Chase T. Anglemyer, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Chase T. Anglemyer appeals his convictions and sentence following an open guilty plea. Anglemyer raises three issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether his double-jeopardy challenge to his convictions is properly before us on direct appeal.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On October 27, 2025, Anglemyer pleaded guilty to two counts of Level 3 felony aggravated battery, one count of Level 5 felony domestic battery, and one count of Level 6 felony strangulation. All four charges arose out of a May 2025 attack by Anglemyer against his live-in girlfriend, D.R., which attack caused D.R. to lose consciousness and was in the presence of at least one of D.R.’s children.

[4] The trial court accepted Anglemyer's open guilty plea and entered judgment of conviction on the two Level 3 felonies and the Level 5 felony. After a sentencing hearing, the court found the following aggravating and mitigating circumstances:

Mr. Anglemyer, the one thing that you have working in your favor is that you have accepted responsibility by pleading guilty to all of the charged offenses without the benefit of a plea agreement. Unfortunately for you, that's where it stops.

[Y]ou did commit this violent act, this vicious violent act against a person who loved you, a person who bore your son, and in front of a child who considered you to be her father and I've looked at this from the totality of the circumstances so this is not the first time that you have committed an act like this. We've talked about it, the State submitted this morning the Probable Cause Affidavit which I saw for the very first time—and, Mr. Anglemyer, there's no other way to characterize that Probable Cause Affidavit other than shocking, horrifying, concerning, and eerily similar to the facts and circumstances that are here before this Court today. This is a court that handles primarily acts of intimate partner violence, sexual violence, violence in general, and several things stand out to me here, particularly when it comes to lethality factors—and lethality factors, for everybody's edification if you're not familiar with what I'm talking about, they are factors that determine the likelihood that you will kill an intimate partner and there's several present here. The fact that this occurred at a time that the victim said that she was going to leave, that is the most dangerous time in a relationship involving acts of an intimate partner violence. The fact that strangulation occurred is another lethality factor. I don't know what the text messaging was about but I've heard testimony about extreme jealousy, that's another lethality factor. I saw the photos, I really don't want to look at the photos because they're that disturbing but when I look at the photographs of the victim in the hospital, particularly looking at State's Exhibit 6 and 7, and I see the bruising on her face and neck, you know some of the bruising on her face is more consistent with strangulation, I believe, than with the actual battery. It is but for the grace of God that she's alive today and it's also because of [D.R.’s child calling the police.]

* * *

I think it would be helpful now to turn to what the Court has identified as aggravating and mitigating factors. As aggravating factors the Court will find that you have a history of criminal or delinquent behavior. So, Mr. Anglemyer, in looking at your presentence investigation report, I noted that you had one conviction for Domestic Battery [also against D.R.] before [as well as] Attempted Murder ․ [a]nd now we have the acts that are here before this [C]ourt today ․ The Court will also find as an additional aggravating factor that this was a crime of violence and that you knowingly committed the acts in the presence of a person who was less than 18 years of age and not the victim of the offense․

As a mitigating factor, again, the Court will find that you have accepted responsibility by way of your plea without the benefit of a plea agreement.

Nevertheless, ․ the Court finds that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh any mitigating circumstances.

Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 69-74. The court then sentenced Anglemyer to the maximum aggregate term of thirty-eight years in the Department of Correction.

[5] This appeal ensued.

1. Anglemyer's double-jeopardy challenge is not properly before us.

[6] On appeal, Anglemyer first contends that his multiple convictions violate Indiana's protections against substantive double jeopardy. But, as our Supreme Court recently reiterated, a defendant may not plead guilty to multiple offenses and then seek to have some of those convictions reversed on direct appeal as contrary to double jeopardy. Monroe v. State, 281 N.E.3d 546, 548 (Ind. 2026). Instead, when a defendant pleads guilty to multiple offenses but then seeks to have some of those convictions set aside under double jeopardy, he must first move to withdraw his guilty plea as to the allegedly prohibited offenses, and he may then directly appeal from the denial of that motion. Id. As Anglemyer did not take that path here, we do not consider his improper double-jeopardy argument.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Anglemyer.

[7] Anglemyer next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. Sentencing decisions are within the “sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). A court does not abuse its discretion if the record supports its reasons for imposing a sentence and those reasons are proper as a matter of law. Id. And a defendant may not argue on appeal that the trial court “abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ ” aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.), clarified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

[8] Anglemyer contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him because the court only “gave a nod to [his] open guilty plea[ ] but then stripped [it] of any meaningful weight” as a mitigating circumstance. Appellant's Br. at 11. But we must conclude that this argument is improper. The trial court expressly found Anglemyer's guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance. Anglemyer's challenge on appeal regarding that mitigator thus goes to the weight assigned to it by the trial court, which is not available for appellate review. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Anglemyer's argument on this issue therefore fails.

3. Anglemyer's sentence is not inappropriate.

[9] Last, Anglemyer contends that his maximum aggregate sentence of thirty-eight years is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[10] However, appellate revision of sentences under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[11] Anglemyer makes no such “compelling” showing that his case is “a rare and exceptional” one. Indeed, he properly concedes that the nature of the offenses were “very serious” and that his character is “troubling.” Appellant's Br. at 12. He simply seeks to have our Court second-guess the trial court's sentencing discretion, which is contrary to our standard of review and to the purposes of Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm his sentence.

Conclusion

[12] For all of these reasons, we affirm Anglemyer's convictions and sentence.

[13] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.