IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.E. (Minor Child) and S.E. (Father) (2026)

Case Summary

[1] S.E. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights to B.E. (Child), arguing the Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and C.B. (Mother) [collectively, Parents] are the parents of Child (born August 2021). On August 10, 2024, Mother, Father, and Child were riding in their car when Mother and Father began to argue. Mother threw her phone at Father, and when he flung it back at her, it hit Child's face instead and caused “a small gash and bruising by his right eye.” Exhibits at 8. For this incident, Father was charged with Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent and Level 5 felony domestic battery under cause 48C03-2408-F5-2511 (F5-2511).

[3] Then, on August 13, Father pulled Child by his arm from the back seat of a car and through the car window and held him while he shoved Mother to the ground. This altercation resulted in Father's charge for Level 6 felony domestic battery in cause 48C03-2408-F6-2422 (F6-2422).¹ Based on these events and other allegations of neglect and repeated exposure to domestic violence, Child was adjudicated a child in need of services (CHINS) on October 10. At that time, Child was placed in the custody of DCS, and the permanency plan was reunification. As part of his mediated agreement,² Father agreed to do the following:

a. Complete a Substance Use Disorder Assessment and follow all recommendations from that assessment[;]

b. Random Drug Screens[;]

c. Successfully complete a program of Homebased Case Work and comply with all reasonable recommendations[;]

d. Successfully complete domestic violence services and comply with all reasonable recommendations[;]

e. Complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations of that assessment[; and]

f. Consistently engage in parenting time with [Child] as permitted by this Court and as allowed by any active no contact orders.

Id. at 13. Five days later, the criminal court issued a no contact order (NCO) in F5-2511 protecting Child.

[4] After a review hearing in January 2025, the trial court found that Parents failed to comply with the case plan, take any steps towards reunification, cooperate with DCS, or participate in court-ordered services. For Father specifically, the court found he completed “some intakes for services but [was] not engag[ed] or in compliance.” Id. at 26. The court scheduled the matter for a permanency hearing in August.

[5] Meanwhile, on May 8, the trial court modified the NCO protecting Child to allow Father to have contact with Child consistent with the CHINS case. Then, on June 11, Father pled guilty to the F5-2511 and F6-2422 charges and began serving his F5-2511 sentence through Madison County Community Corrections (MCCC). When he failed to report to the center by June 27, MCCC filed a notice of termination and the criminal court issued a warrant for his arrest. Father was apprehended on August 6 and has since remained in custody.

[6] At the August 19 permanency hearing, the trial court found, in relevant part, “[Parents] have not complied with the Child's case plan. [N]either parent has fully complied with any recommended service. Father has recently been arrested and has had multiple relapses with illicit substances. Mother has similarly continued to use [illegal substances] and is now in rehab ․”³ Id. at 30. Accordingly, the court approved a new permanency plan of reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. In the meantime, on September 3, the criminal court ordered Father to serve the balance of his F5-2511 and F6-2422 sentences in the Department of Correction (DOC) with a projected release date of May 1, 2028.

[7] On September 12, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights. The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on December 8 and heard testimony from the family case manager (FCM), Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), Child's foster placement (Foster Parent), and Father. Mother did not appear.

[8] The FCM elaborated on Father's noncompliance with his mediated agreement. Specifically, Father only completed the substance use disorder assessment (SUDA), the domestic violence services evaluation, and a few random drug screens. First, the SUDA produced recommendations for Father to engage in entitlement services, group psychotherapy, and skills coaching, which Father participated in but did not complete. Second, the domestic violence evaluation's recommendation was for Father to complete a twenty-six-week program, but Father only attended for a handful of sessions before he was discharged due to lack of attendance. Third, between October 28, 2024 and November 30, 2025, Father missed 185 random drug screen calls and 78 random drug screen tests. And two of the six drug screens Father completed tested positive for buprenorphine ⁴ or cocaine.

[9] Father also did not complete a homebased case work program or parenting assessment, and he did not consistently engage in parenting time with Child. The FCM acknowledged there was an NCO in place protecting Child but explained that even “[w]hen it was modified, [Father] only saw [Child] twice before no-showing to a couple of visits and then becoming incarcerated.” Transcript at 28. The FCM also noted that since the opening of the CHINS case, Father failed to maintain contact with DCS or show that he had stable housing and employment to meet Child's basic needs for food, shelter, and clothing. The FCM and the CASA recommended the trial court terminate Parents’ parental rights and allow Foster Parent to pursue adoption.

