George Elbert Grady, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] George Elbert Grady appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony counterfeiting, arguing the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2024, the Alexandria Police Department received a public records request form, which was purportedly filled out and signed by Jordan Allen. Allen is a deputy with the Madison County Sheriff's Department and denied submitting the form. Soon after, the Alexandria Clerk's Office received a public records request form purportedly filled out and signed by Erica Bell. Bell is a deputy clerk and denied submitting the form. Police investigated and determined both requests came from an email address linked to Grady.

[3] The State charged Grady with two counts of Level 6 felony identity deception and two counts of Level 6 felony counterfeiting. A bench trial was held in March 2026. The trial court found Grady guilty of both counts of Level 6 felony counterfeiting but acquitted him of both counts of identity deception. The court sentenced Grady to 365 days suspended to probation for each offense, to be served concurrently. Grady now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Grady argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for Level 6 felony counterfeiting. Our standard for reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).

[5] Resolution of Grady's sufficiency challenge turns on our interpretation of Indiana's counterfeiting statute. Even if framed as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply a de novo standard of review to questions of statutory interpretation. Dobeski v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1257, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, we first examine whether the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. If it is, we need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be given their plain, ordinary, and usual meanings. Where a statute is open to more than one interpretation, it is deemed ambiguous and subject to judicial construction. Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the statute itself.

Id. at 1259-60 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[6] To establish that Grady committed Level 6 felony counterfeiting, the State was required to prove he knowingly or intentionally “ma[de] or utter[ed] a written instrument in such a manner that it purports to have been made: (A) by another person; (B) at another time; (C) with different provisions; or (D) by authority of one who did not give authority[.]” Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(a)(1) (2021). A “written instrument” means “a paper, a document, or other instrument containing written matter and includes money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, medals, retail sales receipts, labels or markings ․ or other objects or symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.” Ind. Code § 35-43-5-1(s) (2021).

[7] Grady argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the public records request forms were not “written instruments” within the meaning of the counterfeiting statute. Specifically, he argues a “written instrument” under the counterfeiting statute must “independently carr[y] a legal, pecuniary, or proprietary effect.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. In support, he cites several nineteenth- and twentieth-century cases addressing forgery, contending these cases “limit[ ] the reach of the ‘written instrument’ statute to only those instruments that carry an apparent legal, pecuniary, or proprietary consequence[.]” Appellant's Reply Br. p. 7 (citing Garmire v. State, 4 N.E. 54 (Ind. 1886); State v. Floyd, 81 N.E. 1153 (Ind. 1907); State v. Hazzard, 80 N.E. 149 (Ind. 1907)).

[8] But these cases do not analyze the current counterfeiting statute. And we see no such requirement in that statute. Rather, the plain language of the statute provides that a “written instrument” means “a paper, a document, or other instrument containing written matter[,]” and that language plainly covers the public records request forms. See I.C. § 35-43-5-1(s). Grady argues the statute cannot be read “so broadly as to include every paper, document, or instrument containing written matter[.]” Appellant's Reply Br. p. 6. But that is the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Our Supreme Court has acknowledged the definition is “broad[ ]” in that “a written instrument could be an instrument containing written matter or it could be an object or symbol of value, right, privilege, or identification—whether or not such object or symbol contains any writings or markings.” A.-H.Y. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (Ind. 2012).

[9] Further, more recent case law supports this reading. In Trainor v. State, 950 N.E.2d 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, the defendant, purporting to be a law enforcement officer, filled out and signed order forms for various collectibles to be delivered to the home of the officer he was impersonating. When that officer received the collectibles and accompanying bills, he traced the forms to the defendant, who was later convicted of counterfeiting. On appeal, the defendant argued the order forms were not “written instruments” within the statute “because they ha[d] no value, they create[d] no privilege, and they [were] not objects of identification”—relying on the latter half of the “written instrument” definition. Id. at 355. In rejecting this argument, we explained:

But the statutory definition of written instrument is not limited to “objects or symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.” See I.C. § 35-43-5-1(t).[1] Rather, a written instrument is defined as “a paper, a document, or other instrument containing written matter and includes” a list of specific items and “other objects or symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.” Id. (emphasis added). The order forms undoubtedly constitute papers, documents, or other instruments containing written matter, and thus fall within the statutory definition of written instrument.

Id.²

[10] Similarly, here, the public records request forms submitted by Grady undoubtedly constitute papers, documents, or other instruments containing written matter. Thus, these forms fall within the statutory definition of written instrument. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Grady's convictions for Level 6 felony counterfeiting.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The statutory definition of “written instrument” now codified in Indiana Code section 35-43-5-1(s) was previously found in subsection (t), which is the subsection cited in Trainor.

2.   Grady acknowledges Trainor but emphasizes that in Trainor the court went on to conclude that the order forms in question were also objects or symbols of value because they caused the officer to receive items of value and created a debt obligation. While the Trainor court did reach that conclusion, it did so only after holding that the order forms constituted papers, documents, or other instruments and thus were “written instruments” under the statute. See Trainor, 950 N.E.2d at 355 (court finding the order forms fall within the statutory definition of “written instrument” as they are “papers, documents, or other instruments containing written matter” and then concluding “[m]oreover, ․ the order forms were objects or symbols of value”).

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.