Traci Lynn Porretta, Appellant v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Traci Lynn Porretta, pro se, appeals the Kosciusko Superior Court's order denying her motion to transfer venue to Wabash County. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 29, 2025, Metropolitan Title of Indiana, LLC (“Metropolitan”) filed a Complaint for Interpleader in the Kosciusko Superior Court naming Porretta and Jamie Lee Rodriguez as defendants (together, “Defendants”). On November 6, 2025, Metropolitan filed an Amended Complaint for Interpleader alleging that it and Defendants entered into an escrow agreement ¹ by which the sum of $36,850.18 was deposited with it as escrow agent, that “[s]ubsequent to execution of the Escrow Agreement and closing of the transaction, it was determined that the payoff amount” of the mortgage “was understated by $6,019.50,” “[a]s a result, [it] reduced the net proceeds of the transaction by $6,019.50 and paid the necessary amount” to the mortgage company, and “[t]hereafter, the net proceeds being held pursuant to the Escrow Agreement were $30,830.68.” Appellee Metropolitan's Appendix Volume II at 4. Metropolitan stated that a dispute existed between Defendants as to the distribution of sums held by it as escrow agent and that it would tender the sum of $30,830.68 to the clerk of the court.

[3] On November 18, 2025, Rodriguez filed an answer and cross-claim for damages. In her cross-claim, Rodriguez alleged that she and Porretta were joint owners of certain property in Wabash County, they jointly sold the property in or before November 2020 and deposited the net proceeds from the sale into an escrow account with Metropolitan, the total remaining net proceeds after necessary payments on the mortgage were $30,830.68, the net proceeds were to be paid equally to her and Porretta as the joint owners of the property, and she is entitled to half of the amount held in escrow less half the fees Metropolitan incurred in filing the action. On January 5, 2026, Metropolitan filed a motion for default judgment, and on January 7, 2026, Rodriguez filed a consent to judgment.

[4] On January 20, 2026, Porretta, pro se, filed a response and objection to the motion for default judgment. Porretta stated that, in 2008, her mother, Patricia Egolf, executed a warranty deed transferring her property to Defendants while retaining a life estate for herself and that, upon Egolf's death in 2019, the life estate terminated by operation of law and the property vested in Defendants and was not part of Egolf's probate estate. Porretta argued, “[a]fter my mother relocated to Utah due to declining health and following her passing, the property required continued maintenance in order to preserve its value and permit sale,” “[d]uring this period, I paid ongoing property-related expenses, including: Utilities[,] Insurance[, and] Property-related maintenance expenses,” “[m]y sister has consistently refused to contribute to any portion of these expenses, despite equal ownership interest in the property,” and “[t]he interpleader action exists solely because the co-owners were unable to reach agreement regarding allocation of these necessary expenses.” Id. at 19. Porretta stated: “I am not requesting reimbursement at this time. I respectfully request that the Court determine a 50/50 allocation of qualifying property expenses prior to any distribution of escrow funds.” Id. Porretta further stated that she objected to venue in Kosciusko County.

[5] Also on January 20, 2026, Porretta filed a motion to transfer venue to Wabash County. She argued “[t]he property that is the subject of this interpleader action is located in Wabash County, Indiana,” the deed transferring ownership of the property to Defendants, the mortgage on the property, and the release of the mortgage were recorded in Wabash County. Id. at 23. Porretta stated that she resides in Utah and Rodriguez resides in Arizona. Porretta argued, “[b]ecause the property, relevant recordings, and factual nexus of this matter are centered in Wabash County, and because neither Defendant resides in Kosciusko County, venue in this Court is improper or, at minimum, substantially inconvenient.” Id.

[6] On April 29, 2026, Porretta filed a counterclaim alleging that Metropolitan improperly distributed the sum of $6,019.50 and a cross-claim alleging that she had paid expenses totaling $1,749.86 to preserve the property before its sale and that Rodriguez had not contributed her share of the expenses and requesting the court to order that the sum of $874.93, representing one-half of the expenses, be deducted from Rodriguez's share of the escrow funds prior to distribution. On May 11, 2026, Porretta filed an amended cross-claim alleging that she had paid expenses totaling $2,113.89 related to the property and that Rodriguez had not contributed her share of the expenses and requesting the court to order that the sum of $1,056.95, representing one-half of the expenses, be deducted from Rodriguez's share of the escrow funds prior to distribution. On May 17, 2026, Porretta filed a notice of related proceedings stating that an estate action was initiated in the Wabash Circuit Court on June 23, 2025. On June 10, 2026, Porretta filed a motion asking the court to rule on her motion to transfer venue.

