Hoagland Family Limited Partnership, Appellant-Plaintiff v. James L. Nevin, Cathleen L. Nevin, Jerry Augspurger, Mary Augspurger, Bonnie Brown, Clear Lake Town Council, Harold Covell, Don Crapo, David Gardiner, Gary Johnston, Richard Lehman, John McCardle, Dorothy Mosier, Property Management Solutions, Town of Clear Lake, and Robert Troll, Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] This appeal comes to us following nearly twenty years of litigation regarding an easement. James L. Nevin and Cathleen L. Nevin (collectively, “the Nevins”) own a waterfront property on Clear Lake in the Town of Clear Lake. Hoagland Family Limited Partnership (“HFLP”) owns a neighboring property that is not on the waterfront. There is an easement over the Nevins’ property for the benefit of HFLP to access the lake.

[2] In 2006, HFLP filed a complaint against the Nevins, which it amended in 2007 to raise eleven counts against the Nevins related to the Nevins’ placement of items in the easement and their removal of HFLP's items from the easement. HFLP also raised claims against the Town of Clear Lake and members of the Town Council (collectively, “the Town”) alleging that the Town had violated HFLP's civil rights. During the ensuing years of litigation, nine of the eleven counts were dismissed in favor of the Nevins and/or the Town. In addition, the court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Nevins regarding the location and width of the easement. In 2024, the trial court ultimately held a fact-finding hearing on the remaining two issues against the Nevins, and the court considered whether the Nevins had violated a preliminary injunction and whether the preliminary injunction should be made permanent. The court found in favor of the Nevins on the remaining two counts, found that the Nevins had violated the preliminary injunction but did not issue sanctions, and did not issue a permanent injunction. The court also awarded attorney's fees to the Nevins and the Town. HFLP now appeals. We affirm and remand with instructions.

Issues

[3] HFLP raises several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following three issues:

1. Whether the trial court's final order is clearly erroneous.

2. Whether the court erred when it entered partial summary judgment regarding the easement.

3. Whether the court erred when it awarded attorney's fees.

[4] In addition, we consider the Town's request for appellate attorney's fees.

Facts and Procedural History

[5] Gretchen Nahrwold previously owned land at 1120 and 1121 Lake Drive in the Town of Clear Lake. The property at 1120 Lake Drive was located on the waterfront, but the property at 1121 Lake Drive was not. Thereafter, she deeded the property at 1121 Lake Drive to Bruce and Lynn Nahrwold. In 1996, Gretchen entered into an easement agreement with Bruce and Lynn. Pursuant to that agreement, Gretchen granted Bruce and Lynn an easement over 1120 Lake Drive “to provide ingress to and egress from Clear Lake and shall include a right to attach a pier and shall include all other riparian rights[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 71.

[6] In 2000, HFLP purchased the property at 1121 Lake Drive from Bruce and Lynn. Also, in 2000, Gretchen died. In 2002, with the permission of the personal representative of Gretchen's estate, HFLP installed wooden steps and a railing in the easement, and it extended a retaining wall. In 2004, HFLP built a wooden patio on the easement. Also in 2004, the Nevins acquired the property at 1120 Lake Drive. At all relevant times, Dorothy Mosier owned the property at 1116 Lake Drive, which abuts a separate lakefront property owned by HFLP and borders the easement.

[7] At some point, the Nevins asked the zoning inspector to inspect the patio that HFLP had installed. The inspector informed the Nevins that the patio did not comply with zoning ordinances, and, as a result, in June 2004, the Nevins had the patio removed. The Nevins also removed the steps and railing from the easement. The Nevins then started a remodeling project on their home, which rendered the easement unusable from August 2004 until late 2005. After the remodeling and corresponding landscaping projects were complete, the elevation and size of the usable easement had changed.

[8] On June 2, 2006, HFLP filed a complaint against the Nevins as well as the Town.¹ In November, HFLP filed a motion for injunctive relief arguing that the Nevins had interfered with its access to the easement by building a pier; adding a bench, a table, and a hammock; and by planting a pear tree in the easement. HFLP requested a preliminary injunction ordering the Nevins to “refrain from interfering with, blocking, impinging upon [HFLP's] Easement Area, or otherwise attempting to affect the use of the Easement Area” and to “remove the newly planted tree” and other items. Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 7. On February 5, 2007, the court granted HFLP's request for a preliminary injunction, enjoined the Nevins from placing personal property in the easement, and ordered them to remove the pear tree.

[9] On May 30, HFLP filed its fourth amended complaint and raised the following counts:

• Count 1 requested the court to “determine and quiet title to the lawful easement[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 9 at 152.

