S.H., Appellant-Petitioner v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Intervenor (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] S.H. (“Grandmother”) appeals from the trial court's order granting a motion, filed by B.J. and K.J. (“Aunt and Uncle”), to intervene and transfer Grandmother's adoption petition from Johnson County to Hendricks County. Grandmother raises several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Aunt and Uncle to intervene in Grandmother's pending adoption proceeding;

II. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Aunt and Uncle had a right to be heard at the November 10, 2025 hearing regarding consent to adoption;

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Aunt and Uncle's motion to transfer Grandmother's adoption case to Hendricks County and consolidate it with their adoption case pending there; and

IV. Whether the trial court erred in sua sponte rescinding its previous order regarding consent to adopt that had been issued in Grandmother's adoption case.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] A.H. (“Child”) was born in June 2023 and lived with her mother (“Mother”) and Grandmother until November 2, 2023, when the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child and her teenage sibling (“Brother”) due to concerns regarding Child's safety based on Mother being under the influence of drugs while around Child and Mother's failure to meet the needs of Child and Brother. Child was placed with Aunt and Uncle, and a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) was filed in Hendricks County, where all parties resided.

[4] On November 22, 2023, Grandmother filed a petition for guardianship of Child in Hendricks County. DCS later moved to intervene in the guardianship case and amended its CHINS petition to include Grandmother in the CHINS proceedings. On April 5, 2024, the CHINS court adjudicated Child and Brother to be CHINS due to educational neglect as to Brother, failure of Mother and Grandmother to ensure that Child was attending her medical appointments and receiving necessary medical treatment, Mother's substance abuse issues, instances of domestic violence between Mother and Grandmother, and Grandmother allowing Mother into her home while Mother was under the influence of drugs. Grandmother participated in services during the course of the CHINS proceedings and had regular visitation with Child. In January 2025, Grandmother was awarded guardianship over Brother, and in April 2025, she was granted one unsupervised visit per week and one unsupervised overnight visit per weekend with Child. At that time, Child remained placed with Aunt and Uncle and was doing well in their care.

[5] On July 2, 2025, a permanency hearing was held in the CHINS case. At the hearing, it was discussed that Grandmother had filed an adoption petition in Hendricks County seeking to adopt Child; however, this petition was later voluntarily dismissed after the trial court denied Grandmother's change-of-judge motion. At the conclusion of the permanency hearing, the CHINS court changed the permanency plan to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. A few days later, the court denied Grandmother's petition seeking guardianship of Child. In denying the petition, the court found that DCS did not recommend guardianship with Grandmother and that Child's guardian ad litem had testified that Grandmother's guardianship was not in Child's best interests.

[6] On August 21, 2025, Grandmother filed a petition to adopt Child in Johnson County. Although Grandmother resided in Hendricks County, her attorney maintained an office in Johnson County. Attached to the petition was Mother's written consent to the adoption of Child by Grandmother. Also attached was a DCS Adoption Summary, in which it was stated that DCS did not consent to Grandmother's adoption of Child. On the same date, the Johnson County court set the petition for a hearing on November 10, 2025, on the issues of whether DCS was “unreasonably withholding [its] consent” for the adoption and “best interests.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. On September 8, 2025, DCS filed a motion to intervene in Grandmother's adoption case in Johnson County and asserted that DCS objected to the adoption of Child by Grandmother. The Johnson County court granted DCS's motion to intervene.

[7] On November 10, at the hearing regarding DCS's withholding of consent, family case manager Lawrence Vinson (“FCM Vinson”) testified that DCS did not consent to Grandmother's adoption because Child had been placed with Aunt and Uncle for over two years at that point and was bonded with them and their family. Further, DCS did not believe that, if Grandmother had care of Child, Grandmother would prevent Mother from visiting Child while under the influence. FCM Vinson also testified that Child was well bonded with Aunt and Uncle, and he believed that Aunt and Uncle were a better choice for adoption because of his interactions with the parties. He also stated that Aunt and Uncle had not yet filed a petition for adoption because they were waiting for the termination of parental rights to be finalized in Hendricks County. Grandmother testified that there was no evidence that she had ever allowed Mother to have contact with Child. Aunt and Uncle did not testify at the hearing.

