Ryan Weikel, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Ryan Weikel was convicted of two counts of Level 6 felony theft after he obtained money from two homeowners for the purchase of roofing materials and failed to pay for the materials he ordered from a supplier. Consequently, the trial court revoked Weikel's probation and executed the balance of his suspended sentence in another case. Weikel appeals both judgments, contending the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for theft of roofing materials and that the trial court committed numerous errors in its probation revocation order. We conclude that the evidence of theft is sufficient. And although the trial court erred in failing to provide a full written statement of the evidence it relied on and its reasons for revoking Weikel's probation and executing his suspended sentence, we find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on this specific record. We therefore affirm.

Facts

[2] In April 2017, Weikel pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony dealing in a Schedule I controlled substance in case number 87D01-1508-F3-346 (the “Dealing Case”). In October of that year, the trial court sentenced him to three years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction and five years suspended to probation. Weikel began serving that term of probation on April 7, 2020. As a condition of probation, Weikel was prohibited from committing any further criminal offenses.

[3] In May 2022, while Weikel was on probation, Patrick and Natalie Swaney moved into a Boonville, Indiana, home that “needed a lot of repairs,” including “a new roof.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 29. A friend recommended Weikel, who visited the home and provided the Swaneys an estimate. Patrick and Weikel then signed a contract for the work. They agreed to a price of $15,000: $7,500 in advance and $7,500 on completion. Weikel represented that he needed the advance payment to obtain materials and a dumpster. The Swaneys initially gave Weikel a check for $7,500, but he told them he was having trouble cashing it. Natalie then gave him $7,500 in cash instead.

[4] In August 2022, Weikel ordered materials worth around $4,000 from a roofing supply company, Beacon. On August 15, a Beacon delivery driver delivered the materials to Weikel, using a crane truck to lift them onto the roof of the Swaneys’ home. Because Weikel told the delivery driver he would get a check from his bank and run it over to the Beacon store, the delivery driver left the materials without taking payment. Weikel started working on the roof the next day but never took a check to Beacon. Three days after Weikel began the work, a Beacon manager and sales representative went to the Swaneys’ home to collect payment. Weikel was there, and he told them he had given a check to the delivery driver, though he was unable to produce a receipt. The Beacon manager then called a sheriff's deputy to the scene. Weikel continued refusing to pay, saying he had already paid. He eventually left but later returned for his truck and ladders. The Swaneys paid Beacon for the materials, and another roofer ultimately finished their roof.

[5] On September 14, 2022, the State charged Weikel in case number 87D01-2209-F6-439 with two counts of Level 6 felony theft, pertaining to the Swaneys’ $7,500 and Beacon's roofing materials, respectively (the “Theft Case”). The next day, the State also filed a notice of probation violation requesting revocation of Weikel's probation in the Dealing Case. That notice alleged Weikel had committed the roof-related thefts and a separate offense of visiting a common nuisance, as well as failing to pay $720 in probation fees. The trial court issued an arrest warrant pursuant to the State's notice on September 16. Over three years later, on February 18, 2026, the State filed an addendum to the notice of probation violation, alleging Weikel had committed further offenses of theft, trespass, and cruelty to an animal. And later that month, a jury found Weikel guilty as charged in the Theft Case.

[6] On April 6, 2026, the trial court held a combined hearing on Weikel's sentencing in the Theft Case and his alleged probation violations in the Dealing Case. The court imposed concurrent two-year sentences in the Theft Case. In the Dealing Case, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of Weikel's convictions in the Theft Case and presented evidence that Weikel had also pleaded guilty to the theft offense alleged in the February 2026 addendum. The court found that Weikel had violated the conditions of his probation and ordered the execution of the balance of his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, Weikel presents arguments on two issues: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence for theft of Beacon's roofing materials in the Theft Case; and (2) alleged errors in the revocation of his probation in the Dealing Case.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] Weikel first argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence he committed theft of Beacon's roofing materials because “Beacon left the roofing materials” with him instead of demanding immediate payment, thus “authorizing his possession.” Appellant's Br., p. 10. And once Beacon terminated Weikel's authority to possess the materials, he continues, “he abandoned the property.” Id. at 11. “All of the evidence,” he concludes, “indicates that [he] intended to do the work and pay for the materials.” Id.

[9] When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom without reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility.” Farral v. State, 263 N.E.3d 794, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “The evidence need not ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Id. (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007)). And we will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable jury could find the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[10] To convict Weikel of Level 6 felony theft, the State had to prove that he “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] unauthorized control over property of another person,” worth at least $750 and less than $50,000, “with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A). “[A] person's control over property of another person is ‘unauthorized’ if it is exerted,” among other things, “by promising performance that the person knows will not be performed.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-1(b)(6). A defendant's intent may be inferred circumstantially from their conduct. Duren v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[11] Here, circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that Weikel accepted the materials from Beacon knowing he would not pay for them. Weikel did not pay for the materials when he ordered them. A Beacon delivery driver then consented to leave the roofing materials with Weikel only because Weikel promised he would bring a check to the store later on, which he never did. And when Beacon representatives returned to obtain belated payment, Weikel insisted he had already paid, though he failed to produce a receipt. A reasonable jury could infer that he obtained control of the materials only by promising a performance—payment—that he had no intention of performing.