• Count 2 alleged that the Nevins had “frequently and repeatedly intentionally interfered” with the use of the easement. Id.

• Count 3 alleged that the Nevins had committed trespass when they entered the easement “without notice or invitation” to remove the deck, steps, railing, and patio. Id. at 153.

• Count 4 alleged that the Nevins had committed conversion when they removed the same items.

• Count 6 [sic] alleged that the Nevins had committed theft based on the removal of the same items.

• Count 7 alleged that the Nevins had been unjustly enriched when they received the benefit of the “value” of the items removed. Id. at 155.

• Count 8 alleged that the Nevins had committed civil conspiracy when they “engaged in an agreement to commit the unlawful acts[.]” Id.

• Count 9 requested treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs.

• Count 8 [sic] alleged that the Nevins had removed items from the easement “with the aid or acquiescence of” the Town in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. Id. at 157.

• Count 9 [sic] alleged a claim that each defendant was an “accessory” to the “unlawful conduct[.]” Id. at 163.

• Count 10 alleged that the acts of the defendants were either criminal; outside the scope of employment; or malicious, willful, wanton, and calculated to benefit the defendants.

[10] Also in 2007, Mosier filed an action to establish the boundary line between her property and HFLP's lakefront property. In response, HFLP filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the easement. During the second day of trial, the parties entered into a memorandum of agreement (“MOA”), which provided in part:

The north line of the 1116 Lake Drive (Mosier) shall be the line established by the 1968 C.B. Wood survey as determined by the Lojek survey dated September 8, 2004, and confirmed by the Burlage survey dated July 3, 2008. That portion of the easement created by the easement agreement ․ which lies south of the C.B. Wood line is of no effect as Mosier did not convey the easement.

Appellant's App. Vol. 5 at 188-89. The trial court approved the MOA, which this Court affirmed on appeal. Hoagland v. Mosier, No. 76A03-0911-CV-521, 2010 WL 3450680, at *5-6 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2010) (mem.) (the “Mosier case”).

[11] On December 4, 2012, the Nevins filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Counts 1 (action to quiet title), 3 (trespass), and 8 (violation of civil rights) of HFLP's amended complaint, which motion the Town joined. On April 2, 2018, the trial court granted the motion as to Counts 1 and 3, finding that the “holder of a nonexclusive easement for ingress and egress has exactly that, but not ownership” and that claims for trespass and to quiet title require “a good faith claim of ownership” that HFLP did not have. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 181. The court then granted the motion as to that Count 8 on June 7.

[12] On November 20, 2018, the Nevins filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of the location and width of the easement. The Nevins contended that the “issue of the location/width of the nonexclusive easement ․ was described in the 1996 Easement Agreement” and “litigated and necessarily adjudicated” in the Mosier case. Appellant's App. Vol. 8 at 24. Thus, they maintained that HFLP was estopped from challenging the size and location of the easement in the present action.

[13] HFLP responded and asserted that the “issues of the location and width of the Easement” were not “litigated and necessarily determined” in the Mosier case. Appellant's App. Vol. 11 at 92. HFLP also argued that, if any portion of the easement was south of the boundary line shared with Mosier, the easement was “void for lack of meeting of the minds” because the parties intended for the easement to be entirely on the Nevins’ property. Id. at 111.

[14] On September 15, 2020, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Nevins on the issue of collateral estoppel, finding that the Mosier case had “determined the location and width of the subject easement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 12 at 15. The court also found that two paragraphs of HFLP's amended complaint, paragraphs 42 and 85, constituted judicial admissions as to the easement's location and width and that there was a meeting of the minds between the original parties to the easement.

[15] On May 27, 2021, the Nevins filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the remaining eight counts. In its order, the trial court found that the steps, railing, retaining wall, and patio that HFLP had installed were “clearly outside the scope of the plain language of the amended easement[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 15 at 49. The court then found that, while HFLP had obtained a license from Gretchen's personal representative, HFLP had never “secured a renewal of the license” from the Nevins once they acquired the servient estate and that the Nevins had “exercised their right to revoke the license[.] Id. at 33. And the court found that, after the revocation of the license, the Nevins “had a right to remove” the items. Id. Accordingly, on August 9, 2022, the court granted the Nevins’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Counts 4 (conversion), 6 (theft), 8 (conspiracy), 9 (treble damages), 9 (complicity), and 10 (nature of acts or omissions).