[8] On November 17, 2025, the Johnson County court issued an order regarding consent following the hearing (“the Consent Order”) concluding that DCS unreasonably withheld its consent for Grandmother to adopt Child. It further concluded that Grandmother met her burden of “proving that she is a fit and proper person to adopt [Child] and that the adoption is in [Child's] best interest.” Id. at 38. The court took the “matter of issuing a Decree of Adoption under advisement pending [a] final adoption hearing” and set the matter for a hearing on January 12, 2026. Id.

[9] Meanwhile, on December 24, 2025, Aunt and Uncle filed a petition to adopt Child in Hendricks County. On January 5, 2026, they moved to intervene in the Johnson County case, asking the court to transfer the matter to Hendricks County for consolidation with their pending adoption case. Aunt and Uncle alleged that Child had lived with them since she was four months old and was two years old at the time of the petition. They also noted that they had filed an adoption petition in Hendricks County that was pending at the time of the motion. Aunt and Uncle claimed that it was in “the best interests” of Child for the trial court to grant intervention under Trial Rule 24 “so the competing adoption cases can be consolidated” and heard “in Hendricks County where the CHINS case is already pending.” Id. at 40. They asserted that transfer of the case to Hendricks County was appropriate and Hendricks County was the preferred venue because the CHINS case and Aunt and Uncle's adoption cases were pending there, Child was a ward of DCS in Hendricks County, and “Hendricks County ․ is deeply familiar” with the parties involved in Child's life. Id. They further alleged that it was appropriate for the trial court to grant the request for consolidation under Trial Rule 42 because both pending adoption cases involved the same child and common questions of law and fact, the trial court had not yet granted adoption on Grandmother's case, and the court had not yet heard all of the important evidence that relates to Child's best interests.

[10] Grandmother filed her objection to Aunt and Uncle's motion, asserting that, although the Consent Order set the Johnson County adoption case for a final hearing, “all relevant evidence ha[d] been heard” and the trial court had “already made all necessary determinations short of entry of an actual final decree.” Id. at 50. Grandmother argued that intervention was untimely because it was filed more than forty-five days after the Consent Order was issued and was “effectively[ ] a post-judgment intervention” because all relevant findings and conclusions had already been entered. Id. at 51. She also asserted that Aunt and Uncle were on notice that Grandmother was seeking adoption because they were aware of Grandmother's previous adoption filed in Hendricks County, and she claimed that they had no actual interest in the Johnson County adoption such that intervention was necessary. Grandmother argued that Johnson County had preferred venue, the finality of an adoption decree was in Child's best interests, and transferring the matter to Hendricks County would only delay the proceedings.

[11] Aunt and Uncle moved to convert the final adoption hearing set for January 12 to a hearing on their motion to intervene, consolidate, and transfer, which the trial court granted. After the hearing, the trial court issued its order granting Aunt and Uncle's motion to intervene, consolidate, and transfer and rescinding the Consent Order. The trial court found that Aunt and Uncle had a right to be heard at the November 10, 2025 hearing and that it was “concerned with the best interests” of Child in this matter. Id. at 7. It further found that rescinding the Consent Order to allow Aunt and Uncle to be heard and consolidating the adoption proceedings would not “unduly prejudice or unreasonably delay the proceedings.” Id. The trial court transferred the Johnson County adoption matter to Hendricks County for any further hearings and action and stated, “this is a final and appealable order.” Id. Grandmother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Here, the trial court's order included specific findings of fact. When a trial court issues specific findings sua sponte, the findings control our review of the judgment as to the issues those findings cover; for all other issues, we apply a general judgment standard. Todd v. Coleman, 119 N.E.3d 1137, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We apply a two-tiered standard of review, determining first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We review the findings for clear error and will reverse when our review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. at 1139–40. We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. at 1140. While we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. Id. We also note that there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016).¹

I. Intervention

[13] Grandmother first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Aunt and Uncle's motion to intervene. “The decision to grant or deny a motion to intervene is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” In re Adoption of A.E., 191 N.E.3d 952, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Granite State Ins. Co. v. Lodholtz, 981 N.E.2d 563, 566 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

[14] Aunt and Uncle's motion to intervene alleged they were entitled to permissive intervention under Indiana Trial Rule 24 because they had filed a petition for Child's adoption in another court of competent jurisdiction and had a claim or defense and a question of law in common with the action in the trial court. Trial Rule 24(B) provides:

Upon timely filing of his motion anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:

․

(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common․ In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

