Serena L. Slater, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Serena Slater tested positive for drug use while on probation. At her initial hearing on that alleged violation, the trial court ordered her to take a drug screen and then remain at the courthouse until her case was called again. Slater submitted to the screen but subsequently left the courthouse and was not arrested until around a year later. Initially, the trial court summarily found Slater in direct contempt for disobeying its order but ultimately held evidentiary hearings and concluded Slater had committed indirect contempt. The court sanctioned Slater with 19 days in jail for contempt. And as to the probation violation, the trial court ordered her to serve the balance of her original one-year suspended sentence in jail. In this appeal, Slater argues the trial court erred in sanctioning her for contempt and abused its discretion in executing her suspended sentence. But finding harmless error at most in the contempt proceedings and no abuse of discretion in the execution of Slater's sentence, we affirm.

Facts

[2] In July 2024, Slater pled guilty to Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession and received a one-year sentence suspended to probation, with 10 days of jail-time credit. The conditions of Slater's probation required her to complete an addictions assessment, to avoid use or possession of illegal drugs, and to pay court and probation fees, among other things. In December 2024, Slater's probation officer filed a notice of probation violation, alleging Slater had failed to complete her addictions assessment, had tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine, and had made no payments toward her fees. The next month, the probation officer filed a supplement, alleging Slater had tested positive for the same drugs again.

[3] At Slater's initial hearing a few days later, the trial court ordered her to take a drug screen and to remain at the courthouse until her case was called again or else be found in contempt. But after Slater submitted to a drug screen, which returned a positive result, court security informed the court that Slater had left the courthouse. The court issued an arrest warrant for the alleged probation violation and a writ of body attachment for contempt. It also found Slater in direct contempt for disobeying its order. In the following weeks, the probation officer supplemented the notice of probation violation with allegations that Slater tested positive in the courthouse drug screen and failed to report for scheduled appointments.

[4] Slater was eventually arrested around a year later, on January 31, 2026. The court then held a combined hearing on the alleged probation violations and contempt citation on March 17. Slater admitted she had used methamphetamine as alleged in the initial notice of probation violation. She also admitted leaving the courthouse but stated she had done so because her “fiancé was having chest pains.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 24. The court granted Slater a continuance to obtain documents to corroborate her claim. It also converted the direct contempt matter to indirect contempt and sent Slater a written rule to show cause. When the court reconvened a week later, Slater again admitted leaving the courthouse but once more attributed her departure to her fiancé’s chest pains. She conceded, however, that she had not taken her fiancé to a hospital on that day or during the following days. The court imposed a 19-day sanction for indirect contempt, which Slater had already served, and ordered her to serve the balance of her suspended sentence in jail.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Slater appeals, raising issues with both the contempt proceedings and the sanction for her probation violation. We find harmless error at most in the contempt proceedings and no abuse of discretion in the execution of her suspended sentence for violating probation.

I. Contempt Issues

[6] Slater acknowledges that the trial court appropriately “converted the direct contempt proceeding into an indirect contempt proceeding.” Appellant's Br., p. 16. But she contends the trial court improperly entered the 19-day sanction for contempt because: (1) she purged her contempt by “provid[ing] a reasonable explanation” for her action; and (2) the court failed to “follow the proper procedures for indirect contempt of court,” and so “the 19 days imposed for contempt should be re-assigned” to her probation-violation sanction. Id. at 17. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Slater committed indirect contempt and that any procedural errors were harmless.

[7] “Willful disobedience of any lawfully entered court order of which the offender had notice is indirect contempt.” Francies v. Francies, 759 N.E.2d 1106, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).¹ “The order must be clear and certain such that there is no question regarding what a party may or may not do and no question regarding when the order is being violated.” Id. at 1119. “An indirect contempt proceeding requires an array of due process protections, including notice and the opportunity to be heard.” In re Paternity of J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d 447, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). A person may also request “a reasonable and just opportunity to be purged of the contempt.” Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5(c)). “It is soundly within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ind. 2012). “We will reverse a trial court's finding of contempt only if there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding.” City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Ind. 2005).