[16] In June 2024, shortly before the scheduled trial on the remaining counts, a dispute arose over HFLP's exhibit lists. On June 13, the trial court struck HFLP's original and first amended exhibit lists and ordered the parties to exchange revised exhibit lists limited to the few issues remaining for trial. On June 19, HFLP filed a second amended exhibit list, which included 464 exhibits across more than eighteen books. The Nevins moved to strike that second list.

[17] On June 26, following a hearing, the trial court found that HFLP had engaged in “an ongoing, persistent pattern of disregarding the previous Orders of the Court,” which “most recently and flagrantly culminated in [HFLP's] original, amended, and second amended list of proposed exhibits[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 168. As sanctions against HFLP, the trial court ordered that it would not impose sanctions against the Nevins for prior violations of the preliminary injunction and that HFLP was limited to “a total of 42 Exhibits ․ totaling no more than 120 single-sided pages.” Id. On July 24, the trial court issued an order confirming that HFLP's appellate rights regarding prior rulings were “reserved and preserved” without the need for HFLP to provide an offer of proof. Appellant's App. Vol. 17 at 60.

[18] On July 30 and 31, 2024, the trial court held a bench trial on Count 2 (interference with the easement) and Count 7 (unjust enrichment) along with HFLP's request for a permanent injunction and its request to hold the Nevins in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction. During the trial, HFLP presented evidence that the Nevins had: parked vehicles on the easement; placed personal property on the easement; modified the slope of the easement, had construction completed on their house, which blocked access to the easement; and failed to create a defined walkway. The Nevins acknowledged that they had placed items in the easement but asserted that those items did not interfere with HFLP's use of the easement.

[19] Following the fact-finding hearing, on May 8, 2025, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Regarding the unjust enrichment claim, the trial court again found that HFLP had installed the steps, railing, and deck on the easement with permission of the Nevins’ predecessor in title such that HFLP had “permission” to install those items at the time. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 188. However, the court found that the license was “revocable at will” by the owner of 1120 Lake Drive and that HFLP “did not secure” a renewal of the license once the Nevins took ownership of the property. Id. And the court found that HFLP “did not allege in the Complaint, or offer credible evidence at trial[,] that it conferred a benefit upon [the] Nevins or their predecessor in title at their express or implied request.” Id. at 189. Thus, the court concluded that HFLP had “failed to establish the necessary elements” to support its claim for unjust enrichment. Id.

[20] As to HFLP's claim that the Nevins had violated the preliminary injunction, the court found that “there is no question” that the Nevins have violated it. Id. at 190. But the court also found that “there was no credible evidence” that HFLP suffered any material harm. Id. In particular, the court noted that Dan Hoagland, one of HFLP's partners, “admitted that these violations did not bar [HFLP's] use of the easement for its intended purpose.” Id. As such, the court found the Nevins in contempt but imposed no sanctions. Similarly, for HFLP's claim on Count 2 that the Nevins had interfered with its use of the easement, the court found that, despite changes in the condition of the easement, “none of these conditions constitute a significant interference with [HFLP's] ability to access the lake using the easement.” Id. at 196. Thus, the court denied HFLP's claim on Count 2.

[21] Regarding HFLP's request that the preliminary injunction be made permanent, the court again found that none of the Nevins’ violations of the preliminary injunction “have resulted in a material interference with” HFLP's or its guests’ and renters’ access to the lake. Id. at 198. The court also found that a permanent injunction “would unnecessarily increase the burdens” on the Nevins’ property. Id. Accordingly, the court denied the request for the permanent injunction and ordered that the preliminary injunction be dissolved.

[22] Finally, the court addressed the issues of attorney's fees. The court found that the Nevins had “effectively prevailed” on all counts in HFLP's complaint. Id. at 202. And the court found that the Nevins had incurred $198,884.34 in fees due to HFLP's continued litigation. But the court also found that HFLP had incurred $7,500 in fees defending against the Nevins’ attempt to vacate the easement. The court then ordered HFLP to pay the Nevins $191,384.34, which represented the amount of fees incurred by the Nevins less the amount HFLP had incurred. The court also found that HFLP's claim against the Town was “clearly frivolous and groundless” and that the Town was entitled to recover $52,126 in attorney's fees. Id. at 206. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: May 8, 2025, Order

[23] HFLP first challenges the court's May 8, 2025, final order as clearly erroneous. At HFLP's request, the trial court entered findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52. Our standard of review in such cases is well settled:

First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment. Challengers must establish that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced a mistake has been made.