[15] Grandmother asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant the motion to intervene because the motion was not timely and because allowing this untimely intervention would unduly delay and prejudice Grandmother's interest. She argues that the motion was not timely and was “effectively, a post-judgment intervention” because it was filed over forty-five days after the Consent Order, which was issued after a contested hearing on the merits. Appellant's Br. p. 17. Grandmother further claims that allowing the intervention was an undue delay or prejudice to her because “finality of [adoption] decrees is desirable in order to prevent the emotional strain which would otherwise be imposed upon both the adoptive child and parents[.]” Id. at 18 (citing M.R. ex rel. Ratliff v. Meltzer, 487 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), trans. denied).²

[16] The trial court's decision to grant Aunt and Uncle's motion to intervene was not an abuse of discretion. First, contrary to Grandmother's assertion, this was not a post-judgment intervention. Aunt and Uncle filed their motion for intervention before a final adoption decree was issued in Johnson County, and their motion was not a request to reopen the case. Although the Consent Order concluded that DCS had unreasonably withheld its consent for Grandmother to adopt Child and that Grandmother was a fit and proper person to adopt Child with adoption being in Child's best interests, the trial court stated it was taking the matter of issuing a decree of adoption under advisement pending a final adoption hearing. Further, the Consent Order was issued on November 17, 2025, Aunt and Uncle filed their adoption petition on December 24, 2025, and their motion to intervene was filed on January 5, 2026. Within the time between the Consent Order and the filing of their motion, there were three holidays. Therefore, their motion was filed less than sixty days after the Consent Order and prior to the date of the final adoption hearing. We do not find that the motion was untimely filed.

[17] Under Trial Rule 24(B)(2), the party seeking intervention must also demonstrate that their “claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.” Here, Aunt and Uncle stated in their motion that they had filed a petition for adoption in Hendricks County. Therefore, both parties were seeking to adopt Child, and Aunt and Uncle's claim and Grandmother's claim had a common question of law or fact, the best interests of Child. See In re E.M.M., 164 N.E.3d 779, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“The primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interests of the child.” (emphasis in original)), trans. denied.

[18] In its determination that Aunt and Uncle should be allowed to intervene, the trial court found that intervention would not “unduly prejudice or unreasonably delay the proceedings” on Grandmother's adoption petition, as required under the trial rule. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7. Allowing Aunt and Uncle to intervene did not alter the placement of Child or Grandmother's ability to seek adoption of Child. When the trial court granted the motion to intervene, Child was placed with Aunt and Uncle as she had been for over two years, and CHINS proceedings were still pending in Hendricks County. Further, permitting intervention did not alter the fact that both parties were still required to prove their case for adoption. Instead, it allowed for Aunt and Uncle to be heard as to their desire to adopt Child in conjunction with Grandmother's petition, which involved an assessment of Child's best interests. Additionally, allowing intervention did not unduly delay the proceedings since at the time the motion was granted, the trial court had not yet issued an adoption decree, and the CHINS proceedings were still pending, which meant that Mother still had parental rights of Child. Based on all of this, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Aunt and Uncle's motion to intervene.

II. Right To Be Heard

[19] Grandmother asserts that the trial court erred in determining that Aunt and Uncle had a right to be heard at the November 10, 2025 hearing. In arguing that the trial court's determination was erroneous, Grandmother focuses on statutory notice of the proceedings and contends that Aunt and Uncle had no right to notice of the adoption proceedings and were therefore not entitled to be heard at the hearing. We review the trial court's determination for clear error and will reverse only if our review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Todd, 119 N.E.3d at 1139–40.

[20] Grandmother is correct that Aunt and Uncle were not entitled to statutory notice of the adoption proceedings under Indiana Code section 31-19-2.5-3 as they, as foster placement, are not listed as a party required to be given notice. See Ind. Code § 31-19-2.5-3(a) (listing the parties required to be provided notice of adoption proceedings). However, the trial court did not find that Aunt and Uncle were entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings and, instead, found that they had a right to be heard at the hearing held on November 10, 2025. “The primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interests of the child.” In re E.M.M., 164 N.E.3d at 782 (emphasis in original). In its order, the trial court specifically found that it was concerned with the best interests of Child and that allowing Aunt and Uncle to be heard in the adoption proceeding would not unduly prejudice or unreasonably delay the proceedings. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7.

