Troy Austin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Troy Austin appeals his convictions for battery against a public safety official and disorderly conduct, arguing the evidence was insufficient. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 19, 2025, Austin was a patient at Memorial Hospital in South Bend. At approximately 10:45 p.m., Austin believed he saw someone “looking at him from [his third story] window and that they were going to harm him.” Transcript at 21. To accommodate Austin's concerns, hospital staff allowed him to move to a different room. Several police officers and a hospital security officer came to assist the nursing staff with the transition, as Austin “was in kind of ․ a state of paranoia.” Id. As Austin approached the door to his new room, he stopped complying with directions and refused to go inside. Two of the police officers “tried to escort [Austin]” into the room, but when they grabbed his arms, Austin “made his legs go limp,” and he ended up “laying on the floor.” Id. at 32. The officers tried to talk to Austin to convince him to move, but they ultimately had to pick him up and take him inside.

[3] As the officers carried Austin toward the hospital bed, he started “acting very erratic” and “screaming [for] help ․ at the top of his lungs.” Id. at 33. He also repeatedly asked Siri ¹ to help him and said things like, “Siri, they're trying to kill me,” and “Siri, they're trying to hurt me.” Id. at 27. When the officers tried to put him on the bed, Austin went limp again, fell to his knees, and continued screaming. Staff and security repeatedly told Austin to stop screaming, but he did not. Austin eventually got into the bed, but when he did, he stood up and “tr[ied] to climb up on the railing.” Id. at 34. Security surrounded his bed so he wouldn't fall, and Austin continued screaming for help. A few moments later, Austin stopped screaming when a nurse practitioner (NP) arrived. Austin told the NP he wanted to go to a different hospital, so the NP prepared paperwork which allowed Austin to leave against medical advice (AMA). One of the police officers “specifically asked the nursing staff [whether] Mr. Austin [was] on any kind of mental health hold or hold that he's not able to make decisions for himself,” and “[t]hey said he was not.” Id. at 43.

[4] Austin signed the AMA paperwork, and when security told him he needed to change into his clothes so he could leave, Austin started screaming for help again. Austin continued to ignore directions to stop screaming and get dressed so he could leave the hospital. At that point, Officer Jason Moore placed Austin under arrest. Austin resisted the officer's attempt to put handcuffs on him and “put himself on the floor.” Id. at 36. Officers were eventually able to place the handcuffs on Austin's wrists, but when Officer Moore tried to lock them, Austin grabbed the officer's thumbs and twisted them. Austin did not release the officer's thumbs when directed, and Officer Moore had to use force to make Austin release his grip.

[5] Austin's eye was cut during this incident and was bleeding. When another officer used a towel to clean the blood off his face, Austin tried to bite the officer's hand but missed and bit the towel instead. Medical staff tended to Austin's cut and then the officers took him to the St. Joseph County Jail. The whole incident lasted approximately thirty minutes, and Austin screamed for approximately twenty-five of them.

[6] On April 21, the State charged Austin with Level 6 felony battery against a public safety official ² and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.³ On June 4, Austin filed a notice of his intent to assert an insanity defense. He also filed a motion to “be evaluated for competency and insanity as a defense.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 31. The trial court granted Austin's motion, and he was evaluated at the end of June. The psychologist who evaluated Austin believed he was competent to stand trial and “able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the charged offense.”⁴ Id. at 48.

[7] Austin's trial was held on March 19, 2026. Although Austin did not show up for the trial, he was represented by counsel, who clarified on the record that he was not pursuing an insanity defense on Austin's behalf at trial. Officer Moore and a hospital security officer testified consistently with the facts above. The jury found Austin guilty as charged, and the trial court imposed a two-year executed sentence. Austin now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Austin argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that it is the fact-finder's role, not ours, “to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). Additionally, “[w]e consider only the evidence most favorable to” the conviction. Id. “[T]he evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255, 257 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 147) (alteration in original). We will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could have found “the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783 (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[9] To convict Austin of Level 6 felony battery on a public safety official as alleged, the State had to prove he knowingly touched Officer Moore in a rude, insolent, or angry manner while the officer was engaged in his official duties. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (e)(2) (2024). To prove Austin committed disorderly conduct as alleged, the State had to prove he recklessly made unreasonable noise at the hospital and continued to do so despite being asked to stop. Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2) (2014). And pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-41-2-1(a), “[a] person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct in violation of the statute defining the offense.”

[10] On appeal, Austin seems to argue there was insufficient evidence to prove he: (1) engaged in these actions voluntarily; and (2) had the requisite mental state for each offense under the applicable statutes. A person's volition to act and their mental state when doing so are two distinct legal concepts: actus reus and mens rea, respectively. See Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1084 (Ind. 2025) (“The Latin phrase ‘actus reus’ refers to the ‘wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with the mens rea [the criminal state of mind], to establish criminal liability.” (quoting Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 487 n.5 (Ind. 2012))). And both elements require distinct analyses to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support them. As such, we address Austin's voluntariness and mental state separately.