Trabucco v. Trabucco, 944 N.E.2d 544, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 535-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

Interference

[24] On this issue, HFLP first contends that the court erred when it determined that the Nevins’ “repeated encroachments did not constitute interference” with the easement. Appellant's Br. at 30. It is well established that the “owner of an easement, known as the dominant estate, possesses all rights necessarily incident to the enjoyment of the easement.” McCauley v. Harris, 928 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Further, “the owner of the dominant estate cannot subject the servient easement to extra burdens, any more than the holder of the servient estate can materially impair or unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement.” Id.

[25] Here, HFLP correctly notes that the “uncontroverted evidence established that [the] Nevins placed or allowed items within the Easement on at least 129 occasions.” Appellant's Br. at 29. Indeed, the court acknowledged that there is “no question” that the Nevins or their guests violated the easement. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 190. However, the evidence also supports the court's finding that HFLP did not suffer any harm because the Nevins “consistently provided access around obstacles ․ to assure the easement could be used for its intended purpose.” Id. at 194. Indeed, Dan testified that he had used the easement “[m]ore than a thousand times” in the previous twenty years. Tr. Vol. 4 at 90. And that finding supports the court's conclusion that, while the Nevins may have placed items in the easement, they did not “materially impair or unreasonably interfere with” HFLP's use of the easement. McCauley, 928 N.E.2d at 314.

Improvements

[26] HFLP next asserts that the court erred when it did not order the Nevins to make certain improvements and repairs to the easement “at their expense[.]” Appellant's Br. at 31. In particular, HFLP argues that the court should have ordered the Nevins to install a “gently sloping” walkway “to provide safe and easy ingress and egress to the lake, including steps, retaining walls, and railing[s],” and to cut down a 90-year-old silver maple tree. Id. at 31-32.

[27] Regarding the safety of the easement, HFLP's surveyor testified that the existing slope of the easement was “roughly the same” as the slope of other lots in the area. Tr. Vol. 4 at 8. Further, Cathleen testified that she had observed the long-time tenant of 1121 Lake Drive “walk up and down the easement” carrying items like “coolers of beer” and kayaks without incident. Id. at 227. And Cathleen, who was seventy-two years old at the time of the fact-finding hearing, testified that she walked up and down the slope “daily” and that she “pull[s] a full trash can up that easement.” Id. at 240. That evidence supports the trial court's finding that the condition of the easement does not “constitute a significant interference with [HFLP's] ability to access the lake using the easement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 196. And that finding supports the court's conclusion that the Nevins were not required to make the requested repairs.

[28] As for the maple tree, we note that this Court has held that “trees may be removed by the holder of the easement if such removal is reasonably necessary to effect the enjoyment of the easement[.]” Bd. of Comm'rs of Vanderburgh Cnty. v. Joeckel, 407 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). In its findings, the trial court specifically found that removal of the tree was not necessary for HFLP to use the easement because HFLP had been granted “passage around the tree to the north[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 196. Further, we agree with the trial court that the tree is a long-term but temporary obstruction to the easement. Indeed, the tree is over ninety years old, and even Dan testified that the tree “is dying.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 196. Because HFLP can still access the lake despite the tree, the court did not clearly err when it concluded that the Nevins were not required to remove it.

Sanctions

[29] HFLP also argues that the court abused its discretion when it imposed certain sanctions against HFLP and when it declined to sanction the Nevins. “The imposition of sanctions to compensate the other party for injuries incurred as a result of the contempt is within the discretion of the trial court.” Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ind. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). HFLP specifically contends that the court erred when it declined to impose sanctions against the Nevins despite the Nevins’ violations of the preliminary injunction and when it limited HFLP's exhibits at the fact-finding hearing.

Failure to Impose Sanctions Against the Nevins

[30] HFLP contends that the court abused its discretion when it declined to impose sanctions against the Nevins. There is no dispute that the Nevins repeatedly violated the preliminary injunction. Nonetheless, the court declined to impose sanctions.

[31] HFLP first contends that the court declined to impose sanctions against the Nevins “because of a purported discovery sanction [against HFLP] that had occurred almost a year earlier.” Appellant's Br. at 33. “We assign the selection of an appropriate sanction for a discovery violation to the trial court's sound discretion.” Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind. 2012). Here, HFLP does not dispute that it committed a discovery violation. Indeed, in June 2024, HFLP filed its second amended exhibit list, which contained 464 exhibits in 18 books, in violation of the court's order directing HFLP to limit its exhibits to the issues that remained for the fact-finding hearing. The Nevins then filed a motion to strike that list. After a hearing, the court found that HFLP had engaged in an “ongoing” and “persistent pattern of disregarding” previous orders by “raising issues that are not before this Court or on which this Court has previously ruled[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 168. Because HFLP “flagrantly” violated the court's orders, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion when, as a sanction, it declined to sanction the Nevins for violating the preliminary injunction. Id.