[21] The motion to intervene indicated that the trial court had not heard important evidence that was essential to the trial court's determination of what is in Child's best interests. Child had lived with Aunt and Uncle since she was four months old, had continued to live with them at the time of the November 10 hearing, and was over two years old at the time. Aunt and Uncle knew and were familiar with Grandmother, had substantial involvement in Child's life, and had loved and cared for Child for most of her life. Aunt and Uncle clearly had important evidence that pertained to the best interests of Child and was necessary to get a full picture of Child's situation and her life at the time of the November 10 hearing. In order to make the best determination as to what was in the best interests of Child, it was essential for the trial court to hear all of the evidence relevant to such determination and from all parties who had cared—and were presently caring—for Child. As Aunt and Uncle were in essence the only parents Child had ever known and because they had evidence essential to the trial court's determination of the best interests of Child, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Aunt and Uncle had a right to be heard at the November 10, 2025 hearing.

III. Transfer and Consolidation

[22] Grandmother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the motion to transfer the adoption case to Hendricks County for consolidation with Aunt and Uncle's adoption case. A trial court's order on a motion to transfer venue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of E.S.J., 219 N.E.3d 780, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). As previously stated, a trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or when it has misinterpreted the law. Id. “The decision to consolidate actions is purely discretionary and will be overturned only when a manifest abuse of discretion is established.” Kindred v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 136 N.E.3d 284, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing In re Paternity of Tompkins, 518 N.E.2d 500, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)), trans. denied.

[23] Grandmother argues that the trial court's determinations that her adoption case should be transferred to Hendricks County and consolidated with the adoption case filed by Aunt and Uncle were an abuse of the trial court's discretion. She asserts that she properly filed her adoption petition in Johnson County, which was a proper venue under statute, and that the trial court's transfer of the case “effectively substituted [the trial court's] own policy preference for the clear mandate of the Indiana General Assembly,” suggesting that the trial court transferred the case merely because it “expressed a clear aversion” to the language of the statute allowing an adoption petition to be filed where the petitioner's attorney maintains an office. Appellant's Br. p. 22. Grandmother also argues that the consolidation of her adoption case with the case filed by Aunt and Uncle in Hendricks County was an abuse of the trial court's discretion because she asserts that any consolidation was required to occur in Johnson County as a matter of law under Trial Rule 42(D).

[24] Indiana Code section 31-19-2-2 lists where adoption petitions may be filed:

(a) ․ [A]n individual who seeks to adopt a child less than eighteen (18) years of age must, by attorney of record, file a petition for adoption with the clerk of the court having probate jurisdiction in the county in which:

(1) the petitioner for adoption resides;

(2) a licensed child placing agency or governmental agency having custody of the child is located;

(3) the attorney maintains an office; or

(4) the child resides.

․

(c) The county in which the petition for adoption may be filed is a matter of venue and not jurisdiction.3

I.C. § 31-19-2-2(a), (c). Indiana Trial Rule 75(A) governs preferred venue requirements in Indiana. Preferred venue includes “the county where a claim in the plaintiff's complaint may be commenced under any statute recognizing or creating a special or general remedy or proceeding.”

Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(8). Our court has previously held that section 31-19-2-2 is a special venue statute to which Trial Rule 75(A)(8) applies. In re Adoption of E.S.J., 219 N.E.3d at 783. Thus, preferred venue lies in any county where the adoption petition may be filed pursuant to section 31-19-2-2. Therefore, under the statute and Trial Rule 75, both Johnson County and Hendricks County were preferred venues for an adoption petition.

[25] Our case is similar to In re Adoption of E.S.J. where section 31-19-2-2 was held to be a special venue statute to which Trial Rule 75(A)(8) applies. 219 N.E.3d at 783. There, a stepfather and mother filed an adoption petition in Marion County—the county where their attorney maintained an office—even though the petitioners and the child resided in Johnson County. Id. at 781. The biological father moved to transfer venue to Johnson County, arguing that Marion County was not a preferred venue and that Johnson County (where the child, mother, and stepfather all resided) was the preferred venue. Id. The trial court granted the motion to transfer, and this court reversed, holding that because section 31-19-2-2 dictates where an adoption petition is to be filed, it is a special venue statute, and “preferred venue lies in any county where the petition” may be filed under the statute. Id. at 783 (emphasis added). Because the petitioners in E.S.J. filed in a county included in one of the four enumerated locations in the statute, that county was a county of preferred venue, and transfer of the case to another county of preferred venue could not be granted. Id.

[26] Here, as both Johnson County and Hendricks County were preferred venues for filing an adoption petition and Grandmother filed her petition in a county with preferred venue, the trial court could not grant the motion to transfer the case to Hendricks County. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the motion to transfer.

