David L. McDonald, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After entering a plea agreement, David McDonald was convicted of criminal mischief and arson for damaging property belonging to his ex-wife. The trial court sentenced McDonald without ordering restitution or reserving that issue for later determination. Three months later during a restitution hearing in an unrelated theft case, the court ordered McDonald to pay restitution to his ex-wife in the prior cases. Because the trial court lacked the authority to impose restitution in these unrelated criminal cases, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2025, McDonald went to the home of his ex-wife and threw two rocks at the house despite an active protective order prohibiting him from contacting her. As a result, the State charged McDonald with Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. Later that year, McDonald returned to his ex-wife's home, poured gasoline on part of her wooden fence, and set it on fire. The State then charged him with Level 6 felony arson and other offenses. Around the same time, McDonald was facing a Level 6 felony theft charge in a separate case involving his employer.

[3] McDonald later entered into a single plea agreement resolving these and several other pending cases. As relevant here, he agreed to plead guilty to criminal mischief and arson in the cases involving his ex-wife and theft in the separate case involving his employer. The plea agreement expressly left restitution open for later determination in the theft case, but it did not provide for restitution to his ex-wife.

[4] At sentencing, the State attempted to introduce evidence concerning restitution in the theft case involving his former employer. Because the employer was not present, McDonald objected, and the trial court deferred the issue of restitution to a later hearing. The court then proceeded to sentence McDonald on all the pled counts. That same day, the court entered sentencing orders in the arson and criminal mischief cases, neither of which mentioned restitution. On May 4, McDonald filed a motion to correct error requesting the court correct his credit time in the arson case. The court scheduled the matter for hearing on June 3.

[5] On May 6, the trial court conducted a restitution hearing in the theft case. Noting the hearing was “only set under [the theft case],” the State told the court “there was an open plea under the [ex-wife's cases] and ․ we said we would address restitution on those causes today as well, but they're not on the calendar.” Transcript at 33. Then the following exchange occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: And Judge, Defense would object to those being added to today's restitution hearing. The plea agreement doesn't leave restitution open to the Court on those cause numbers. It only left the matter of restitution [open] on the case which was assigned for today.

Deputy Prosecutor ․: Judge, the entire sentence on those cases was open to the Court. That includes restitution.

[Defense Counsel]: It's my understanding that the placement was open to the Court, Judge.

Deputy Prosecutor ․: It says three hundred and sixty-five days open to the Court. That's what the plea said. And you said at the hearing we would address restitution on those causes today.

[Defense Counsel]: And also in the plea agreement it says restitution to [McDonald's employer] shall be open to argument at a restitution hearing.

Deputy Prosecutor ․: Because that's a set term plea.

[Defense Counsel]: If it was the intention of the parties to have a restitution hearing on the other cause numbers it would make sense for the parties to put that in the plea agreement.

Deputy Prosecutor ․: It's an open plea, Judge.

The Court: Yeah, it's an open plea. I'm going to do it today. I'm going to address both restitutions.

Id. at 33-34. The court heard evidence in support of restitution in all three causes. After the hearing, the trial court entered restitution orders in the ex-wife's cases requiring McDonald to pay $3,760 for the criminal mischief and $11,257.50 for the arson.¹

[6] Then, after the June 3 hearing on McDonald's motion to correct error, the court entered a new sentencing order in the arson case with the corrected credit time. However, the court also added that McDonald owed $3,760 in “Non-Interest Bearing Principal” to the “monetary obligations” section of the order—the same amount of restitution it previously ordered him to pay. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 3 at 6. McDonald now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] McDonald argues that because the trial court had already sentenced him in the criminal mischief and arson cases, it no longer had jurisdiction to enter the restitution orders in those two cases by the time of the May 6 restitution hearing. “After a final judgment[,] a court retains only such continuing jurisdiction as is permitted by the judgment itself, or as is given the court by statute or rule.” Wilson v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Marts v. State, 478 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ind. 1985)). And critically, “[a] trial court does not have the inherent power to modify a sentence.” Id. It is well established that a restitution order “is as much a part of a criminal sentence as a fine or other penalty.” Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Miller v. State, 502 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. 1986)), reh'g denied.