[32] In any event, HFLP fails to acknowledge that the trial court also declined to issue sanctions because HFLP “suffered no resulting harm[.]” Id. at 190. And, as outlined above, the evidence supports the court's findings that, while the Nevins violated the preliminary injunction, the Nevins did not materially interfere with HFLP's access to the easement.

[33] HFLP also asserts that the court erred when it did not sanction the Nevins because “[n]one of the Trial Court's prior Orders warned HFLP that if HFLP submitted an Exhibit List that [the] Nevins might claim is too long, it could be subject to sanction.” Appellant's Br. at 49. However, notice of a possible sanction is not required in every case. See Bankmark of Florida, Inc. v. Star Fin. Card Servs., 679 N.E.2d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that we “cannot conclude that the trial court's decision should be set aside because it did not expressly warn” the party of the possible sanction where the party “had ample opportunity to produce the requested document and should have known that it risked sanctions for its failure to comply with the court's order[.]”). Here, the court informed HFLP that it needed to limit its discovery responses to those items relevant to the issues that remained for adjudication at the final fact-finding hearing. While the court did not expressly warn HFLP that it could be subject to sanctions, HFLP should have known that it risked sanctions by violating the court's orders. We cannot say that the order should be set aside simply because the court did not explicitly warn HFLP that it risked sanctions.

[34] HFLP further contends that the court erred when it sanctioned HFLP even though “[n]one of [the] Nevins’ Motions to Strike requested that HFLP not be able to pursue sanctions against them for violating the Preliminary Injunction[.]” Appellant's Br. at 49. However, our Supreme Court has held that, “[i]n protecting the discovery process, the trial court has the inherent power to impose sanctions[.]” Noble Cnty. v. Rogers, 745 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ind. 2001) (quoting O'Connor v. State, 382 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)). Thus, it is entirely within the court's power to impose a sanction against a party. HFLP has not directed us to any authority to demonstrate that the court is authorized to impose sanctions only at the request of a party. We affirm the court's order declining to impose sanctions against the Nevins.

Limiting Exhibits

[35] HFLP next contends that the court abused its discretion when it sanctioned HFLP for its discovery violations by limiting the exhibits it was permitted to offer at the fact-finding hearing. The court struck HFLP's initial and first amended exhibits lists and reiterated to the parties the issues that remained for resolution at the fact-finding hearing. Despite that advisement, HFLP's second amended exhibits list contained hundreds of exhibits, many of which were irrelevant to the remaining issues. Indeed, the court stated that it was “fed up with continuing to be badgered with paperwork that goes nowhere on topics that have previously been decided” and that HFLP had made a “completely bad-faith response to a request for a meaningful exchange of the exhibits.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 190-91. Based on HFLP's actions related to discovery, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion when it limited HFLP's exhibits.

[36] In any event, HFLP has not demonstrated that it was harmed by the court's order limiting its exhibits. Dan was able to testify as to the Nevins’ history of violating the preliminary injunction. And HFLP was nonetheless able to present various exhibits on the topic. In addition, the court admitted Exhibit 47, which contained hundreds of itemized questions addressing HFLP's claims regarding the Nevins’ historical interference with the easement.

[37] Still, HFLP contends that it was required to offer the exhibits at trial in order to preserve its appellate rights. But it “remains the case that non-appealable interlocutory rulings merge into the final judgment and are subject to appellate review through an appeal from the final judgment.” C.L.F. v. C.M. (In re Adoption of A.E.), 191 N.E.3d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Thus, all of the court's orders prior to the final judgment were subject to appellate review, and HFLP was not required to submit the exhibits during the final hearing in order to preserve its appellate rights. The court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned HFLP by limiting the exhibits it could present at the fact-finding hearing.

Permanent Injunction

[38] HFLP next asserts that the court erred when it did not convert the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. This Court has previously stated:

Permanent injunctions are limited to prohibiting injurious interference with rights. Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condos. Phase I, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 702, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The grant or denial of an injunction lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless it was arbitrary or amounted to an abuse of discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or if it misinterprets the law. Shipley v. KeyBank Nat. Assn., 821 N.E.2d 868, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

The trial court considers four factors in determining the propriety of permanent injunctive relief: (1) whether the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits; (2) whether plaintiff's remedies at law are adequate; (3) whether the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm a grant of relief would occasion upon the defendant; and (4) whether the public interest would be disserved by granting relief. Ferrell, 751 N.E.2d at 712.