[12] Weikel's argument that he intended to complete the roof and pay for the materials is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. And his contention that Beacon authorized his control of the materials by leaving them with him disregards the evidence that the delivery driver left the materials only because Weikel promised—insincerely—to pay for them. The evidence was therefore sufficient to show that Weikel's control of the materials was unauthorized. See Long v. State, 935 N.E.2d 194, 195–98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding sufficient evidence of theft where a defendant promised to pay for a home under a lease-to-purchase agreement, moved in for a while, left without ever paying, and took the appliances).

II. Probation Revocation Issues

[13] Weikel next raises four distinct issues concerning his probation revocation, claiming: (1) the State's February 2026 addendum to its notice of probation violation was untimely; (2) the addendum alleged Weikel committed cruelty to an animal after his probationary period had ended; (3) the trial court failed to identify its reasons for revoking probation; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in executing the entire balance of Weikel's sentence. We find no reversible error.

A. Timeliness of the Addendum

[14] Weikel argues the State's February 18, 2026, addendum was untimely filed. The addendum alleged Weikel had violated the terms of his probation by committing theft and trespass offenses (separate from the Theft Case) that the State had charged on August 14, 2024. According to Weikel, the State needed to add these alleged violations within 45 days of their 2024 charging date.

A court may revoke a person's probation if the State files notice of a violation either: (1) “during the probationary period”; or (2) before the earlier of one year after the probationary period ended or 45 days after the State received notice of the violation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(2). Weikel's five-year probationary period began on April 7, 2020. Thus, in due course, it would have ended five years later. However, “[t]he issuance of a summons or warrant tolls the period of probation until the final determination of the charge.” Id. § -3(c). And here, the trial court issued an arrest warrant on September 16, 2022, after receiving the State's initial notice of probation violation the previous day. Weikel's probationary period was thus tolled until the State's revocation request was finally adjudicated in April 2026. Accordingly, the State's addendum of February 18, 2026, was timely filed.

B. Timing of the Animal Cruelty Offense

[15] Weikel also argues the State improperly alleged he violated his probation by committing cruelty to an animal in December 2025, outside his original probationary period. But the State presented no evidence of this offense at the combined sentencing-and-revocation hearing, effectively abandoning the allegation. Therefore, any error was harmless.

C. Reasons for Revoking Probation

[16] Weikel next argues the trial court denied him due process by failing to adequately explain its decision to revoke his probation.

[17] When a person is found to have violated probation, a court may continue them on probation, extend their probationary period by up to one year beyond the original period, or order execution of all or part of the suspended term of imprisonment. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). Due process entitles a probationer to a written statement explaining the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. Medicus v. State, 664 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (Ind. 1996) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972)). This requirement is intended to ensure accurate fact-finding and provide an adequate basis for review. Id.

[18] In Medicus, the State sought revocation of probation after the probationer was drunk in public and resisted arrest. Id. Following a hearing, the trial court stated orally that it was “going to find that the defendant ha[d] violated his terms of probation. Any (inaudible) violation of the term of good and lawful behavior.” Id. Our Supreme Court held that this statement neither complied with the written statement requirement nor served that requirement's purposes because it recited no facts found and gave no guidance on the trial court's rationale for revoking probation. Id. at 1165.

[19] Here, the trial court issued a written order that was scarcely more informative than the statement in Medicus. It stated: “After hearing the evidence and arguments, the Court finds that Defendant violated the terms of probation, grants the [petition to revoke], and orders Defendant to execute the balance of the sentence at the Indiana Department of Correction.” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 187. We agree with Weikel that this succinct statement violates due process. As in Medicus, the statement recites no facts found and gives no express guidance on the court's rationale for revoking probation.

[20] Still, the Medicus Court did not explicitly consider harmless error. And even due process violations in probation revocation proceedings may be harmless. See Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Black v. State, 794 N.E.2d 561, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We ultimately agree with the State that it is obvious the trial court revoked Weikel's probation because the State proved he had been convicted of three new theft offenses across two separate episodes. Those were the only allegations the State attempted to prove with evidence. The notices of violation based on those new offenses were timely filed. And Weikel has not contested the evidence for the new convictions. This specific record is, therefore, adequate for appellate review of the trial court's decision to revoke probation and order execution of the balance of Weikel's sentence. Consequently, we deem the trial court's error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Black, 794 N.E.2d at 565 (applying the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard because a due process violation affects constitutional rights).

D. Execution of the Balance of the Sentence

[21] Weikel finally argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the balance of his sentence executed. Yet, as he acknowledges, “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Otherwise, “trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id.

[22] Here, Weikel contends he “reported to probation, paid fees, and continued living under the probationary framework for one year after his original probationary period had ended.” Appellant's Br., p. 15. But Weikel's compliance with technical requirements of probation pales beside his commission of three new theft offenses. And “[w]e have repeatedly ruled that it is not an abuse of discretion to order execution of the entire suspended sentence when a defendant commits a new criminal offense while on probation.” Sieg v. State, 271 N.E.3d 620, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). What's more, the trial court stated in sentencing Weikel in the Theft Case that he had acted in a “threatening and disrespectful” way during trial, leading the court to believe he would not “be successful on probation when he seem[ed] to not have respect for authority, including [by making] outbursts in court.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 235. In these circumstances, executing the balance of Weikel's sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

[23] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Weikel's conviction for theft of roofing materials. The State's addendum to its notice of probation violation was also timely, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in executing the balance of Weikel's sentence. The trial court erred, however, in failing to provide a full written statement of the evidence it relied on and its reasons for revoking Weikel's probation. But, on this specific record, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus affirm.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.