[8] McDonald relies predominantly on Wilson v. State to support his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. There, Wilson was sentenced for burglary and theft, and he was ordered to pay restitution only as part of the burglary sentence. 688 N.E.2d at 1294. His theft conviction was affirmed on appeal, but his burglary conviction was reversed. Id. at 1294-95. On remand, the trial court modified Wilson's theft sentence and ordered him to pay restitution. Id. at 1295. A panel of this court reversed the imposition of that order, reasoning:

Here, the trial court entered a final judgment with respect to Wilson's [t]heft conviction on August 14, 1995 when it sentenced Wilson to three years, executed. The trial court's sentencing order did not purport to retain any continuing jurisdiction over Wilson. Further, as we find no statutory provision which would give the trial court jurisdiction to enhance Wilson's sentence by entering a restitution order after a sentence has already been pronounced, we hold that the trial court lacked authority to enter such an order.

Id.

[9] We find similar circumstances here. On February 4, 2026, the trial court entered judgments of conviction and sentencing orders—final orders—in the criminal mischief and arson cases. Nowhere in the orders of those two causes did it purport to retain continuing jurisdiction over McDonald for purposes of restitution or any other issue. In fact, the court left restitution and monetary relief sections in its form sentencing orders blank.

[10] The State distinguishes Wilson, arguing that the trial court indicated at McDonald's sentencing hearing that it was retaining jurisdiction on the issue of restitution and would address it at a later date. We disagree. First, during that discussion, the State sought to address restitution as to McDonald's former employer—the victim in the theft case. The theft case was the only cause for which the plea agreement contemplated restitution, and it was the only cause scheduled for a restitution hearing. Nothing in the court's statement from the bench indicated it intended to retain jurisdiction over McDonald in the criminal mischief and arson cases.

[11] Second, the court's subsequent sentencing orders made no mention of an intent to retain jurisdiction in the criminal mischief and arson cases. What's contained in the court's sentencing order is an important consideration in these circumstances. See id. (“The trial court's sentencing order did not purport to retain any continuing jurisdiction ․”) (emphasis added); see also Andrade v. State, No. 24A-CR-2667, 2025 WL 2355740, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (concluding the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order restitution after it had entered its sentencing order because the sentencing order “did not purport to retain any continuing jurisdiction over [the defendant] to hold the matter of restitution open”) (mem.). We therefore find the State's arguments unpersuasive.

[12] Neither of these circumstances are surprising given the language of the plea agreement at issue here. The plain terms of McDonald's plea agreement provided that he would owe restitution under only one cause—the theft case. See Grider v. State, 976 .E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that plea agreements are subject to the rules of contract interpretation and applying “[t]he plain meaning of the language”). Once the trial court accepted the plea agreement, it was bound to enter the sentences in accordance with the terms of the agreement. See Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 794 (Ind. 2019) (“[T]he State, defendant, and trial court become bound by the [plea] agreement's terms once the plea is accepted by the court.”).

[13] The State's assurances to the trial court at the restitution hearing that this was an open plea are not well taken. “A plea agreement in which the trial court has discretion over the length of the sentence is referred to as an ‘open plea.’ ” Johnson v. State, 898 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Ind. 2008) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court had no discretion as to the length of any portion of McDonald's sentence. The only “open” terms in McDonald's plea agreement were (1) the amount of restitution in the theft case and, (2) where he would serve 365 days of his sentence, i.e., placement. Neither the plain terms nor the form of the plea agreement permitted the court to order McDonald to pay restitution in the criminal mischief case or the arson case.

[14] In all, the trial court did not have the authority to enter the restitution orders in the arson and criminal mischief cases or to later amend McDonald's sentence in the arson case to require restitution.²

Conclusion

[15] Finding the trial court did not have the authority to order restitution in the criminal mischief and arson cases (cause numbers 49D23-2503-CM-7567 and 49D23-2511-F6-34672, respectively), we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate those restitution orders and enter an amended sentencing order in the arson cause (F6-34672) to remove the $3,760 cost from the “Non-Interest Bearing Principal” section of the amended order.

[16] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also entered a restitution order in the theft case requiring McDonald to pay his employer $2,500. McDonald does not appeal this order.

2.   McDonald also argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering restitution in the criminal mischief case because the supporting evidence stemmed from damages that were not part of the State's factual basis at the change of plea hearing. However, we need not address this argument because McDonald's jurisdictional argument is dispositive.

DeBoer, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.