay attention to or parent all eight children during visits. Cooley believed that Parents’ difficulty parenting the elder siblings affected the Children. Cooley opined that it would be unwise to increase the frequency of Parents’ visits with the Children because little progress had been made in their cases. In addition, court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Linda Jennings indicated that she had not observed “either parent demonstrate an ability during [ ] visits to consistently provide” the constant level of supervision that the Children required. Tr. Vol. II p. 123.

[16] The juvenile court heard evidence that Parents had participated in individual therapy. However, Sujatha Jawor, who had worked with Mother from September of 2022 through August of 2025, noted that Mother had not demonstrated significant, long-term growth during their time together. Jawor had also worked with Father and noted that while Father was more invested in therapy and showed cognitive growth, Mother “is more dominant. She makes all the decisions. And [Father] tends to follow whatever she decides on, even if it's not a good advice or decision.” Tr. Vol. II p. 141.

[17] Additionally, while Parents had not tested positive for cocaine since 2024, in the two months leading up to evidentiary hearing, they had continued to test positive for THC. During this period, Father had missed one drug screen and completed five or six drug screens, all of which had been positive for THC. In that same period, Mother missed five drug screens and completed three screens, all of which had been positive for THC. FCM Sargent testified that since midJune of 2025, Parents had each “produced under five negative drug screens[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 41. In discussions with FCM Sargent, Parents had admitted to using marijuana but expressed their belief that the juvenile court would not punish them for marijuana use. Parents had also not been honest about their substance use during therapy, and Jawor opined that their substance abuse had likely played a role in their struggles with cognitive ability and poor decision-making.

[18] While Mother claimed to have obtained employment working for the family's landlord, she provided false information about her finances. Parents did not have independent transportation and relied on their homebased case manager and landlord for transportation. While Mother's eldest three daughters were living with Parents as of the date of the evidentiary hearing, service providers indicated that Parents relied heavily on services for the girls, who were teenagers, and could largely care for themselves.

[19] As it relates to the Children, DCS presented evidence indicating that the Children had been placed with their foster parents for fifteen months and foster parents were willing and able to adopt the Children. Children were “doing well” in their placement and seemed “to get along well.” Tr. Vol. II p. 56. J.P., who was seven years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing, had expressed that “he [does not ever] want to live in a motel ever again.” Tr. Vol. II p. 145. Even when his foster family “goes on a short vacation” and is “checking into a hotel[,]” J.P. “has twenty thousand questions about this hotel room and if they are going home or not. So, that anxiety increases very fast. So, that's a trigger for him.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 145–46. J.P. is “very vulnerable about the concept of love” and feels that “[i]f you criticize him, that means he's not loved.” Tr. Vol. II p. 147. Jawor testified that J.P. needs “[c]onsistency and for someone to really love him, truly, genuinely love him and tell him that he's being loved. Right now, you know, the [Children] seem to feel like they're not worthy of love.” Tr. Vol. II p. 148. X.P., who was three years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing, has special medical needs and FCM Sargent expressed the concern that they would not be met if he were to be returned to Parents’ care.

[20] FCM Sargent opined that Parents have not been able to remedy the reasons for Children's removal in part because they (1) had not demonstrated an ability to provide for X.P.’s medical needs, (2) had not progressed beyond supervised visitation, (3) had continued to test positive for illegal substances, and (4) were still heavily reliant on DCS services. There were also still cockroaches in Parents’ apartment two weeks prior to evidentiary hearing. Jawor opined that Parents were not able to meet the needs of the Children, noting that Parents had demonstrated a “weakness in following through[,]” raising the concern as to whether Parents would follow through with the Children's needed medical and dental care. Tr. Vol. II p. 144. Jawor further opined that permanency is “[v]ery important” for J.P. Tr. Vol. II p. 149. In addition, neither FCM Sargent nor CASA Jennings believed it would be in Children's best interests to provide Parents additional time to remedy the reasons for DCS involvement. CASA Jennings explained that

[c]hildren need permanency. They don't need the courts or the State to raise them. They need safe and loving parents, whether that be foster parents or biological parents. And these two little ones have been in our care for many years and they just need a safe and secure life at this time.

Tr. Vol. II p. 126. Both FCM Sargent and CASA Jennings opined that it was in Children's best interests to terminate Parents’ parental rights.

[21] On March 26, 2026, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights to the Children. In its order, the juvenile court found that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the Children's removal from Parents’ care would not be remedied, that the termination of Parents’ parental rights was in the Children's best interests, and that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the Children's care, i.e., adoption by the Children's current placement.

Discussion and Decision

[22] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[23] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[24] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[25] In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3).² Of relevance to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). Parents do not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that it has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the Children, with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of their parental rights to the Children, Parents argue only that DCS failed to prove Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(3).

A. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[26] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Parents’ parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[27] Pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's continued placement outside of Parents’ home will not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[28] In its order, the juvenile court noted that Parents had participated in services and had made some improvements to their situations, acknowledging evidence outlining their efforts. To the extent that Parents each point to additional evidence which they claim proves that they are able to change the conditions leading to the Children's continued placement outside of their care, the juvenile court was under no obligation to credit such evidence, and, apparently, did not. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”).

