Ryan Matthew Gluys, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Ryan Matthew Gluys appeals following the revocation of his probation. He argues the trial court erred by revoking his probation because the State presented insufficient evidence at the fact-finding hearing to prove that he violated a condition of his probation. The State agrees with Gluys. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 15, 2025, Gluys pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated.¹ The trial court sentenced Gluys to a term of 365 days in jail but suspended execution of the sentence to probation. On November 21, 2025, Probation Officer Justin Zirkle (“PO Zirkle”), Gluys's probation officer, filed a petition to revoke Gluys's probation. The petition alleged three probation violations: (1) Gluys had been charged with Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended ² in Henry County under cause number 33C03-2511-CM-000744 (“Cause 744”), (2) Gluys had failed to notify his probation officer within 48 hours of a law enforcement interaction, and (3) Gluys had failed to pay probation user fees.

[3] On June 17, 2026, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the petition to revoke Gluys's probation. At the time of the hearing, PO Zirkle was no longer assigned to Gluys, and Probation Officer Wilann Beeson (“PO Beeson”) was Gluys's assigned probation officer. PO Beeson testified that she had familiarized herself with the allegations in the petition, and the State asked PO Beeson to “tell us about the violation[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 6.) PO Beeson responded:

Well, the violation speaking of the Defendant was charged in Henry County for a new case for driving while suspended. Um – and – uh – failed to notify the officer regarding the new conviction – or, excuse me – the new arrest within forty-eight (48) hours and then he owes fees for probation.

(Id.) The State did not ask PO Beeson any follow-up questions or present any additional testimony. The State noted Cause 744 was still pending and asked the trial court to take judicial notice of that case.

[4] Following the presentation of evidence, the State argued:

Your Honor, while he was on probation in this case, the State of Indiana has alleged that he committed a new offense, that is driving while suspended. That case is still pending, but the allegations have been made. Uh – he also did not – the State alleges that he also did not inform his probation officer of this new offense. State would ask that you – that you find him in violation of the terms of his probation.

(Id. at 9.) Gluys asserted the State had presented insufficient evidence of a violation. He argued the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had committed the underlying criminal offense in Cause 744 or that his conditions of probation required him to report law enforcement interactions to his probation officer within 48 hours. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court pronounced: “And, Sir, I do find that you violated the terms and conditions of your probation.” (Id. at 10-11.) As a sanction, the trial court ordered Gluys to serve 192 days of his previously suspended sentence in the Hancock County Jail and to return to probation for the balance of his term.

Discussion and Decision

[5] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (internal citation omitted). “Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation omitted).

[6] “Probation hearings are civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Votra v. State, 121 N.E.3d 1108, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court's finding that a violation of a condition of probation occurred, we “will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, without regard to weight or credibility, and will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion.” Id.

[7] Gluys asserts, and the State does not contest, that the State presented insufficient evidence of a probation violation at the fact-finding hearing. “When a probationer is accused of committing a criminal offense, an arrest alone does not warrant the revocation of probation.” Johnson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 485, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). “Likewise, the mere filing of a criminal charge against a defendant does not warrant the revocation of probation.” Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Rather, “the State is required to prove – by a preponderance of the evidence – that the defendant committed the offense.” Id. Here, the State established Gluys was arrested and charged in Cause 744, but the State did not present any evidence beyond the charging information to prove Gluys committed the underlying criminal offense. Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Gluys violated the conditions of his probation by committing a new criminal offense. See, e.g., Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618 (holding preponderance of the evidence is the correct legal standard to apply when the State alleges a probationer committed a new criminal offense while on probation and remanding for a new hearing to ensure the trial court applied that standard).

[8] In addition, while the State alleged Gluys violated the terms of his probation by failing to report his arrest in Cause 744 to his probation officer within forty-eight hours, the State did not present any evidence that the terms of Gluys's probation required him to report law enforcement contacts within forty-eight hours. Thus, the State presented insufficient evidence to support revocation of Gluys's probation on that basis. See Lampley v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1034, 1036 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“We caution that failing to enter the conditions of probation into evidence runs the risk of not satisfying the substantial evidence of probative value standard we use on review.”).

[9] Moreover, while PO Beeson testified that Gluys owed probation fees, the State presented no evidence that Gluys's failure to pay the fees was reckless, knowing, or intentional. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) (“Probation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.”). Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support revocation of Gluys's probation on that basis. Consequently, we must reverse the trial court's revocation of his probation.

[10] Generally, double jeopardy prohibits retrial of a criminal defendant for an offense after the defendant's conviction is reversed because the State presented insufficient evidence. Jaramillo v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind. 2005). However, “a violation of a condition of probation does not constitute an offense for purposes of double jeopardy.” Knecht v. State, 85 N.E.3d 829, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). A probation revocation hearing is different from a criminal proceeding. Childers v. State, 656 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The purpose of a probation revocation hearing is to “determine whether a convicted defendant has complied with the terms previously imposed by the court as conditions for suspending a portion of the sentence.” Id. “Because the trial court imposed the specific conditions of probation, the finding of whether a defendant has complied with these conditions is a question of fact and not an adjudication of guilt.” Id. Consequently, double jeopardy does not bar a new fact-finding hearing, and we remand the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See, e.g., Thompson v. Reivitz, 746 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding probationer's right to due process was not violated when the trial court held a second probation revocation hearing after the result of the first probation revocation hearing was reversed on appeal because of insufficient evidence).

Conclusion

[11] The State presented insufficient evidence at the fact-finding hearing to support the trial court's finding that Gluys violated a condition of his probation. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

[12] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2.

2.   Ind. Code 9-24-19-3.

May, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Vaidik, J., concur.