[27] As to Grandmother's argument that consolidating the cases was an abuse of discretion, “Indiana Trial Rule 42 provides that a trial court may order actions to be consolidated when the actions involve a common question of law or fact.” Kindred, 136 N.E.3d at 292. However, subsection (D) of that rule controls the consolidation of actions pending in different courts, stating:

When civil actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending in different courts, a party to any of the actions may, by motion, request consolidation of those actions for the purpose of discovery and any pre-trial proceedings. Such motion may only be filed in the court having jurisdiction of the action with the earliest filing date and the court shall enter an order of consolidation for the purpose of discovery and any pre-trial proceedings unless good cause to the contrary is shown and found by the court to exist.

T.R. 42(D). Here, as we have found that transfer of the Johnson County case to Hendricks County was not proper, we have a situation where there are two actions pending in different courts that involve a common question of law or fact. Therefore, under subsection (D), it was proper for Aunt and Uncle to file a motion to request consolidation of the two actions in Johnson County as it was the court having jurisdiction with the earliest filing date. However, such a motion can only be filed for the purpose of discovery and pre-trial proceedings, and the trial court in Johnson County is required to enter an order consolidating the cases for those purposes unless good cause is found to contradict such consolidation. As it is unclear what, if any, discovery and pretrial proceedings are necessary in light of this opinion, we reverse the trial court's order as it pertains to consolidation and remand for further proceedings.

IV. Rescission of Consent Order

[28] Grandmother asserts that the trial court erred when it sua sponte rescinded the Consent Order. A trial court has the inherent power to reconsider, vacate, or modify any previous order so long as the action remains in fieri, meaning that it is “pending resolution.” Pond v. Pond, 700 N.E.2d 1130, 1135 (Ind. 1998). Under Trial Rule 54(B),

any order ․ which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order ․ is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

[29] As we concluded above, the Consent Order was not a final order. The Consent Order specifically stated that it was taking the matter of issuing a decree of adoption under advisement pending a final adoption hearing. An order in adoption proceedings that leaves for future determination whether an adoption petition will be granted is not a final order. See In re Adoption of S.J., 967 N.E.2d 1063, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that an order that concluded that father's consent to adoption was not required but did not determine whether the adoption would be granted was not a final appealable judgment). Thus, since the final determination of whether Grandmother's adoption petition would be granted was not made, the adoption proceedings were still in fieri, and the trial court had the inherent power to reconsider, vacate, or modify the Consent Order. Pond, 700 N.E.2d at 1135. In its order, the trial court specifically concluded that it was “concerned with the best interests of [Child] in this matter” and that it was rescinding the Consent Order to allow Aunt and Uncle to be heard. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 7. As “[t]he primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interests of the child[,]” see In re E.M.M., 164 N.E.3d at 782, and the Consent Order was not a final order, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rescinding the Consent Order.⁴

Conclusion

[30] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Aunt and Uncle's motion to intervene and did not err when it determined that Aunt and Uncle had a right to be heard at the November 10, 2025 hearing or in its rescission of the Consent Order. However, the trial court did abuse its discretion when it granted the motion to transfer the Johnson County case to Hendricks County and the motion to consolidate the cases. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's order as to the grant of the motions to transfer and consolidate and affirm in all other aspects.

[31] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Under Indiana Appellate Rule 14, an interlocutory appeal to transfer a case under Trial Rule 75 is an interlocutory appeal of right. Further, we note that an interlocutory appeal raises every issue presented by the order that is the subject of the appeal. Tom-Wat, Inc. v. Fink, 741 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ind. 2001).

2.   Grandmother also argues that an “applicant seeking intervention must claim an immediate and direct interest in the proceedings” to merit intervention. Appellant's Br. p. 19. However, the case that she cites to for such a proposition analyzed whether a party was entitled to intervention as of right under Trial Rule 24(A), which is not the provision of the trial rule at issue here. Instead, Aunt and Uncle sought permissive intervention under Trial Rule 24(B).

3.   To the extent that Grandmother argues that this is an issue of priority jurisdiction, she is incorrect.

4.   We note that Grandmother raises for the first time on appeal an assertion that the trial court's rescission of the Consent Order violated her right to due process. We conclude that this claim has been waived since Grandmother raises it for the first time on appeal. See Hilligoss v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“Generally, a party waives an issue if it is raised for the first time on appeal.”).

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.