[10] Foster Parent testified that Child had lived with him, his wife, and their other children since August 2024. There, Child had a schedule, attended school, and maintained a relationship with his biological sisters, who were adopted by a friend of Foster Parent. Foster Parent stated he and his wife intended to adopt Child.

[11] Finally, with some variation, Father's testimony was consistent with the facts above. Specifically, he said he did not follow through with the SUDA recommendations, the domestic violence program, or parenting time because he was in a deep state of depression from not being able to see Child, which caused him to relapse on methamphetamine. Father indicated the buprenorphine-positive drug screens occurred at times when he had a valid prescription. He also said he was enrolled in DOC's recovery while incarcerated (RWI) program and on a waitlist for mental health treatment, but parenting classes were unavailable at the facility. Finally, he advised that he had established post-release employment and housing. The trial court took the matter under advisement.

[12] On March 24, 2026, the trial court entered an order with detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law terminating Parents’ parental rights. Father now appeals.⁵

Discussion and Decision

[13] When DCS files a petition to terminate parental rights, it must prove the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2 (1998). On appeal, we defer to the trial court's judgment and neither assess witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence. In re E.P., 267 N.E.3d 531, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment.” Id.

[14] We review the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under a two-tiered standard of review. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans denied. “First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” E.P., 267 N.E.3d at 535. We accept unchallenged findings as true and will affirm the court's judgment unless it was clearly erroneous. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Id. (quoting In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).

[15] Here, Father claims DCS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.5(b)(2) by failing to provide him with services.⁶ Under the statute, “DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families during CHINS proceedings.” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). But this Court has long held the obligation “is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute.” In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Notably, “a failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.” In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re J.W., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[16] Nevertheless, Father makes several arguments in support of his contention. First, Father claims he “was incarcerated for a significant amount of time[ ] while the CHINS case was pending” and DCS failed to provide him with services during his incarceration. Appellant's Brief at 8 (emphasis added). We recognize Father was arrested in August 2025 and remained in custody for the balance of the CHINS case and the entire duration of the termination proceedings, which concluded in March 2026. However, a close review of the record reveals he was incarcerated for only two days between Child's CHINS adjudication in October 2024 and his arrest in August 2025. Stated another way, Father had nearly ten months of non-incarcerated time to complete each of the services in his mediated agreement. During that time, Father failed to fully complete any of the services that were offered to him. And “[t]he time for parents to rehabilitate themselves ‘is during the CHINS process, prior to the filing of the petition for termination.” In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Prince v. Dep't of Child Servs, 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Father had ample time pre-incarceration to participate in the services that were offered to him, and he chose not to do so.

[17] Second, Father argues DCS did not provide him with adequate time to complete a parenting assessment between the NCO modification and the petition for termination. Yet the evidence shows that after the NCO was modified on May 8, 2025, Father visited with Child twice. Then, he failed to appear for several scheduled visitations and stopped participating altogether before the termination petition was filed on September 12. While we acknowledge Father was in custody beginning on August 6, he had adequate time to complete the assessment before his arrest.

[18] Third, Father contends DCS failed to notify him of the SUDA recommendation for group psychotherapy. On the contrary, the record shows Father was aware of the recommendation and that he worked with a therapy provider to establish services, but he did not follow through with completion.

[19] In sum, Father's arguments are merely requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The record supports the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights, and we find no error in its judgment.⁷

Conclusion

[20] Finding the trial court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights, we affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father was incarcerated for a total of four days while both cases were pending: August 13-14 and October 14-15, 2024.

2.   Mother also entered into a mediated agreement.

3.   Mother had a suspended sentence in cause 48C05-2301-F6-107 since February 2, 2024. But on July 24, 2025, following multiple probation violations, she was ordered to serve the balance of her sentence in the Department of Correction. However, the criminal court stayed its sentence pending completion of inpatient treatment and six months of sober living.

4.   Buprenorphine is a prescription opioid. Father also tested positive for buprenorphine in two other tests but had a prescription for it at those times.

5.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

6.   To the extent Father's argument raises a potential due process violation, the State contends, and we agree, that Father waived the issue because he did not raise it with the trial court, nor did he develop it in his opening brief on appeal. It is well established that a party may waive a due process claim “by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016). Waiver notwithstanding, in light of our conclusion that DCS provided reasonable efforts, we find no due process violation.

7.   Father also argues that “although [he] provided the FCM with his home address, the FCM never visited the home.” Appellant's Br. at 10. He says nothing more and does not cite any legal authority indicating this fact constitutes error, let alone reversible error. Therefore, we find he has waived this argument for appellate review. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); see also A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156 n.4 (failure to present a cogent argument waives the issue on appeal).

DeBoer, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.