[29] Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that a parent's historical pattern of behavior was an appropriate consideration. In In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014), the Indiana Supreme Court held that a juvenile court

must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions—balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. We entrust that delicate balance to the [juvenile] court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

(Brackets, citation, and quotation omitted, bracketed material added). Specifically, the juvenile court “may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. As such, to the extent that Father argues that the juvenile court erred in considering Parents’ historical pattern of failing to adequately care for the Children, we disagree and find the juvenile court's consideration of such evidence to be appropriate and relevant.

[30] The evidence establishes that while Parents had participated in services and made some improvements to their situations, they had ultimately failed to remedy the conditions that had led to the Children's continued placement outside of their care. For instance, although Parents had obtained stable housing, concerns remained as to the appropriateness of the housing, namely, ongoing safety concerns and a cockroach infestation. Further, while Mother claimed to have obtained employment, she had also lied about her financial situation and Parents had relied on their elderly landlord for reduced rent and transportation assistance, calling into question whether Parents would be able to adequately provide for the Children. Parents also continued to test positive for illegal drugs and were heavily reliant upon service providers. Visitation had never progressed beyond a single, weekly, supervised visit, and Parents had demonstrated an inability to simultaneously care for all eight of their children. While Mother's eldest three daughters had been placed in Parents’ care, these children were teenagers who could largely care for themselves and, unlike the Children who were three and seven years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing, were not fully reliant upon Parents to meet their basic needs. Mother's inconsistent statements regarding the medical care she obtained or provided for her eldest three daughters led to reasonable concerns as to whether she could and would ensure that X.P. received necessary medical care.

[31] Despite Parents having made some progress, the evidence most favorable to the juvenile court's judgment establishes that Parents had not resolved the conditions that led to the Children's removal or shown a reasonable likelihood that they would change those conditions in the future. Parents’ claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[32] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[33] “[A] child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child[.]” Id. Father acknowledges this fact but argues that [p]ermanency is not the end all be all goal that the court must achieve.” Appellant E.P.’s Br. p. 18. In support, Father cites to In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009), in which the Indiana Supreme Court noted that “there was no evidence presented to show that permanency through adoption would be beneficial to G.Y. or that remaining as a foster care ward until he could be reunited with his mother would be harmful to G.Y.” (Internal quotation and brackets omitted). Unlike in G.Y., there is ample evidence supporting the juvenile court's determination that the Children's need for permanency supported a finding that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in their best interests.

[34] Jawor, who served as J.P.’s therapist, testified that J.P. needs “[c]onsistency and for someone to really love him, truly, genuinely love him and tell him that he's being loved. Right now, you know, the [Children] seem to feel like they're not worthy of love.” Tr. Vol. II p. 148. Jawor opined that permanency is “[v]ery important” for J.P. Tr. Vol. II p. 149. Jawor further opined that Parents would not be able to meet the Children's needs. The Children were bonded to each other and to their foster parents, who were willing to adopt them. J.P. had indicated to Jawor that he wanted to remain with foster parents and displayed anxiety about the possibility of returning to Parents’ care.

[35] In addition, neither FCM Sargent nor CASA Jennings believed it would be in Children's best interests to provide Parents additional time to remedy the reasons for DCS involvement. CASA Jennings explained that

[c]hildren need permanency. They don't need the courts or the State to raise them. They need safe and loving parents, whether that be foster parents or biological parents. And these two little ones have been in our care for many years and they just need a safe and secure life at this time.

Tr. Vol. II p. 126. Both FCM Sargent and CASA Jennings opined that it was in Children's best interest to terminate Parents’ parental rights. We have previously concluded that the testimony of a case worker and CASA can support a best-interests finding. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests).

[36] Beyond the testimony of Jawor, FCM Sargent, and CASA Jennings, the evidence establishes that while Parents had obtained housing, that housing was not in a safe condition for the Children as it was infested with roaches, it was missing plates covering electrical outlets, the refrigerator door had to be propped shut, and the door to the furnace area was off its hinges. Parents had not demonstrated an ability to watch all of their children at the same time and had not progressed beyond supervised visitation once per week. While Mother claimed that her eldest daughters were receiving appropriate medical and dental care, she provided inconsistent information relating to said care, raising the concern that she would not obtain necessary medical care for X.P., who has special medical needs.

[37] Parents point to evidence that they claim demonstrates that they would be able to appropriately care for the Children at some point in the future, relying heavily on the fact that Mother's eldest three daughters had been returned to their care under DCS supervision. Mother's eldest three daughters, however, were teenagers and, unlike the Children, could largely care for themselves. Again, to the extent that Parents point to additional evidence that they claim proves that the termination of their parental rights was not in the Children's best interests, the juvenile court was under no obligation to believe or credit such evidence. See Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149 (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”). The evidence most favorable to the juvenile court's order is sufficient to prove that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in the Children's best interests. Parents’ claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[38] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time the five youngest children were removed from Parents’ care, Mother's three eldest daughters were living “with a relative under an informal type of situation[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 37. However, in July of 2024, DCS also filed CHINS petitions relating to Mother's three eldest daughters after the relative with whom they had been living was evicted from their home.

2.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025. DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children on August 18, 2025. Although Parents each cite a prior version of the statute in their respective appellate briefs, we apply the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS petitioned to terminate their parental rights.

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.