Timothy Mackall, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Timothy Mackall, pro se, appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. Mackall raises five issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether he has demonstrated any reversible error. We affirm Mackall's conviction and remand with instructions for the trial court to correct its records regarding the level of Mackall's conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mackall has a long history of stalking and harassing K.S. In 2021, K.S. obtained an order for protection that prohibited Mackall from communicating with her. However, despite the order for protection, by May 2022 Mackall had committed at least twenty-eight separate instances of invasion of privacy, harassment, and stalking of K.S.

[3] The State charged Mackall for those offenses in Case Number 49D20-2205-F5-13411 (Case F5-13411). After entering its judgment of conviction against him, the court sentenced Mackall to an aggregate executed term of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. As a condition of his sentence, the court further ordered Mackall to have no contact with K.S.

[4] Yet, not two months after his sentencing in Case F5-13411, Mackall wrote a letter to K.S. from prison. Accordingly, the State charged Mackall with Level 6 felony invasion of privacy for contacting K.S. despite the no-contact order. At his ensuing bench trial, Mackall did not dispute that he sent K.S. the letter from prison; he instead argued that the letter was permissible because he needed to keep K.S. apprised of his address for service of process.

[5] The trial court found Mackall guilty and sentenced him to an additional two-year executed term to be served consecutively to his sentence in Case F5-13411. This appeal ensued.

No reversible error occurred.

[6] We initially note that Mackall proceeds pro se. It is well-settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. at 983-84. These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal. Id. at 984. Where an appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived. Id. We will not become “ ‘an advocate for a party[ ] or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’ ” Id. (quoting Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 106 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied).

[7] On appeal, Mackall appears to levy numerous jurisdictional challenges to his conviction. These challenges appear to attack not just the court's subject-matter and personal jurisdiction here but prior judgments in related actions, namely, the original order for protection and his sentencing in Case F5-13411. Appellant's Br. at 21-31, 34-38. The trial court here had subject-matter jurisdiction over the State's charge against Mackall and had personal jurisdiction over him. None of Mackall's other arguments here are properly before us, nor are they arguments supported by cogent reasoning. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We therefore do not consider them.

[8] Mackall also argues that the State's information and evidence were “self-defeating,” which, like the State, we interpret to mean were in fatal variance. Appellant's Br. at 31 (bold font removed). The State's amended information alleged that Mackall's prison letter to K.S. violated Indiana Code section 35-46-1-15.1(a)(6) (2024), which identifies the violation of a no-contact order that has been issued “as a condition of probation” as an offense. But the State's evidence made clear that Mackall's prison letter in fact violated subsection (a)(12), which identifies the violation of a no-contact order that has been issued as part of a prior sentence as an offense.

[9] As our Supreme Court has explained:

Because the charging information advises a defendant of the accusations against him, the allegations in the pleading and the evidence used at trial must be consistent with one another. Simmons v. State, 585 N.E.2d 1341, 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). A variance is an essential difference between the two. Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ind. 1997). Not all variances, however, are fatal. Id. Relief is required only if the variance (1) misled the defendant in preparing a defense, resulting in prejudice, or (2) leaves the defendant vulnerable to future prosecution under the same evidence. Winn v. State, 748 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind.2001).

Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014).

[10] The variance here is not a fatal one. First, it did not mislead Mackall in the preparation of his defense in any way; Mackall never disputed that he wrote and sent the letter to K.S. and that he did so despite his knowledge of the no-contact order. Second, Mackall has presented us with no argument supported by cogent reasoning as to how the variance here might leave him vulnerable to a future prosecution under the same evidence. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). We therefore conclude that there is no reversible error here.

[11] However, the trial court's sentencing order and CCS in this case number do erroneously cite subsection (a)(6) instead of subsection (a)(12) of the statute. Further, both documents also identify Mackall's conviction as a Class A misdemeanor rather than a Level 6 felony, even though the trial court's comments at the end of the bench trial (and Mackall's two-year sentence) make clear that Mackall's conviction is for the Level 6 felony. Accordingly, we remand with instructions for the trial court to correct those records.

[12] For all of these reasons, we affirm Mackall's conviction and remand with instructions for the trial court to correct its records.

[13] Affirmed and remanded.

Mathias, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.