Keith Domonique Owens, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Keith Domonique Owens appeals his conviction for intimidation, as a Level 5 felony. Owens raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Michael Williams is an operator for Last Chance Wrecker in Indianapolis. On June 28, 2025, Williams saw a silver Volkswagen Beetle “with a left rear flat tire” and an expired “paper plate” on a public road in front of a house. Tr. Vol. 2 at 112. Williams determined that the vehicle had been “abandoned” due to the flat tire, “accumulating dust,” and “rotors were rusty.” Id. Williams decided to “tag” the vehicle, which would alert the owner to the problems and give the owner three days to move the car. Id. at 118.

[3] As Williams exited his truck, Owens “stepped outside with [a] gun in his hand” and his dog by his side. Id. at 118. Williams attempted to explain to Owens what he was doing, but Owens said that he “did not care what [Williams] had to say.” Id. Owens then told Williams that if he “touched the car again, [he] was going to die.” Id. Owens was “very aggressive[ ].” Id. at 122.

[4] At that point, Williams retreated to his truck because his “intentions were done there” and the job was “not worth [his] life.” Id. at 123. Williams then noticed “what seemed [to be] a racking motion from the gun” and “the gun slightly raised in [his] direction.” Id. Williams believed that Owens was “chambering a bullet into the gun,” and he “fear[ed] for his life[.]” Id. at 124. Owens was holding the gun in his hand and, while it was not pointed “directly” at Williams, it was “raised” in his direction “as if [Owens] was sending a warning or a message.” Id. at 125. If Owens would have fired the gun, “the bullet definitely would have hit” Williams. Id. at 163.

[5] Williams was able to get back into his truck, and he drove down the street and called the police. Williams drove approximately six to seven houses away and tagged another vehicle while he waited for officers. Officers ultimately arrested Owens, and the State charged him with intimidation, as a Level 5 felony, and pointing a firearm, as a Level 6 felony.

[6] The trial court held a two-day jury trial beginning on January 21, 2026. During the trial, Williams testified to the events that had occurred outside Owens’ house. The jury found Owens guilty of intimidation but not guilty of pointing a firearm. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Owens to 1,095 days, with 550 days suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Owens contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[8] To convict Owens of intimidation, as charged, the State was required to prove that he had communicated a threat to commit battery by means of a deadly weapon to Williams by drawing or using a handgun with the intent that Williams be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 14; see also Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(b)(2). On appeal, Owens challenges only whether he communicated a true threat to Williams.

[9] A threat means “an expression, by words or actions, of an intention to ․ unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person, or damage property [or] commit a crime.” I.C. § 35-45-2-1(c). Indiana courts have adopted an objective view of whether a communication is a threat. McBride v. State, 128 N.E.3d 531, 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Owens v. State, 659 N.E.2d 466, 474 (Ind. 1995)), trans. denied. Whether a defendant's communications, objectively viewed, were threats is a question of fact for the fact-finder to decide. Id. The fact-finder must consider all the contextual factors because assessing true threats is highly dependent on context. Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 963 (Ind. 2014).

[10] In particular, Owens argues that he did not communicate a true threat because, even if “Williams’ testimony that Owens had a gun in his hand is accurate, his description of where it was point[ed] was, at best, vague.” Appellant's Br. at 13. Owens asserts that Williams’ “indefinite” description offers “little, if any, support to a conclusion that Owens intended to place Williams in fear.” Id. And Owens maintains that Williams’ act of driving a few houses away “does not support a conclusion that there was any need for fear.” Id. at 13.

[11] However, the evidence most favorable to the judgment demonstrates that, when Williams attempted to do his job and tag Owens’ car, Owens exited his house with a gun in his hand. Owens told Williams that he would die if he touched the car again. And, as Williams retreated to his truck, he saw a “racking motion” from the gun and that the gun was “slightly raised in [his] direction.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 123. Williams believed that Owens had “chamber[ed] a bullet” and that he “fear[ed] for [his] life.” Id. at 124. And Williams testified that, if Owens “would have pulled the trigger, that bullet definitely would have hit” him. Id. at 163.

[12] Stated differently, the evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that Owens pointed a gun in the direction of Williams such that he could have shot Williams if he had pulled the trigger and that Owens told Williams that he would die if he touched Owens’ car again. A reasonable fact-finder could infer from that evidence that Owens had communicated a true threat to Williams. Owens’ argument on appeal is simply a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We therefore affirm Owens’ conviction.

[13] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.