1. Voluntariness 5

[11] “The term voluntary is used in this [context] as meaning behavior that is produced by an act of choice and is capable of being controlled by a human being who is in a conscious state of mind.” McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Ind. Crim. Law Study Comm'n, Indiana Penal Code Proposed Final Draft 11, 12 (1974)), reh'g denied. Typically, the State's burden to prove that a defendant acted voluntarily “is carried by proof of commission of the act itself.” Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1176 (Ind. 1992), cert. denied. But “once evidence in the record raises the issue of voluntariness, the [S]tate must prove the defendant acted voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[12] As discussed by our Supreme Court, involuntary conduct contemplates “those mental impairments that are the product of an otherwise healthy mind,” including automatisms ⁶ and other “movements not a product of the actor's effort (where the actor is moved by force).” Davidson v. State, 849 N.E.2d 591, 594 (Ind. 2006) (citing Model Penal Code § 2.01 cmts. 1 & 2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)); see also McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 106 (recognizing automatism stemming from sleep deprivation as an issue of voluntariness).

[13] Here, Austin argues the issue of voluntariness was raised by the fact that he screamed for help for a majority of the incident and “begged the digital assistant ‘Siri’ for help.” Appellant's Brief at 15. He claims “the only logical deduction that naturally flows from these facts is that he did not” act voluntarily. Id. However, Austin fails to explain why these facts invoke the issue of voluntariness. There was no evidence presented at trial indicating what may have caused Austin to engage in this behavior, let alone evidence of a condition known to induce involuntary conduct. Neither below nor on appeal did Austin suggest that his behavior stemmed from convulsions, reflexes, hypnosis, a medical condition such as epilepsy, or any similar condition or state.

[14] Austin compares this case to Fairchild v. State, No. 25A-CR-2542, 2026 WL 573565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (mem.). There, the panel found sufficient evidence to show the defendant voluntarily engaged in criminal conduct. Id. at *4. Its conclusion was based on testimony that at the time of the crime, the defendant “had been able to communicate and to converse back and forth,” “was negotiating with [hospital staff] to get what she wanted,” and “seem[ed] to understand what was happening.” Id. (second alteration in original). Austin asserts “[t]here is no such evidence” in this case and that instead, the evidence showed he “was unmoored from reality.” Appellant's Br. at 16.

[15] We note that Fairchild is unpublished and can therefore only serve as persuasive authority. See Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D)(2). And, critically, that decision did not hold a defendant's ability to communicate during an altercation was necessary to show voluntariness. An absence of similar testimony here does not require a conclusion that Austin acted involuntarily. What's more, the evidence here showed Austin communicated with the officers, the nursing staff, and the NP during this incident. Most evidently, he expressed his desire to leave the hospital and go to a different hospital, and he signed a form acknowledging that he was leaving AMA. Austin's reliance on Fairchild is therefore unpersuasive.

[16] Overall, we conclude Austin has failed to show the evidence presented at trial raised the issue of voluntariness. Thus, the State's evidence that he grabbed Officer Moore's thumbs and incessantly screamed throughout the incident despite being told to stop was sufficient to prove that he acted voluntarily.

2. Mental State

[17] Next, the State had to prove Austin had two different mental states in this case, one for each charge. For battery, it had to prove he “knowingly” grabbed and twisted Officer Moore's thumbs. I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (1977). For disorderly conduct, the State had to prove Austin “recklessly” screamed throughout the incident despite being told to stop. I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a)(2). “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(c).

[18] “Admittedly, it is hard to get inside [the] head of the defendant,” so a trier of fact must often “resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence” to determine a defendant's mental state. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). In other words, the required mens rea may be inferred from Austin's behavior “and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Stokes, 922 N.E.2d at 764.

[19] We find the jury could have reasonably inferred from the surrounding circumstances that Austin had the requisite mental states. With disorderly conduct, “[t]he criminalization of ‘unreasonable noise’ was ‘aimed at preventing the harm which flows from the volume of noise.’ ” Woods v. State, 222 N.E.3d 296, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996)). “Noise is considered unreasonable if it is too loud for circumstances that exist at the time.” Id. Here, Austin screamed “at the top of his lungs” for twenty-five minutes at 11 p.m. on the floor of a hospital with other patients and despite repeated instructions to stop. Tr. at 33. His disruption also caused additional nurses to leave their own patients and assist with Austin's situation. Moreover, Officer Moore testified there was a sign on the hospital floor that explained “the hospital has a zero[-]tolerance policy” for “disruptive” and “abusive behaviors towards staff, visitors, other patients.” Id. at 45. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Austin's screaming was reckless.

[20] As for the battery, in addition to shouting at the group trying to assist him, Austin physically resisted all directions and assistance throughout the incident. He went limp in the officers’ arms when they tried to guide him into his new room; he fell to the floor to thwart his arrest; and he attempted to bite one of the officers as he tried to clean the blood off Austin's face. Then, when Officer Moore finally handcuffed him, Austin grabbed his thumbs and twisted them. The jury could infer from the surrounding circumstances that Austin knowingly grabbed and twisted Officer Moore's thumbs.

[21] We conclude there was sufficient evidence to show that Austin possessed the requisite mental states.

Conclusion

[22] Finding there was sufficient evidence to support Austin's convictions, we affirm.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Siri” is the virtual assistant available on Apple devices.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (e)(2) (2024).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2) (2014).

4.   Despite efforts to have Austin evaluated by another psychologist, he either refused to come out of his cell for the evaluation or failed to respond to scheduling inquiries.

6.   “Automatism has been defined as ‘the existence in any person of behaviour of which he is unaware and over which he has no conscious control.’ ” McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 106 (quoting Donald Blair, The Medicolegal Aspects of Automatism, 17 Med. Sci. Law 167 (1977)). “Automatism manifests itself in a range of conduct, including somnambulism (sleepwalking), hypnotic states, fugues, metabolic disorders, and epilepsy and other convulsions or reflexes.” Id.

DeBoer, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.