Kevin Rinear, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Milan Community School Corporation, Pat Murphy, Indiana Department of Child Services, Lee Davidson, Ripley County Sheriff's Department, and Laura Macon, Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kevin Rinear sued multiple defendants for declaratory and injunctive relief after the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) briefly separated his children from him and his wife and interviewed them at a child advocacy center. The trial court dismissed Rinear's complaint. Because that complaint alleged no basis for the declaratory and injunctive relief Rinear requested, we affirm.

Facts

[2] According to Rinear's complaint, he spanked one of his children in September 2023, causing a bruise. When school employees in Milan, Indiana, noticed the bruise, they made a report to DCS. That report led to DCS briefly separating Rinear's children from him and his wife and interviewing them at a child advocacy center. DCS returned the children to their home later the same evening. Afterward, DCS substantiated the report against Rinear. His complaint further alleged that school officials retaliated against the family in September 2024 by submitting false or misleading information to the Indiana High School Athletic Association to try to block one of his children from participating in varsity athletics. However, the Association ultimately deemed the child eligible.

[3] In September 2025, Rinear sued numerous defendants, seeking “a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff's fundamental parental rights under Indiana law and the Indiana Constitution” and an order “[e]njoin[ing] them from further retaliation against Plaintiff or his family.” App. Vol. II, p. 16. He did not request damages. The defendants each moved to dismiss Rinear's complaint, and the trial court granted those motions. Among other reasons, the trial court explained that Rinear had “no basis for the declaratory or injunctive relief sought, as there [was] no ongoing violation or threat of future harm.” Id. at 140. Rinear appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Rinear maintains that the trial court erred in striking one of his filings as an “improper surreply” and in granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Appellant's Br., p. 3. His arguments for reinstating his complaint include that the trial court erroneously: focused on “alleged procedural defects”; applied the Indiana Tort Claims Act; and disregarded allegations of “state interference with parental rights without exigent circumstances or court order, supported by clearly established law.” Id. at 3–4. But we need not address those arguments because Rinear's initial appellate brief failed to challenge the trial court's conclusion that he alleged no basis for declaratory or injunctive relief. See Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925–26 (Ind. 2023) (an appellant's failure to address an issue in his or her opening brief constitutes waiver).

[5] Waiver aside, we review a trial court's dismissal of a claim under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) de novo. Kelly v. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 260 N.E.3d 934, 937 (Ind. 2025). “Taking the facts alleged as true and viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, we ask whether a legally actionable injury has occurred.” Id. at 937–38. And here, Rinear alleged no ongoing or threatened injury sufficient to support the relief he seeks.

[6] It is well settled that a plaintiff may obtain a declaratory judgment only when he or she has “a substantial present interest in the relief sought.” Holcomb v. City of Bloomington, 158 N.E.3d 1250, 1256 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Educ. Emp't Rels. Bd. v. Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 365 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Ind. 1977)). Hence, plaintiffs may not seek “merely advisory opinions” that “ ‘would not change or affect legal relations’ between the parties.” Saylor v. State, 81 N.E.3d 228, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting City of Hammond v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 284 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972)). Here, a declaration that the defendants violated Rinear's legal and constitutional rights two years before he filed his complaint would be purely advisory because it would have no impact on the parties’ present legal relations, given Rinear's failure to seek damages.

[7] It is also well settled that a plaintiff seeking an injunction must allege “the present existence of an actual threat that the action sought to be enjoined will come about. Injunctive relief may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury, or a future invasion of rights.” Adams v. City of Ft. Wayne, 423 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 450 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1978)). Here, Rinear's complaint contained no facts to suggest the defendants were continuing any alleged retaliation against the family. Accordingly, any future injury is speculative and insufficient to support injunctive relief.¹

Conclusion

[8] Because Rinear's complaint alleged no basis for the declaratory and injunctive relief he sought, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We have examined the filing Rinear claims the trial court improperly struck and determined it has no bearing on our analysis.

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.