Drees Co., v. Thompson, 868 N.E.2d 32, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[39] HFLP contends that the court erred when it denied HFLP's request for a permanent injunction because the Nevins had “repeated violations” of the preliminary injunction. Appellant's Br. at 35. But, as discussed above and as the trial court found, HFLP did not suffer any material harm from the Nevins’ violations. Thus, there was no “injurious interference” with the easement by the Nevins. Drees Co., 868 N.E.2d at 41. Further, the court found, and HFLP does not challenge, that a “permanent injunction would unnecessarily increase the burdens on the Nevins property[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 198. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the request for a permanent injunction.

Issue Two: Partial Summary Judgment

[40] HFLP next contends that the court erred when it entered partial summary judgment regarding the location and validity of the easement on September 15, 2020. As our Supreme Court has stated:

We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ․ the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to “demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks and substitution omitted).

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (alterations original to Hughley).

Mosier Case

[41] On this issue, HFLP first contends that the trial court erred when it relied on the Mosier case to establish the location of the easement. HFLP asserts that neither the MOA nor the final judgment in that case supports a finding that the Mosier case “fixed the Easement's location and width.” Appellant's Br. at 37. Rather, HFLP argues that the MOA and final judgment contain “the same conditional limitation: any portion of the easement that lies south of the C.B. Wood line ‘is of no effect’ because Mosier did not convey it.” Id.

[42] Mosier and HFLP disputed the boundary line between Mosier's property and HFLP's lakefront property. In response to Mosier's claim, HFLP filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the easement. During the second day of trial, the parties entered into the MOA, which provided:

The north line of the 1116 Lake Drive (Mosier) shall be the line established by the 1968 C.B. Wood survey as determined by the Lojek survey dated September 8, 2004, and confirmed by the Burlage survey dated July 3, 2008. That portion of the easement created by the easement agreement ․ which lies south of the C.B. Wood line is of no effect as Mosier did not convey the easement.

Appellant's App. Vol. 5 at 188-89. The trial court approved the MOA.

[43] Contrary to HFLP's arguments, it is clear that the MOA, which HFLP entered into voluntarily, considered and determined the southern boundary line of the easement. Indeed, it expressly stated that the boundary line was the north line of Mosier's property and that any portion that was located south of that line was of no effect. The MOA contains no hypothetical or conditional language. There is no language that says that, if any land lies to the south, it is of no effect; it specifically says that “[t]hat portion” of the easement south of the line is of no effect. Id. Further, the language of the easement agreement established the easement's northern boundary, which no party disputes.

[44] Because the southern boundary was established by the MOA and the final judgment in the Mosier case and the northern boundary was established by the easement agreement, the width and location of the easement were conclusively established by the MOA and final judgment in that case. We therefore agree with the trial court that the MOA and the Mosier case “determined the location and width of the subject easement.” Appellant's App. Vol. 12 at 15. The court did not err when it entered summary judgment on this ground.

Collateral Estoppel

[45] HFLP next asserts that the trial court erred when it found that collateral estoppel precluded HFLP from arguing the location and width of the easement. Our Supreme Court has stated:

There are three requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of the issues; and (3) the party to be estopped was a party or the privity of a party in the prior action. Furthermore, two additional considerations are relevant in deciding whether the defensive use of collateral estoppel is appropriate: “whether the party against whom the judgment is pled had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel.”

Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc., v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2012) (internal citation omitted), cert. denied.

[46] HFLP specifically contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether it had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the location and width of the easement in the Mosier case. To support its assertion, HFLP points to the fact that it unsuccessfully attempted to consolidate the Mosier case with the present case, that the Nevins asserted that the two cases did not involve common questions of law or fact, and that the court in the Mosier case stated that its ruling would not impact the Nevins.

[47] But the designated evidence demonstrates that, despite those facts, HFLP had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the easement issue in the Mosier case. Indeed, it was HFLP that filed the counterclaim raising the issue of the easement boundary. Mosier's claim and HFLP's counterclaim were in litigation for over a year before they entered into negotiations and, ultimately, the MOA. HFLP voluntarily entered into the MOA that set the southern boundary line of the easement. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it determined that HFLP had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue during the Mosier case.

Judicial Admissions

[48] HFLP also contends that the court erred when it concluded that paragraphs 42 and 85 of its amended complaint constituted judicial admissions regarding the location and width of the easement.