A. Contempt Finding

[8] Slater first argues she purged her contempt by offering a reasonable explanation for her failure to obey the court's order, but we find no abuse of discretion. The trial court held two hearings at which Slater presented evidence that she acted reasonably in leaving the courthouse. Slater explained that she left because her fiancé was having chest pains. When asked why she did not inform the court at the time, she responded that she “wasn't thinking” about anything but her fiancé’s health. Tr. Vol. II, p. 40. And she admitted she did not communicate with the court about her failure to remain at the courthouse until she was arrested one year later. The court found aspects of Slater's testimony “incredible and unreasonable.” Id. at 58. It noted there had been no emergency that day and nobody had run out of the courtroom. The court also found it hard to believe that, although Slater's fiancé had suffered serious chest pains, she had not taken him to a hospital, as her account did not “make much sense.” Id. And it concluded Slater had not purged her contempt because she did nothing to “surrender [her]self” to the court: she was simply arrested at her home. Id. at 61. As evidence supports the trial court's finding that Slater committed indirect contempt, the court did not abuse its discretion.

B. Contempt Sanction

[9] We also find no grounds for “re-assign[ing]” Slater's 19-day contempt sanction to her probation violation because of alleged procedural defects. Appellant's Br., p. 17. Slater argues the trial court should initially “have issued a Rule to Show Cause rather than a body attachment and given Slater notice and an opportunity to be heard before taking her into custody.” Id. But we find any errors harmless because Slater received adequate notice of the accusations against her and admitted them.

[10] In Knowles v. State, a defendant failed to report to a probation officer to provide information for her presentence investigation (PSI). 202 N.E.3d 1165, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the court ordered the defendant detained so the PSI could be prepared. Id. The defendant ultimately spent 28 days in jail before sentencing. Id. at 1169. The trial court refused to credit those days toward the defendant's sentence, attributing them instead to contempt of court. Id. A panel of this Court held that the trial court had failed either to provide the defendant with the procedural protections guaranteed by Indiana Code § 34-47-3-5 or to give “clear notice” before making its contempt finding. Id. at 1170–71. As a result, the defendant's 28 days of confinement had to be credited toward her sentence. Id. at 1171.

[11] We find Knowles distinguishable. Even assuming the trial court committed procedural errors, strict compliance with statutory procedures “may be excused if it is clear the alleged contemnor nevertheless had clear notice of the accusations against him or her, for example because he or she ․ appears at the contempt hearing and admits to the factual basis for a contempt finding.” J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d at 451. Here, the trial court eventually issued Slater a rule to show cause providing written notice of the indirect contempt allegation one week before the continued hearing. She then appeared at that hearing and admitted she had left the courthouse in contravention of the court's order. Hence, any failure to comply with the letter of Indiana Code § 34-47-3-5 was excusable and harmless. Accordingly, we decline to credit Slater's 19-day confinement to her probation violation.

II. Sanction on Probation Violation

[12] Slater also argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve the balance of her suspended sentence. We find no error.

[13] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). When a person is found to have violated probation, a court may continue them on probation, extend their probationary period by up to one year beyond the original period, or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). Although “probation may be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition, the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013).

[14] Still, “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. That is because “[i]f this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. “Accordingly, a trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard.” Id. And an “abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[15] Slater argues the trial court abused its discretion in executing her suspended sentence primarily because her fiancé “suffers from congestive heart failure and, besides Slater, has no one else to take care of him.” Appellant's Br., p. 18. Documents showed Slater was deemed eligible for electronic monitoring and work release through community corrections. She also states she had a job lined up and planned to seek mental health treatment.

[16] Other considerations support the trial court's decision, however. Slater admitted using methamphetamine, which the trial court concluded would “not result in [her] being any sort of legitimate caretaker” for her fiancé. Tr. Vol. II, p. 63. And in the trial court's view, Slater had “forfeited her right to serve community corrections” because she had not “done anything in an entire year.” Id. at 62. In other words, she absconded for one year in contravention of a court order and failed to comply with her existing probation requirements. That history suggested that Slater was unlikely to comply with the rules and conditions of community corrections. Given these facts and circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in executing Slater's suspended sentence.

Conclusion

[17] The trial court committed harmless error at most in sanctioning Slater for indirect contempt. And it did not abuse its discretion in ordering her to serve the balance of her suspended sentence for violating probation. We therefore affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Direct contempt, by contrast, “includes those actions occurring near the court, interfering with the business of the court, of which the judge has personal knowledge. Courts have inherent power to punish summarily acts of direct contempt.” In re Haigh, 7 N.E.3d 980, 989 (Ind. 2014).

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.