IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.R. Jr. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] R.R. Jr. (“Child”) was born exposed to methamphetamine and amphetamines. Child is the biological child of R.R. (“Father”) and C.R. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”). Parents admitted Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Father failed to meaningfully engage in services, so a petition to terminate his parental rights was filed and granted. Father now challenges the termination ¹ and presents three issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 25, 2024, in Allen County, Indiana, Child was born “positive for illegal substances.” Tr. Vol. III at 94. At that time, Parents did not have stable housing and “struggle[d] with substance abuse addiction.” Id. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from Parents’ care and filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS. In January 2025, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS on Parents’ admissions. Although the trial court had not yet entered a dispositional order, DCS “put in referrals for substance abuse treatment, random drug screening, [a] domestic violence assessment,” and visitation with Child. Tr. Vol. II at 117. Father did not “consistently” participate in any services. Id. at 118.

[4] In February 2025, Father was charged with theft as a Class A misdemeanor. In March, Father was incarcerated because he failed to appear for a pretrial conference on a May 2024 charge for auto theft as a Level 6 felony. Father was convicted of both offenses and sentenced to a total of three years of incarceration.

[5] On April 12, the trial court entered its dispositional order requiring Father to (1) refrain from using illegal substances, (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation, (3) submit to random drug screens, (4) complete a domestic violence assessment, and (5) attend all appointments related to the CHINS matter. Father failed to meaningfully engage in these services, so on September 17, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights.

[6] After a factfinding hearing in January 2026, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights to Child. The trial court entered the following relevant findings and conclusions in support of that termination:

b. Father never completed a substance abuse evaluation.

c. Father attended approximately ten (10) supervised visits with Mother.

d. Father never completed a parenting assessment.

e. Father never completed a domestic violence assessment.

f. Father became incarcerated and served a sentence at the Department of Corrections (DOC) for Auto Theft, a Level 6 Felony under cause number 76D01-2405-F6-688 ․

g. Father is now consecutively serving a sentence at the Steuben County Jail for an offense committed after [Child]’s birth for Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor under cause number 76D01-2502-CM-310 ․

* * *

i. Father also has [eight additional] criminal convictions.

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 26–27. Additionally, Father (1) would “be on parole until January 2027,” id. at 27; (2) had “never obtained a valid driver's license,” id.; (3) “did not participate in any services in the six and one-half (6 1/212) months between the time of removal of [Child] until he became incarcerated,” id. at 28; (4) visited Child 9 times but missed or canceled 31 other visits prior to his incarceration, id.; (5) had three of eight drug screens return positive for “THC,” id.; and (6) had not been employed since February 2024, id. The trial court further found that Father “intended to participate in” a 6-month “program at the Salvation Army upon his release from the Steuben County Jail”; Father had only recently applied to that program, was awaiting acceptance, and would not be able to leave the facility or work for the first 30 days. Id.

[I]f accepted and if completed, following the release from the Rehabilitation Center, Father would still need to complete all recommendations, including but not limited to: obtaining stable housing; obtaining stable employment; obtaining stable transportation; completing a substance abuse assessment; completing a parenting assessment; completing drug screens upon request; and restarting supervised visitation with the Child.

Id. at 28–29. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Father's Parental Rights to Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[7] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[8] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Father does not challenge any of the trial court's findings, so we accept them all as true. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[9] To terminate Father's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, (a) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(3), and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests, id. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). We address each element in turn.

a. Remediation of Reasons for Removal or Placement

[10] Father first challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied. To determine whether those conditions are not likely to be remedied, the trial court first “identif[ies] the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine[s] whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643); see also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010). “The second step of the analysis requires judgment of the parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Changed conditions are balanced against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234).

[11] Child was removed from Father's care because of Father's substance abuse, lack of stable housing, and unemployment. The trial court determined that there is a reasonable probability that Father will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal because “his almost zero compliance prior to the incarceration and somewhat combative behaviors don't hold much promise of change.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 29, 34.

[12] Father acknowledges the “substantial evidence of his pre-incarceration noncompliance, including missed visitation, incomplete assessments, and criminal history,” but he argues that the trial court's termination order impermissibly relied solely on the duration of the CHINS case. Appellant's Br. at 14. According to Father, the trial court failed to balance his historical shortcomings against his more recent efforts. Id. (citing K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 641; Matter of A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)). We cannot agree with Father's characterization of the trial court's termination order. Father's parental rights were not terminated solely because the CHINS case was open for 17 months. Instead, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights after considering his pattern of criminal conduct; his history of unstable housing and employment; his failure to comply with DCS-offered services, including visitation; and his uncertain future after his release from incarceration. Against this backdrop, the trial court noted that after the petition to terminate his parental rights was filed, Father participated in three classes while he was incarcerated and had applied to join the Salvation Army program. The trial court did not fail to balance Father's “habitual patterns of criminal behavior and substance abuse against his efforts to improve while incarcerated,” A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 491. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for Child's removal or placement outside of Father's care.²

b. Best Interests of Child

[13] Father also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of his parental rights over Child is in Child's best interests. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[14] Importantly, “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Both the FCM and CASA testified that termination was in Child's best interests, and we have already determined that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that Father likely will not remedy the reasons for Child's removal from his care. This alone is sufficient to show that termination is in Child's best interests.

[15] Father argues that his identified release date from incarceration, completion of three classes while incarcerated, and unapproved application to the Salvation Army program warrant reversal. This is a clear request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). Prior to his incarceration, Father canceled approximately 75% of scheduled visits with Child and did not participate in any other services. After Child was born, Father continued his pattern of criminal conduct by committing an additional criminal offense, and he continued using illegal substances. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that termination is in Child's best interests.

[16] Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by terminating Father's parental rights to Child. We affirm that decision.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother's parental rights to Child were also terminated, but she does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Additionally, DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that Father's parental rights to Child should be terminated because the continuation of their parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(4) and Father failed to substantially comply with Child's dispositional decree for a period of at least 12 months following Child's removal pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(7). Father challenges these conclusions, as well, but DCS only needed to prove one of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). Because we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding the circumstances in Subsection (d)(3) existed, we need not address Father's arguments regarding Subsections (d)(4) and (d)(7). However, we note that Father's arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)).

Felix, Judge.

Foley, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.