A judicial admission is an admission in a current pleading or made during the course of trial; it is conclusive upon the party making it and relieves the opposing party of the duty to present evidence on that issue. Statements contained in a party's pleadings may be taken as true as against the party without further controversy or proof.

Brazier v. Maple Lane Apartments 1, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 442, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[49] HFLP asserts that the specified paragraphs in its complaint “merely reference surveys prepared by third parties ․ without any clear or unequivocal admission that those surveys accurately depict the Easement's true location or width[.]” Appellant's Br. at 40. In paragraph 42 of its complaint, HFLP stated:

While conducting the field work for [a] survey[,] Michael Ruff set survey stakes marking the monuments previously set by Donovan Engineering at the southwest corner of the Nahrwold residence and the southeast corner of the easement just south of the pine tree by the lake. IE: See Exhibit 6. The adjacent real property is owned by the Mosiers. None of the Mosiers ever objected to said survey stakes. Said survey describes the Nahrwolds’ property, and depicts a 1.06 acre tract of land, a 0.11 acre tract of land, and a 4 foot easement which widens to 10 foot wide by the lake, as owned by the Nahrwolds. A true and correct copy of this June 1, 200 survey is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.

Appellant's App. Vol. 9 at 141.

[50] Then, in paragraph 85, HFLP stated:

The Donovan Engineering survey that was attached to the Easement Agreement shows the south boundary of said easement to be 5’ south of the southwest corner of the Nahrwold residence. See Exhibit 29. The southeast corner of the easement was shown to be just south of the pine tree by the lake. See Exhibit 6.

Id. at 151.

[51] However, we need not decide whether the court erred when it identified those statements as judicial admissions. The court, in essence, determined that HFLP had admitted to the location and width of the easement as a matter of law, which foreclosed any genuine dispute over that question of fact. But, as outlined above, the MOA and final judgment in the Mosier case conclusively, and independently, established the southern boundary of the easement, and the plain language of the easement agreement established the northern boundary. As such, even if the court erred when it treated the two paragraphs of the amended complaint as judicial admissions, any error was harmless as the location and the width of the easement were separately established by the easement agreement and the Mosier case.²

Meeting of the Minds

[52] Finally, on this issue HFLP contends that the court erred when it entered partial summary judgment based on its conclusion that there had been a meeting of the minds between the parties to the 1996 easement agreement. “In order to create a valid easement, a document must identify with reasonable certainty the easement created and the dominant and servient tenements relative thereto.” Mackiewicz v. Metzger, 750 N.E.2d 812, 817 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

[53] HFLP claims that, if a portion of the easement was located south of the Mosier boundary line, then the agreement is “clearly void for lack of meeting of the minds” because the parties intended the entire easement to be on the Nevins’ property. Appellant's Br. at 43. Here, the easement agreement identified with reasonable certainty the easement created and the dominant and servient estates. Specifically, the easement agreement created an ingress/egress easement to Clear Lake and gave the dominant estate the right to attach a pier and all other riparian rights.

[54] HFLP relies on the fact that part of the easement was later found to be located on Mosier's property instead of the Nevins’. However, the fact that part of the easement may have been located on Mosier's property does not render the entire easement void. Indeed, a partial defect in an easement description does not automatically void the entire instrument. See Kopetsky v. Crews, 838 N.E.2d 1118, 1124 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that invalidity of one portion of an easement does not render the remainder void). The trial court did not err when it found that there was a meeting of the minds between the individuals who entered into the easement agreement and when it entered partial summary judgment accordingly.

Issue Three: Attorney's Fees

[55] Finally, HFLP contends that the court erred when it entered its award of attorney's fees. We review a trial court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. River Ridge Dev. Auth. v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or misinterprets the law. Id. On appeal, HFLP challenges the court's award of attorney's fees to both the Town and the Nevins. We address each argument in turn.

The Town

[56] Here, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the Town pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-13-4-4, which provides that, “[i]n any action brought against a governmental entity under civil rights laws of the United States, the court may allow attorney's fees as part of the costs to the governmental entity prevailing as defendant if it finds that plaintiff ․ brought the action on a claim that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” HFLP argues that the court erred when it awarded attorney's fees to the Town because HFLP's claims against the Town were dismissed on procedural grounds, which “is not a basis for finding a defendant [to be] a prevailing party.” Appellant's Br. at 51.