[7] On June 11, 2026, Metropolitan filed an Objection to Change of Venue. Metropolitan argued that it “maintains an office in Kosciusko County, Indiana,” Defendants are non-residents of the State of Indiana, and Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(10) authorized the filing of the complaint in Kosciusko County. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 49. The trial court issued an order denying Porretta's motion to transfer venue pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(10). On June 15, 2026, Porretta filed a notice of appeal. On June 16, 2026, Porretta filed a motion to stay trial court proceedings pending interlocutory appeal. On June 25, 2026, Rodriguez filed an objection to the motion to stay. On June 26, 2026, Porretta filed a reply.² On June 29, 2026, the court granted Porretta's motion to stay.

Discussion

[8] Porretta argues the trial court erred in denying her request to transfer venue from Kosciusko County to Wabash County. Porretta proceeds pro se. Pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. As such, pro se litigants are required to follow the established rules of procedure. Id. at 983-984. We will not become an advocate for a party. Id. at 984.

[9] Whether a county is a preferred venue is a question of law that we review de novo. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Poluciano, 272 N.E.3d 1009, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019)). Interpretation of our trial rules, such as Ind. Trial Rule 75, is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. Also, where factual determinations are made from a paper record, those determinations are reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Scribbles, LLC v. Wedgewood by Wedgewood, 101 N.E.3d 844, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). Generally, we will affirm the trial court's ruling if it is sustainable on any basis found in the record. See Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. 2009) (addressing motion to dismiss).

[10] This Court has held:

Indiana Trial Rule 75, which governs venue requirements in Indiana, provides that a plaintiff may bring a case in any county in Indiana. See Ind. Trial Rule 75(A) (“Any case may be venued, commenced[,] and decided in any court in any county[.]”). Additionally, Trial Rule 75(A) provides that a party can file a motion to transfer venue and requires a trial court to transfer venue if the party “properly filing such motion” shows both that “the county ․ where the action was filed does not meet preferred venue requirements ․ and that the ․ county selected has preferred venue[.]” Id. (emphasis added). See also Ind. High School Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Garcia, 876 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that “Indiana Trial Rule 8(C) provides that a claim of improper venue is an affirmative defense, which the pleading party must prove” and that the party moving to transfer venue has “the burden of proof in challenging venue”), trans. denied. Trial Rule 75(A) “contains ten subsections, each setting forth criteria establishing ‘preferred’ venue.” CTB, Inc. v. Tunis, 95 N.E.3d 185, 187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

CSX Transportation, 272 N.E.3d at 1013

[11] Ind. Trial Rule 75(A) provides:

Preferred venue lies in:

* * * * *

(2) the county where the land or some part thereof is located or the chattels or some part thereof are regularly located or kept, if the complaint includes a claim for injuries thereto or relating to such land or such chattels, including without limitation claims for recovery of possession or for injuries, to establish use or control, to quiet title or determine any interest, to avoid or set aside conveyances, to foreclose liens, to partition and to assert any matters for which in rem relief is or would be proper; or

* * * * *

(8) the county where a claim in the plaintiff's complaint may be commenced under any statute recognizing or creating a special or general remedy or proceeding; or

* * * * *

(10) the county where either one or more individual plaintiffs reside, the principal office of any plaintiff organization or governmental organization is located, or the office of any such plaintiff organization or governmental organization to which the claim relates or out of which the claim arose is located, if the case is not subject to the requirements of subsections (1) through (9) of this subdivision or if all the defendants are nonresident individuals or nonresident organizations without a principal office in the state.

“The rule does not create a priority among the subsections establishing preferred venue.” Garcia, 876 N.E.2d at 351 (citation omitted).

[12] To be entitled to a transfer of venue from Kosciusko County to Wabash County, Porretta as the party requesting the transfer had the burden to show both that Wabash County was a county of preferred venue and that Kosciusko County was not a county of preferred venue. See CSX Transportation, 272 N.E.3d at 1013 (transfer of venue required only where requesting party shows both that county where action was filed does not meet preferred venue requirements and that the “county selected has preferred venue”) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)).