[57] Contrary to HFLP's arguments, it is clear that the court dismissed HFLP's civil rights complaints against the Town on multiple grounds, including that HFLP was not a member of a protected class for purposes of its claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, that HFLP's claims were time-barred, and that HFLP had not sought compensation before asserting its taking claims under Section 1983. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 120.³ Those are not purely jurisdictional bases but, rather, go to the substance of HFLP's claims. Further, HFLP made multiple attempts to reassert the civil rights claims and to file a fifth amended complaint even after the court expressly prohibited further amendments without leave. HFLP's repeated attempts to relitigate issues that the court had previously dismissed and the fact that the Town prevailed support the court's award of attorney's fees to the Town.

Appellate Attorney's Fees for the Town

[58] In addition, the Town asks for an award of appellate attorney's fees. Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) provides that this Court may assess damages, including attorney's fees, against an appellant if an appeal or a brief is frivolous or taken in bad faith. “Our discretion to award attorney fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) is limited, however, to instances when an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[59] Here, HFLP's challenge to the Town's fee is largely conclusory and fails to meaningfully challenge the court's order. HFLP's sole substantive arguments, that its civil rights claims were not frivolous and that dismissal was procedural, are contradicted by the court's findings of fact. HFLP offers no good-faith argument for reversal. Accordingly, we grant the Town's request for appellate attorney's fees and remand to the trial court to determine a reasonable amount of fees incurred by the Town in defending against HFLP's appeal.

The Nevins

[60] HFLP next argues that the court “under-awarded HFLP attorney fees and awarded attorney's fees to [the] Nevins under the Easement Agreement[.]” Appellant's Br. at 52. The easement agreement specifically provides that the parties “agree that the prevailing party shall have a right to recover all costs, including attorney[’]s fees, in the event this Easement Agreement becomes the subject of any litigation[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 9 at 197.

[61] On appeal, HFLP contends that the court abused its discretion when it awarded nearly $200,000 in attorney's fees to the Nevins because the “Nevins were not the prevailing party and HFLP was the prevailing party.” Appellant's Br. at 53. Specifically, HFLP argues that it was the prevailing party because it successfully defended the existence of the easement, obtained a preliminary injunction, and proved that the Nevins violated the injunction.

[62] We acknowledge that HFLP obtained an injunction and that the Nevins violated it. However, the Nevins prevailed on all substantive counts. Indeed, nine of HFLP's eleven counts were dismissed before trial, and HFLP did not prevail on its claims to quiet title, for interference, or for a permanent injunction. And even though the Nevins violated the preliminary injunction, as we have discussed, HFLP did not sustain any harm. Given that this litigation has spanned nearly twenty years and that the Nevins have prevailed on all substantive claims at various times throughout the proceeding, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion when it ordered HFLP to pay the Nevins’ attorney's fees.⁴

Conclusion

[63] The trial court did not err when it: found that the Nevins had not materially interfered with the preliminary injunction, did not order the Nevins to make improvements to the easement, issued its order regarding sanctions, or denied HFLP's request for a permanent injunction. As such, the court's final order is not clearly erroneous. Further, the court did not err when it entered partial summary judgment regarding the location and width of the easement because the Mosier case and the MOA established the boundaries of the easement and because HFLP was estopped from relitigating the boundaries. In addition, any error in the court's identification of statements in the amended complaint as judicial admissions was harmless, and there was a meeting of the minds between the original parties to the easement agreement. Finally, the court did not err when it ordered HFLP to pay the Town's and the Nevins’ attorney's fees. We therefore affirm the trial court. In addition, we grant the Town's request for appellate attorney's fees and remand with instructions for the court to determine a reasonable amount.

[64] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   HFLP also named numerous other defendants, but this appeal relates only to claims regarding the Nevins and the Town.

2.   HFLP briefly asserts that the court erred when it struck the affidavit of Michael W. Davis. The court struck that affidavit on the ground that it contradicted the judicial admissions made by HFLP. However, any error in the court's striking of that affidavit is harmless for the same reasons. According to HFLP, the Davis affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact as to the location of the easement. But, again, the location and the width of the easement were conclusively established by the easement and the MOA and final judgment in the Mosier case.

3.   That court order dismissed HFLP's civil rights claims based on the reasons argued by the Nevins in their motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Nevins argued, in part, that HFLP's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must fail because it failed to follow the correct “procedures” for a claim for compensation. Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 235. The Nevins then argued that HFLP's claim under sections 1985 and 1986 must fail because HFLP was not “a member of a protected class[.]” Id. at 236.

4.   We note that HFLP does not challenge the amount of fees as unreasonable. We further note that, unlike the Town, the Nevins did not request appellate attorney's fees.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.