[13] Porretta first asserts that Wabash County is a county of preferred venue under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2). She argues every instrument relating to the property is recorded in Wabash County and the escrow funds at issue are the proceeds of the sale of the property. This Court has held that the test to determine whether a claim relates to land under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2) is “whether a sufficient nexus exists between the land and the underlying action.” Trs. of Purdue Univ. v. Hagerman Const. Corp., 736 N.E.2d 819, 820-821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Diesel Const. Co., Inc. v. Cotten, 634 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)), trans. denied. We have also held that, if a plaintiff's claims concerned “only a question of debt,” the nexus test is not satisfied. Diesel Const., 634 N.E.2d at 1354 (“If the trial court finds that Cotten's claims concern only a question of debt, the nexus to the land would be too remote to meet T.R. 75(A)(2).”). See Bayless Specialties v. Affordable Hous., Inc., 637 N.E.2d 840, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2) not applicable where claims were “mere requests for repayment of debts”), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[14] Under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2), a county where land is located is a county of preferred venue where “the complaint includes a claim for injuries thereto or relating to such land,” including claims for recovery of possession, to quiet title, to set aside conveyances, to foreclose liens, to partition, and “to assert any matters for which in rem relief is or would be proper.” Metropolitan's complaint does not assert any such claim relating to the property previously owned by Egolf and later owned by Defendants. Indeed, the property was sold in November of 2020, the complaint does not raise any claims regarding possession of, title to, or liens affecting the property, and the property's current owners are not parties. The complaint does not raise any matter “for which in rem relief is or would be proper.” Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2). The complaint relates only to the proper distribution of the funds held in escrow. We conclude that Porretta has not shown on this record that Wabash County is a county of preferred venue under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2).

[15] Porretta further asserts “[t]he escrow transaction governed by IC § 27-7-3.7[³ ] arose from the sale of Wabash County real property” and “[s]ubsection (8) provides an additional basis for Wabash County preferred venue.” Appellant's Brief at 14. Porretta's motion to transfer venue did not cite Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(8). In any event, under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(8), a county is a county of preferred venue where “a claim in the plaintiff's complaint may be commenced under any statute recognizing or creating a special or general remedy or proceeding.” This Court has held that Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(8) “adopts special venue statutes into the regulatory scheme of T.R. 75” and that “[s]ubsection (8) retains the ‘statutory’ venue as an alternative venue, thereby avoiding any conflict.” MacLeod v. Guardianship of Hunter, 671 N.E.2d 177, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted) (discussing Ind. Code § 29-3-2-2 governing venue for appointment of guardian and protective proceedings), trans. denied. Metropolitan's complaint does not invoke a statute conferring a special venue. Moreover, Ind. Code Chapter 27-7-3.7 relates to Porretta's counterclaim, not Metropolitan's complaint, and in addition, Porretta does not point to any special venue statute in Ind. Code Chapter 27-7-3.7. Porretta has not shown that Wabash County is a county of preferred venue under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(8).⁴

[16] Because Porretta has not established that Wabash County meets the criteria of a county of preferred venue, the trial court did not err in denying her motion to transfer venue. See CSX Transportation, 272 N.E.3d at 1014 (because defendants did not show Hendricks County was a county of preferred venue, trial court did not err in denying their motion to transfer venue to Hendricks County). Also, because Wabash County is not a county of preferred venue, we need not determine whether Kosciusko County is a county of preferred venue under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(10).⁵ See id. at 1013.

[17] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Following the signatures of Defendants on the last page of the escrow agreement, the following appears:ESCROW AGENTMetropolitan Title of Indiana9604 Coldwater Rd, Ste. 105Fort Wayne, IN 46825ATTN: _______________Appellee Metropolitan's Appendix Volume II at 7.

2.   In her reply, Porretta states that Metropolitan's “principal office and company headquarters is located at 4100 Edison Lakes Parkway, Suite 120, Mishawaka, Indiana, 46545 — in St. Joseph County, not Kosciusko County.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 56. She also states: “[Metropolitan] maintains a branch office at 122 W. Main Street, Warsaw, Indiana 46580 in Kosciusko County. A branch office is not a principal office for purposes of Indiana Trial Rule 75(A)(10).” Id.

3.   Ind. Code Chapter 27-7-3.7 governs escrow transactions in real estate transactions.

4.   In a heading in her appellant's brief, Porretta states that Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(1) supports the conclusion that Wabash County is a county of preferred venue. However, she develops no argument related to that subsection.

5.   In her reply brief, Porretta argues, “The existing record supplies substantial connections to counties other than Kosciusko: Wabash County through the identified real estate and net proceeds, Allen County through the Fort Wayne escrow-agent address on Metropolitan's own filed agreement, and a filed assertion identifying Metropolitan's principal office in St. Joseph County.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 5-6. Porretta's motion to transfer venue did not request a transfer of venue to Allen County or St. Joseph County, her argument in her reply brief is much more expansive than the request in her motion to transfer venue to Wabash County, and we decline to address whether Allen County or St. Joseph County may constitute counties of preferred venue.

Brown, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.